Eastern front : won from the start ?

Sure, but then again the same argument of Napoleon can be used in this instant can it not? In other words just by capturing certain cities doesnt mean the population as a whole would surrender.

 

But that channel, with Britain's undisputed naval superiority and local air superiority, meant that the massive Germany army couldn't get over and defeat the Brits. On the east front Germany could use its large army to effect and its short range air force could also come into play more effectively.

While Russia was less dependent on naval supply its resources and industrial might were hardly near an infinite amount. The vast majority of accessible Russian resources and industrial might were in the west. If the Germans had captured Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad the Soviet Union economy would have been crippled. While Russia has a vast territory, most of it is sparsely populated and beyond the Urals, which as Daniel Jones has pointed out wasn't really of immediate interest to the Germans. While Russian population was much greater than Germany's, Russia was not as industrialized as Germany. Hitler may have been wrong that by kicking in the door the whole rotten edifice would come tumbling down but I don't think attacking Russia was obviously a mistake as a lot of modern day arm-chair strategists would like to think. Britain was all but unattainable; Russia held better chances for Germany's military. It was simply too big a task to finish off in one short campaign and Hitler had never planned on a long war. And in a long war Germany was all but doomed, given its encircled position and population and industrial weakness in comparison to the Allies.

 

I would go as far to say the morale but not exactly the industry, as that was in Siberia.

Even with millions dead and tens of thousands of vilages, towns and cities turned to rubble, Russia still out produced Germany throughout the war.

Otto Von Bismark disagreed

quite on the contrary the only thing that kept Britatin in the war was its marvelous airforce and its heroic pilots, which had it been destroyed as it was on the brink of, Britain very well just migh have fallen.

 

The industry that was moved to Siberia did not return to production until mid-1942. If the Soviet Union was also deprived of all the factories in Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad the Soviet economy would indeed have been crippled.

Russia's population was three times as much as Germany's so you have to take that into effect. Also note that Russia's production increased dramatically during the war. Pre-war it was far less industrialized and its armaments were generally inferior to German armaments. Germany and Russia took different approaches to production, with Russia favoring quantity while Germany favored quality. (Note, this is a generalization, and I fully admit that for a while Russia had some superior weapons.) My point is that in 1941 Russian production was not so overwhelming as to make it obvious that Germany could not defeat it in a short war, in which production plays little part anyway.

And Hindenburg and Ludendorff, though fighting the Western Allies in the First World War at the same time, still managed to defeat Russia, despite Russia's huge numbers. Remember Hitler's comment about kicking in the door of the Soviet Union and having the whole rotten edifice come crashing down; he had WWI history as a demonstration that Russia was hardly invincible. What Hitler should have realized is that since Russia held out for at least a few years during World War I that he should have made contingency plans for such an extension of Barbarossa before launching his war.

You ignore Britain's premiere military arm, the Royal Navy. Hitler's navy couldn't hope to defeat the British navy, and Germany's Luftwaffe had short range planes that could not effectively compete over southern England. Russia's navy, on the other hand, could be handled by Germany's Baltic Fleet (though there was little strategic fighting to be done on this sea) and Hitler could make full use of his Luftwaffe which was manifestly superior to the Red Air Force. Plus, he could launch his battle tested armies against the Red Army, that though superior in numbers, had less experience and was no match one-on-one with Hitler's armies in early 1941.

Thus it is clear that the Russian front was not won from the start. Hitler and his generals had good reason for believing that they could be victorious in 1941.

 

Sure, However Germans didnt reach Moscow till October and didnt end till January. 42' wasnt very far away. Not sure of Stalingrad's factory output as the city was turned to Rubble. Now you say that "if" Soviet Union was deprived of the factories in Moscow and in Leningrad.... The question is how could this have been accomplished?? Did the Germans not do everything that they could have, with all of their superiority in the beginning of the war.

No dispute there. As the war went on however everything changed remember that Germany's armaments were superior due to the fact that it was getting ready for war and had plenty of time to prepare, even then the T-34 was a nasty surprise.

My friend it wasnt the Germans but the Bolsheviks who defeated Russia. Remeber that in May of 1916 a Russian offensive was launched which lasted for 10 weeks an advance of 400 miles. Russia would ofcourse have to withdraw do to a Revolution.

Not in the slightest... on the contrary I think that the Royal Navy was far to superior for the Germans... However with no aircover as was provided by the airforce, its Royal battleships would have suffered the same faith as the Bismark or the Yamato.

The conflict started the 22nd of June 41' exactly 1 year later things didnt exactly go according to plan..... heavy casualties, over extended lines, and neither Moscow nor Leningrad had been captured. Germany's greatest moments were in the opening months of the war, where it captured, killed or destroyed an enormous amount of the Soviet war machine with minimal cost. But later on everything came at a huge price.... and the reward were not huge cities or factories but was worthless empty land.

 

I don't think it was lost right from the start. It is largely a combination of poor qualities that the Germans did not rectify that ultimately caused their demise. Had the Germans recognized and fixed these deficiencies, even after they started this campaign, they could have possibly either stalemated or even won in Russia.

The single biggest German failing was that they always had a very fragmented strategic view. The Luftwaffe did not coordinate their planning well with the Heer. The army itself set the destruction of the Red Army as their priority rather than a combination of strategic, political, and military goals that realistically would have collapsed the Soviet Union.
Compounding this mistake, the Germans never had a good handle on intelligence against the Soviet Union. They frequently underestimated the Soviet's capacity. They were badly wrong on what equipment was available. Strategic knowledge of the Soviet economy was poor and underutilized.
The final straw doing the Germans in was that they perpetually pushed their armies far beyond their culmination points in an attempt to get a victory in a short war. This was a costly mistake and probably the most glaring error the Germans made. It repeatedly resulted in huge losses when their armies became immobile at the end of tenious supply lines far from help and were then surrounded and crushed in Soviet counter offensives.

In both armies there were poor logistics and inadequite communications. The only real advantage the Germans had was superior tactical and operational leadership. Now, that alone translates into a huge advantage of as much as 20% or more. It shows in the heavy casualties the Soviets took in fighting virtually right through the end of the war.

The two big plusses for the Soviets were:
1. They had far greater depth of resources, particularly manpower and supplies via their allies. This gave them the necessary edge in numbers to eventually win.

2. They did not repeatedly go beyond their culmination point on the offensive. Their offensives were limited to advances within the capacity of their army to catch up and consolidate the gains adequitely to prevent the kind of encirclements the Germans so regularly suffered from that cost them millions of PoWs and losses throughout the war.

 

I must say from everything that has been stated above, there is not a single mention of fighting spirit. The reason why the Germans lost from the start, is not due to poor leadership or not enought tanks, guns or ammunition, its not even about the cold weather or production. The reason why they lost is the same reason why the Americans are currently loosing in Iraq, the soldiers dont know why or what they are fighting for!!!

Just like the Germans the Americans benefit from every possible advantage. They have great leadership, experience, unmatched military and an infinate amount of finacial support ( at least from the start). The Arabs on the other hand have nothing but one thing. The will to fight and die for THEIR country.
In the first gulf war the conflict lasted 100 hours, why? because it was the right thing to do and was supported by the entire planet, even the Arabs knew it and surrendered by the thousands. The second war was and is viewed as an invasion.

The Americans unfortunely just like the Germans, are condemned to loose because it is a wrong war.....

Just like Hochiminh said to the French " We will loose 10 men for every 1 that we kill and you will still get tired of the war first!"

 

In neither the German-Soviet war, nor the current US - Iraq one morale was / is a major issue. Rather in both leadership is. In both the leadership (German / US) did not have a clear and coherent plan of operations beyond initial objectives.
The US currently has a major problem in that it is trying to manage its war rather than exhibit leadership. There is far more concern about casualties, legalities, and cost than winning.
For the Germans their leadership had no clear objectives beyond defeating the Red Army. There was no planning as to how to wreck, capture, or otherwise deprive the Soviets of their economic / logistic tail. Lack of supplies and support does create a major problem.
In fact, the Germans, much like the Japanese, thought that fighting spirit would prevail and that they had far more of it than their opponets. In both cases they were wrong. "Fighting spirit" is no substitute for sound leadership, planning, good logistics, and good communications / intelligence.
In the current Iraqi situation the US has only good logistics currently. It is their war to lose; not the Arabs to win.

 

I have to agree with T.A. Gardner; morale really wasn't the deciding factor on the Eastern Front in WWII, nor is it in Iraq. The US won the Iraq War in 2003. What they've got is an insurgency that they can't quell. The damage inflicted on US forces is minimal. The only way that the insurgency can beat the US is to affect the will of Americans to keep funding the war and sacrificing any forces at all.

Now, Sloniksp, I understand your interest in seeing the Russians as superhumans who won despite overwhelming odds against them, and that it was just their superior morale that won it for them. Unfortunately, the facts won't bear that out. How do you explain the fact that Russians surrendered in their millions during 1941 while Germans rarely surrendered in large numbers to the Soviets? Hitler thought that the Germans' superior morale would be the deciding factor in the war; he was wrong. The Japanese thought that their fight-to-the-death attitude and banzai charges would overwhelm the enemy, even when the enemy outnumbered them and had superior weapons. The Japanese were wrong and millions of them died in the war proving that while it is difficult to field an effective force that does not have good morale, that good morale can't win battles on its own.

I disagree with both of you guys, however, when you claim that the Germans lost because of poor leadership and a lack in strategic goals in Russia. The Germans had clear goals; they simply couldn't reach them. Germany had to capture Moscow and Stalingrad and destroy Leningrad. They failed to do any of those and we've already been over the reasons for those failures. Germany's war aims in Russia were no less clear than the Allied war aims with Germany; utterly defeat the enemy. The only real difference I see is that Germany would have probably been satisfied with a rump Soviet state in Siberia (at least for a while) while the Allies insisted on unconditional surrender of Germany. Don't forget that the Allies didn't map out the post-war world they were going to impose on Europe until the war was almost over.

 

I think we are forgetting the original topic of discussion. Did it make more sense for Germany to attack Russia or to attempt to conquer England. Did Germany have a chance at conquering Russia? If Germany had managed to capture Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, they pretty much would have managed to obtain a victory for, among other things, this would have crippled the Soviet economy. Could Germany have conquered those cities? I say yes. They reached the outskirts of all three cities, and conquered most of Stalingrad and neutralized Leningrad. The point is that they had the opportunity to reach those Russian cities. They had no such hope of reaching London.

OK, so are we are in agreement, then, that if Germany had been able to defeat Russia in 1941 (conquering those 3 main cities), before the huge increase in Russian armaments, the Russian economy would have been crippled and the rump Soviet Union state would not have been in much condition to reconquer European Russia?

Hitler never planned on having to fight a unified Russian force with high morale. He expected the Red Army to perform badly due to similar poor morale and training exhibited in WWI. Germany in WWII could expect to beat the Russians, despite their superiority in numbers, for the same reason that they beat them in WWI; internal problems in the Russian Army. You are correct that Germany only defeated Russia in WWI because of internal problems in Russia. However, that fact is precisely the reason why Hitler could expect to defeat Russia again in WWII.

But the RAF DID provide air cover, and the Luftwaffe did not have the planes that could defeat the RAF or effectively bomb the Royal Navy into submission. So there is no way that Germany could, in 1941, ferry its armies across the Channel to England. Because of the problems with the Luftwaffe and Germany Navy Hitler could not expect to defeat England. As I have pointed out many times now, Germany's military was overwhelmingly weighted towards the army. Hitler's Luftwaffe was formidable, but as a tactical force, aiding directly the army with short range flights. Long range flights, for strategic bombing, wasn't something that Germany had the ability to carry out and so England could barely be touched. The Luftwaffe could, however, easily hit the Russian air force, and German planes were substantially better than their Russian counterparts, while English planes, especially the Spitfire, were more than a match for the Bf109 and 110s.

Yes, but remember that if Germany won the war against Russia quickly, then all of that "later on" bit doesn't come into play. German forces were half way to Moscow practically within a week of the opening of Barbarossa. I certainly don't argue that with just a few adjustments Germany could have easily won the war against Russia. However, I do think that if some things had been done differently, Germany did stand a chance of winning, while they had no chance of defeating Britain in 1941.

 

Yes, the German captured millions in the first months of the war without a doubt.... The question is how many of them surrendered in the years following?

And how many German prisoners did the soviets have by the end of the war?

How?

The total losses for the Luftwaffe over the eastern front would strongly contradict your statement above.

Yes, you have some legitimate points... The point that I was making was that the Russians had more to fight for ( Their own land ) and out fought the Germans for this very reason.

You know what I find funny and at the same time a little amusing is that everyone who came from Marienburg, ended up in Nuremberg.

 

My point exactly; if Russian forces won simply due to their superior morale why did so few Red Army soldiers exhibit this superhuman morale in the first year of the war? Russian soldiers weren't as willing to die for their motherland in 1941 as they were later on in the war. What changed? I would say it is the awful treatment that they received in German POW camps and the atrocities committed by German soldiers in Russia. This suggests that Russian morale was built more on vengeance and hatred of the treatment of their fellow citizens by Germans. Now, getting back to the original point of discussion, since the Russian forces did not exhibit superhuman morale in the first months of the war Hitler was not wrong in discounting the Red Army's fighting abilities in the event of a short war. Only with a long war did Russian morale increase and Hitler never planned on fighting a long war.

About the same amount taken by the Germans in 1941. Again, sloniksp, you are trying to compare apples and oranges here. In discussing a short war you can't compare data that involves the entire war. The Russians never captured more Germans in the entire war than the Germans captured Russians in the first months of the war. Your argument about superior Russian morale, especially during the first months of the war, does not hold up to scrutiny.

This is discussed on many other threads and I won't get into it here. However, if Germany had captured Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad, as I have pointed out, the Soviet Union would have been crippled and forced to retreat beyond the Urals, exactly what Hitler considered would be a victory in this campaign. I know you don't want to admit it, but the onset of winter seriously hampered German efforts and without the Siberian forces transfered from the East, the Soviets wouldn't have had much to counterattack with in front of Moscow. Things could have easily gone quite differently there. And I've already pointed out how the Germans neutralized Leningrad and actually took most of Stalingrad. As I've said before, it would not have been easy, but there was a chance that Germany could have beaten the Soviet Union in 1941.

Again, you are comparing apples and oranges, trying to use German losses over the entire war in the east to defend your argument that Germany couldn't have beaten Russia in 1941. The reason why the Germans lost air superiority in the east has to do with increased production by the Russians while German production had to siphon off a lot of planes to defend the Reich against British and American bombers hammering German cities. Through time, the Germans lost air superiority. However, in 1941 the German Luftwaffe was indeed superior to the Red Air Force.

After 1941 yes, I agree with you. However, in 1941 this was not the case and so you can't point to this morale issue as the reason why the Germans never stood a chance against Russia.

The Marienburg referred to by my moniker is the Marienburg in West Prussia, the castle of the Teutonic Knights in what is today Malbork, Poland. I am unaware of any citizen of Marienburg, W. Preussen, who was tried at Nuremberg.

 

Now it is my time to disagree. I do not believe your claim that "The Germans had clear goals". Sure, "Germany's war aims in Russia were ... utterly defeat the enemy.", that's fine for an ultimate objective (or not even that, see quote below), problem were the intermediate objectives to reach the final one.

We have already discussed this in this forum that Germany was not quite clear about it's war aims, starting with Hitler's Barbarossa Directive, no.21.

No clear definition of victory, push the Russians east of the Volga/Archangelsk line and we'll assume they'll call it quits. Meanwhile

The latter paragraph is a beauty. None of the objectives was reached, so this made the premises in the first paragraph pointless.

So we have here a repetition of the Moscow intent, and a clear view of the Donets industrial area, even if afterwards the economical benefits from the occupation were mininmal, but that's another story.

But what do we have? After the surrender and consolidation of the Smolensk pocket do we see an all out effort to the objective defined? No, see Directive 33. http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/1084/hitler_directives/dir33.htm

So what's clear about this is that the panzer groups are dispersed North and South towards Leningrad and sealing off Kiev, and we'll think of Moscow later. Yes, very clear and decisive strategic thinking. And this was issued in July 21, while in August 23 (who said anything about wasting time with the Balkan excursion? this is worse) Guderian was meeting with Hitler (at Halder's instigation) to beg for a resumption of an armoured advance on Moscow. The upshot was a shrug and the lapidarian sentence "My generals know nothing of the economic aspects of the war"...

As we know, the Moscow advance was resumed later, when the rains were setting in and from then on it was all down the drain.

I could go on and on about this (damn, I have to take care of lunch now) but what I want to emphasise is that no Russian influence was mentioned here (bar the implied Russian caused erosion and friction), all difficulties were endogenous. Or in plain English: the Germans were tying themselves in knots with their own and only help, they were unable to design a decisive plan and even then were unable to stick to that one.

Now to I have to go cook a barrellful of Brazilian style black beans, yummy. Bon App.

 

Bon app ' Za !

Maybe we can push this thread a little forward : I suggest people considering Germany could have won, in a way or another, their war against the USSR, just post when exactly (at what point) they believe the German lost, and why.

 

Sorry, I have to disagree with your assessment here. There is a clear definition of victory, the reaching of the Volga/Archaengelsk line. There isn't the assumption that the Soviets would call it quits at this point but the realization that at this point the Soviet Union would be so crippled that even if it did not call it quits it would not be able to seriously threaten Germany.

Right, the problem is in reaching their objectives, not in not having objectives to begin with.

And here the problem is in changing priorities, not in not having priorities to begin with.

Again, the problem is in changing priorities and goals, not in not having them to begin with or having only vague ones.

I have to disagree. What you have shown is that the German goals changed during the campaign and they did not stick to their own schedule and plan. Furthermore, they ran out of time and the mud and winter weather held them up and neutralized a lot of their firepower, allowing the Russians to reinforce Moscow and bring up counter-attack forces from the east.

 

I would hardly presume to be such a great armchair general as to propose the guaranteed method in which Germany could have won the war. I don't believe there is a specific moment to which one could point to at which Germany lost the war. I think the failure to take Moscow was the critical failure of Barbarossa and this was due to a number of factors, including Hitler's decision to shift his armor southwards in late summer, the greater-than-expected resistance from the Russians, and the onset of mud and winter weather. All of these factors contributed to the Germans reaching Moscow only after winter set in and this allowed the Russians to hold back the Germans until their Siberian reserves could counter-attack.

 

Don't get me wrong, this was not a "trap" question, neither I implied that people have to post an unbreakable demonstration, it's just for us to discuss forward in this interesting thread.

 

I think we can only assume Moscow could have changed something. this has been discussed earlier. If Guderian had not been sent to Kiev there would have been a million man strong Red Army flank to Guderian´s right, and the AGS could not have moved an inch from its position and was definitely behind of the other Army groups.

Also read Bock´s diary. He definitely says that after Smolensk there was no plan how to continue and this troubled him very much.

I don´t think we can say that the Red Army soldiers did not fight with courage just because they were taken prisoner in huge numbers. Many fought with courage like at Brest-Litowsk, the problem is that these troops were more or less sacrificed because Zhukov with Stalin were planning a new line some 300 kms behind the starting border line, because they knew otherwise they could not make it. This was not told to the Army groups at the border who fought quite bravely killing lots of Germans. Read for examply "Stalin´s folly" by Constantine Pleshakov about these.

ABout the turning point we have discussed that it was winter 1941-42. After that Hitler lost a massive amount of veteran soldiers and tanks and weapons, which never could be replaced. Like I put the figures a while back units were up to 60-70 percent at most supplied with men, and the AGN and AGC lost 85% of their vehicles to supply the AGS in its attack. Also in 1942 Hitler could only start an operation in AGS sector with many divisions from its neighbour lands, not GERMAN divisions. Why did the operation in the south start so well? Well, first operation Federicus, then we must remember that Stalin was expecting an attack towards Moscow. It took awhile to send the troops that were in reserve around Moscow to the southern battle field. AFter that Hitler realized that the Russian was not dead.

 

On this subject I tend to think, like many other ww2forum people that the German army could not win.

There are many reasons for this, often reminded on this very forum, but the most important I believe is the total lack of an overall goal, including the strategy, planing and logistics needed to reach the said goal, and this very important weakness was already in effect when Barbarossa started.

Like Za Rodinu says, it looks like Germany had no plan, it is said to be a common trademark of WWII Germany to plan only a few weeks ahead, it can be considered as a very pragmatic approach, but shows its limits when war lasts. See also TAG posts about logistics.

For example, Germans had carefully recon almost every single Soviet military airfield whithin reach, and more or less destroyed the whole advanced Soviet airforce in 2 days, and in the other hand they had very inaccurate figures when it comes to some Soviet moderne weapons, USSR road net, seasons and weather etc etc...just like if It looks like Germans were interested only in the short term tactical matters and did not care to enlarge the time scale or the space scale.

But still, I think the capture of Moscow could (I mean COULD, not WOULD) have changed the outcome of the war (discussed here, in another thread).

How could the Germans have take Moscow over ? By reaching the city before they were totaly worn out (by Soviet fighting), freezed in their tracks (climate factor – one of the coldest winters in a century - which was very important to explain why did the Germans stopped, even if it would have not stooped them alone of course) and facing very strong defenses (the Soviet reserve factor).

So, how could Germans have reached Moscow earlier ?

I don't think Kiev was an option, like Kai says, the Soviet forces in this area had tobe dealt with, for a reason or another.

I think it comes down to the strategical hesitations, but also the time lost in the sealing and reduction of the Smolensk/Orsha/Mogilev pockets, which was very late and imperfect, mainly the consequences of the very strong defending fights put up by the Red Army and also the fact Guderian did not waited the sealing of the pocket before looking further eastwards, spending direly needed Panzers into capturing and holding the useless at this time Ylenia salient.

I think these mistakes, around 1941 july the 20th costed AGC 15-20 days and a lot of losses in men and material, the Yelnia position, immobilizing valuable armored forces, made the whole AGC' s position precarious when the Red Army counter attacked at the end of July 1941, turning Barbarossa into a static war for the first time in the Central sector.

I think that, because of this ambiguous position (trying to encircle the pockets without managing to sealing them, and in the same time holding springboards to Moscow, like Yelnia, and later Roslavl, without effectively moving forward east) are responsible for a significant amount of time loss, and this issue began one full month before the decision to go for Kiev first.

So, I would say that, if Germany had a chance to beat USSR, which is debatable (I tend to believe they could not but I'm not 100% sure), I think that it was over for Germans as soon as end of July 1941, they entered a short static war in the central sector, loosing at least 2-3 weeks and put themselves into a positon where this static campaign would cost them the time to rest and refit AGC later on.

I they had either pushed forward earlier and meet incoming Soviet forces, or sealed the pockets while organising AGC into a reasonable position in the Smolensk area, they would have gained 2 or 3 weeks that could have made the difference later, with or without Kiev.

 

As I have previously read mainly German side views I must say several key factors have been left out from my knowledge, I notice.

Guderian´s style was "fast forward " meaning the infantry behind, often very late behind, was doing the mopping up. SO no wonder there would be enemy troops getting away from the pockets.

From " Moscow 1941 " by Robert Forczyk:

" Guderian put little effort into fully enclosing the two pockets- he had made the same mistake at Smolensk in July - and far more Soviet troops would escape from the Bryansk-Trubchevsk pockets than the Vyazma pocket. Guderian would later come to regret- but not admit - this mistake."

Also the book mentions that even if the Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts lost up to 50-80 % of their troops in Octoer, it was significant that eight out of nine Soviet Cavalry divisions survived (!). It is mentioned in the book that those Cavalry divisions were the crucial part of the early counterattack, not the Siberians or the tanks.

" Zhukov, Konev and Timoshenko were only able to commit small amounts of armour in the openinng attacks and most were light tanks."