WW 1: How/Why did Germany lose it

No, Carl. This thread is not yet over!

First, there are many, many reasons why Germany lost WWI and it is very different from WWII. Although we can compare the battles of Mons and 1st of the Marne as Moscow in WWII. The Germans were not really defeated (because the war didn't end there) but it made the Germans unable to win the war.

Good point and true to some extent. However, a war in two fronts in WWI could NOT be avoided as it could in WWII. France and Russia had a pact, to attack from West and East.

This is not true, at least not in 1914 and 1915, when the BEF had the BEST soldiers in the world. After those men were killed, Kitchener's volunteers and conscripts were very much undertrained while the German conscripts, in the other hand, became professional and good regular soldiers very quickly.

This did not happen entirely because of logistics. German troops in the summer of 1914 were well-supplied and supplies moved as fast as the advancing German Armies. What was the problem then? That the German Army was as mobile as Hannibal's, Alexander's or Napoléon's Armies. Horses and feet were their mobile mechanisms. It was not until the invention of armoured and motorised divisions that quick and continous advances were possible in warfare.

The problems the German Armies faced in Belgium was that they stupidly underestimated the Belgian Army, the Belgian fortresses, the BEF and the will of the Belgians to resist. However, these things only delayed 'Von Schlieffen's Plan' for one or two weeks (not very decisive in the Marne Battle).

Not really. The German Army in WWI was far better supplied than in WWII. The German Army (at least since 1914-1917) had almost complete resources for its offensives and deffensive battles. Maybe we could think about the BEF being the one ill-supplied in WWI (remember Gallipoli).

To the contrary. Everybody did everything wrong in WWI. The Germans had the most stupid infantry tactics in WWI and those costed them lack of troops in the decisive battle of the Marne. A British officer said during the battle of Mons: "Only the boches have infantry formations in which you can kill two soldiers with one shot". And it was truth. The Germans also didn't followed their well-planned strategies, they disobeyed orders, they used their secret weapons too soon and as every other Army in WWI they didn't take advantages of their successes and even worse, always reinforced failures.

Agreed. If you are going to provoke wars you do it like Von Bismarck or even Hitler, by knowing what you do. Policies as agressive as those of Kaiser Wilhelm II were completely unwise. And the Zimmermann telegram is one of the most idiotic diplomatic measures in History.

They were definately defeated on the field. The 2nd battle of the Marne was a German defeat. The battles of Argonne and Château-Thierry were German defeats. the AEF did win those battles. Remember that in the western front in WWI there were no battles in which you surrounded your enemy and destroyed it. But you destroyed it in your offensive while defending from frontal attacks. Those are defeats. And Germany had everything but men able for combat. Von Ludendorff's spring and summer offensives cost more then 800.000 casualties. There were absolutely no way of replacing them. He withdrew the German Army because he had no reinforcements and didn't have troops enough for defending germany. That's certainly a DEFEAT.

And no, Von Ludendorff may have blaimed the politicians but he, very WISELY brought the war to an end when he knew Germany was going to lose it, preventing millions of Germans to get killed and Germany from being destroyed as it happened in WWII. The German Armies were indeed defeated on the field, so the military High Command prevented more slaughter by signing an armistice. It was not a stab-in-the-back at all. the German people believed it, but they used to belive in a lot of lies back then...

No. The politicians were powerless in 1918. General Von Ludendorff was the military dictator of Germany and he decided everything.

The Kaiser was indeed a Hiro-Hito of WWI. The Kaiser transfered almost all his powers to marshal Von Hindenburg and he transfered them to general Von Ludendorff.

 

And now, my explanation of why Germany lost WWI.

First, stupid policies and diplomacy. Most important thing; the Kaiser being obsessed in having a Navy which GERMANY DID NOT NEED and that brought her to direct conflict with Great Britain. If there would not have been a German Navy Great Britain would not have had many reasons to get involved in the war and by doing so, it is rather unprobable that France could have dealt with Germany alone. Germany spent millions of marks and tons of resources in building this Navy that she did not need and that even worse, she did not use.

Now we come to the appointment of the most incompetent person as Chief of the General Staff, general Helmuth von Moltke, who had no military capacity at all, had no nerve, no courage, no mental-stability, no experience, no intelligence but did have a very impressive name. The Germans should have known that military geniousness is not inherited. Example, Napoléon III... Von Moltke immediately started changing the 'Von Schlieffen Plan' even if the corpse of marshal Von Schlieffen was not yet cold... He reinforced everything but the most important wing of the attack. First, he overrated the French fortifications in the North and was afraid of allowing the French to enter into Alsace-Lorraine (which Von Schlieffen was willing to tolerate), so he reinforced the German Armies in the area, at the expense of the right wing, of course. Then, he reconsidered invading Holland (necessary for the full-deployment of the lethal right wing). Then he underrated the Belgian Army and the Belgian King as well as the fortresses in the country which turned out to be a very disgusting surprise in 1914. The Germans had to use their secret siege weapons and let the french know that they had huge Howitzers deployed. Then, their weak right wing never thought of capturing the Channel ports without a fighting, getting into severe troubles the BEF. Latter, they realised of how important these were, tried to take them. Of course they then failed and only gained casualties.They also underrated the BEF. Their recoinassence was so bad that when seven British divisions appeared in front of the Germans at Mons the German commanders did not know what to do. The French were easily stopped in their Alsacian offensive, so the troops Von Moltke deployed there were useless. Again, Von Moltke (and Von Schlieffen too) had underrated Russian mobilisation and Russia rapidly deployed two huge Armies in the gates of Eastern Prussia. Paranoid Von Moltke took two Army Corps from the already weakened right wing and sent them to Prussia and of course, when these corps arrived, the battle was over.

During the battle of the Marne, general Von Kluck disobeyed Von Moltke over and over again. All the German Armies stupidly started turning left in the East of Paris, trying to surround the French Armies in the centre, contrary to the Von Schlieffen plan which clearly stated that the turning should have been done at the West of Paris, taking the city and then surrounding the central French Armies. But one, the German right wing was not able to do so because it was too weak and two, it was too busy trying to surround French Armies that were far from them, leaving other French Armies in their flanks, undisturbed. What a bad surprise the Germans had when a whole French Army came out from Paris and stroke the German flank. Then Von Kluck had to turn all its Army, leaving a huge gap in the German line. Again, the incompetent German intelligence did not work and precisely in that weak gap, the BEF appeared. The whole German front was at about to collapse, and of course, its commander, Von Moltke was in the middle of a nerves break-down at the moment when decisions were desperately needed. The whole German offensive and their perfect plan were over. The strategy of 'Von Schlieffen plan' had suffered a 180º turn. The Germans achieved a decisive victory in the East (which even if a great victory, didn't defeat Russia) and a stand-still in the West. They lost many weapons and men. And now she was facing three formidable enemies and had to deal with two incompetent allies. The trench-warfare then came and every hope of anyone's victory vanished. In 1915 the Germans of course were unable to defeat the Russian mastodont. It is obvious that you cannot defeat a nation with an Army of six million men and a territoty, fifty times yours. The only German posibility of final victory against France came in 1918 when tactics finished with trench warfare, but by that time, the German Army was weakened by huge and stupid battles like the Somme, Verdun, Passendaele, Champagne and the Brusilov offensive. Thousands of men needed for the final blow against France were not available because imbeciles like Von Falkenhayn had wasted them in useless offensives. Von Ludendorff tried to beat France even if he didn't have enough strenght to do that. He failed, he lost even more men and had a whole country starving by the British blockade. The German submarine blockade itself (the only way of defeating Great Britain) had failed because of German naval inexperience and British determination. It was idiotic to go on with a war like that: no men available for combat and the whole population starving to death.

 

*BUMP*

(I didn't do all the typying for not getting a response)

 

They didnt lose it as such. Germany wasn't as strong as it had been, but it stil had the men and resources to carry on the fight. The front-line Soldat still felt ready to give battle to the Allies so it was bureacratic failure that wrote the WW1 history books.

 

This is the post-war version of the loss that was circulated by German apologists, and capitalised upon by such powers as the nazis, and dozens of other German nationalist groups.

In fact, while the ermans were thechnically still fighting on foreign soil, the war was lost. At the time of the Armistice, the South Eastern front (often ignored by Historians) had broken open and Allied troops were getting ready to march into Germany, the Western front was unstable, and germans lines there had been driven back ceaselessly for months, and the German Army was exausted, having lost control of the air, and lost their superiority in infantry tactics, chemical warfare and artillery use. One of the big ones, again understated by many historians, was the fact that the allies had started widespread use of Mustard gas, a chemical weapon which until the last months of the war, had been a monopoly of Germany.

It was a matter of weeks before the Allies would have been fighting on German soil. When confronted with the terms of surrender, the General staff was asked if there was any possibility at all of carrying on the war, and the answer was no.

Desertion, which had never been a big problem in the German army, was rampant in October and November of 1918, morale was non-existant, and the Germans could not hold a line long enough to fortify it. Replacements were few and far between and were terribly undertrained...

In November 1918, the German Army had lost the war, and it was in fact pressure from the Germans military staff on the civilian leaders which forced the surrender, not the other way around.

Keegan, who really runs hot and cold with his books, actually wrote a very good history of WWI for amateur Historians which goes in some detail into the situation at the end of the war. If thats too basic for you, I can suggest an assotment of other texts if people are interested.

 

Germany had LOST the war.

There WERE NOT men enough to keep on with the fighting! And the frontline soldiers were not willing to go on with the fighting. The ill-trained reserves formed of old men and boys heading to the front always faced the last two or three men remaining from a whole regiment who shouted them: "Idiots! You just make the war to last longer!" The young officers couldn't do anything about that! Veterans with no legs, blinded by gas, men who had survived Verdun and Ypres! The German Army was collapsing by that time.

 

Here's my response
Well done Friedrich, a well thought out and written post
I agree with you as well(which always helps )
Take care

 

Thanks, Redcoat!

(I must stop being so sincere so often!)

 

Well I'm damned if Im responding, aww hell, ok then, I agree Friedrich.

Carl, I think you are forgetting one thing (sorry to bring the argument back), the Kaiser was from the age of kings who ruled rather than watched, the political monarch. Sure he ruled as a politician, but that was part of the job of a king. Does that make sense?

 

Even though this is basically not wrong, it is a bit of an exaggeration. Austria performed poorly in WW1 (despite the Italian front), but not so badly that you can call here 'incompetent', in contrast to e.g. 'formidable' Russia.

Further I disagree that flaws on the battlefield made Germany lose the war. It is cheap to argue: "Well, they did this and that wrong. IF they had executed everything right, AND their opponents still had slipped up the way they did, they could have won." But this is unrealistic. Germany lost due to poor diplomacy before and during the war.

 

Exaggeration? Maybe not incompetant Allies nor formidable enemies. But you must admitt that the Austrian-Hungarians performed very badly at Serbia, Russia and Italy. And that the Russians fought incredibly well despite of their bad logistics and poor equipment. Russia, as we know, was not defeated in the field.

I would agree about awful German diplomacy, but many mistakes in the field cost Germany the war.

 

I agree at Serbia and Russia, but not at Italy. Italy was the only European great power left to join the war with full power, when Austrias troops were tied up against Russia and Serbia. Her south-west flank was completely unprotected. That Austria was able to set up a stable front was indeed her only remarkable achievement in this war. Italy's performance was pathetic.

 

All the 11 battles at Isonzo river were usless and bloody. If the front resisted it was never because of the good defenders, but the ill-performed attacks...

But I'll agree, the Austrian Alpinian troops were the best they had.

 

They were not only Austrias best, but actually GOOD.

About the Isonzo battles, well, I deem them rather the same as the Battle of Verdun or the Aisne - extremely bloody, no sense at all.

[ 19. November 2003, 01:08 AM: Message edited by: KnightMove ]

 

Basically you're saying that the Austrians were just good enough to be better than the Italians...which is perfectely enough.

The Austrian Forces at the High Alps were not at all the best they had. O.K. maybe the Kaiserjäger, but the bulk of the menpower were 3rd rate Landsturm and replacements.

Cheers,

 

Time to add a little-known detail:

The Austrians, not the Germans, had cracked the Russian funk code. If not the Austrians would have provided the Germans that info, there would have never been the Battle of Tannenberg like this.

 

Friedrich is absolutely correct. Germany lost the war because it took on too many opponents simultaneously and unnecessarily. The British if not threatened by Germany's naval build up and the ultimatum to Belgium may likely have never entered the war, in which case the empire and the US may not have joined. Attacking Russia was always totally dumb. Frederick the Great knew that, and Napoleaon learned that. And why attack France again - what long term gain was there? The Kaiser created the war (sparked in the Austro-Hungarian conflict with Serbia) for what real reason? Germany may have banked on a quick victory to gain some benefit (surrender of French and British colonies perhaps), but once this was not achieved there was no more strategy except trying not to lose. This was a stupid war and the Kaiser and his entourage were to blame.

 

It's not THAT easy...you can be sure that Russia would have sooner or later intervened, if not attacking Germany, than in every case Austria. Germany would have been involved at latest then. And France definitely would have joined the conflict on Russian side. When the Kaiser claimed Germany had to defend itself, he was not COMPLETELY wrong.

However the mistakes to blame them for:

* It was not necessary to play aggressive diplomacy to weld Britain, France, and Russia together.
* As the situation was what it was, Germany should have held back Austria, not encourage them.
* They didn't want war with Britain, but they set up a plan that certainly had to involve them - invading Belgium. There was no alternative. In the very last moment, Kaiser Willhelm suggested to do it the other way round - attack Russia, defend against France. But the army was simply not prepared for this. They should have had an alternative plan.
* It was a dull decision to declare war on Russia. What for, why the hell??? If you just want to be defensive against an opponent, let him declare war!

 

Friedrich, being the lazy sod that I am (or more rightly too poor to afford all the books you have excellent access to )...

Can I say first up that I have agreed in principle with most of your postings to date. But as I know so little of WWI and for those who disagree with you, can I suggest that instead of saying (to the effect) that Germany had no troops left to fight, would it be possible for you to list the armies that Germany had at the essential fronts, their numbers at the time of surrender against what they were fighting against.

Something to the effect: (I'm going to be a bit silly here )

XVI Infantrie Division on the [insert place name] front was down to 15% of their original numbers (10,000 troops) with no reenforcements were up against the [BEF/French/Russian] 21st Division which were at 90% of their numbers (100,000)

Otherwise I think your learned collegues will continue to disagree with your interpertation of there being no enough soldiers to win the war...which I of course agree with

 

Knight's post was very good. It was indeed a matter of very bad diplomacy...

Brat, I'll do my best to bring those exact figures to-morrow. But by the time of the end of Ludendorff offensive in spring 1918, German divisions were down to some 12.000 men while British and French had some 15.000 men approximately and 1/3 more guns, while the first American divisions engaged had some 29.000 men each and almost twice more artillery than the Germans.

The spring offensive cost Germany 800.000 casualties and the German people's diet was less than 1.000 calories a day...