WWII Rations and Mess Kits

Polar bear for breakfast? LOL

 

MP just in case (but no magazine!)

 

Was that photo taken in the German secret Arctic base??
When the war finally ended in 1956??



Cheers...

 

I wonder which one took the shot? LOL

 

Christmas dinner aboard the USS Wasp 1943.

The menu was written in the form of battle orders for a mission to "attack and consume enemy forces" -- those forces being the ship's holiday meal.
The menu for Christmas Day dinner aboard the aircraft carrier USS Wasp during World War II included strategic instructions for how to "attack" the meal.
Included in these "tactical evolutions" were such offerings as: "The enemy main body of TURKEY in GIBLET GRAVY should appear over the horizon at this time. Steer a direct course to intercept battle line, and attack with all knives and forks available."
And "... another fleet of HAM, TOMATO SALAD and PARKERHOUSE ROLLS will endeavor to weaken you by striking at your middle. You can best frustrate this attack by slowly and deliberately chewing them to shreds, a unit at a time."
Browngardt said that when another brother, Arthur, a B-25 pilot in the Pacific during the war, found out about the carrier's holiday menu, the flier was astounded, saying their own meals largely consisted of Spam and pineapple.

'43 Christmas Day menu from WWII carrier brings on smells, sounds of war: A World at War - Metro - cleveland.com

 

Sometimes this was the only meal for Christmas .

 

25/12/41 Thursday. Just had a great giving out of parcels to soldiers, Doctors and Sisters. An orderly dressed up as Father Xmas and made a good job of it. He was dressed up in the Sisters’ red robes with cotton wool for decoration. My parcel came from Stratford, packed by a Mrs Lamplough. Tinned fruit, coffee, cake, razor blades and odds and ends. Oh Boy! Oh Boy! Am I full, and was it good? Our Xmas dinner I mean. We had tomato soup, roast turkey, fresh green peas, new and roasted potatoes. jelly and Spanish cream. A most delightful feed and did I do it justice! We had a small bottle of beer each, gave us an appetite for dinner. The main dining room looked great, with its long tables and bottles etc. The Sisters lookedafter us wonderfully, and no doubt we will all get castor oil to offset the gorge.




Credit goes to bigfun .

 

MMMMMMM fresh chicken

 

A very interesting and detailed report om the food ration conditions in the Philippines in 1941 and 1942.

"The lot of the individual soldier on Bataan was hardly affected by changes in command. The search for food was his constant pursuit; hunger and disease his deadliest enemies. Literally, he faced starvation. When measured against this terrible and inescapable fact all else was of secondary importance.
Food and Clothing

Since 6 January, when the ration had been cut in half, the 80,000 soldiers and 26,000 civilians on Bataan had received a steadily diminishing and unbalanced allowance of food. Theoretically, the half ration supplied the American soldier with 6 ounces each of flour and canned or fresh meat daily; the Filipino with 10 ounces of rice and 4 of meat or fish. In actual fact the ration varied with time and circumstances and never on Bataan did it equal a full half ration. From January through February, the daily issue averaged less than 30 ounces, as compared to the peacetime garrison ration of 71 ounces for Americans and 64 for Filipinos.[1]
From the start it proved impossible to establish any theoretical basis for the issue of rations. The issue varied from day to day and was based not on the number of calories required or the vitamins necessary to maintain the health and efficiency of the command, but solely on the amount of food on hand. Since rice was most plentiful it became the basic element in the diet and all other foods were rationed to last as long as it did.
As the supply of food dwindled the amount issued was steadily reduced. The inventory of 5 January had disclosed that there was only enough canned meat and fish to last 50 days, canned milk for 20, flour and canned vegetables for 30, and small amounts of sugar, lard substitutes, coffee, and fruits.[2] By the end of the month this supply had diminished to an 11-day supply of meat and fish, 6 days of flour, 5 of fruit, and 4 of vegetables.[3] On 23 February the Philippine Department quartermaster, Col. Frank Brezina, reported that he had on hand only a 2 [SIZE=-1]1[/SIZE]/[SIZE=-1]2[/SIZE]-day supply of meat and fish, enough flour to last 4 [SIZE=-1]1[/SIZE]/[SIZE=-1]2[/SIZE] days, and only 228 cans of tomatoes, 48 cans of fruit, 30 pounds of coffee, 1,100 pounds of raisins,

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27,736 cans of milk, and 21,700 pounds of sugar.[4] A few days later he told Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, the USAFFE quartermaster, that there was no corned beef, corned beef hash, or bacon left on Bataan. "We are entirely dependent upon the shipments of salmon from Fort Mills," he declared, "as it is impossible to slaughter sufficient carabao to make an issue to all units."[5] Before the end of the campaign the amount of canned meat, usually corned beef, issued to the troops had been reduced from 60 ounces to 1.2 ounces. The Filipinos, whose ration, except for flour, was the same as the American ration, did not suffer as much, for the allowance of rice rarely dropped below 8 ounces. The stock of canned vegetables, limited in quantity and variety from the very start, shrank steadily until its issue was virtually discontinued. Within a month after the troops reached Bataan, butter, coffee, and tea had practically disappeared from the menu. Sugar and canned milk were extremely scarce and were doled out in the most minute quantities.
By the middle of February the ration had already dropped far below the standard half ration. On the 17th of the month the men on Bataan received only 27.7 ounces, consisting of 9 ounces of rice, 4 of meat, 5 of bread, plus a small allowance of sugar, coffee, bacon, juice, and canned tomatoes and fruit, amounting altogether to 10 ounces.[6] As the days went by the ration was cut again and again. By the end of March it had been so reduced and the fare offered had become so monotonous as to amount to little more than a token diet barely sufficient to sustain life. The bareness and inadequacy of this diet is revealed strikingly in the ration for 25 March, shown in Table 8. At that time the men were receiving less than one quarter the amount of food allotted soldiers in peacetime.

Hospital patients, though allotted a double ration, ate none too well. Rice was the chief component of their diet and it was extremely difficult to provide the special foods required for postoperative and intestinal cases. "It was quite a sight," wrote one doctor, "to see . . . those who should have received adequate soft and liquid diet trying to eat a gob of sticky, gummy, half-cooked rice."[7]
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Every effort was made to exploit the slender food resources of Bataan. The two rice mills constructed by the engineers began operations in mid-January. Under the supervision of the quartermaster foraging parties gathered the palay (unhusked rice), which stood ripe in the narrow rice belt along Manila Bay, and brought it to the mills for threshing. Before the supply was exhausted sometime in March a total of 250 tons of palay had been collected. Since the rate of consumption was fifteen tons a day, this impressive total amounted to only a seventeen-day supply. Had modern farm machinery been available the quantity of palay recovered, one officer estimated, would have been ten times greater.[8] Since it was the most abundant food on Bataan rice ultimately replaced wheat in the diet of the American soldiers. Accustomed to potatoes and bread they found rice a most unsatisfactory substitute. Consisting mostly of starch and with scarcely any vitamins it possessed little nutritive value. Without seasoning or other foods it had little flavor of its own and tasted like "wall-paper paste." As one wit remarked, "Rice is the greatest food there is--anything you add to it improves it."[9] But it had one virtue none could deny; it filled empty stomachs, and on Bataan that was a most important consideration.
While it lasted fresh meat was issued to the troops at regular intervals, usually every third day. This meat was obtained principally from the carabao slaughtered at the recently established abattoir near Lamao and at scattered, small slaughterhouses consisting of little more than platforms over rapidly running fresh-water streams. In the absence of refrigeration the carabao were kept in enclosures until a fresh meat issue was due, then quickly slaughtered and issued to me troops. Toward the end of the campaign about 500 of the butchered carabao were sent to Corregidor for storage in the refrigeration plant and later returned to Bataan for issue. When forage for animals was exhausted, the 250 horses of the 26th Cavalry and 48 pack mules were regretfully slaughtered also. Maj. Achille C. Tisdelle, a cavalry officer and General King's aide, wrote on 15 March that the 26th Cavalry and other units had that day finished the last of their horses.[10] Altogether the amount of fresh meat slaughtered on Bataan totaled approximately 1,300 tons.[11]
For a time the meat component was supplemented by fresh fish caught by local fishermen. At one period of the campaign the daily catch reached as high as 12,000 pounds. This supply ended when Japanese and indiscriminate American gunfire discouraged the nightly fishing trips.[12]
To these sources of food must be added the amounts procured by the individual soldier. The Filipino was most adept at fending for himself in the jungle. In various localities he could secure chickens, pigs, camotes (sweet potatoes), bamboo shoots, mangoes, and bananas. He could supplement his diet with dog and monkey meat; with the chicken-like meat of the iguana lizard, so relished by the natives; and with
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the meat of the large python snake whose eggs the Filipinos considered a great delicacy. On his own initiative he picked rice in the fields near him and threshed it in his foxhole. Those in the front lines could make their way through the outposts to near-by barrios and at exorbitant prices purchase food not obtainable by the quartermaster. Ofttimes patrols would return with sacks of milled rice.[13] The Americans soon learned that hunger is a great leveler and sought the meat of dogs--which tasted like lamb, iguanas, and monkeys as avidly as their native comrades-in-arms. "Monkeys and iguanas are quite scarce," wrote one officer regretfully, "and about all we have is rice."[14] Colonel Mallonée's experience was wider. After a varied diet o Bataan, the 195-pound six-footer offered this advice to epicures: "I can recommend mule. It is tasty, succulent and tender--all being phrases f comparison, of course. There is little to choose between calesa pony and carabao. The pony is tougher but better flavor than carabao. Iguana is fair. Monkey I do not recommend. I never had snake."[15] To supplement this report there is the judgment of another gourmet who declared "that monkey meat is all right until the animal's hands turn up on a plate."[16]
The search for food sometimes had tragic results for those who could not distinguish the edible from the inedible. The wild carrot, highly toxic in its native form, caused numerous violent intestinal disturbances and frequent deaths. Some types of berry were also poisonous and resulted in illness or death. But the troops continued to eat every berry and root they could find and by April the peninsula "had been broken dry of all edible vegetation . . . which anyone thought he could eat."[17]
In addition to the food obtained from the quartermaster and that secured by individuals through their own initiative and ingenuity, men soon found other ways to supplement their ration. A large amount of fresh meat was procured by units which seized any livestock unlucky enough to come within their reach. There was always the possibility that the animals might be diseased, but men were willing to take that chance. Headquarters frowned upon this practice for reasons of health and because it curtailed the supply of fresh meat for regular issue, and early in February prohibited the slaughter of carabao "by any individual, unit, or organization . . . except at the Field Abattoir under the direct supervision of the Department Veterinarian."[18] Despite these orders about 1,000 carabao were butchered privately during the campaign.[19]
Many units had their own private reserves of food, secured in various ways, regular and irregular. The chief source of these caches was the supplies picked up at depots during the withdrawal and never turned in. One unit, investigation disclosed, had "a considerable cache of subsistence . . . well guarded behind barbed wire"; another had 8,500 C Rations in its private
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dump.[20] In one case the driver of a ration truck had accumulated 520 cans of tomatoes, 111 cans of evaporated milk, 297 cans of tomato sauce, 114 cans of tomato juice, 6 cans of oleomargarine, 12 sacks of rice, and three fourths of a sack of wheat.[21] So large was the private supply of one unit that MacArthur's chief of staff ordered an investigation which revealed a situation even worse than had been thought.[22] Orders had been issued at the start of the campaign directing the return of these supplies to the quartermaster, but few units obeyed. Even the requirement of a detailed, certified report of stocks from all unit commanders failed to bring in the private caches.[23] One of the most persistent irregularities in the issue of rations was the padding of strength reports by units so that they could draw more than their share. At one time, 122,000 rations were being issued daily. "It appears," wrote Lt. Col. Frank F. Carpenter, Jr., of the Bataan echelon of USAFFE, "that many units are doubling up."[24] A warning from MacArthur brought the figure down to 94,000 for military personnel alone, which was still considerably higher than it should have been.[25] One flagrant example of padding that came to the attention of USAFFE was that of the division, with two regiments detached, which drew 11,000 rations on 6 February. At full strength this division did not have more than 6,500 men.[26] But despite the strictest orders and the most careful procedures, the number of rations issued continued to exceed the troop strength.
Even within units rations were sometimes distributed unequally. Reports that complete rations components were not being pushed forward from division quartermaster dumps to the front-line troops reached USAFFE and on 17 January commanders were told that "in some cases subsistence has been forcibly diverted from the units for which it was intended."[27] This reminder, like most dealing with the ration, was ignored when it was safe to do so.
While such practices existed the fare of units was uneven. Some ate well, others poorly, and it is a truism of warfare that the units to the rear always live best. "There is nothing quite so controversial as the Bataan ration," wrote one reflective officer. "Some units got corned beef, others none. Some got eight ounces of rice, others 3.7. Some got flour in place of bread, some hard tack. But there is nothing controversial about the fact that the ration was grossly inadequate."[28]
Even when no irregularity interrupted the normal distribution of rations, the confusion and hazards of war often robbed men of their food. General Stevens justly complained that his 91st Division was receiving an unbalanced ration when, by some misadventure, the quartermaster issued for his 5,600 men 19 sacks of rice, 12 cases of salmon,
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3 [SIZE=-1]1[/SIZE]/[SIZE=-1]2[/SIZE] sacks of sugar, 4 carabao quarters, plus a few miscellaneous items. That same day another division received nothing but canned goods.[29] Sometimes a change in assignment would leave one unit without a ration for one day while another received a double issue. The movement of units from one sector to another, usually made at night when the rations were issued, resulted as frequently in a double issue as in none at all. The long and difficult supply lines on Bataan often slowed up the delivery of food, and vehicles carrying supplies broke down on the mountain trails. The distribution of fresh meat was extremely difficult under these conditions. Since refrigeration and an adequate road net were lacking, the meat had to be transported in open trucks during the heat of the tropical day on hauls lasting as long as twelve hours. It is not surprising that the meat which reached the front-line troops was not always fresh.
Sometimes an accident could have tragic results for the starved garrison. A lucky hit by a Japanese bomber knocked out a freezing unit in the Corregidor cold-storage plant, and 194 carabao quarters--about 24,000 pounds, almost one day's supply--was thereupon sent to Bataan for immediate issue. Five successive air raids delayed the loading of the meat which did not reach Bataan until the next morning. Since it could not be unloaded during daylight the meat remained on the barge the entire day. By evening it was unfit for distribution.[30]
The difficult supply routes and the ever-present threat of starvation were responsible for large-scale pilferage, looting, and hijacking by civilians and troops alike. Supply trucks moving slowly along the narrow, tortuous trails of Bataan were ideal targets for hungry men with guns. Guards were posted but even they were not above temptation. Philippine Army military police placed along the supply routes helped themselves generously from the vehicles they halted.
Officers also sought to secure food and supplies in this way, and on one occasion two officers, and American and a Filipino, were caught red-handed looting a quartermaster dump. So serious was the situation that it was proposed that guards be instructed to shoot anyone caught looting. A similar fate was proposed for those in the vicinity of a supply dump without "proper reason or authority."[31] Despite threats of dire consequences, looting and hijacking continued. It was comparatively easy to toss off a sack of rice to a waiting friend as a truck moved forward, and the closer the rations trucks came to the front lines the less food they contained.[32]
One item of issue that created serious difficulty was cigarettes. Never present in sufficient quantity for general distribution, they were doled out to the front-line troops from time to time. No item disappeared so quickly between the point of supply and destination. The loss was a heavy one. In mid-January an officer of the Bataan echelon of USAFFE urgently recommended that cigarettes be sent from Corregidor to the men at the front, and a month later Colonel Beebe told the chief of staff that the demand for cigarettes
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was rapidly creating "a real morale problem."[33] Finally, early in March, USAFFE authorized the issue of five cigarettes daily to men in front-line units, and 104 cases--less than one pack a man--were shipped to Bataan.[34] This issue did not even begin to satisfy the need for cigarettes. While inspecting a battalion position, Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, USAFFE engineer, took out a pack of cigarettes. He was immediately mobbed. Every Filipino within fifty yards left his foxhole and rushed to get one.[35] Rumors began to reach Corregidor that cigarettes sent from there had been hijacked, that they had been held back by rear echelons, and that favored treatment had been accorded higher headquarters. An investigation disclosed

. . . a dire lack of cigarettes among the front-line units. Soldiers will pounce on any discarded cigarette stub for a single puff. There is in time of war no difference between the needs of smokers as between front and rear echelon units, unless the need at the front is greater. It would appear only just to make an equal allocation between all officers and men, at the front, in rear echelons, and at Ft. Mills. Troops should not be in a position of paying 2 Pesos [$1.00] on the black market for a package of cigarettes and even then being unable to get them when those in the rear can secure them in plenty at ten centavos [5 cents].[36]
​

A visitor from Corregidor who had heard that cigarettes would bring a fantastically high price on Bataan decided to test the validity of the rumor on his Philippine Scout driver. He was able to get ten pesos ($5.00) for a single pack and the thanks of the driver as well. "I gave the soldier back his ten pesos," he wrote, "and told him that if anyone every wanted to charge him more than twenty centavos a package for cigarettes he should shoot them."[37]
Altogether, it is estimated, only 400 cases, each consisting of fifty 200-cigarette cartons, were sent from Corregidor to Bataan between 6 January and 2 April. In concrete terms this meant that each front-line soldier received less than one cigarette a day.[38] Deprived of the solace of tobacco and coffee, the soldier living on 17 ounces of food a day could be very miserable indeed. "

HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Fall of the Philippines [Chapter 21]

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Reading above ,and in these days of "Cigarettes are bad", I never really realized how important cigarettes were back then. Just for morale even.

 

Thought I would have the Subject line changed to reflect the addition of rations to it

 

I wonder what the views of people who served in the war back then think now about the cigarettes they couldn't get back then? To think that it seems that soming was such an entrenched part of life back then and especially during war.

 

Smoke 'em if you got 'em

By Carl Zebrowski


WWII Americans loved to smoke cigarettes. Who could blame them? Movie stars smoked. The president smoked. The heroes fighting the enemy overseas smoked. No one quite knew the extent of the dangers of inhaling all that tar and carbon monoxide from those nifty little sticks of shredded tobacco rolled neatly in paper and sold in such handsome and handy packages.
The tobacco business was doing very well. A lot of people thought that as good—good for tobacco companies and their investors, and for the American economy as a whole. One 1943 Phillip Morris ad glowed like a lit butt with enthusiasm. “America is smoking more,” it proclaimed. That year, Phillip Morris and its similarly pleased competitors rolled and sold a record 290 billion cigarettes. Thirty percent of those cigarettes ended up overseas, stuck in the mouths of young GIs. But most of the other 70 percent remained in the States for tense folks at home, who perhaps developed the nervous nicotine habit in a misguided effort to relieve the anxiety brought on by the possibilities and realities of the massive and frighteningly modern war. For those who then wondered whether they should be even more anxious because they smoked too much, an ad for the new hint-of-mint Julep cigarettes offered some comforting advice. “Should you cut down now?” asked the headline in order to set up the response “Switch to Juleps and smoke all you want!” Smaller type explained that “even chain-smokers find that new Julep Cigarettes banish unpleasant smoking symptoms.”
Cigarettes were actually part of the GIs’ rations, right alongside more obvious staples such as meat, vegetables, and starches. The most popular brands found their way all over the world, in some cases everywhere but home. Often missing in the States were Chesterfields, Camels, Kools, and Pall Malls. So Americans who remained behind were stuck smoking long-forgotten off-brands such as Rameses and Pacayunes, if they could find cigarettes at all. Archie P. McDonald, a historian from Texas, recalled “lines outside stores on the one or two days per week that cigarettes were available for purchase.” By December 1944, signs lamenting “no cigarettes” turned up in store windows everywhere. Cigarettes eventually became so scarce in some places that a lot of confirmed smokers were forced to end their addictions. Others clung tenaciously to their vice, paying three to four times the standard pack price for their preferred brands on the gray market.
The American Tobacco Company was one of the big success stories in its field. With marketing genius that has had few peers outside the industry, the company responded to a war-created shortage of its green dye, which contained copper, by changing the color of packages for its best-selling Lucky Strike brand from green to white. As much a part of its reasoning for the move was to please women, who had long complained that the green clashed with their carefully chosen outfits. And though the metallic dye made the package stand out, it wasn’t cheap. An ad campaign that coincided fortuitously with the US invasion of North Africa plugged the new look with the patriotic slogan “Lucky Strike green has gone to war.” The clever marketing strategy linking the cigarettes psychologically with the boys in olive drab worked, and sales shot up 38 percent in 1942. But at least one radio program, the popular quiz show Information Please, dropped Lucky Strike as a sponsor because its producer heard too many complaints that the ads were annoyingly disingenuous.
With all those cigarettes burning, there were bound to be short-term consequences besides coughs, sore throats, and foul odors. One major concern was forest fires, which seemed to be an epidemic with, among other things, smokers tossing butts and matches onto grounds covered with grass, leaves, and twigs. The enduring icon Smokey Bear became the mouthpiece for urging Americans to be more conscientious. Born in August 1944 on a government poster that read “Smokey says—Care will prevent 9 out of 10 forest fires,” Smokey would by year’s end be delivering his classic line, “Only you can prevent forest fires.” The extent of the consequences of smoking would not come to full light until years after all those GIs returned home addicted to cigarettes. “I’m going to sue the government!” joked WWII veteran Walter Berns of the American Enterprise Institute. “That’s when I started smoking.” That was true for many, and according to some sources, cigarette smoking jumped 75 percent in the United States from 1940 to 1945 with the average annual consumption hitting a heart-stopping 3,500 cigarettes per person. It was no joke.

America in WWII: Cigarettes, Phillip Morris, Lucky Strike, Julep, Chesterfield, Kool, Camel, Pall Mall

 

German WWII cigarettes

 

cigarettes and hershey bars... probably the two most prized ration items an American soldier could hope for.

 

Chow in the Red Army is not elaborate, but is nourishing and heavy. Standard are rich soups and stews of vegetables and meat. One common dish is "kasha," a sort of buckwheat porridge.

 

German cigarettes

 

It seems that cigarettes and tobacco were prized by all soldiers during the war. Very highly.

 

They still are.

A mechanized cavalry scout who is a friend of mine said he was smoking 2 packs a day when out in the sandbox. Conincidentally another American friend of mine who worked as a musician in Chinese bars said that a pack of American cigarettes are can get you very far and is more useful than its value in currency.