What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?

First off, "bunk" is the use of data or an opinion that isn't necessarialy a "lie", but might be of little real value. Here is the article from a few years ago which brought this to mind.

New light has been shed on the treachery of a Dutch double agent, codenamed King Kong, in the disastrous Allied operation at Arnhem towards the end of the Second World War.

But the MI5 documents released by the Public Record Office yesterday fail to provide a conclusive answer to the extent of damage caused by Christian Lindemans' passing of information to the Germans.

Historians and espionage specialists have differed over Lindemans' role in the major reverse suffered by the Allies in Operation Market Garden in 1944, later depicted in the award-winning film A Bridge Too Far. Almost 10,000 British and Allied paratroops were dropped on the outskirts of Arnhem with orders to take the bridge and hold it until reinforcements arrived. There followed some of the fiercest close-quarter combat of the war as the lightly equipped paratroops came under attack from tanks and battle-hardened German regiments. Fewer than 2,000 Allied soldiers escaped from the city.

The intelligence reports show that Lindemans, a resistance fighter turned collaborator, gave the Germans specific warnings of an airborne attack on 17 September, the night of the Arnhem landings. But the target he identified was Eindhoven, 30 miles away.

This leads to the strong possibility that Lindemans had overblown his importance to the Germans. Although he could get hold of some intelligence, he did not have ready access to the latest battle plans through Allied Headquarters in Brussels as he had claimed. (bold mine)

Goto:

MI5 files reveal how 'King Kong' betrayed Allies - This Britain, UK - The Independent

This version is substantially confirmed in the new book out last year in celebration of MI-5’s 100 year anniversary. The name of the book is Defending the Realm: The Authorized History of MI-5, by Christopher Andrew. I haven't quite finished reading this one yet, it is really long, but I have covered the interwar and WW2 years a couple of times since it is very detailed and revealing.

Sorry I didn't reply to this post sooner, I didn't see it.

 

Thanks for help with the clarifications Clint. Looks like I am going to have to get more movies now.

 

First and foremost, the plan did not present the Germans with a delimma. The paratroops dropped right at the beginning to open the entire corridor. XXX Corps etc., then made a frontal assault on the German lines. The plan was quickly obivous and easily countered.
When you add a misreading of intelligence on the strenght and composition of the German defenders, the various misques that the Allies made such as poor drop zone choices, communications failures, etc., the plan was doomed almost from the start.

Now, one could have created the delimma necessary by having XXX corps attack and break the German front and start advancing. This would have drawn the German reserves out of Arnheim and elsewhere to the front to plug the breakthrough. Once that happens then you drop the paratroops in the German rear.
Now, their forces are committed to stoppng XXX Corps but they are cut off to their rear. If they try to withdraw and recommit against the paras they have XXX Corps grinding them from the rear. If they continue to fight XXX Corps they are becoming trapped in a pocket.
Either way they now have to avoid disaster more than they need to fight the British.

 

And just hope the Germans just don't blow the bridge anyway.

 

We say that however, with a benefit of hindsight. From their point of view...quickly capture the bridges with paratrooper and assault groups, with the hell of CAS, driving tanks across a supposedly weakly supported area seemed almost like a Blitzkrieg tactic.

I just view it as a bit of bad luck here and there, and underestimating the enemy is what got them.

 

The seeds of failure were sown long before the Operation Market Garden was launched. Discord and disagreement had festered between the allied commanders Montgomery, Bradley and Patton since the campaign in North Africa.

Neither the Americans nor the Germans considered Monty to be a commander of any great ability, he was probably the most overrated allied commander during WWII. The Americans found him arrogant to the point of bumptiousness, bad mannered and ungraceful, what one American called ‘his sharp beagle nose, the small grey eyes that dart about quickly like rabbits in a Thurber cartoon.’
General Omar Bradley stated waspisly at one occasion:
‘Montgomery was a third-rate general and he never did anything or won any battle that any other general could not have won as well or better.’

Returning from North Africa with an inflated ego after the comparatively easy defeat of the German Africa Corps, he considered himself to be the greatest commander ever. Later information has revealed that he inflated the number of German casualties to improve his image.
At El Alamein he claimed that there were more German casualties than there were German troops all together on the actual front!

After the invasion in Normandy Montgomery had promised to take Caen the first day, but had not done so even by the end of June.
Finding himself overshadowed and sidelined by the flamboyant, gun-toting Ol’ Blood n’ Guts George Patton was more than he could stand, so he went to Eisenhower and demanded his ‘own’ operation.
Tact was never a prominent feature of Monty’s character and he made no attempt to conceal his disregard of Eisenhower’s broad front policy, constantly criticizing it and demanding additional resources of troops and supplies for his own purposes.

Although ‘Market Garden’ was launched on September 17, it was already by then too late. The opportunity to drive north through a disorganized and retreating enemy had been lost.

Like the British General Sir Brian Horrocks put it:
‘We had made the cardinal mistake of underestimating our enemy – a very dangerous thing to do when fighting the Germans, who are among the best soldiers in the world. Their recovery after the disaster in Normandy was little short of miraculous.’

 

Either youre being funny, or youre inventing facts out of thin air.

 

I think it's possibly fair to ask - which later information....?

 

I don't know about 'thin air', links have been proved from other sources, so he does have a leg to stand on, even if it is a wonky one.

 

Fair enough, Martin.
It is said that history is written by the conquerer.
This was certainly the case on both sides during WWII, after the war it was the Allied version that represented the truth an nothing but the truth. German fighter aces that claimed 200-300 kills were ridiculed and their claims dismissed as nonsens by their Allied counterparts. When it turned out that there was some truth in it, it was diminished with comments like 'Oh Yeah, but most of the kills found place on the Eastern front!'

The first book on the North African Campaign written by a German, in German, was the 'Das Deutsche Afrika-Korps: Siege und Niederlage' by Hanns-Gert von Esebeck, Limes Verlag 1949.
As said in the foreword:
'Die erste Darstellung von deutscher Seite, die Kampf des Deutschen Afrika Korps unter Rommel in grossen Zusammenhängen schildert.'

On page 188 he states:
'Vom Begin der Alameinschlacht bis zum 30. November verlor die Armee 13258 Deutsche und 17904 Italiener. Englische Militärschriftsteller gibt demgegenüber
Allein für die Alameinschlacht die Zahl der Verluste mit 59000 Mann an, unter denen 34000 Deutsche zählt. Da nur 24000 Deutsche an der Front standen, ergibt sich die Unrichtigkeit dieser angabe von selber. Die Englische verluste in Alamein beziffert er auf 13500, trotz der materiellen Überlegenheit waren sie also höher als die deutschen Verluste.'

So the British claimed 20 742 more German casualties than there actually were at El Alamein, and 10 000 more casualties than there were German troops at El Alamein all together!

 

This as a gross over-exaggeration. The fact that he stopped Axis advance in North Africa where the allies have previously failed proves a success it its own words, never mind going into the statistics...British were beginning to accept defeat in North Africa and local Egyptians were starting to panic and pack their stuff. I'm pretty sure Rommel would have said otherwise to Monty's fighting ability.

I'd like to see more references in your claims, rather than an American perspective...since that's all i see, one point of view.

 

Here's a pick:
1: 'Das Deutsches Afrika-korps: Siege und Niederlage.' by Hanns-gert von Esebeck.German.
2: 'Mit Rommel in der Wüste: Kampf und Untergang des Deutschen Afrika-Korps' by Volkmar Kühn.German.
3: ' Masters of Battle. Monty, Patton and Rommal at War.' by Terry Brighton. British.
4: 'Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors.' by Peter Harclerode. British.
5: 'Arnhem. Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945.' by Lloyd Clark. British
6: 'Patton - A Genius for War.' by Carlo D'Este. USA.
7: 'The Bitter Sea. The Struggle for Mastery in The Mediterranean 1939-1945.' by Simon Ball. British.
8: 'Eisenhower - Soldier, General, President Elect 1890-1952.' by Stephen E. Ambrose. USA.
9: 'World War II Companion' by Margaret E. Wagner, Linda B. Osborne and Susan Reyburn. The Library of Congress, USA.

 

check out the links >_>, I'm not being funny it's the frecking truth.

 

I didn't see how anything in ...???... The links are gone now. Oh well
The links as already mention do point out that you didn't pull it out of thin air. Now whether or not it's the truth is another matter entirely. If this is the quote that is being discussed:

It's pretty clearly fallacious as neither planned on getting to Berlin at all.

 

Than its the magazines fault.

 

Gone now or not, it wasn't the "frecking truth". Those were old links to a story that has been completely debunked (there is that "bunk" word again). The agent who was known as "King Kong" was a braggart and liar, he greatly exaggerated his importance and got the target wrong.

See MY post in reply to yours from a few days ago, the 27th.

 

The article says ' The americans feared that if Montgommery would succeed in taking Arnhem and Nijmegen and that he would capture berlin, who took control of berlin, had the might of 'europe'

I translated it from dutch to english.

 

The article is incorrect. The zones of occupation had been decided before M-G, taking more or less territory would do the western allies NO GOOD!

The establishment of zones of occupation had been decided at a series of conferences. At the conference in Casablanca, held in January 1943, British prime minister Winston Churchill's proposal to invade the Balkans and East-Central Europe via Greece was rejected. This decision opened the road for Soviet occupation of eastern Germany. At the Tehran Conference in late 1943, the western border of postwar Poland and the division of Germany were among the topics discussed. As a result of the conference, a commission began to work out detailed plans for the occupation and administration of Germany after the war. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, participants decided that in addition to United States, British, and Soviet occupation zones in Germany, the French were also to have an occupation zone, carved out of the United States and British zones. (bold mine)

See:

Germany - Postwar Occupation and Division

Who was going to occupy what was decided BEFORE the Normandy invasion, not while or after it was going on. The details were hammered out between late '43 and early '45, i.e. during the year of 1944.

At the Yalta Conference in Feb. of 1945 the only thing that changed is that the western allies persuaded Stalin to allow France to have an occupation zone as well. The only thing that Stalin demanded was that any territory the French got control over came out of the British and/or American zones.

 

Thanks.

 

The essence of manouvre thinking.