Alternate German naval strategies

Could Germany have realistically devised a naval war plan and building program that was capable of defeating Britain? While it is doubtful that Germany could have come up with a naval program or strategy that could have outright defeated the Royal Navy at sea it is likely that they could have come up with one that could have successfully allowed them to fight and win a commerce war against Britain. This "what-if" is to look at the pre-war period and see if the KM could have changed their strategies and production from say the early 30's to build ships to a plan that could have won against Britain.

Plan Z was definitely not going to do it. It is unlikely that most of the ships would ever have been built. Germany just lacked the resources and economy for it.

One alternative would have been to build a carrier centered fleet. Let's say Germany starts WW 2 with 4 CV roughly on the size of the Graf Zeppelin but without that ship's major flaws and another 4 large merchant / liner conversions capable of slightly smaller air wings.

Another possibility might be to build a coastal defense navy supplemented by a focus on commerce raiding in near waters (eg., the North Sea, Channel, and North Atlantic around Britain). Here the surface raiders would operate at sea for short periods using hit and run tactics rather than stay out for prolonged periods. A few long ranged raiders might also be used.

A third is to build more surface raiders and ensure they are at sea around the world prior to the start of the war in fair numbers along with continuing a U-boat war.

Discussion?

 

<One alternative would have been to build a carrier centered fleet. Let's say Germany starts WW 2 with 4 CV roughly on the size of the Graf Zeppelin but without that ship's major flaws and another 4 large merchant / liner conversions capable of slightly smaller air wings.>

I think, if this were to happen, Britain would have hunted them down as soon or while they were still in port......just like Bismarck. Carriers were in violation of the Treaty[so I would think.]



As long as the Uboats messages were being 'read', I don't see any help here either.

 

I like this.

If i was not constrained by material shortages. After thinking about this for some time i would have gone for a fleet of at least 100 heavy class ocean capable destroyers, 140 U-Boats, 20-30 Surface Raiders (Kormoran type), 10-20 Pocket Battleships/Heavy Cruisers. I would not waste my time on the large Tirpitz class and Graf Zeppelin class of ships.

I would have prior to the outbreak of war deployed at least

40 Heavy class Destroyers.
40 U-Boats.
8 Surface Raiders
5 Pocket Battleships/Heavy Cruisers

Into the Med and have them based in Italy. This is to work with and assist the Italian Navy in taking on the Royal Navy from the ouset, sorta like preemptive strike at Alexandria.
As for everything else i'll think about it.

 

But, you are constrained by material and production shortages. Reality deals you an evil blow. How do you win in a constrained enviroment?

 

The Bismark was awesome.

 

How about the raiders with FW Condors? The Condors did quite alot of damage in the beginning but no increase in production there. The Germans, I figure, did not have the resources to build a "real navy" like the RN. Also the gliding bombs would have been excellent in bombing harbours and perhaps destroyers etc, say putting the V1 money in those things. So Germany would have to find alternative means to fight the war at sea. And of course the subs.

 

Given that the German Navy was not ready for war when Hitler invaded Poland, the best strategy would have closely followed what historically happened. The U-Boat campaign was very effective until the Greenland air gap was closed and an effective convoy and escort system was implemented.

The fact that enormous allied resources were tied up by the Allies in trying to keep the Tirpitz bottled up, the Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, Hipper, and others in check, it would seem that a this tactic was even more effective than direct confrontation. This division of allied air and naval forces was the most effective means that the German navy had for effectively dealing with the numerically superior Allies.

It the Germans had and used more U-Boats, particularly longer-ranged schnorkel-equipped types, and had more of the fast battle cruiser type of task groups early in the war, they could have stretched the Allies' resources and ability to supply England to the breaking point. Of course, this would have required the cooperation of the Luftwaffe, something that would have been impossible with Goering at the head.

tom

 

100 war-ready Type VII U-Boots at krieg's begin. That would have done it. Germany had around a dozen Type VII's ready for the Battle of the Atlantic in 39. Doenitz said he needed 300 to be successful. I think, realistically, Germany could and should have had around 100 ready at war's begin (some hidden because of T of Versailles), with plans to produce a further 200 within 2 years. A massive concentration of wolf packs, before suitable counter-measures had taken effect, would have spelt DOOM with a capital D for the UK. It was only in mid-42 when the Allies finally had some decent weapons to use against the U-Boats, and aircraft finally had long enough range to cover the gaps. If we combine this, with another what if and say that the Germans developed the schnorkel 2 years earlier, well....

Germany's leadership squandered the little naval resources and potential they had. They should have learned from WW1.

 

I believe German Naval strategy is a moot point unless they also had air superiority. The carrier strategy discussed earlier could have worked had the Germans been able to protect them in port. Again this would have to be done with air superiority.
All the ships and all the subs, I think, are negated with out this.

 

Perhaps more of the U-boat approach?

 

If they had let Speer loose a couple years earlier...

Well, more U-boats.

 

Dont worry about the "Treaty". After the French withdrew their army from the Rhineland in 1924 it was uneforceable. The lack of German military expansion from 1925 to 1934 had more to do with economics and a lack of serious interest by the Weinmar era leaders.