Tora! Tora! Tora!

Dug out my special edition dvd copy with feature length commentary and a short documentary. The THX digital remaster is crisp, the only flaw was in the USS Ward/midget sub sequence. I think when filmed a speck was on the lens which transferred to the print.

Told largely in a just the facts style, its a bit ponderous in the first half at times, but builds tension in a steady manner. Eagle eyed viewers will notice the occasional glimpse of more modern ships in the attack sequence and that the same planes being blown up from differing angles. On balance, despite being 50 years old, it still hold up pretty well in most respects.

I alsoi watched the commentary and was surprised to hear the original version of the Japanese half was projected to run 4 hours! It was never made of course but it is interesting to wonder what a miniseries might have looked like.

 

This NY Times movie review back in 1970 pretty much blasted the film as a $25 million dollar disaster...everybody is a critic.

Tora‐ble, Tora‐ble, Tora‐ble

 

Our next door neighbor in Alexandria, VA 1970-1973 was a Navy lieutenant commander aviator who flew some of the "Japanese" planes for the filming.

 

History is hard? Hell, I practically had to give my blood type and sign a second mortgage to just read that review from the NY Times!

 

McDaniel.

 

..I just watched it again on Memorial Day...I never get tired of it...it's well done.....

 

I watched TTT and thought that the actors were made of wood and stone.

25 million was a hell of a lotta money for the early seventies to spend on any movie, let alone one as terrible as this, but I suppose it has to be said that an historical narrative was the concept, not a product for entertainment.

Far better value for money may well have been to turn the whole mess into a 'super' documentary.

 

..I agree...it's entertaining for me ...but it did not do well at the box office...no love stories/etc like the others.....but it was better than Midway 1976

 

It’s been years since I have seen the movie OP, but I seem to remember a scene with Halsey talking to Kimmel about their oil supply being cut and not getting enough to “feed his fat battle wagons”, or something like that.

Was there any truth or half-truths in that scene?

 

The problem was the fleet oiler program had just gotten started and there were very few capable of keeping up with a carrier-based task force. Leaving the battleships behind that the Lexington and Enterprise were doctrinally supposed to scout for was done for speed...their missions were to be quick in and outs and then the Fleet would return to SOP.

 

Carriers would scout for battleships if the battleships were conducting an operation. When it was the carriers conducting a mission, one which only involved air operations, there was no reason for battleships to accompany them.

If I may offer an analogy, battleships rarely went to sea without a screen of destroyers, but destroyers frequently conducted operations not involving battleships.

 

"...but destroyers frequently conducted operations not involving battleships..."

Indeed Mr Carronade.....

The Pacific destroyer fleet was, IMOH, the unsung workhorse and "maid of all trades" that actually did as much to win the war in the Pacific as the carriers did.
I recall something that Roosevelt alluded to, as being "regretful" that he had traded 50 old destroyers to Britain for bases in the Atlantic during 1940.
Such largesse could have come back to bite hard had losses been more severe than they already were in terms of the availability of destroyers generally.

And, too, indeed speed was the key performance indicator that resulted in 1941 and 42 carrier escort forces being mainly composed of destroyers and light cruisers.

This must have hampered the length of operations that could be conducted at sea, as light vessels must refuel far more frequently than their heavier brothers.

But also, think of this. The American battleships spent many days and weeks at sea steaming back and forth in a concerted effort to confuse Japanese intelligence. The IJN was still stuck in believing that movements of battleships gave advance warning of possible American operational intentions, something that the U.S. Navy played to the hilt.
I'm not saying that ALL IJN admirals and planners thought this way, but it would seem that they still planned their operations around the movements of their big units, despite Admirals like Yammamoto declaring that big fleet units, like the Yamato and Musashi would "be about as useful as a Samauri sword".
Yammmoto ignored his own advice for his overly complex plans, particularly at Midway, where he was still planning for IJN large fleet units to play a decisive role.

I might add, though, that American thought process vis a vis the strategic thinking of their admirals was not entirely "carrier dominated" either, yet their thinking must have reached a point of no return for the dominance of carriers a lot sooner than it occurred to IJN planners and Admirals.

Christopher