Invasion of southern France, 1944.

my info is from a prof,pogue.
the buildup of supplies,would have been many more times greater in a may overlord,using the snatched anvil ships,as well as mullberry.even walter-beetle-smith,eisenhouers buddy agreed.ask prof.pogue,i believe he is an expert.but hey,i am crazy..lee.

 

I read a first hand account from an old friend that served in Anzio. He said the most depressing sight was the landing crafts droping troops and instantly disappearing. They did not stay around in case of an evacuation. They were left there and that was that. He was mighty mad aftrewards to find out there was a fight over these ships due to Overlord. Eisenhower gave Operation Shingle the bare minimum.

Also, my uncle served with the 36th and landed at Blue Beach. I've read many times it was the best amphibious operation of WW 2. Of course it was not a major defensive operation by the Germans. I say the real effect was in late 1944 when the Northern Allies joined up with the Southern France liberators.

Best Regards,

Steve

 

i will conceed that anvil was ideed a complete success,however,imo the 40 lst and lsi would have given a may ovelord,with more lift capabilty over the beaches,as well as lift from liberty type ships using the mullbery harbours.many more supples could have been gotten ashore,and maybe the problems that occured,would not have.lee.

 

I agree it was probably one of the best landings made during the war. The Units involved where all veterans of Sicily, North Africa, and Italy. There where quite accustomed to working together, and where very experienced soldiers.

Anvil was cancelled in April 44 because of the need for ALL available landing craft for the invasion of Normandy. After the invasion, more amphibious lifts where available so on 24 June Anvil was brought back too life. Note this is AFTER Overlord. The final authorization from Allied High Command to proceed with the landings did not come until 11 August. 4 days before the assault took place.

 

More than anything, I'm glad my uncle got out from under General Mark Clark in Italy. After the capture of Rome they pulled his 36th out of the line, to Naples and areas south ( raised alot of hell) for the S. France Invasion

 

you are certainly right there mate,i dont know how clarke kept his job.yours,lee.

 

Interesting how much difference there was on how to attack the Hitler´s fortress....

1944: Action This Day - The Churchill Centre

Churchill's disagreement with the Americans on strategy in Italy continued. He feared that their insistence on an invasion of the south of France after Normandy, on top of Alexander's "desolating delay," would destroy future success in Italy. He and his American allies also disagreed on whom to support in Yugoslavia.

 

I suspect the "prof" was off on his statment. A quick check of Jackson and Atkinson shows they both state the landing craft withdrawn after Shingle was complete. From elsewhere I recall a very few were retained for possible raids or other small operations in the Balkans, and for a deception operation in support of Overlord. That is they sailed a few amphib ships or boats repeatedly past German spies, repainiting the hull number each time.

There was a shortfall in the number of boats and ships desired for operation Neptune, at the end of April. But this had to do with delayed deliverys from the US. The residual craft remaining in the Med were too few to make up the difference in any fashion.

I any case executing Neptune/Overlord in May does not get around the problem of delay in capturing and restoring the French & Belgium ports. At best it might allow for the installation of the prefab port at Quiberon Bay. But, under the best circumstance that would not come close to the capacity of Marsaille or Antwerp. Plus the material that was diverted from Quiberon Bay to use at the Normandy Mulberrys or for restoring the other ports would not be availble.

 

so how many lst and lsi do you think you need to land 2 armies in anvil ,with all you need,and indeed supplythem,before you have captured a port that can land supplies adequately.prof pogue does cover this.look at overlord,how long did it take to build up enough lst lsi craft,for this op.lee.

 

Capturing ports: It took the Allies until December to first capture, and then restore enough port facilty to supply most of Montgomerys and Bradleys Army groups, and most of the the Communications Zone. The restoration of Antwerp was essential to this as the weather dictated the Mulberrys cease significant cargo handling by the end of October. I recall the Mulberrys cargo numbers started to decline in mid October due to weather.

Antwerp was captured in September, but like most other ports it had been heavilly sabotaged. It was November before it was restored to 80% of its theoretical capacity. Much of the delay was due to the failure to clear the Scheldt estuary until October. While much of the personell for operating Antwerps port and adjacent railroad connections, warehousing, communications could reach it via other ports or be drawn from the Belgians who worked there, the heavy equipment needed had to be brought in by sea. It was not practical to bring it though the other overtaxed ports and on the half restore railroads. For items like harbor tugs and floating cranes this was simply impossible. The Germans had to removed from effective artillery range of the Scheldt, the water cleared of mines and dredged of four years accumulation of silt and junk.

Even with Antwerp close to its planned or expected capacity the Atlantic port fell far short of requirements. My Staff & Command course leassons on the logistics of Overlord indicate that by December these fell short some 30% of requirements for the three Army Groups plus the Comm Zone units, and the US & British tactical airforces that had relocated to France. Marsailles made up the difference. Earlier in September the shortfall is larger. With Antwerp not useable and the ports of Cherbourg, Brest, Le Harve, and the other smaller harbors operating at less than 50% expected capacity, or still held by the Germans, the shortfall is between 40% & 50% for supplying three army groups and the tactical airforces and the Comm Zone. It is simplly not possible to supply the French 1st, US 7th Armys, and their support if they are brought into France via the Atlantic coast. Not without Marsailles.

Transfering Amphibious Craft to the Medditerrainian.

The larger seagoing LST types were slower than cargo ships. The smaller had to be loaded aboard tranports. Add on some days for replenishing fuel/food and maintiance before departing, and the same on the other end before combat ops you have three to four weeks. Maybe less if things go well. Not all the amphibs used for Anvil/Dragoon came from Britian. production in the US had not ceased and a portion had come from there.

A few other points.

Bringing the two Allied Armys from the Med to the Atlantic ports requires a minumum of nine to twelve days sea voyage. Add in time making up convoys and weather one can expect up to three weeks transit time aboard ship. To move the same from the ports in the Med to the southern French coast takes three to four days. So, thats triple the days the ships are in use. The Allied cargo capacity was finite despite its size. Using up twelve days of cargo capacity to move two armys means you have to give up that capacity transporting something else. That translates into delaying a lot of other things needed somewhere for a couple weeks.

Left out of my supply requirements above was the need to feed France. The food stocks in France post liberation were short what was expected or required. Imports were inadaquate as it was. Any diminuation of port capacity any time from June through December means more hunger amoung the liberated civillian population. As with military supply not capturing marsailles in Augusts only aggravates this problem.

I have not read "Pogue" I'm taking this from the material used in the Staff & Command Course lessons. These are largely US Army sources, including the the US Army Green Book concerning logistics for the NW Europe campaign. A number of other sources can be drawn from for the same conclusion. Ellesbergs 'The Far Shore' for a decription of the problem of restoring Cherbourg and the actual capacity of the Mulberrys. Bradleys remarks on logistics, ect... They all vary in detail and focus, but all lead to the point that the ports of NW Europe were not serving the Allied Armys as expected.

 

indeed.forgive me if i missed it out but,
a/what date was anvil launched.
b/when were the first usable ports captured after anvil,in southern france.yours,4th wilts.

 

Main amphib fleet departed ports circa 10 August, tho as usual some went to sea earlier or later depending on their port of departure.

OSS activities had been building for many weeks. Hard to map this out as they were interwoven with the main Overlord campaign and the FFI activities that were beconing uncontrolable and spontaneous.

Deception operations specific to Dragoon started 13 July, tho again these overlapped deception operations related to Overlord and the Italian campaign. ie: the invasion fleet for Dragoon set a course for Genoa and did not turn towards the actual landing site until late on the 14th of August.

Main force crossed the beach 15 August near St Raphael.

FFI & OSS were fully active in Marsaille & Toulon on the 16th, I'm not clear here exactly when the ground forces entered the city. This was the task of the French corps of the 7th Army and their claims seem to include those of the FFI. They were positioned for assualting Marsailles on the 20th Of August. The attack went in rapidly and the bulk of the city occupied in 2-3 days. A German forst held out untill the 27th. In any case the projected date for the capture of Toloun was D+20 and Marsaille D+45. Both were fully secured by the French far ahead of that. Also a US armored cavalry task force had advanced 60 miles or halfway to Grenoble on the 19th of August. Grenoble was a D+90 objective. It fell by D+5. Basiclly the German armys in the south ran for their lives. On D+2 a Corps HQ & the commander was overrun & captured adding to the sense of panic.

Allied port salvage/construction and operating units were entering Marsallies before the 27th August. Cargo was unloading circa 13 September.

 

so,from the time the troops assaulted s/france,to the time marsielle etc was up and fully operational,how were all the supplies gotten ashore?.was there a long line of men passing shells up the beach,or maybe a couple of dukws,no lst,s etc were used,stolen from a may 44 overlord,and pushed by ike,marshal etc to this med panacea.

 

IIRC the assault was expected to be a pitched battle. Guns and ammunition where overloaded. Much of the fuel the allies needed was captured from the Germans.

 

Lightering with a combination of the various LST, LCVP, DUKW, ect... The Sicillian, Salerno, and Anzio beachheads were supplied 'across the sand' for several, or many, weeks until ports or other supply routes were established. Where the beach is protected from high waves or surf docks floating on pontoons can be used, like those in the Mulberry harbors.

Lightering cargo from deep water ships onto beaches with rafts or flat bottom barges is nothing new. The Romans practiced it, and probablly the Sumerians 2000 years earlier. It is not as fast or effcient as using a dock, but will do.

 

Cool THread

 

iirc,pogue was an official u.s ww2 historian,i think?..

 

Here is a link to an excellent site run by the West Point library group, this one is directed toward the invasion of Southern France, but all of the major conflicts in both the ETO and PTO can be found on their home page.

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2 europe/ww2 europe maps/ww2 map67.jpg

 

i suggest you read..lct stories of ww2...a good site imo,especially the chapter concerning the utah landings,here you will see the numbers and types of landing ships,etc that were uused on 1 beach in normandy.if the amphib ships used in anvil,that were earmarked for overlord,were available in england,overlord would have been a may 44 operation.this is why imo walter beedle-smith did not like anvil.cheers..