Luftwaffe in Russia,the first 100 days

The Luftwaffe and Its War of Attrition

 

Sorry. I forgot to mention I thought some might be interested LOL.

 

This comes from my 'favorite' of all sources(notice the dripping sarcasm).

"The failure of the Luftwaffe during Barbarossa was reflected in its losses, with 2,093 aircraft of all types being destroyed. Soviet losses stand at 21,200 destroyed, 10,000 in combat, of which 7,500 were shot down by the Luftwaffe fighters, who could now boast some of the top aces like Günther Lützow who had already surpassed the 100 victory mark; these scores were to increase over time.[70] The successes of the German air arm were offset by the losses which unlike the Soviet Air Force could not be replaced easily as the German economy had not yet been put on a full war footing. Losses in personnel were also high and irreplaceable with 3,231 killed, 2,028 missing and 8,453 wounded.[71]" - Wikipedia.

2,093 aircraft lost. This is from the beginning of Barbarossa to the end of 1941. Which would be from roughly July(Yes, June 22, its near the end of the month though) to January. So, 2093 divided by 6 = 348 aircraft a month.

Its wiki which is notoriously inaccurate, but it might help?


Yours,

Bill

 

"By the time the United States entered the war in December 1941, the Germans had lost the equivalent in aircraft of two whole air forces. From the onset of major operations against Scandanavia and Western Europe in the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe had faced an appalling attrition rate. In May 1940, a month during which the Germans lost 20.2 percent of their total force structure and 27.4 percent of their bomber force, the Luftwaffe lost more aircraft in three weeks of heavy fighting than it would lose in any other month of that year.3 By the end of 1941, sustained attrition of Luftwaffe units in Russia had brought German air power into serious straits, as production of new aircraft and the training of new crews proved incapable of keeping up with front-line demands for replacements. Adding to the seriousness of the situation was the fact that the German logistic system broke down in the depths of Russia. By January 1942, only 47 percent of bomber crews in front-line units were fully operationa1.4 "In-commission" rates had fallen to 52 percent for fighters, to only 32 percent for bombers, and to 45 percent for the whole force structure.5"

http://www.ww2f.com/wwii-general/21696-attrition-luftwaffe.html

 

Tch, how can you say all that about the BEST airforce in the world, who painted their airplanes with the sexiest camouflages?

 

What is so weird about the German Army and Luftwaffe finding it hard to continue the campaign?

Hitler had told the war would be over in two months and that´s it.

No need to produce more tanks and planes etc that is according to Mr H. If you think how tough it is for the planes and tanks etc to continue fighting all the way through the autumn, some of which had only returned from the Balkans´operation without proper time to make repairs etc, the numbers are not very surprising. The best example to describe the poor situation of replacements is from Guderian who went to request new tanks from Hitler himself in late August/early Sept 1941, and Hitler only had 200 new tank engines to offer. And Guderian himself thought the tanks available were almost beyond repair after almost three months of battle continuously.

Just my two cents...

 

No, that goes to the P-51 in the all chrome/shiny metal scheme. That is a sexy airplane.

Yours,

Bill

 

Don't forget the "cool" uniforms and the "awesome" weapons too LOL.
Damn Logistics!!! Always ruining those master plans .

 

Yes, but what was so "cool" about their uniforms or weapons systems Mr. Falkenberg? :stickpoke:


Yours,

Bill

 

I don't have figures for the time period in question but looking at a collection of day fighter plane losses for units in France in 1942 more than 50% are non combat related. Of course in France 1942 losses due to AA are low, even if there were some friendly fire incidents, but it's likely that the poorer airfield conditions on the Eastern Front would make that worse. I have no hard data but from most WW2 unit accounts I would expect an attrition not far from 0.5% just from accidents for aircraft operated from forward fields and with a tempo of operations that limits maintenance. Considering some units were doing 3 or more sorties a day over one hundred days that alone would make something close to half the initial force.

 

There is a site I have where it gives the reasons for Luftwaffe aircraft losses in Norway Both combat and non-combat. I was hoping that there might be something similar for the first few months of Barbarossa

 

You should be asking those here who think so. Im not one of them.

 

interesting