Should the Axis have tried harder to take Malta?

The problem is this would consume a lot of German resources as well both planes, ships, and fuel. If an invasion was tried and failed would the Germans have been able to keep North Africa supplies since they would have lost a lot of thier transport fleet. Based on the plans for Sea Lion even a successful invasion might have resulted in so much shipping lost that they would have had to give up North Africa.

 

Reminds me of these quotes:

"A simple exercise in logistics, nothing very complicated:"

"A wink from a pretty girl at a party results rarely in climax, Karl. But a man is a fool not to push a suggestion as far as it will go."

"This operation could make the Charge of the Light Brigade look like a sensible military exercise!"

For the above Malta exercise but the same could be said for Crete. For the Germans material could be replaced experienced Soldaten could not...

 

We're looking at Malta with the benefit of hindsight.

Let's look at Malta as it was in June 1940. The British considered it a lost cause, garrisoned only by a few troops and obsolete biplanes.

As such, I think it was natural for the Axis planners to think that Malta was just a mosquito that could be squashed at a convenient time. There were more important things to do first. Malta could wait. A few bombers could handle Malta.

Only when the biplanes stood up to the Italian bombers did the British decided to reinforce the island in July.

That was a critical one-month window of opportunity that the Axis missed. It was only in January 1941 did the Luftwaffe made its presence felt.

I wouldn't fault the Axis planners for what happened. Malta in 1940 was a low priority because their attention was focused on other stuff. Malta only became significant to Germany when DAK was sent to North Africa. The Axis didn't realize that the mosquito that was Malta had given them malaria.

 

Who in this world was the genius who said that????

Cripes! A jokester from the Phillipines

 

Guess

 

How the hell shall I know?

 

Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel.

 

Robert Duvall

 

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From today's Times of Malta News
When Luftwaffe intensified attacks on Malta


Photo above: Rescue workers, assisted by servicemen, search for survivors and recover bodies on the site of the Regent Cinema, in Valletta, hit on the evening of Sunday, February 15, 1942.


The Luftwaffe in Sicily intensified its attacks on Malta in the first two months of 1942, so that the island would no longer serve as a base for attacks on Axis convoys ferrying troops and supplies to North Africa.

In January, the Luftwaffe opened its offensive with strong fighter sweeps escorting small formations of bombers, with its top aces taking on the defending Hurricanes. At the time, an attempt was made by the Royal Navy to escort a convoy of three merchant ships to Malta from Alexandria but it ended in failure, with two of the ships sunk and the third sailing back to port.
At the same time, four empty ships sailed from Malta to Alexandria and arrived safely, including one, HMS Breconshire, carrying Maltese internees.
These episodes are also recorded in the latest two issues of Malta At War.
Also highlighted in the two issues are the heavy bombing raids which brought further destruction in various towns and villages such as Valletta, Floriana, Sliema, Paola and Ghajnsielem.

Malta At War is published by Wise Owl Publications and sells at Lm1.85 (€4.31).

 

Nice info. Thanks.

 

but that didn't change much things...

axis convoys keept on sinking, and rommel tanks bogged down into sand with no petrol.

 

maybe because germany had their eyes mainly set on defeating russia ,due to its enormous geography ,that been also its big industry in oil metals , and so on .Germany i think had its pryoretys set on this giant ,same as on britain ,eventually,for the nazis things would get out of hand .Maybe yes ? they should have concentrated on key elements such malta,gibraltar in closing the straits ,and strungling supply lines etc; But good for us they did not win the war .

 

I think the losses taken by German paratroopers/gliderborne troops during invasion of Create were enough to deter Hitler from another airborne attack ( besides this time on a heavily fortified target. Malta was no Create. Its defenses was much more stronger ) Besides Hitler's priority was Eastern Front during that time. Most of the reinforcements , material and resources were going to Russia. In fact he was barely convinced by General Student for Operation Mercury , invasion of Create in 1941. After the heavy casaulties taken Hitler lost his faith for airborne operations and often remarked "Airborne troops are a thing of past"

In 1940-42 period a possible invasion of Malta , "Operation Hercules" required a massive Italian involvement. Unfortunetely Italian Navy was not in a shape to fight. ( but Mussolini insisted that invasion of Malta should be a complate Italian operation and Hitler who wished to keep his blundering ally happy complied it. Besides he didn't want to involve Mediterenian Front personally at all ) Their commanders are very hesistant after defeats they have suffered at Taranto and Matapan. Moreover they had very little fuel. So Italian battleships were not able to leave harbour. Italian merchant fleet and naval units which already suffered heavy losses during this period ( they couldn't replace the ships they lost ) , were barely conducting supply operations for German/Italian units in North Africa and that was it. They had no more resources for both supplying Rommel and invading Malta. ( or so Italian commanders assumed ) When General Student presented his plan "Operation Hercules" for an airborne and seaborne attack on Malta to Hitler in April 1942 , Hitler was under the influance of negative reports about state of Italian Navy sent to him by German commanders in Mediterenian theatre. So he postponed Hercules to an indefinite time.

But of course meanwhile he and German General Staff forgot to put a leash on Rommel. When Rommel won Battle of Gazala and captured Tobruk he didn't stop and entered Egypt meanwhile outrun his supply lines. Then Kesselrings Luftwaffe units based on Mediterrenian began both participating supply operations for North Afrika and covering Afrikakorps on the ground while it advanced beyond their range as well as surprassing Malta and trying to stay alive. Predictably they failed in all of them.

Only Malta incident shows how uncoordinated Axis operations are in strategic level even in a local theater like Mediterrenian.

 

there was no point malta was a fortress and the british in north africa could of holded out alright.

 

Check my earlier post in this thread. Malta was not always a fortress. Before the DAK deployed, Malta was hardly defended. It was entirely possible for the Germans to take Malta first before landing in North Africa.

 

My new Alternate History Novel "OPERATION HERKULES" is now available on Amazon.com as an e-book and it addresses exactly the querstions posed here.
It is a novel with fictional as well as historic characters. I agree entirely that the invasion would have been a close-run affair, but I believe it would have
succeeded if tried in the late spring or early summer 1942. With Malta in Axis hands, I will explore the outcome of the desert war in the sequel.
http://www.amazon.com/OPERATION-HER...?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1325374333&sr=1-1

 

IMHO,it is unwise to focus on Malta.The supply problem of the DAK was intricate:there first was the problem of sending supplies to Naples (1500 km?),there,they had to be loaded on ships,a convoy has to be constituted,at the arrival on Tripoli,everything has to be transported to the front,on a quasi non existent rail infrastructure .
I have posted somewhere the monthly supply arrivals in NA,and,there were no big differences .

 

I can agree that Axis control of Malta would not be decisive in a Axis victory in North Africa, nor solve all the supply problems for Rommel. That does not however detract from the fact that there was a window in mid-late 1940 when the island was takable by Axis forces, and once taken to be a net value to the Axis cause.

Basing ASW assets from there would hinder Allied sub attacks on convoys.

Basing Fighter aircraft would hinder air attacks on convoys.

Basing long range reccon aircraft would expand the area under observation, granting the option of either intercepting Allied warships or rerouting convoys to avoid same.

Staging salvage and rescue assets in the port would enable aid to be given to damaged/sinking convoy vessels, damaged vessels could put in, repair or transfer cargos to other hulls.

When the Axis were forced out of North Africa the Allies would likely insist on retaking Malta prior to any attack on Sicly or the Italian mainland, thus delaying such a attack, keeping the Italians in the war longer and Germany more time to prepare to hold Italy.

Sometime events take on a life of their own. An early focus in the Med by Germany might ecourage the Axis to do the other things like expanding port and rail nets in North Africa that would prolong the campaign for the Axis and possibly delay Overlord.

It could also distract Mussolini from his Greek adventure which would no longer sap both German and Italian assets from more important fronts such as Russia and North Africa, and eventually, Northwest Europe (France). No Yugoslav-Greek adventure might start Operation Barbarossa 2-3 weeks earlier. Not enough time to ensure victory, but more time to render Red Army forces 'Hors de Combat' before winter sets in. Any additional Soviet losses work in favor of a longer living Reich.

Enigma Intel could only be used if the Allies could plausably convince the Axis that it came from a different source, usually air-sea reccon. Malta was usefull to the Allies in this reguard, and its loss would increase (however small) the chance that the Axis would conclude that their signal traffic had been compremised. Loss of Enigma would have added many layers of difficulty to tha Allies, and greatly aided the Axis.

Not every act is the one thing that ensures ultimate victory, but sometimes doing them does buy you time, and that was all Hitler wanted from Rommel anyway.

 

First of all, the Med. area was not of interest to Hitler, it was within Mussolini’s sphere of influence, the Germans had no designs on the area at all, nor even access to the Med. itself. until AFTER Yugoslavia & Greece. Hitler looked East, war with Stalin was always in the offing, both knew it, they were not Allies. Hitler moved into the area i.e. North Africa and then Greece and the Balkans, for one reason; to support Mussolini. Without Mussolini’s aspirations, then military rebuffs, there’re no Germans in the area, it’s as simple as that. Along the same lines, Mussolini did not support Hitler in Poland for fear of the Allies, i.e. Britain and France, he was not prepared for war and knew he had a great deal to fear from both, and that includes North Africa. Mussolini’s “Parallel War” concept wasn’t even formulated until both France and Britain were on the ropes thanks to Germany, and continued German pressure against Britain itself if not an outright invasion if Britain refused to submit, and even then the French were able to handle his efforts, and so did the British in Africa.

While it was distinct from Germany's war, Mussolini's "Parallel War" was quite dependent on it. While Hitler was keeping the British busy, attacking the UK and otherwise taking Britain’s stomach out of continuing the war, the Italians, much like they did against the French, would use the period to their advantage by hedging in on the areas that they would claim at the final peace table; Suez from the Med., and the Red Sea area from East Africa, consolidating the area largely at Britain’s expense. It's not even a matter of attacking Egypt, more of taking on border posts and getting close enough to point just “over there” to make claims. Never the less that is how actual combat was initiated in Africa, Mussolini felt the urge so acutely that he wrote off a huge chunk of his own merchant marine seized in foreign ports in order to stake his claims before Britain caved in to Germany, it had little to do with the Germans directly. Most histories are of the view that Mussolini disappointed Hitler, however the reverse is just as appropriate when you consider the grief Sealion beached in France caused Mussolini in the long run. The British, left off the hook, and aware that apart from bombing they were limited as far as options for offensive war with Germany, and would be for a while, opted to exert diplomatic and economic pressure on Spain to limit Germany’s options in the Western Med. (and Petain wasn’t interested),and to respond to the Italian challenge, even shipping out a large part of their armoured force during the BoB, but it was a war that played to British strengths, i.e. maritime and largely colonial, that they knew they could win.



The Axis didn’t need Malta for anything, the Italians remained in control of Pantelleria, and Lampedusa for ASW, fighters & recon, salvage ships, repair et. al., and with a limited merchant marine, what they didn’t need was another island to feed and supply, and those forces were better served on Sicily anyway. Pantelleria, and Lampedusa themselves required neutralizing before HUSKY. But Axis ASW by aircraft was poor, although aircraft versions of ASW weapons were developed prior and during WWII, only one non-Soviet submarine was “possibly” sunk by Luftwaffe aircraft and another shared with surface ships. Information on Soviet submarine losses is unreliable even now, but, omitting harbor or stranded losses, it appears that only five were sunk by aircraft. The Luftwaffe’s ASW record was abysmal.

 

Malta was a important point but not in the way to make the NA campaign a top or a flop. It would´ve been better to have it under control but not under all circumstances. The bigger problem was Italy and their not really successful troops and the danger of having a allied landing in the early years of the war at there.