What if Germans attacked through Maginot?

The spacing between the forts would allow for another points f the fortress to fore on the section under attack. You would face a fierce barrage if you decided to attack the Maginot Line. And the germans were stoped at some points!


Cheers...

 

How fierce? How many guns within say 10km range? What anti-tank obstacles?

 

It varies quite a bit. A rough estimate is that there is about 5 to 7 km between Gros Ouvrages with something like one to two km between interval blocks in between. So, one could expect long range fire from two Gros Ouvrage typically, and possibly three at the very most. At closer ranges two Gros Ouvrage and one or two interval forts could engage targets.

One possible method I haven't discussed would involve use of alot of smoke rounds coupled with a general bombardment by field artillery on these forts. They are completely dependent on the observation cupolas for effective return fire. If these are blind by smoke and possibly uninhabitable due to concussion from the artillery fire (not an uncommon thing) the Germans probably could have closed fairly quickly on a fort to assault it.
There are no defensive minefields so only the wire and antitank obstacles would prevent it. Unaimed defensive fire probably would slow things down alot but it might have been possible to still enter the fort perimeter and take on the above ground portions without prohibitive casualties.

 

I found this perhaps it can bring the maginot line from words to life with the pictures and map references. Some nice movies too.

The maginot line Lorraine Tourism Horizon Hotel

and these.
The Maginot Line

The Maginot Line

 

Thanks for all the valuable info you guys provided. I'm not that well versed with the Maginot Line and now I know more than I used to. From what I see here, I have to say that the Maginot Line can be taken but only at a very heavy cost to the attacker. The Germans were right in taking the path of least resistance. It would have been fool hardy to waste valuable troops and equipment in an attack on the Maginot when one can still render that tough defensive line ineffective by attacking in a lesser defended sector.
Tanks that are mobile are less vulnerable to artillery fire, that's true. However, tanks have to stop to fire accurately. And if artillery fire can force them to continue weaving instead of firing, then the tanks are denied much of their offensive punch, which is a boon to the defense.

 

Oe detail I've assumed, but not yet found any evidence pro or con, is a link between the fortress artillery and the field divsion and corps artillery of theinterval units. French doctrine makes this a easy assumption, but solid evidence would be nice, as well as the details of coodinationg the fires of the fortresses and the field artillery.

The maps of the French deployment I have show a considerable ammount of heavy and long range artillery emplaced in the fortress zone.

 

And some others:

Fort de Fermont

http://lignemaginot.com/menu12/indexen.htm

 

The French and their forts...to assume the whole Maginot line was a tremendous feat is good, bit to assume the wehrmacht would have attacked the whole front of this line is absurd....you have 200 panzers. Luftwaffe air superiority, how long would have the line held if attacked at a narrow front by a spearhead???? once penetrated, could the fort/line retreat and form another line of defense??

Diem Bien Phu, i think was another French fort...General Giap soon eliminated this as well

 

If I felt generous I'd say the Dien Bien Phu argument is weak. DBP was not a fortress, only an airstrip with a number of reinforced positions consisting of no more than a few trenches and dugouts, sited absolutely in the middle of no place at all, cut-off from communications, completly isolated of other supporting units.

No connection at all with the subject of the thread.

 

Exactlt. A totally different situation and circumstances. The VietMinh were able to fire basically from all sides DOWN upon DBP should give you one good example of how that were totally different

 

This misconstrues how the fortresses were to fight. They were not a stand alone system but built as adjuct or renforcement for the field army. Conventional divsions, corps, and army units were deployed in a intergrated defense system. Where the enemy actually broke through the fortress zone it was role of the field units to counter the enemy. The purpose of the fortresses were to act as hardend points to stall the enemys manuver, forcing them to delay to organize a methodical attack with carefully coordinated artillery fires. This would give the French heavy artillery a moment to organize long range counter fires to attrition and break up the enemy units, and then for lighter artillery to support the infantry and tanks in counter attacks. In this respect the fortresses were a more elaborate or sophisticated form of the entrenched strong points the French and Germans used in 1918. Concrete and steel rather than sandbags and timbers.

One way to think of this is he fortresses as a warriors shield, used to asorb or deflect a blow while he makes a counter thrust with his sword.

 

Exactly. The Maginot Line was primarily designed to provide a series of interlocking fire zones along its length that would pin an attacker and blunt breakthroughs. It was not primarily intended for offensive fire. That was to be provided by supporting field units.

 

Exactly the Germans only began to move against the M-Line when German forces had come in from behind through Belgium, once the Germans had begun to infiltrate into the rear of those troops behind the M-Line it became obsolete, that is why Army Group C never made an attempt to attack it directly.

Bf109 emil

As far as i know, and i'll look it up but i don't recall that Army Group C had any Panzer Divisions attached to it, it was an infantry only Army Group.

v.R

 

Here is a description of one of the German attacks on the main fortified zone. While I dont like using internet sources it seems reasonable match with the books and should illustrate some of the details. Note that most of this description covers the time after the field divsions comprising the Interval Forces were withdrawn to cover the Somme/Oise sectors. Most of the units identified are the fortress garrisons and the 'Infantry Regiments Fortress' that occupied the forward zone of MG & AT positions that covered the border and approches to the main fortress zone.

http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=45&t=29084

 

sorry, but numerous german mercinaries(ex SS troops now fighting in Indo-China) employed by France still wondered why France would not send out scouts..and scoffed at France and their forts....while tracking and attacking General Giaps forces...i stand corrected at being an airstrip....but in the artillery barrage from the hills around the valley French where hunkered down in trenches, barb wire defenses, so might not have been a fort but an air-strip,,the fire-support for this base was not mobile or was it????

 

During the initial days the French sent patrols out to the hills. They were driven back into the valley. After first week the Viet Minh had the valley encircled with infantry positions. Subsequent French ventures out were raids on the VM positions.

The French artillery was initially twentyfour 105mm & four 155mm howitzers. There were also three "companys" of 120mm mortars. Dug into pits open topped pits the cannon & mortars were exposed to plunging fire from the cannon and mortars of the VM positioned in the surrounding hills. Overall the French artillery was out numbered by 3-1.

Dien Bien Phu was not fought in isolation. Several French offensives into the same area from Laos and the Red River Valley were also defeated that spring. That is the entire French stratigic offensive for the year was defeated in several battles. Dien Bien Phu was the one battle that recived all the publicity.

 

It was the main French garrison, and when defeated, basically defeated the French's claim on Indo-China as a colony...little is printed in works on diem bien phu, unless books on actual fighting, or works about General Giap having to fight former SS mercenaries brought their seeking employment after the collapse of Germany for want of jobs...
i will try and find the book among my stuff which reveals or states scouts. early LRRP units where ex SS troops now employed in Viet Nam (Indo-China) and their words during this battle

 

Not exactly the same type of terrain nor fortifications isn't it?

 

Main garrison? The group trapped in Dien Bein Phu represented just a small percentage of the French field forces. The eight Groupes Mobiles, and the amphbious force (that conducted the Atlante operation the same time as the Castor operation), were all busy either attacking in the northern highlands in support of operation Castor, or in subsidiary operations elsewhere. Overall these operations failed to achieve Navarre's goals. Even had the Dien Ben Phu garrison survived, or Operations Castor not been executed the French would still have been in a losing stratigic position in the summer of 1954.

The parachute force used in Operation Castor was not to be a static garrison but rather a mobile raiding force cutting the Viet Minh supply route through that area. That it was trapped by a enemy with a better strategy and operational plan is not the result of a 'fortress mentality'. Trying to bend this battle around to illustrate a point about the Maginot fortifications and fortress mentality is a weak proposition.