Who saved Moscow in December, 1941?

They wouldn't have been able to seize Moscow but they would have been able to protect themselves better against the Soviet counter-attack. If the Germans were prepared for winter, I take that to assume that German locomotives were winterized for the Russian winter as would be vehicles, aircraft and weapons to go along with winter clothing for the troops. Having said that (which is a tremendous amount), its likely the Germans could have stopped the Soviet counter-offensive without giving up ground and caused more Red Army casualties. The whole winterization plan hinges on German locomotives. The Wehrmacht supply crisis of the winter of 41/42 was centered on German locomotives unable to operate in the extreme cold temps of the Russian winter until they were modified for it. If we assume this was done prior to winter, then the supply arteries flow to the front with everything else that was desperately needed.

 

What do they have to give up to prepare for the winter? I've read for instance that they had the winter clothes they just hadn't moved them to the front. Certainly they could have but what did they move to the front historically that they would have to leave behind to move the winter gear instead? They were operating in a very constrained logistical environment.

 

yes I have heard the story of winter clothing put on the back burner so that ammunition, fuel and food could be transported first, but going back to Hitler, is there any truth that the Fuhrer went on a trip to eastern Poland around this time and made some comment about the weather being not that bad and he had lived through worse in the trenches of ww1. I would have loved to have made him spend a night on the front line with his men with only a grey coat and leather boots for comfort when the Russian winter was at its hight.

 

This has to do with the mud which we discussed in the other thread ongoing parallel with this one. The Wehrmacht's ability to get supplies forward through the mud in late Oct-Early Nov was severly hampered by the mud, so only the necessities you mentioned above went in any quantity. The winter gear for the troops would have gone forward after they declared an end to offensive operations, but unfortunately for them the Soviets attacked the next day. The Soviet attack kept the status quo of necessities only flowing forward to the front and also forced the troops to stay out in the elements. Perfect timing by the Red Army actually.

 

I dont know how much the Germans relied on Horses to bring up supplies, I know most of the artillery in the infantry divisions was horse drawn but if they had to bring every thing up by animal power in thick mud it must have been hell on earth for both man and beast.

 

Most of the artillery was horsedrawn (excepted the Flak units),but,it was also the same in may 1940.
About the horses :the Germans attacked with 557368 horses,of which at 31 decemver 1941,143503 were dead and 163345 were sick or wounded=total horse losses of 55 %.

 

My impression is that the rail network traffic was pretty well saturated in any case and it wasn't affected by the mud. Indeed the mud may have actually helped it as by slowing down the German advance it would have slowed down the demand for things like fuel and ammo.

 

The rail moved all the tonnage it was capable of moving regardless of the mud, this is true. The mud affected logistics adversely from the railhead depots down the supply arteries and hugely affected things at critical choke points which were the approach areas to the temporary bridges over the rivers. A muddy road is one thing, a muddy field that was never developed in any way to handle traffic is a whole different animal. These were the weakest link in the Wehrmacht supply chain. The rail gets supplies to the Army depot, the Army's own tranportation assets (trucks) have to then move the supplies forward to the corps/division rear depots for the units to come and get them with their own assets (trucks, wagons, pack animals, carts, man power, etc.). The rail is obviously the most efficient and the units have a short leg to run (20-30 kms max.). So AGC's grosstransportatraum (trucks similiar to the Allied effort in France 1944) is stuck with the most difficult task of bridging the gap through the mud from the rail to just behind the front and this was hamstrung by the river choke points I mentioned above.

 

However there were a rather limited number railroad connecting the front (10?) and at least for most of the period everything had to be moved form the German width lines to the Soviet width lines. Indeed in August the problem was enough trains weren't reaching the front. This was fixed in September from what I remember but once the offence began again it's not clear how much if any excess capacity existed. Especially sense a lot of replacements were sent forward in September from what I recall.

 

I agree with what your saying about the rail and rail conversion, etc. until the time Taifun started. To clarify my point; the key difference between Taifun and the previous offensive operations as it regards logistics is that the grosstranportatraum could not bridge the gap between the railhead depots and the rear area of the front anymore because of the mud and the river choke points specifically. This exacerbated the supply situation creating an insurmountable deficit during the Rasputitsia which could not be overcome when the ground froze. Whatever problems there were with the rail portion of logistics, it was the motorized portion where the choke point was located. The Soviets in possession of Moscow's rail net in very close proximity to the front did not have this issue in any where near the extent the Germans did.

 

As I already mentioned on the other thread,the eastern front needed ,for normal supplies,monthly 2220 trains,were arriving:
in september:2093
in october:1860
in november:1701
in december:1643
in january:1420

 

My POV is more nuancing:Hitler was meaningne decisive blow and the whole roten lot will fall dow,better :the whole rotten lot MUST fall down,because Germany only had one opportunity for a decisive blow,later,no decisive blow could be dealed,because Germany would be to weaken,and the SU would be to strong.

 

Do you think Hitlers orders for Gudarian to join forced with Kleist to capture Kiev helped the Russians to regroup even though it was sucessfull to capturing thousands of prisoners, Gudarians armour was a major force in the drive to Moscow and was badly needed.

 

logistically,an attack on Moscow before 30 september was impossible .

 

If you have some free time,look at the following source
AHF :WWII in Eastern Europe:Operation Barbarossa:The Case against Moscow

 

Interestingly enough, the Guderian attack in early October 1941 was a major surprise to the Soviets, and actually led to a similar number of losses ( Vyazma pocket ) to the Red Army as the Kiev pocket. So in a way if Hitler´s idea of crushing the man power of the Red Army was the key to success, this should have been more than enough to bring the Colossus on its knees. We know it did not od that....

 

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I think this is best described in Clauswitz' terms:
"Unless it is strategically decisive, every offensive operation will sooner or later reach a point where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued offensive operations therefore risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat. In operational theory, this point is called the culminating point.​

 

Just a an FYI and point of reference to the weather during Barbarossa, you can go to Youtube and find all of the sequential "Die Wochenschau" war news films that were taken during the operation for propaganda purposes. The weather is clearly evident in the films as the campaign wears on and so are the subsequent road conditions. These fils provide a great back ground with written account and with period maps to give the historian a pretty accurate idea when and where the mud/weather really did play a role in the campaign.

YouTube - WW2GermanNewsreels's Channel

Look for Die Frontschau or specifically Minsk, Smolensk, Vyazma, Briansk, Moskau, etc.

 

I have always wondered how Hitler thought he could conquer the SU with its vast expanse of territory and almost unlimited population to draw from to build armies. I mean, even if Moscow surrendered, the Germans would have controlled a small part of the country. There always would have been partisans operating in the German's rear, not to mention the armies that would have been created in the rest of the country to fight the Germans. How could they have controlled such a vast amount of territory? I know, it would have been a public relations coup to have taken the capital city, but what then?

And with most of their factories lost to the Germans, it would have taken years to rebuild the industrial base, but the Russians would never have just given up. Hitler would have had a tiger by the tail.