Why was Moscow the Be All, End All?

Huh?

I always thought Operation "Typhhon" was stopped late November so December weather is complete irrelevant for the German attack on Moscow. What attack was "delayed" by Hitler?

As for German cases of frostbite, I only have sources for Jan. 1942:

Jan. 1, 1942 - Jan. 10, 1942 (10 days): 25,890 men
Jan. 11, 1942 - Jan. 20, 1942 (10 days): 24,538 men, incl. 1,856 amputations up to that date
Jan. 21, 1942 - Jan. 31, 1942 (20 days): 42,139 men

So 92,500 total. I guess sthe same number for Dec. 41 (though I have no info, it's simply a guestimate)

My source are German Quartermaster reports of Jan. 15 (Nr. I/298/42), Jan. 25 (Nr. I/494/42) and Feb. 2, 1942 (Nr. 720/42) all issued by OKH/GenStdH/GenQu/Abt. H Vers/ Qu2 (III).

As frost during the AGC's advance towards Moscow did only occur in early November and from mid-November onwards (see my earler post), the impact of frostbite/coldness in terms of losses is irrelevant for the time of the German advance towards Moscow (until Dec. 5, 1941).

"General Winter" stopping the German advance on Moscow is a myth. "General Winter" causing substantial losses on the German Ostheer during the Soviet counteroffensive Dec. 41 / Jan. 42 is reality.

Cheers,

 

Thanx Andy for the stats!!

 

Andy, you have really nice thoughts and information. And I agree with you in some points.

But what I meant with the big failures, the counter offensives of the Red Army is that operationally they were complete failures. However, they gained some strategic victory, by example the winter counteroffensive, which pushed us away from Moscow and that certainly made us suffer quite a lot because of the fighting and the elements... But the offensive was intended to destroy large German formations and it didn't. That is a failure. But it was a little better than the 2nd battle of Khárkov in 1942, when it became a trap and it did not only failed operationally, but tactically and didn't achieve any strategic thing...

And Kiev meant the delay of the attack on the necessary attack on Moscow and to make the German forces weaker for the further offensive in Moscow. The Kesselschlachts are very bloody and they consume a lot of men and resources, even if they are enormous tactical victories.

With the diversion of the Panzergruppen time and resources were used, and those resources and time were essential for the attack and victory on Moscow. Therefore the offensive did not succeed. And if we did not take Moscow we could not win. If we add this that the Soviet counteroffensive made the German forces even weaker then it is obvious that the war could not have been won at any time.

 

OK to get ahead we need some hard evidence. I got the memoirs of von Bock,and Guderian to look into. If necessary I´ll get Mansteins´s as well but he was going for Sevastopol so I don´t think it is necessary here.

To start with the main area of operation was divided by Pripet marshes. The AGC was marked the southerly army group as the main effort clearly is said to be put in the northern sector
( directive 21 ). The AGC as well has the duty of annihilating the enemy forces in white russia. After which it is possible to switch strong mobile forces northward to co-operate in the Baltic area ( Hoth panzers ). After this follows occupation of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and continuation of offensive operations at the capture of Moscow. Only collapse of Russian resistance would justify aiming at both objectives simultaneously.
AGS goes to Lublin and further to Kiev, in order to advance along the Dnieper river.

Guderian doesn´t mention the exact date when he found out of Barbarossa first, but

he scarcely could believe his eyes as they spread the map in front of him." Was something I utterly held impossible becoming a fact?" I made no attemp to conceal my disappointment and disgust! "

Guderian as well mentions he doesn´t see any single clear objectives (?) " From professional point of view this is not at all promising!" At this point Guderian hoped tthese plans were just bluff.

Von Bock doesn´t get to know of the operation until 2nd of January 1941. On 1st of february 1942 he meets Hitler, who receives von Bock very warmly. Hitler beliesves that " British willrealize that continuation of war is pointless with Russia beaten and eliminated ". In this discussion Fuhrer believes that occupation of Ukraine,and the fall of Leningrad and Moscow will bring peace.

On 25th February Von Bock says the main attack remains on the southern front ( in war games ?).

On 30th of March Hitler speaks with von Bock that his armoured groups in particular might become decisively important in the later course of an advance on Leningrad.Von Bock so far interested in the link up of two panzer groups at Minsk, nothing of Moscow.

Guderian doesn´t mention much during the spring, but in early june on his goals:
" The intention was that three army groups break through the russian forces stationed near the frontier, encircle and destroy them.New defensive fronts are prevented from forming. The army groups are appr. equal sized except AGC which has two panzer groups , AGN and AGS only one.
Intention is to advance to Roslavl-Elnya-Smolensk, after which new orders would come.Preliminary orders indicate that OKH will sitch Hoth´s 3´rd and my 2nd Panzer groups due north to capture Leningrad."

On 6th june
" The Chief of Army General Staff visited. Only bare indications of the supreme command´s intentions of the second phase of the operation had been reached. These envisaged first of all capture of Leningrad and the Baltic coast, so that contact with Finns and AGN might be established.Operational studies issued stated that Hoth´s 3rd panzer group and possibly my group were to halt at Smolensk and prepare to swing north!This operation would have one advantage, secure the left wing once and for all.This was the best plan I heard so far but never heard anything more about it.

On 14th june Fuhrer discusses the operation with the all the generals in the Reich chancellery. For von Bock nothing new. Nothing on Moscow By von Bock.

By Guderian:
" Hitler spoke on the following lines. he could not defeat England. He must bring the war to an end with a complete victory on the continent.
During the day I was only asked one question: How long would it take to reach Minsk? 5-6 days. (I arrived at Minsk on 27th.)"

So far the attack seems to have more tanks in the center, yet the main force in the southern sector.After the phase one, intention of going for Leningrad is the no 1 choice so far. No talk of Moscow,and only a minor hint of Ukraine being Hitler´s favourite in von Bock´s diary.So far I see that the goal after Smolensk was open.

Now I´ll have a bite and continue with the war time later on.

 

Wow, Andy. Some impressive stuff there...

I agree on the issue of Moscow... Although I have one minor issue...
You correctly note that the winter in 41 was not quite the unbearable ice age it is often made out to be. BUT- your source seems to focus on logistical problems (right on!), but gives little import to the specifics of the german winter supply situation. Because of Hitler's idea of a quick campaign, winter clothing was not issued or even provisioned for. Thus, although the winter may not have been quite so bad, the german lack of equipment greatly compounded the weather conditions... The "breakdown of logistics" cited is the major issue here, but we shouldn't forget the actual effects of said breakdown.

But on Moscow, I'd agree fully. The logistics and support, not to mention the actual troops and field forces- all were insufficient to take Moscow. We can easily assume the russians would have fought incrediby hard- look at Stalingrad. The germans would have been caught up in much the same type of urban battle, with the same high casualties and static nature.

this is the idea I've had all along. Even if the germans had succeeded in taking Moscow, what then? They would still have massive russian manpower to deal with, they would still have all the russian manufacturing to deal with... Moscow would have given the germans only a symbolic victory... and a road and rail station. Capturing Moscow certainly would not have been some miracle victory to end the war...
Funny- an instance where Hitler demonstrated reasoned judgement. Wow...

 

Sorry guys. I´ll be back tomorrow on this. Days sure are short when you write from 3-4 different sources.See ya!

 

German Winter equipment 1941/42

Contrary to common myths it must be said that the German General Staff (CoS Halder) and the resp. Department (General Quartemaster Wagner) did care about winter equipment since July 1941.

First trains with winter equipment were prepared by end of AUGUST 1941.

The entire question why the majority (it is also a common myth that ALL of the Ostheer wasn't equipped) of German forces did not received any winter eqipment even until January 1942 was:

a) the logistical breakdown, espec. the failures of the rail transportation system
b) the insufficient number and quality of the winter equipment.
c) the believe that winter equipment is not needed

As for a) and c) it's emough to say that the 255 trains had a low priority until October because the German General staff (and Hitler) thought that war would be over until winter anyway. So why bother to burden the transportation system (who had shown to be a most critical "bottleneck" in entire operation) with needless stuff, if fuel and ammo is needed most badly?

Later in Oct./ Nov. when it became clear that the more and more troops of the Ostheer will have to stay in Ruzssia during winter, the trains of "Operation Bogen" (the supply of the East Front with winter equipment) were caught in traffic jams in Poland and were additionally stopped by the general "train stop" (an emergency issue to stop further trains to run into a "traffic jam"). Believe it or not, but most trains arrived as late as December/January 1942.

As for b) it must be said that the winter equipment provided in August was only calculated for 56 Divisions (the planned occupation Army) and consisted of "normal", Central European, winter equipment; later in September "special" winter equipment was loaded on trains, and as it became clear that many more german Division will have to stay in Russia during winter time after time , more and more equipment was put on train who could not be sent to the fron because of the transportation breakdown.

So after all it fair to say that the lack of winter equipment was at first hand a logistical problem: the equipment was there, not in sufficient numbers but still much, not perfectly adequate but better than nothing, but it wasn't transported to the front because of the complete breakdown of rail transport.

In the big picture, the reason why there was no winter equipment at the troops in winter, was the German decision to sent fuel and ammo to the front instead of winter equipment which was believed to be worthless anyway, because of (believed) near victory. Obviously the Russians did believe they would still fight at winter. They received their winter equipment in October.

Whose fault was it? well, naturally after the catastrophy it was no-ones: Those who solely blame the Quartermaster (Wagner) are forgetting that he has no influence on rail transport, those who blame the Transport Chief (Gercke) forget that he relied on the "Reichsbahn" which was simply not prepared to "feed" a operation like Barbarossa. At the end of the day, and after the war, it was all Hitler's fault: Paulus mentioned in his memories that Hitler himslef forbid any winter preperation; However, Luftwaffe (Milch) shipped her winter equipment as soon as August to her units. So as memoirliterautr is somewhat suspicious, I think it was basically an OKH problem.

That's it for short, the breakdown and failure of the German transportation system is a chapter for itself.

Cheers,

[ 26 August 2002, 06:02 PM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

Good stuff on the winter clothes issue, Andy. We can clearly see that the war in russia was hugely dependent on logistics. Like I mentioned, the lack of support and logistics was the main factor making the capture of moscow impossible, let alone many of the other operations in the east. Winter clothing is a perfect example- had the troops been supplied with winter equipment, some other area would have suffered. No matter how you look at it, SOMETHING had to come up short, whether clothes, food, fuel, ammo, etc.

 

On von Manstein´s diary there´s something interesting to tell ( actually it proves what might have been read between the lines)

" It must be admitted that there was never a mutual agreement on the strategic plan for Barbarossa between OKH and Hitler.Not during the making of the plan or during the 1941 attack phase.
Hitler´s strategic objectives were 1. Leningrad. The city he kept as the cradle of Bolschevism. Reaching the city would bring contact with Finns and dominance over the sea.
2. Ukraine with sources and the war factories, later on oil fields of Caucasus.

OKH´s main point was to crush the red army before conquering these important places.Von Manstein sees that this would have to happen on the road to Moscov as this was the center of USSR, politically, the area had a number of factories, and also it was important junction for roads and railway.After losing Moscow the Russian front would have been cut to two parts.

The difference is that Hitler wants to get into military solution on both sides wheras the OKH wishes to concentrate forces in the middle.
Von Manstein sees this as rope pulling between the two,the end result being that Hitler couldn´t reach his objectives with the men and time he had, and at the same time he spoilt the OKH plan."

There has been talk of OKH running things in its own way. It is one of the thnigs to discuss but I would like to hear opinions on men like Keitel,Bormann, Jodl,Kaltenbrunner etc. They have been accused of leading Hitler to the wrong direction or maybe just agreeing too much to Hitler´s wishes. Was this ring of men destructive for Hitler´s mind??

 

Erich von Lewinski called von Mastein wrote a DIARY???

Never heard about that...

He wrote his pretty apologetic memories ("Lost Victories") with all the 20/20 hindsight, but no diary like von Bock.

While authentic and unedited diaries, written at her time, might have some substantial historical value, post-war, apologetic memories aren't very usefull to find the "truth". Manstein's memories, as any memoir literature, is completely biased, apologetic, selective and contains flat lies.

But I admit that Manstein and Guderian's and other's memories are an entertaining read - just don't take it for granted.

Cheers,

 

Indeed Andy, you´re right. Thanx for that. It must be kept in mind as things do change with memory.

Going through these books gives new ideas all the time, things that didn´t mean a thing some time ago.Like that panzer group four was taken from the Leningrad front to the AGC. So it was actually impossible to get to Leningrad while almost all tanks were heading to Moscow , I think.
Map of this:
http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/eastfront1/1typhoon.htm
More maps:
http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/

By the way, I found a site that might interest some:
http://www.geocities.com/armysappersforward/kursk.htm

OKH orders of battle for 1939-1941.

And about that change of attack towards Kiev. I do find it easier to accept after reading that there was also slower movement than other army groups, in some place is mentioned total of 600 kms being left behind the other army groups
( probably less?). Hitler was upset by this. By turning to Kiev from north this was removed. Unfortunately no map on this situation as Guderian turned south.Yet the Germans were lucky as Russians stayed in the forming pocket and wouldn´t escape like during summer 1942.

 

Here´s some more thoughts by Guderian and Von Bock.

To start with I would like to remind of this:

More disturbing was the challenge by rival and duplicitous command organizations to the army's power base. In 1935 Hitler created a German air force including its own General Staff. And after the Blomberg-Fritsch scandal in 1938, he formed the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), which functioned as his personal military secretariat.

Far from again becoming the preeminent military authority in Germany, the Army High Command (OKH) found itself curbed, controlled, and diluted. It became little more than an advisory unit and forfeited its historic and fundamental right to decide when, and how, to make war. This prerogative became Adolf Hitler's alone.

( From Skalman.nu )

As it is known in the army world nothing is harder to command than a group of officers. So how do you do it with generals??

After the beginning of Barbarossa the first weeks go rather well despite some heavy counterattacks by Russians.

Guderian mentions on 13th july that OKH first thought of swinging the panzer group 2 in a souh-easterly direction.
Von Bock on this idea:
" The enmy is only really beaten at one place-opposite Army Group Center.If the armoured groups now fly apart, it means foregoing the exploitation of our success.What matters now is to establish a new front before Moscow.
Because tremendous wear and tear the panzer groups are only still an effective striking force if employed in unison.I consider employing individual panzer corps to operate alone pointless.
It is necessary to concentrate all armored forces and with them drive quikly to the east until enemy is offering no more resistance in front of Moscow!"

Guderian on 27th July
" I flew to the HQ of army group to receive instructions for future operations.I expected to be told to push towards Moscow.To my surprise Hitler had ordered that 2nd panzer group was to go for Gomel. My Panzer Group would be swung round in a south-westerly direction, towards Germany..."
" We were informed that Hitler was convinced that large-scale envelopments were not jsutified.The theory was based on a false one by the General staff corps and the events in France hap proved this point.He preferred alternative plan by which small enemy forces were to be encircled and destroyed piecemeal. Hitler was anxious to encircle the eight to ten Russian divisions in the Gomel area"
Von Bock:
" The Smolensk pocket has finally been closed from the north.Brauchitsch arrived with news the Fuhrer has ordered to attack south.Guderian is to advance towards Gomel.I pointed out the left flank will be threatened from Roslavl."

Guderian on July 29th

" Colonel Schmundt brought the Oak leaves to the Knight´s Cross and explained that Hitler had three objectives:
1. The North-east, Leningrad.The city must be captured at all cost.
2. Moscow, whose industries were important
3. The South-east, The Ukraine
According to Schmundt Hitler had not yet made his mind up about an attack on the Ukraine.I urged Schmundt to advise Hitler in favour of a direct push to capture Moscow, the heart of Russia.I begged him not to withhold the new tanks and replacements."
Von Bock:
" Schmundt arrived late in the evening and had the following to say about the Fuhrer´s plans: The main thing is to eliminate the area of Leningrad.Then the raw materials of the Donets basin. The Fuhrer cares nothing of Moscow itself.
...That differs somewhat from what is said in the Army Command´s directive!"

Guderian on July 31st
"The OKH liaison officer Major von bredow arrived.he had the following information:It is now considered that the original objectives for October 1st, the line Lake Onezhskoe-the Volga cannot be reached by that date.On the other hand line Leningrad-Moscow is believed with certainty to be reached. The OKH and the Chief of the General Staff are engaged in a thankless undertaking, since the conduct of all operations is being controlled from the very highest level.Final decisions have not yet been taken.

Everyhting now depended on what these final decisions were to be."

I´ll continue with august next but in order not to lose this part I´ll send it now.

 

Guderian on 4th August:
" I was ordered to the Army Group HQ to report to Hitler. It took place in Novy Borissov, the HQ of AGC.
Those present were Hitler, Schmundt, von Bock, Hoth and Myself as well as representative of OHK, colonel Heusinger, the chief of operations department.
We were each given an opportunity to express our views, and we did this alone so no man knew what his predecessor had said.But von Bovk, Hoth and I shared the the opinion that offensive towards Moscow was of vital importance.
Hitler assembled the company together.He designated the industrial area about Leningrad as his primary target. He had not yet decidec if Ukraine or Moscow would be next.He seemd to favour the latter for a number of reasons: AGS was laying groundwork for a victory there, secondly the raw materials and agricultural produce were necessary for Germany, and finally the Krimea as " Soviet aircraft carrier against Rumanian oilfields" was to be neutralised.
We turned tomore detailed questions.I stressed the problems with our tanks.After a certain amount of humming and hawing Hitler promised to supply 300 new tank enigines for the whole Eastern Front.A figure I described as totally inadequate.As for new tanks we were not to get any, since Hitler intended them for equipping new formations.I stated that we could only cope the Russians with making good the tank losses rapidly. Hitler then said:If iI had known that the figures for Russian tank strength which you gave in your book were in fact true ones, I would not-I believe-ever have started this war!
Von Bock:
" The Fuhrer repeatedly congratulated me on the unprecedented successes.He is not yet clear how the operations should proceed.One of the possibilities is attack to the east.I happily agreed and said this is the way we would surely meet the Russian strength and a decision against what was probably his last forces was to be hopedfor there."

August 10th Guderian
"After a few days later ( of the 4th august meeting ) Hitler was to change his mind and share my views on the Moscow attack-though insisting that certain preliminary conditions be fulfilled before it was launched.The OKH did not know how to make use of the moment´s of Hitler´s approval.A few days later the picture was changed again."

August 23rd Guderian
" I as ordered at the Army Group HQ.We were informed that Hitler had decided that the immediate objective should be the capture of Ukraine and the Crimea.Halder seemed deeply upset at this.We were allagreed that this new plan move on Kiev must result in a winter campaign.Von Bock suggested that I should fly to the Fuhrer´s HQ. The suggestion was approved."
Von Bock:
" Halder showed me a memo from the Fuhrer which justified the drive to south.The memo emphasized that it was necessary to smash the Russian army. But the bulk of the Russian army is standing opposite my eastern front!"
Guderian:
" We arrived in East Prussia as it was getting dark.I reported to von Brauchitsch, who greeted me by telling : I forbid you to mention the question of Moscow to Fuhrer. The operation to the south has been ordered.
I went to see Hitler. there were a great many people there incl keitel, Jodl, Schmundt but neither halder nor Brauchitsch, nor any representative of the OKH.I described the situation to Hitler. I was allowed to give my opinion on Moscow.I explained in detail all the points that favoured continuation of the advance to Moscow.Hitler let me speak to the end without once interrupting me.He then talked in detail the considerations which led him to a different situation.For the first time I heard him use the phrase " My generals know nothing of the economic aspects of the war".I here saw for the first time a spectacle with which I was later to become familiar with;all those present noddedd in agreement with every sentence Hitler uttered, while I was left alone with my point of view.In view of the OKW´s unanimous opposition to my remarks I avoided all further arguments on that occasion"

24th August von Bock
" Army High Command informed that Guderian had told the Fuhrer that immediate southward advance was possible!
Guderian returned in the afternoon: The Fuhrer had told him how urgent the advance to the south was,and finally he had approved the plan."

If interested I´ll get back to this later.

 

Incredible, Kai! Well, I mean those thoughts by Guderian. I knew Von Bock's comments perfectly.

And Andy couldn't be more right about the winter clothing. It was a myth. Indeed, many soldiers in the Moscow area froze to death because of the lack of adequate clothing. So, with the weather and the weakened German forces, the capture of Moscow by that time is not plausible at all.

And I have always understood Hitler and many generals about the importance of Leningrad and the whole Ukraine... So, Hitler did not do the things bad as oftenly thought.

 

Going through the net for maps on situation after Smolensk and why Guderian was made to turn south:

Here´s one example and the AGS does not look too good on it.According to this map the AGS is not getting anywhere?

http://www.bibl.u-szeged.hu/bibl/mil/ww2/map/orosz_1.html

All I can say is bye bye fast victory as tanks are moving almost towards Germany like Guderian said...

By hitting Kiev from north they opened the southern front indeed but what if the Russians would have left the pocket before its closure? No 660 000 red army soldiers caught. They could not be sure as Guderian rolled on to Kiev.

So I still- somewhat more afraid of the situation- keep my idea : 1.To Moscow straight ahead, or2. to Kiev and hold the positions, with some local advance maybe, but waiting for spring to make the new major attack.

Don´t get me too serious now, as the situation is making progress again. There´s more to think about and figure out how to solve it.
What could be the decisive action to end the war? Got any ideas? Or should we prepare for long war?

 

Nice map, Kai! Thanks!

Indeed, the Bulgarians, Romanians and Hungarians at the very South had not advanced an inch! And the rest of Von Runstedt's forces are advancing quite slow because the Soviets were better prepared there, because they expected the main attack to be over there... (or maybe trying to attack Romania... ).

But I still have the opinion that AGC should have gone on straight to Moscow, even with an uncovered flank of several kilometres. We perfectly know that any Soviet counterattack at the Northern or Southern flank would have failed. And with the favourable conditions Moscow could have been captured and taken by late November. Obviously with A LOT of German casualties but it meant to a Kesselschlacht bigger than Kiev, the collapse of the comunist government and the Russian morale. The capture of the main intelligence and comunication centre. It would have provoked the collapse of all the front. What would the Russian forces in Kiev and Leningrad would have done without Moscow and Stalin?

 

Cool map--thanks again Kai.....

 

Here´s some data on the lost sources by Russia for autumn 1941. Although counted as much as 2/3 of industry lost (? ) for Russia, of some probably being turned into functioning factories in Siberia still, the Russians could outnumber the German industry output 2-3 times. The mass production lines must be one reason, as well as the number of vehicles and guns to make being like two at most.Germans had "too many" options.
Thinking that one Tiger required months to build it is awkward to think one T-34 could be built within 40 hours at best.THAT is quite a difference. Also with limited number of guns you only need to make few types of bullets.

Anyway, here´s the data:

By the end of November 1941 the Soviet retreat had lost ground that contained 63 per cent of all coal production, 68 per cent of pig iron, 58 per cent of steel, 60 per cent of aluminium, 41 per cent of railway lines, 84 per cent of sugar, 38 per cent of grain, and 60 per cent of pigs. Some major centres, notably Leningrad, were effectively isolated. Huge supplies of basic materials and equipment were suddenly cut off, and much more was put at risk by the swift German advance.

After initially dragging its feet, the Soviet government evacuated human and material resources on a gigantic scale. From July to November 1941, no fewer than 1,523 industrial enterprises, of which 1,360 were described as large-scale, were uprooted and physically removed from threatened areas. This was an incredible feat, unequalled in the history of war. With the German advance, tens of millions of people were moved eastwards. The Soviet economy however suffered heavy blows. By November 1941 over three hundred armament factories were captured by the Germans. In the same year, 1941, industrial production totalled only 51.7 per cent of the output of November 1940. Between 1940 and 1942 there was a massive fall in production. The production of pig iron fell from (in million tons) 14.9 to 4.8; steel from 18.3 to 8.1; rolling mill products from 13.1 to 5.4; coal from 165.9 to 75.5; oil from 31.1 to 22.0; and electricity (milliard kwhs) from 48.3 to 29.1. In 1942 the Germans had occupied the north Caucasus and the Don basin which cost the USSR the best of its remaining grain areas and the Maikop oilfield, and for a period the crucial oil from Baku was stopped. Harvests were devastated. Only by March 1942--despite continuing defeats and retreats--did production show a steady upward trend.

Well, just one minor detail from the text as well:

Incidentally, throughout all this a large British army was stationed in Persia, just across the border of the USSR. Stalin asked Churchill to send the British troops who were doing nothing to help the Red Army on the Eastern Front. His British "ally" amiably counter-proposed to the Generalissimo that the Russian troops which were facing them on the other side of the border might be withdrawn to the front, while the British army would then kindly look after the border for them. In point of fact, Churchill was waiting for the Red Army to be defeated, so that he could order the British army to seize oil-rich Baku, pursuing the same policy as when the British army invaded the Caucasus during the civil war. Even Stalin could understand this!

http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/~socappeal/russia/part5.html

 

The Caucasus oil fields have been on my mind recently, and went through stuff on it in the net. As well the Finnish Waffen-SS men fought in Grozny so I was able to refresh my memories on that as well.

The Caucasus produced some 72% of Russian oil at the time so it is understandable Hitler was interested in it. But nevertheless as they reached Maikop etc the Russians had destroeyd everything, it would have probably taken 1-2 years to make the area efficient in producing oil.So not much gain there. Maybe the parachute operation would have been in place there?

Anyway here´s a site on this with pics of Hitler eating the "Baku" cake, the center of the cake...well, too early anyways. Nice pics!

http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/32_folder/32_articles/32_ww22.html

-----------
" But by late July 1942, Hitler's quest for Baku seemed well on its way to achieving his goal. The Germans had already captured the city of Rostov and severed the oil pipeline from the Caucasus. On August 9, they reached Maikop, the most westerly of the Caucasian oil centers-which turned out to be quite a small source for the Germans. Even under normal conditions, Maikop's production was only one tenth that of Baku's. However, before withdrawing from the city, the Russians had thoroughly destroyed the oil fields and supplies and equipment, right down to the small incidental tools of the workshops. Consequently, by January 1943, the Germans were able to eke out no more than 70 barrels per day there (Yergin, 336-337)."

--------

So the attack south gave no profits (70 barrels per day??! ) at the time but meant the total loss of Stalingrad in the end.With those forces...who knows.

 

Talking about courage. Here´s truly something by Baron Adrian von Fölkersam. Using NKVD uniforms cheated the Russians to evacuate Maikop in 1942, and thus the Germans got it without a fight!

http://home.planet.nl/~graspol/frame_25_01.htm