Monte Cassino/ Anzio

The so expected thread about the two greatest (and most idiotically leaded) of the Italian campaign. Those battles shouldn't have happenned the way they did. Let's discuss now the whys and what fors of the battle.

Was Clark an idiot?

Was the bombing of the ancient monastery worth it?

Could Keßelring had drove the Allies back to the sea at Anzio without Hitler's intervention?

Is Lucas to be blamed for the débâcle at Anzio?

Ready! Set! Debate!

 

bon jour Fried, just notice you have French citizenship........I didn't know that.

Say are wanting the debate to follow in order of your questions....i.e. was Clark an Idiot (yes), but under that should we be talking about the tactics of using almost green US divisions and the decision making going on in reference to cross the Rapido river and then into open county before the eyes of the Wehrmacht ? I would like the informed that have visited this CAssino battlefield to chime in repeatedly if they would with their first hand info on the terrain they encountered

You do know that this thread could get as large as "what happened today" ?

got to run gents........time to put another 55 plus miles on my bod ! yeah

 

No, Erich. I just wrote those questions as examples. Those do not necessarily have to be the topics. This thread could have the name, EVERYTHING about Anzio-Cassino...

Indeed, Erich, some months ago I had to make all the changes concerning my nationality. I was able to choose between German and French citizenship for the respective citizenship of my parents. And the fact that I haven't lived in Germany for years... (and that I like France more...)

Perhaps you are going to hate me now... gay, liberal and French... (also, someone who would vote for the democrats if was American...)

 

oh no not another.......l****** ! that's ok Fried, let's just keep the politics out of the foums bitte. Really you enjoy the French people or countryside better than Deutschland.........oh wait it has to be the Wine richtig ?

Sure I was just trying to look at the initial causes of all the pain suffered by the American forces right at the beginnings with the complete understanding that this was going to be a bloody series of battles. maybe this is how we should all approach it ? Take the battle one step at a time, and of course this could be done with Kursk as well as long as we do not get tired of all the pages that will forecasted.

~E

 

Well, I do like the country and the culture much much more than the German one. For someone so bohemian and Mediterranean as me, Germany isn't as attractive...

Well, I think we should start by talking about how the different commanders handled their troops. We know that the Italian countryside meant a very difficult terrain for the attackers and that it provided everything that a defender needs. General Von Senger und Etterlin performed in the way it should be done. And above him you had the strategic genious of marshal Keßelring.

We should discuss too about if Alexander was the man for the supreme command. Maybe he had the skills, but not the personality to get things done with someone as disobedient and egocentrical as Clark. Maybe the Allied Corps commanders were good, but they were mistreated and forced into useless combats by almighty Clark.

As you say, Erich, the American divisions (specially the Texans) paid a huge cost for Clark's stubborness in trying to cross the rapido river without enough supplies, preparation, forces and facing horrible terrain and a well-dug-in enemy...

 

Freddy, isn’t this resurrecting recent chestnuts……..by you………again! I mean, are we going to establish anything new by more Clark bashing???

Re Cassino, I would be interested in reading the war diaries in the US for the officers involved. Closest I can get is Clark’s version in his book, and associated British references. Clarks Chief of Staff first took the request from Freyberg to ‘bomb the convent’. It was established he mean the monastery and was told it wasn’t on the list of targets he could pick from. Clark, who was elsewhere at the time, says he backed the advice. Freyberg continued to argue his demand and Clark took it to his boss, Alexander, who gave him a non committal answer (i.e. no ‘yes’ or ‘no’), but left the ball in his court saying Freyberg should not be ignored out of hand, and, the New Zealander’s were given special consideration. Clark maintains he was not in favour of the bombing, but, ‘had’ to give in to Freyberg and this was following Freyberg’s statement that; ‘If the monastery is not bombed as I want and my assault fails, it’s your fault’. This, in the high end chain of command, is a classic Catch 22 comment. Alan Brooke used a similar ploy with Churchill when Churchill was trying to bully him over deployment of the second BEF. (Specifically; "You've already lost one Scottish Regiment, do you want to lose another?")

It’s also the case that the New Zealander’s were being given special consideration from the top, Churchill. The PM of New Zealand was coming under pressure at home from his citizens as to the number of men provided for the war and the duration of their absence. While the numbers were not the largest contribution among the Allies, they represented a large proportion of prime New Zealand manpower. The folks wanted the boys brought home, something Churchill had to diplomat over, and, had to give assurances and concessions. The spectre of use (or abuse) of NZ forces in WWI also a consideration. Freyberg in turn was told, formally, from his PM to minimise the risk to his men, and Churchill passed a similar sentiment to Alexander etc.

All this does not excuse the case that bombing the monastery was a bad a pointless call. No one was saying the Germans were using the monastery and if they were, how much use could be made of it? You didn’t need the monastery as a firing point, the windows and structure would provide fewer opportunities than open ground. It had most use as a shelter/store/command post. It wasn’t being used for any of the above and the Germans didn’t particularly need it as such, and, when reduced to rubble it actually benefited the Germans by providing more firing points and obstacles than when intact!

Whether or not Clark objected as strongly as he claims, I don’t belive he could have denied the request and the can is to be carried by Freyberg.

No.9

 

We are here to bash Clark, aren't we?

YOur statements are really good, nine. I agree about Freyberg being the guy behind the bombing. But we all know that Freyberg was not a good corps commander. As brigade and divisional commander he was supperb, not more. He ordered the bombing of the monastery. Results: German paratroopers made a fortress of it. He wanted the town of Cassino bombed. Result: The rubble made of it a mini Stalingrad where his tanks couldn't move and take advantadge of the momentum...

I have always believed that the Italian campaign happened the silly blody way it happened ONLY because of leadership imcompetence at every level and all the time!

 

For sure Italy favours the defender, especially if you go about its conquest as the Allies did by basically starting at the bottom and working your way up. Item 2 was the winter weather, notably bad during the war. Item 3, everyone was jumping up and down screaming D-Day, D-Day, D-Day, send all the men and boats to D-Day! Re Cassino, before the war it was acknowledged as one of the classic defensive positions of the world. Cadet officers were taken there to see it as part of their instruction. And, yes Freddy, the Allies had Clark.……happy now?


No.9

 

I'm sure the Allies thought they had been chumped when they left Sicily over the Messina straits, sure the good looking Italien honies, the pasta and wine was an after the battle attraction but surely they thought as you said 9; the suck weather, mud and severe cold the higher they climbed into the mtn's. Flooding rivers and crap roads to boot that were mined at every chance. It's time now to give all these brave men credit where it is due..........the forgotten theater as faar as I am concerned. A littel OT but the first book I read that gave an inkling on this front was one of the Ernie Pyle classics with his first hand accounts. Schu mines everywhere and a sniper behind every rock pile.

 

Erich is right about the mines and the snipers. The Germans bloody mined the whole city of Naples and it took the British sappers months to clear it up!

And why don't we start by discussing who had the great idea to invade Italy from the very bottom and coming all the way up in the worst terrain in the world for attackers?! However made that decision didn't listen to the greatest military genious of contemporary era who clearly said: "Italy is a boot; therefore, the best thing is to invade the north, cut his neck, isolate the rest of the country and smother the defender".



It is an axiom. It can't be more true or clearer! BUT, we must take into account what did the Allies thought THEN? I'm sure they had good reasons...?

 

Ah Fried it was almost like Normandie.......take the shortest road possible. you have to admit that going by the way of the straits and then securing the warmer southern low-lands; setting up a firm base to attack from and establish centers-airfields for the famous P-47 dive bomber units and the 15th AF heavy's. Would of made no sense to go beyond this even in the summer months to try an air assault into the Tirol. The country had to be taken slowly and also whether down the Italiens so that they might switch their loyalties.

~E

 

That's why I say they had good reasons... :rollyes:

 

OK Freddy fair to describe Italy as a boot, but it's a long kinky boot that goes righta upa to her bum! So you send your armada to the Po delta and establish the worlds biggest beachhead. Then you march inland with the enemy below you, and, the enemy above dumping down on you from some of the best defensive rocks in Europe, (Rommel said so )???

Then, you have to get your supplies up the Adriatic with enemy on your west coast and enemy on your east coast - Tito wasn't that good in 1943??? (wasn't that good after but there you go).

You want to land from the Med? Got to be Genoa or you're straight into the mountains??? So how much can you cram in at Genoa, (Dieppe ring a bell - dunggg), and where you going to go from there? Only one passage to Alessandria??? Tight!!!

And, as Erich pointed out, where's your air cover coming from???

No.9

 

The General der Infanterie tells us it was 'the greatest military genious of contemporary era who clearly said: "Italy is a boot; therefore, the best thing is to invade the north, cut his neck, isolate the rest of the country and smother the defender".'

Who was this genius? The only contemporary military leader I'm aware of who wanted to (and did) come in from the north was Marshal Tito, and that only in April 1945.

The only other plausible option I might see - if the Allies had had two more divisions to spare in September 1944 - would have been coming east through the Franco-Italian border against Graziani's Ligurian Army (which included Schlemmler's LXXV Corps).

But keep in mind that the US Fifth Army, and probably the British Eighth Army, ran out of artillery shells in October 1944. The three most important things is war are logistics, logistics, logistics.

 

I know (From the brief time i was on the coast of Italy during that biking trip i made this past summer) that the coast is very undesirable in many parts. For instance, where i was (Levanto) other then where the small beach was, there was no flat ground. The ground rose steeply (numerous swithcbacks everywhere) up a thousand feet straight from the waters edge. It would be impossible attempting to land a force of any side there, and this sort of terrain went on for miles and miles - and even at oppurtunic spots, you'd still have to deal with these steep rocky mountains that would be a defenders best friend.

 

There was no need to 'land a force'. They were already there, and moved very quickly up to Grenoble.

When de Gaulle wanted a slice of the pizza in May 1945, he came on the Briancon-Susa road. But the US 34th Infantry Division was there to say, "Sorry, mon General, you must be satisfied with quiche".

 

Well done for bringing up this often forgotten theater. I have a next door neighbor in Australia who is polish and hate the germans with a passion as his unit was doing the dirty work

Question regarding invasion from the "Toe" of the "boot". I would've thought that the allies had no choice given the amount of trouble they had securing Sicily and Malta from the incessant air attacks and bombings which almost crippled the convoys and Malta itself.*

So many ships went to the bottom of the Med Sea so close to Africa, wouldn't it have been suicide to go further north?

* The bombing must've been bad, not even the Britons were offered the George Cross for what they went though, so for them to offer it to every inhabitant on Malta, they must've been though some wild ride.

 

Brat, the Italian campaign is nothing new to this forum and aspects discussed many times in depth. If you check back you’ll see that.

The Axis had no air superiority over Italy once the war was conducted there, and, the Allies needed bases within ‘effective’ range meaning there was realistic time for engagement once in the target area. A quick look at a basic map, for anyone not familiar with the geography of Italy, will show generally on the Mediterranean side the mountains descend straight into the sea. Landing points for invasion forces where they can move ‘off the beach’ and inland are very limited. On the Adriatic side it’s largely a different matter, often with extensive beaches, a Continental Shelf, and a number of resulting sandbanks.

The ploy of starting at the bottom and moving up was quite secure given the resources committed. The west side was always going to be more formidable and, as happened, the 8th Army on the east had to wait (and eventually go and help) the east to keep the line of advance. If the east continues its advance it just extends the front line to be defended and supplied. Resources were not committed there because the flavour was Normandy and largely Churchill’s desire to storm up Italy and push for Vienna and into Germany was countered by the American insistence to attack through France. What happened then was Italy was used to tie down German resources which otherwise would/could be used in France.

The landings at Nettuno/Anzio were under strength and suffered accordingly. If there had been different thinking and far greater commitment, the east could have been rolled-up leaving a mountain barrier of the Apennines between them and the Axis on the eastern side of them. To prevent resupply of this Axis force, you’d need to cut their northern roads so you’d have to go in around Genoa and fight across, having enemy on both side of you. However, given the natural defensive characteristic of much of Italy, the commitment of resources would be disproportionate to the draw on the enemy, and, what you would have ultimately achieved in comparison to the cost? Effectively all you do is secure the ‘boot’, which increases the threat to Germany but does nothing to harm Germany. It just provides another route by which you can go on to harm Germany, either side of neutral Switzerland!

No.9

 

About whom was I talking about being the greatest military genious of contemporary History - and that is, from 1789 onwards - is Napoléon I. But as Erich and Nine have pointed out, an invasion in northern Italy in 1943 was something extremely difficult to achieve and the worst option then. Napoléon's quote is undeniable and perfectly logic, but it could be done more easily in the early XIX century when there were no planes to base nor to protect of neither defended coasts. Maybe he had Nelson to smash every naval ambition he could have, but... that's another century...

But now I get it, even if invading Italy from the south was not good in the long term, it was the only thing that could be done at the moment. With German occupied Balcans, Corsica, Sardinia and southern France, invading Italy's neck would have been something like getting in-side the wolf's mouth. Planes and ships had limited bases in Malta and Norafrica. And once Sicily was taken, Messina seemed quite obvious and relatively easy.

 

Nap I would have the luxury of attacking over the boarder into Italy, wouldn’t he Freddy. And, in his day it wasn’t a united Italy. Few Kingdoms, few Dukedoms, a chunk in the hands of the Austro-Huns and the Papal States. It was Nap III and Vic Emanuel – who couldn’t claim more than King of Sardinia and Piedmont – who did a deal to take Lombardy and Venetia back off the Austro-Huns. Cost Italy Nice and Savoy that did – part of the deal.

No.9


(he never had any paratroops either did he?…….unlike Munchausen!)