when (if any) is the turning point on Eastern front ?

Jaeger, I'm away from my books, but IIRC an Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG) is a self-contained task force of any size (up to corps) from the second echelon that does not take part in the penetration and is inserted after breakthrough at the appropriate moment to race past the frontline, avoid contact with the enemy and head to a select objective of strategic importance behind the lines, such as a depot, bridgehead, etc, to seize and hold it until relieved.

This is different from the normal exploitation force, intended to operate in the tactical or logistical rear of the enemy.

 

I agree with the others… the turning point was June 22nd 1941…

 

Za Rodinu

Thanks for putting it straight. I did not want to place the OMG in the same booth as a Explotation force. But the similarities are there in the operation in the enemys rear.
The difference is in the fixed objective of the OMG.

 

Thanks for all your answers

so far we've got

4 votes for 1 (USSR won from the start)

1 vote for 2 (well, more or less) : Moscow was not taken over

1 vote for 3 (Stalingrad)

 

Jaeger, if I can throw David Isby's Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army at you...

"The operational manoeuvre group is one answer to the problems posed by the need for a quick victory in Europe under either conventional or nuclear conditions. Used in the Second World War, when they were termed "mobile groups," OMGs are independent formations which may be as small as an independent brigade or as large as several divisions. Division-sized OMGs are likely to be part of each front or even army. Their re-emergence in the early 1980s apparently stemmed from exercise experience rather than a continued application of wartime lessons. Indeed, in the early 1980s OMGs had become so operationally significant that there was criticism within the Warsaw Pact that they were being included in exercises whether they were needed or not.

OMGs are intended to achieve objectives in the operational depths of the enemy's defences. They are by no means solely exploitation forces, and frequently serve as an advance guard in mobile combat. They can be used with the army or front deployed in either one or two echelons. A deployment of one echelon and an OMG has been suggested as probable in a future conflict in Europe. The OMG may be committed once the first echelon has gained its objectives — the first echelon making the penetration and the OMG exploiting - or before a penetration is achieved.

Once committed, the OMG penetrates the defences, seizing key political and military objectives and defeating reserves. Much as tactical units use their forward detachments and reydy as "keys" to unlock the defence, operational formations will use their OMGs. The army-level OMG appears to be based usually on a tank division. It may be reinforced by units which include an air assault brigade, a helicopter regiment, an army artillery group, reconnaissance and intelligence units, air defence units, engineer units, command and control elements, one or more motorised rifle regiments, and a number of fixed-wing aircraft.

Generally, an OMG will initially deploy about 40—60km behind the FEBA. It can be used to reinforce the first echelon, become or join the second echelon, be placed in reserve, or be employed as an OMG. It can be as much as 20-30% the size of the parent organisation, further increasing its flexibility of employment."

 

The plan was Stalingrad reagion only, and this was the first time a large encircling move was successful. If the Red Army got too ambitious for its capabilities, as it did subsequently, the resut would be a disaster. This plan was good enough, and was made according to an accurate view of possibilities. More than this certainly would be an overreach.

They had to burst through two flanks over very unfavourable ground, encircle a functioning army and build a contravallatio (outer wall) strong enough to deter the obviously coming relief attack. Success on three counts Not bad!

 

Field Marshal-General Erich Von Mainstein, he wrote about his defeat at Stalingrad after the war: “In winter 1942 I realized that we would not win in the war against the Soviet Union. We failed to maintain the far-stretching front in Russia. I understood the Soviet troops would finally crush us, moving step by step”.

No argument from me I agree.

 

I agree with the working skunk The Germans had shot their bolt and in 1942 they no longer had the ability to wage offensive operations along the entire front. They were able to do only one thrust, and were smart enough to go for a peripheral and divergent target.

 

I´d like to get more info on the German operations plans in the Leningrad sector actually for summer-autumn 1942. I think we´ve discussed of the troops transfer from Crimea area to Leningrad sector but the Red Army started the attack first forcing the Germans to defend and thus never got the offensive going. Don´t know if the Germans ever had the amount of troops that could be called a major offensive in the AGN area 1942?

 

Look at the size of Russia to Germany no contest, greater population greater the output in weapons game over. AH was to short sighted to see this, Barbarossa was a very poor move.

 

No big deal, Hitler himself tol us what his plans were. You only have to look for his Directives.

Directive 39, Dec 8th 1941:

3. ...
(c) Army Group North will shorten its eastern and southeastern front north of Lake Ilmen, while still denying the enemy the road and railway from Tikhvin to Volkhovstroi and Kolehanavo. This will make it possible, after the arrival of reinforcements, to clean up the area south of Lake Ladoga Only thus can Leningrad be finally enclosed and a link with the Finnish Karelian Army be established.

(d) Should it turn out that the enemy has withdrawn his main forces from the coastal area south of the Bay of Kronstadt, and no longer intends to defend this area seriously, that coast will be occupied in order to economize our forces.

Not exactly what I call very aggressive...

Directive 41, April 15 1942

I. ... The final encirclement of Leningrad and the occupation of Ingermanland may be undertaken as soon as conditions in that area permit, or sufficient forces can be made available from other theaters.

May be.. When... Nothing else. The rest of the directive is concerned with the South. Not even a mention of AG Centre! As you see no great plans other than sit tight and wait.

 

Hey Za I am interested in reading AH's Directives found one book on the subject - (Hitler's War Directives 1939-1945 By Hugh Trevor-Roper) do you know if this is any good?

 

Trevor Roper is a good author, won't let you down. I haven't read that particular book.

 

Yes he is good I think, I shall give it ago.

 

very good book i particularly liked it

 

On the possible Leningrad operation:

The attack on Kursk was to have been followed by a German offensive in the north, code-named Operation Parkplatz, which was intended to take Leningrad by storm.Given the extraordinary losses suffered by the 6th Army at Stalingrad,it is astonishing that Hitler still had any appetite for warfare in built-up areas. Nine divisions were earmarked to join AGN for the assault, although Field Marshal von Kuchler signalled that he had enough siege artillery in place and would not require more.The failure at Kursk led to the cancellation of the operation.

From Ostfront
By Charles Winchester, 2000 Osprey Publishing Ltd

 

August 23

August 23, 1942: After a year-long siege of the city, Hitler orders the final attack on Leningrad (Operation Nordlicht).

http://www.feldgrau.com/august.html

 

Methinks it didn't work too well. The city didn't change hands...

 

I have a question did Field Marshal Leeb ask AH could he take Leningrad back in 41?

 

I guess this was the time when Hitler changed his mind every two weeks of what he wanted: Leningrad-Kiev-Moscow-Ukraine-Moscow... So I´d think Leeb would have wanted to take Leningrad but he did not have the armor to do it because Hitler had sent the tanks to AGC.