Why Hitlers turn south in 1941

I believe that it is in Hitler's "Hunger Plan" to capture the great expanses of Ukraine along with all of the food that it provides, no? Furthermore, the oilfields if captured would provide the fuel for Germany's panzers to continue through Russia. It seems to me that this decision to go south was made so that resources for a more prolonged war than intended could at least be acquired should the war on the Eastern Front not go as he had initially hoped.

 

In 1941 Hitler turned south because of the slower progress experienced by Army Group South in the Ukraine. Particularly with the capture of the Donitz Basin, which provided the Soviet Union with valuable mineral resources and foodstuffs. At the time, it didn't look like a bad idea, because it resulted in the encirclement, and subsequent destruction, of about 600,000 Red Army troops. This victory around Kiev, was actually the single largest victory of the war to that point in sheer numbers. So naturally, at the time, most people saw this as a really smart move.

Later on that year, the Hungarian and Romanian governments approached the German government on the issue of petroleum production. From 1941 onwards, Germany depended on Hungarian and Romanian petroleum exports. Both governments warned Hitler that within the next year, oil production would peak and subsequently diminish. This information shifted Hitler's strategy to focus his major offensives in the south. Ultimately the goal was to capture the Caucasus oilfields, which provided the Soviets about 85% of their oil production. Realistically, these oilfields would have been trashed... but it would have put the Soviets at an enormous disadvantage.

 

The main operational goal of Barbarossa was not the capture of Moscow, but the destruction of the Soviet army in the field, to achieve strategic freedom to range as they pleased.

No one believed the Soviets could mobilize an average of 500,000 men a month, for the duration.

They had to turn south; you can't leave 600,000 Soviet soldiers in supply, in a major railroad junction, in your flanks.

 

I can largely agree with the two first points, but have some issues with the third.

We often seem to forget Army Group South was giving this mass of 600,000 troops all they could handle. Yes they alone could not swallow the entire force of Red Army troops, but did they need to?

AGC was not going to see 600,000 men hitting their right flank because the Russians could not turn the entire mass northward with out allowing AGS to swallow them from behind. Nor had any Soviet attacks or counterattacks enjoyed more the limited success before being decisively thrown back. All things being equal, until winter arrives and negates German mobility, why would this change in the late summer of 1941?

As for the important Rail junction is there any more important junction in European Russia than Moscow itself. Loss of the Moscow rail network would go far to making any organized defensive line west of the Volga difficult to impossible. Disruption of enemy defensive positions is/was a major tenet of German Mobile warfare.

Lastly your second point about the ability of Russia to mobilize 500,000 men per month renders the value of capturing 600,000 men almost moot does it not? This is what, slightly more than a month's mobilization. Germany could not win a war of attrition so it must win one that made effective resistance difficult to impossible.

Whether or not that strategy is viable is another matter.

 

In august,there was a crisis on the eastern front :AGN was blocked at Leningrad,AGC was blocked at Smolensk,AGS was blocked at Kiew;Barbarossa had failed .


Could the Germans start a big offensive in september,and,where ?

From all I have read,AGC was unable to start an offensive in september, only in october.Meanwhile,what should the Germans do ? Remaining idle,waiting till october ? Or try to solve the crisis on the front of AGS ?Which was the logical decision,IMHO.