Why didn't the US standardize the T23E3?

The V-1 wasn't really "new" tech., it used the WW1 French idea of a ram-jet coupled with another WW1 tech., the American Kettering "bug" guidance system, and the German "pulse-jet" modification to the engine inlet. Not really cutting edge, and relativly easily (it turned out) defeated.

Then let’s see here, there were more than 6,000 V2 rockets made, out of aluminium skins and high quality steel alloys. Those resources could have been applied elsewhere of course, whether von Bruan would have been an asset anywhere else is questionable of course.

Of all the V-2s which were launched as military rockets by the Germans against Allied targets in WW2, they only resulted in the deaths of 7,250 allied persons, both military personnel and civilians. At the same time as many as 20,000+ persons at Mittelbau-Dora died constructing V-2s. And this doesn't count any who perished at Pennemunde during construction or bombing raids.

This sets the record for the weapon that caused more deaths building it than from using it; most of those who died in the construction process were German prisoners/slave laborers.

2,890 V-2s were launched successfully, and they were distributed over the various targets as follows:

Aftermath of a V-2 rocket attack on the main intersection in Antwerp, Belgium, November 27, 1944, was 1610, making a total of 1664 killed in Belgium; Antwerp (1610), Liege (27), Hasselt (13), Tournai (9), Mons (3), Diest (2)

In Great Britain it was 1402 killed total; London (1358), Norwich (43), Ipswich (1)

In France, 76 total killed; Lille (25), Paris (22), Tourcoing (19), Arras (6), Cambrai (4)

In other areas, Maastricht (19), Remagen (11).

Ironically the entire V-2 project from start to finish cost the Third Reich the equvilant of about 2 billion 1940’s US dollars. Compare that to the entire Manhattan Project (excluding the $74 million spend to convert the special B-29s into the Silver Plate versions); $1,889,604,000.

At the end of 1945, there were four complete atomic devices finished (two used in the war), and one more set of implosion cases and its plutonium core which were NOT coupled together.

See:

Manhattan Project Costs

Without considering the "moral or ethical" values of any weapon of war, which seems to have been the more cost effective expenditure toward ending the war, the V-2 or the Atomic bombs?

V-2 production:
Number manufactured: 6,240
Number launched: 3,590
Successes: 2,890 (81%)
Failures: 700 (19%)
In inventory: 2,100
Work in progress: 250

Expended in development: 300

Development program cost: US$ 2 billion
Development cost per launcher: US$ 350,512
Total manufacturing cost per launcher: US$ 43,750
Marginal cost, launchers 5000+: US$ 13,000 (Yes, 13K!)

These are actual figures for the first mass-produced rocket vehicle, the V2 (A4) years ago. Prices are in gold backed US wartime dollars.

Stating the obvious.... The V2 was a suborbital vehicle, intended to lob high explosive over relatively short distances. Quantity production of the V2 at Mittelwerk was accomplished with unpaid slave labour under the brutal rule of the SS. And the failure rate was unacceptable by current standards.

From:

A Rocket a Day Keeps the High Costs Away

Werner von Braun was a fan and follower of America's Robert Goddard, and lead the charge to get the organiztions he went to work for in the States to honor the 214 Goddard patents they were using, and which he acknowledged he used in WW2. He and the widow Goddard won the suit finally in 1960, and the largest (to that time) patent enfringment suit payment went to the Goddard estate ($1,000,000).

Von Bruan knew full well he was using Goddard's work/patents, the gyroscopes, the liquid-cooled, gimbled nozzles, the turbo-pumps just to mention a few.

 

Hello brndirt1,

nice post!

However I wouldn't know were the data would come from, that adds up to 2 Billion $.
6000 aluminim skins, concrete and labor costs? - nevermind.

Anyway I doubt that these materials could have been significant in a way to win the war - maybe some better jetengines or aircrafts, on the other hand the prop engines would still be missing or the ammo, or the fuel or the pilots or whatever - Germany simply did not have the industrial capacity, and mineral recources to mass produce simmilar to the Americans who additionaly were never bombed, not to mention the additional production from all the others.

A prolonging of the war would have meerly resulted into Germany becomming the guinea pig for the A-bomb.

So thank you Adi, for producing wonderweapons and big fat Tigers

Regards
Kruska

 

The reason we couldn't build wider tanks was due to our railroad tunnel widths!

 

I've read that the Engineers pointed out that they wouldn't fit on their mobile bridgeing equipment and that was one of the major design constraints in the late 30's and early 40's.

 

The M-26 would fit into an LST and was transported in same both in WWII and in Korea. There were at least three categories of LST's in WWII. The Type I, were produced by the British from converted shallow draft tankers. There were only a few made. The bulk of LST's were the U.S. designed and manufactured Type II, it came in basically three classes built during the war, LST-1, LST-491 and LST-542. All are basically the same ship with minor improvements, the biggest being the elimination of the main deck/well deck elevator and replacing it with a ramp in the 491 class.
All had a 14 foot wide door and ramp width, the M-26 was 11ft 6in wide so it would easily fit.

I don't buy this either, it was easy enough to back a tank onto the LST from the beach to load it, this was a quite common practice. Also, the 542 class had it's deck strengthened because of the practice of carrying LCT's on deck. An LCT weighs in at 286 tons for a MK5 to 320 tons for a MK6. They got on deck by crane, so a 46 ton tank should find a crane of sufficient capacity to lift it. An LCM 6 weighed weighed in at 64 tons and the ships cranes could lift them so I don't think weight or width was an issue.

I'm with others, it's potential increased capabilities weren't offset by the increased drawbacks to it's early deployment.

 

The problem is in loading transport ships. The Sherman was near the max weight for most cranes found in ports and on ships. Larger ones were available but they weren't common. Limiting it to them would result in considerable restricitons on when and where you could load and unload transport ships.

 

lwd wrote:

I may be missing the point, if so I apologize but, the LST is an ocean going vessel with speed comprable to most transport/cargo ships. They could sail directly from the U.S. to England or where ever they needed the tanks. The LST can and did transport the Pershing so why would inability to transport be a factor in the tank not being deployed to Europe earlier?

 

I wouldn't be surprised that since the production/distribution of the LSTs was split between the PTO and ETO/MTO, there weren't as many available for that duty as you suggest.

Over a 100 were turned over to the RN as I recall as soon as they were built, and if you have a 1000 + ships, with more than half in the PTO (where they were really needed), and another 100 in the RN service, and then spread out between the ETO and MTO for the rest perhaps it just wasn't a "good idea" to use them as only "tank transports" to the theaters in Europe?

Just wondering is all.

 

Indeed you are missing a very vital point. LST were a very limited resource. Using them to ferry tanks across the Pacfic and Atlantic would hardly have been an optimum choice.

 

First of all, if I remember correctly the discussion centered on the T23E3's use in Europe not "Pacfic and Atlantic". The use of the T23E2 would have been overkill in the Pacific, the Japanese had limited and less advanced armor assets. Europe is a different story, the increased capabilities might have been advantageous in fighting advanced German armor types.

From the original post:

The discussion, thus far, has provided many reasons why it probably wasn't fielded:
brndirt1-problems with electric drive, need to retain maintainence personnel, the additional supply issues and decreased cross country capability due to increased ground pressure. All are arguments that sound reasonable.

Von Poop-

Once again all arguments I can buy into.

This problem I questioned, because I knew the Pershing was routinely deployed in Korea using WWII type naval assets with no issues. So I did more research. The more I look into it the less convinced I am that this was more than a minor issue, easily overcome if they decided to deploy the tank.

I fully agree with formerjughead's post:

The question of transportation from the U.S. to Europe was raised,

This is incorrect, the Pershing would easily fit into all the U.S. made LST type II's (1051 of this type operational before wars end).

brndirt1 (who always posts reliable info) let us know that the Pershing was transported to Europe on standard cargo ships and offloaded in captured ports. I am reasonably sure that cargo handling equipment in England was much more plentiful and in better repair, than in the captured ports of continental Europe. So it stands to reason that if they could do it with the Pershing they should be able to do it with the smaller T23E3.

Why I don't buy the reasoning that maritime transportation assets were the deciding factor.
1.)Navy amphib vessels AKA's and all but the first converted APA's had at least one boom capable of 50+tons lift. The M26 weighed something like 46tons, I can't find the exact weight of the T23E3 but it was a medium not heavy tank like the Pershing so should have weighed somewhat less. Still within the 50 ton boom capacity.
2.)Even if number one were not true the Navy had ample LST's, 1051 were built during the war (and this number doesn't include British built types). That's a huge number, even when fighting a two ocean war. As a comparison the largest number of ships built for any single ship type was the Liberty ship with 2710 built. There were close to 40% of this number of LST typeII launched. The Victory ship had a total of 534 examples built during the war. Twice as many LST type II's were built. If there actually was a shortage, just a few LST's could shuttle tanks from CONUS to England in a relatively short period of time.
3.) Unlike in the Pacific where an amphibious operation had to bring everything needed because of the long distances involved. Normandy was a cross channel amphibious operation, all ships involved didn't have to be deep ocean going vessels. U.S. built LCT's (LANDING CRAFT TANK) were capable of carrying three Pershings each, were available in large numbers, could load and unload directly from the beach and could have made numerous cross channel trips for additional assets. LST's same same, they could quickly return to England, reload and return. No high capacity crane loading facilities available no problem. Back the vehicles on board from the beach.
I just don't really believe that lack transportation capacity was a factor in the decision not to deploy the tank. Everything I've read supports the points that brndirt1, Von Poop and formerjughead made.

 

When you state standardize the implication is that it become the standard ie used in both theaters.

Again having to use LSTs to move your tanks from the US is a waste of those vessels.

The question here is the time frame and the quantities. The captured ports certainly weren't on line in June or July. Indeed for most it was signficantly later. Alsoe there weren't many Pershings sent to Europe.

I don't think anyone said they were the deciding factor. Just a consideration. Indeed from what I've read the Engineers comments in regards to their bridgeing equipment probably had more weight.

The Pershing started off life rated as a "medium" tank was upgraded to a "heavy" tank for propaganda purposes for the most part and was later downgraded again to a "medium" tank. That said T23E3 shouldn't have out weighted it by much if at all.

From previous discussions the most common cranes by far were smaller than this (40 tons?).

When were they built however? And what were they doing. From what I remember reading in 43 and 44 both theaters were makeing repeated requests for more landing craft.

The question is would this have been a reasonable use of those assets. Certainly the above is a long way from answering that question.

Could they do so on the beaches at Normandy? My impression is that the majority of M4's were landed via Mulberry rather than over the beach. I could be worng on this but ..

Note that the points they are made do not rule out the impacts of transportation factors. I too doubt that the they were the most critical factors but they may well have been an ancillary one. Indeed if the decision had been to go with a heavier tank one remedy might well have simply have been to but heavier cranes on a number of cargo ships. It would have required some forward planning but I would think it reasonable (but then I'm not even sure I rate as a novice in regards to building cranes and mounting them on said vessels).

 

The T23E3 was really a pretty heavy tank, since it weighed between 73 and 75,000 lbs depending on models, suspension type (VVHS or Torsion bar) and ammo storage capacity.

Its weight had some impact on the revolutionary electric drive system, and its 15 pounds of ground pressure in lbs per square inch was more than the existing M4 Shermans, or even the Pershing M26 which put down about 13 psi even though it weighed more at 93,000 pounds to start out. It's wider and longer tracks spread the weight better.

See:

United States' T23 Medium Tank - World War II Vehicles, Tanks, and Airplanes


The M26 Pershings also saw duty on Okinawa in May of 1945,

 

Ok on landing tanks on Normandy beaches using "normal" landing craft if "normal" landing craft could handle heavier tanks like the T23 or M-26 then why all the fuss about developing the swimming versions of the M4 prior to Overlord? I seem to remember General Bradley being somewhat discomforted upon hearing that some of so-called swimming tanks sinking during the landings. There must have been a reason why these amphib versions of tanks were developed when there were evidently landing craft availiable that could land even heavier tanks versus the Sherman.

 

I believe that the DD (Duplex Drive) versions were constructed to keep the deeper draft and larger ships outside of the many anti-ship traps built up by the Nazi's defense system. Even though their hull armor was thin, it was better able to survive a "teller mine" on a post, or other anti-ship device.

Only the DD's at Omaha suffered real loss by numbers, those on the other beaches arrived without such percentages of sinkings. Many reasons probably made this the outcome, Omaha's DD's were launched a bit further out than other beaches, they were manned by Army commanders who focused on the Church Steeple as a target, and allowed their "ships" to be overcome by waves on their sides as sea conditions changed. British DD tanks had a higher "free board" since they were the A4 versions, and they used small craft yeoman and bosins as "drivers" and they compensated for sea conditions.

Most of the DDs actually made it to shore, and performed well, only at Omaha were they lost in those percentages.

 

brndirt1 wrote:

Thank you for the info sir. So we're talking 37 tons or so.
lwd wrote:

37 tons is within the 40t weight limit so that wouldn't be an issue, if that boom lift capacity is correct.

Since I posted this earlier:

I have come to question the source I used. I have found a better source that gives some different data. The late war 43-44 APA's/AKA's were equipped as stated but the new data suggests that a larger number of the early APA's and some of the AKA's were equipped with smaller capacity booms. I wish to ammend my previous statement to reflect this new data.

I think we just have different perceptions of what "standardized" meant, I always took it to mean standardized for production and use. There were a number of items that weren't deployed in both theaters but were standardized. Also standardized for one service didn't necessarily mean standardized for all.

That depends. If you're using them to transport tanks from the U.S. to England while an amphibious operation is taking place, yes, it's a waste. If you're using them to transport tanks from the U.S. to England when they would otherwise be sitting idle in a harbor because no amphibious operation is imminent, I'd say it was an efficient use.

You're right about time frame and quantities but, I think you mistook my meaning because I didn't express it clearly enough. What I was trying to say, and failed to do properly, was that if the captured ports had sufficient capabilities to offload Pershing's when they were called upon to do so. It would stand to reason that the ports in England would have sufficient capabilities 6 months earlier for the Normandy Invasion. England is an island nation and was a maritime power, logically they would have more ports with greater capabilities than ports located on the continent.

You may be correct, I don't know, I just know that it could have been done.

 

I personally don't believe it was weight, width, height, or anything else that keep thay tank from being a "standard" production model. It was the drive system and the problems it would have created inside of the logistic/supply "train".

Turned out the electric drive wasn't a great design for the time, the complications of supply, retraining, and other maintenance issues made it a "bad" idea.

 

Very well put sir. I agree.
One question I would like to ask you. Do you think if the T23E3 had been standardized and deployed in numbers to Normandy, would it have really made much of a difference in the fighting until after the breakout from the hedgerow country? I'm just asking for your informed opinion.

 

And where would the pilots, aviation fuel, and oil come from for those 109's and 190's?

The V-1 weapons were cheap and used less resources by comparison.

 

From what I've read the above was the most important factor. I'm not sure however it was a "bad" idea. My impresion is that it was considered a "risky" idea. Given that what we had was working and we were winning the T23 was judge to be not worth the risk. It might have worked out very well or not.

 

Yeah, "risky" would probably have been a better choice of wording. What I meant by "bad" really was just that. No reason to take the risk with a new system. The idea wasn't really new, but untried on smaller vehicles used for the "road" and not the rails.

The diesel-electrics had been around for years, but they hadn't been scaled down to "non-rail" size until this unit. Notice it didn't catch on in the future either. I mean there were a few of the 'electric' drives made by some nations, but they were the exception not the "shape of things to come". The use of the automatic transmission in the M26 was also a departure, but at least that was a "scaling up" from the automobile industry, not a "scaling down" from the railroad industry.