Realistically, what WWII German secret/advanced weapons programme had the best chance of being a gam

Firstly

Thanks for welcoming me to the site.

As I explained in my intro I used to post regularly for many years on the old Armchair General Forum and have been checking out and doing ‘test’ postings on a few other sites since ACG folded and simply disappeared a couple of years back.

BTW: Anyone know if the ACG Forum is ‘archived’ somewhere on the ‘cloud’ they had some great stuff (mostly mine!!!)?

Amazingly since I started posting here a day ago, I noticed my poster profile tells me I originally joined in 2010!
Must have joined up then forgotten to post.

Anyway I’m here now, so the rest of you guys and gals have finally got something to live for.
I thought I’d post some of my more salient ACG questions and issues here to see what posters think about the endless topics, perspectives, controversies and issues which arise from mankind’s greatest conflict.

Starting with this one I posted about German Secret/Advanced weapons.

I’ve edited it down a bit to eliminate some of my more smart-alecky remarks and asides which were a hallmark of my ACG persona (thought of myself as the forum’s resident demigod!):
Realistically, what WWII German secret/advanced weapons programme had the best chance of being a game-changer?

“Usually I’m not a huge fan of techno discussions on forums, did it all forty years ago at University gab sessions and board-game gatherings, not much has changed......sorry.

But of late I’ve slowly had my interest re-kindled in things like, the maximum speed of the Rogozarski IK-3 or the design of mounting brackets for skirting armour of the late models PZKW IV you, know crucial stuff like that.

Hmmm……. another stage in my development. Fascinating is it not (seriously, I am pretty interesting aren’t I?)

Naw…. all messing aside, I’d like to open a discussion on aspects of the old standard of German World War II secret weapons development and whether it realistically had the potential to be a game-changer in the outcome of WWII in Europe?

Realistically, of course being the key word.

Much drivel has been written about the Nazis ‘being close to having the A-bomb’ or how ‘if only’….they had deployed the ME 262 earlier and in larger numbers, or stuck a nerve gas warhead onto a V2 etc,
Generally the stuff of Nazi fantasists, fanatics and fanboys,

However, the Germans had some excellent potential developments in the wings and all sorts of avenues were being explored by war’s end.

Some the most promising included:
. some jet fighters

. XX class U-boats

. Shoulder launched AA rocket and multiple warhead ideas and prototypes (LuftFaust /
Fliegerfaust / Fliegerschreck)

. the E 50 and E75 Main Battle Tanks (to replace the Panther and Tiger II)

. Radar and radio guidance systems for air-launched ordnance

. Surface to Air, Air to Surface and Air to Air rocket and missile
proposals and partial
developments.

However …….. there were enormous problems in terms of resource allocation, production, transportation, training of weapons users, administration and organisational structures bureaucratic inertia, deployment and maintenance ec etc.

And above all would Hitler okay something or not and would it help against the Soviets (the actual ‘war’ that mattered most crucially in overall terms).

Anyway food for thought.
Be interested in your ideas.

Gotta go now…destiny awaits…on the horizon, always there…….just out reach always….. just out of reach."

Regards lodestar

 

The Nazi nuclear weapons program was definitely not the province of Nazi fanbois or other cultists. The real WWII German nuclear effort had very little to do with Werner Heisenberg and the other Farm Hall internees (though 3 of them were major figures), but was rather a joint venture black project with input from the various military ordnance bureaus, two private superlabs, various academic institutions, and above all, the SS.

Nearly all of the most well known English language histories that mention the German nuclear weapons effort do little more than rehash the same handful of talking points that were put out for public consumption by ALSOS scientist Samuel Goudsmit in his 1945 Congressional testimony and 1947 book. This despite the fact that an enormous number of long classified primary source documents were finally released to the public at NARA beginning in 1995---the 50 year mark past the end of the war. Other national archives followed suit to one degree or another, but the overwhelming majority of ostensibly professional "name" historians in the English speaking world had long since stopped paying any attention whatsoever to this sort of development. Instead, they are content to stay in their comfortable echo chambers, where they reinforce their mutual confirmation bias and political correctness. I can't name a single one of these supposed "scholars" who have done any real archival and other research worthy of the term for many years now.

One man who has is Dr. Todd Rider, formerly a longtime senior staff scientist at MIT. Rider completed his own, nearly decade long investigation into the WWII German nuclear effort approximately five years ago. The results are found in his massive book, Forgotten Creators. While there are a handful of others who have likewise pushed back the veil of secrecy that long surrounded the German program, Rider's work is by far the best and the most comprehensive, and as a nuclear physicist himself, he is well qualified to assess the evidence he and others have uncovered.

If you are willing to read his work for yourself, you can download it here: Rider Institute | RIDER Institute | Founded by Dr. Todd H. Rider

 

The Germans didn’t KNOW how to build a bomb…they worked on a few areas hoping they would crack it in the mean time. The obvious answer IS the Me 262…it wasn’t a ‘what-if’ platform, it was functional and performed as advertised. Not just if it had been produced earlier, but if the necessary materials were made available the 262 would’ve had even MORE performance (and less maintenance). Imagine if Germany had enabled a cease fire say somewhere in 43-44 and had time to re-group and build…even just 6 months rest would have been a game changer.
The 262 is not a tired arguement, just ask the bomber crews who first saw this thing streak by them…

 

I guess one of the problems with some counterfactuals or 'just suppose they.....' suggestions for different ways WWII (or any other conflict for that matter) is that those presenting the alternative very often assume the 'other side' would do exactly as they did historically?
Let's suppose the Luftwaffe higher -ups who had Hitler's ear somehow managed to convince him to speed up Me 262 development and deployment as a fighter and using it as the main German weapon against the allied bomber armadas?

Note I stress somehow managed to convince. Hitler wanted it as a fighter bomber remember.
Adolf was one hard man to convince.
Just ask any German general in late 19944 early '45 who tried to tell Hitler the war was lost!
Not gonna be easy mate.

Retooling German and satellite factories would have been a huge task, as would have been production of parts, training of pilots and ensuring enough fuel was available.
The allies I'm sure, had the resources, imitative, technology and tactical / operational flexibility to counter German moves.

On the old Armchair General Forum I posted the following on just this subject:

"Always bear in mind when it came to the air war in WWII:

Though they (the Germans) produced some very good (Me 262, Me 109, FW 190) and versatile (Ju 88, Me 110) aircraft they were simply never in the numbers needed. Nor could they produce trained pilots at the rate the allies could due to the crushing demands and remorseless losses the Luftwaffe endured once the Germans invaded the USSR and the allied strategic bombing campaign got into full swing.

In addition they lacked the depth and breadth of command, training, logistical and infrastructure requirements to match the allies. The war in Russia was always priority and there was no way Hitler was going to change that.

Fat Hermann was another liability the Luftwaffe laboured under but even with a sharper hand in control, matching the allies was just beyond their capacities.

Interestingly, contrary to much ‘if only’ speculation the German decision not to build a fleet of heavy four-engined bombers to wage a strategic bombing campaign against the British Isles or Soviet industry beyond the Urals was probably a wise one"

Thanks to both you and williamjpellas2 for reponding to my first history post on this site.

Cheers
lodestar

 

To me ‘game changer’ doesn’t necessarily mean ‘would have changed the result of the war’. It means would have changed how things panned out. With my idea of a cease fire most of the problems you bring up become far less…Everything the Germans came up with was too little too late…We still have jet fighters, we still use rockets for our ‘advanced’ spacecraft…They taught the world submarine and tank tactics…In other words the fact that the Germans lost wasn’t because their wonder weapons were duds…Wasn’t because their tactics were faulty. You put your finger on the weakest link or what if…Hitler.

 

I would go for one of the radio-guided missiles, the Henschel HS293 or the Fritz X. I'm sure I read that my old man's troopship the SS Cathay was sunk off Bougie, Algeria by one of them, but I forget which.
The Allies soon developed transmitters to jam the Henschel, but there was a variant called the HS293D which was television-guided. It was never tried operationally though-
Henschel Hs 293 - Wikipedia

 

Of all the things the Germans could have produced in an advanced weapon it would have to be a surface-to-air missile. Most of what they did develop along those lines wasn't going to work. The subsonic ones were barely viable, and the worst of the lot was the Wasserfall.

Their big failing was developing a guidance system for these. But it was at least conceivable they could have succeeded in putting a viable one in service. For example:

They put a lot more effort into Rheinmetall's Rheintochter R-III version as a transonic or supersonic missile using beam riding. This could have worked against WW 2 slow flying bombers at higher altitudes quite well. You could even get a VT fuze in one easily given there is more room in the nose and no excessive G forces or spin. That means regular vacuum tubes would do just fine. So what if your VT fuze is the size of say, a cigar box?

A solid fuel boosted, liquid fuel missile moving at say, 800 to 1000 mph with a range of 20 miles using beam riding with a low 20 to 30% probability of a kill puts flak guns to shame.

A 30-mile engagement range gives a battery about 10 minutes incoming and another 10 outgoing to fire on a bomber formation, assuming it's in range the whole time. With a 2-minute engagement time from target lock to missile arrival, that's 10 shots. Let's say they can manage just 6 most of the time. That's 2 or 3 bombers shot down per missile battery engaging them.

A continuous wave radar for beam riding is nearly impossible to jam, so that's not an issue.

That would give you time to build a better missile and guidance system by say, 1945-46 if you get the first one in service by early 1944.

 

Hey William! Do you really want to go through this again...?

 

The 262 isn't the answer. There are two serious problems with it, one of which is insurmountable.

The first problem is the aircraft is horribly unreliable. It is doubtful, given the production of Jumo 004 engines, that Junkers could produce enough engines to keep as many as 50 Me 262 flying daily. Production could be ramped up, but the unreliability of the engine itself is a serious bottleneck to getting useful numbers of these jets in service.

The second problem is fuel. This one is insurmountable. An Me 262 requires roughly triple the fuel of an Me 109. Yes, the jet fuel isn't high octane avgas, but it still requires refining and capacity is limited overall on that. Basically, the 262 eats the Germans out of house and home so-to-speak.

Also, the 262 would soon be countered by the Western Allies. They'd have their own jets in service and would introduce new bombers--some jet propelled--that would bring the 'equation' back into balance.

On the other hand, if you get a SAM in service, the shoot down rate on bombers increases exponentially. The rockets don't require petroleum-based fuels but would use one of several storable liquid fuels with a diglycol solid fuel booster. The missiles are cheap to manufacture compared to aircraft, and you are, conservatively, getting a kill for something like 1 in 3 to 1 in 5 missiles fired. Missiles that miss are still a flak round, detonating either on command or after a timed flight run.

 

Metallurgy (shortage thereof) and slave labor makes not for Wunderwaffe.

 

Again, it argues for the SAM. Most of the guidance system already exists as technology: Radar, analog computer fire controls, radio, and a plotting system like the Malsi table. The missiles use guidance components that are already developed and used on missiles like the HS 293 or guided bombs like Fritz X. The missile itself is made of sheet metal and wood for the most part.

The engine can be an extant rocket motor design, or it could be a variant of one. Storable fuels are already known. The only real issue here is that the Germans have no decent solid fuels for rockets and are limited to double base nitrocellulose, that by 1943 is really obsolescent.

So, instead of the V-2 program wasting huge amounts of resources on a marginal weapon, you get a viable SAM that raises Allied bomber losses to say 10 to 15% per raid and that becomes unsustainable for the Allies. The result is a need for a paradigm shift in tactics and technology on their part.

 

An interesting possibility. However as always Hitler would need convincing and as I said in my OP:

"However …….. there were enormous problems in terms of resource allocation, production, transportation, training of weapons users, administration and organizational structures bureaucratic inertia, deployment and maintenance ec etc."

Also, it's difficult to see how guided AA missiles would turn the tide against the Soviet onslaught.
Essentially, once ole Joe decided someone needed killing?........well you know. Sooner or later they were gonna be.....

The fate of Hitler's secret weapons program is perhaps best summed up by Brian Ford in 'German Secret Weapons - Blueprint for Mars.' (part of the Purnell’s History of the 2nd World War weapons book series.) when he said in conclusion:
" And so Hitler's vision of a range of secret, hard-hitting weapons evaporated into the mists of history and the German effort - so stalwart in some respects, but so muddled and confused in it's direction as to be virtually impotent - literally fell over itself."

The stupidest advice you can ever give, receive or act on is.....'Just be yourself.'
Cheers lodestar

 

SAM would only confer a tactical advantage and that's presuming the the principles of Douhet were correct. Lest we forget, it wasn't until recently that we could drop a (guided) bomb into a picklebarrel. Despite heavy bombing, German production increased in 1944. Recently read an account where Germans were more fearful of British night bombing than American daylight bombing.

Game changer would have been nukes but thankfully the Nazis were no where near making one. German nukes would allow for eliminating Soviet build up for offensives, elimination of command centers (London, Moscow), vital ports and the logistics associated with it,

 

A nuclear weapon would have been the obvious choice, but that wasn't in the cards for the Germans. Their capacity to build such a device really was nonexistent.

As for dealing with the Soviet Union, the thing they needed there more than anything else was construction capabilities on the order of what the US could do. That is, they needed a mechanized construction capability coupled with things like prefabricated materials like buildings, rail sections, and such. Reducing the wastage in manpower and equipment would have done wonders there.

 

In other words what they needed was a totally different Germany!!

A very different approach to the War in the East was the only slim chance they had to win against the Soviets (it's 'the Soviets' BTW NOT 'the Russians').
No racial /exterminationist policies, arming anti-Soviet elements, allowing autonomy etc.

Once again, virtually unthinkable for Hitler and most of the despicable creeps surrounding him.

Cheers
lodestar

 

The Type XXI U-boat if they came out in larger #s with trained crews. Strangle the supply line to everyone. No more lend lease or supplies to Europe for SHAEF.

Or not:



They weren't as fast underwater as anticipated and too slow on surface to chase a convoy.

 

Not really. By 1943 the Allies were already ahead of that game. They had sonobuoys, MAD, scanning sonar, homing torpedoes, fast sink depth charges, ahead thrown weapons like Hedgehog and Limbo, radar, and a plethora of other things. The US was in a building program to put 1000 destroyer escorts in service and had built over 500 at that point.

A better sub in limited numbers wasn't a game changer. All the Type XXI did was rebalance the existing technology slightly in favor of the Germans. You need a nuclear sub to really change the game, and that wasn't happening.

Also, the video is wrong. The British R class of WW 1 were the first submarines specifically designed for high underwater speed. The Japanese I 201 class in 1944 were another contemporary of the Type XXI that were intended for the same purpose. The Type XXI was evolutionary, not revolutionary.

 

hence the "or not" but recall the issue is what German weapon could be a game changer.... Let's not get tied down with semantics either. It's not about being "first" or "revolutionary." BTW, even the Soviets worked on a rocket airplane in the '30s.

 

Outside of some so-called wonder weapon, I'd say if the Germans could have done civil engineering on some level approaching what the US was doing, it'd be a huge game changer for their military.

 

You all make a good point that Germany might have been better served if their talent had focused on designs and processes for production of conventional weapons.

There’s an old Arthur C. Clarke sci-fi story called Superiority in which a space empire is defeated because they put all their effort into superweapons that…..don’t……quite……work.