Having collected a couple of books about Dienbienphu ( including Fall's famous 'Hell In A Very Small Place' - great title ! ) over the years but never having got around to reading them, recently found a cheap copy of Jules Roy's 'The Battle Of Dien Bien Phu', started reading it, and I'm hooked.... An extraordinary story which feels as though it falls somewhere between Arnhem and Stalingrad ; you know that the whole thing is doomed to awful failure and read on, fascinated.....
Sounds good. Sure I read somewhere that the Yanks learned the lessons of Dien Bien Phu and avoided the same thing happening at Khe San.
Here is a US Army Pdf on the subject . Just click on the Handle/Proxy URL. Resupply at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu: What Lessons Were Learned and How Are They Applied to Today's Military Operations This is a case-study examination of operations characterized as small separated unit operations with great strategic significance without the benefit of secure ground lines of communication linked to secure support bases. The paper looks specifically at the battle of Dien Bien Phu during the French-Indochina War of 1946 to 1954 and the battle of Khe Sanh during the second Indochina War in 1967. These battles had decisive strategic implications, which affected the conduct of the war. The paper focuses on the French failure at Dien Bien Phu to logistically support a viable strategy for winning the war or specifically this battle which in defeat undermined any effort of the French to win the war against the Vietminh. French logistical errors in planning or lack of concern for the logistical aspect of the operation, ensured their defeat. These logistical shortfalls at Dien Bien Phu provided an opportunity for the United States Military to learn from this operation and incorporate the lessons learned into future applications of airborne operations and training. The standard of measurement in determining if the United States learned from the logistical shortfalls at Dien Bien Phu began with the support effort at Khe Sanh and in the Airborne operations conducted by the United States since Khe Sanh. Studying the lessons of these two battles and their impact on national strategy are applicable to Army Transformation and will add to the professional growth and understanding of future United States Army War College students and other interested military officers and strategists. Resupply at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu: What Lessons Were Learned and How Are They Applied to Today's Military Operations
Or this one, The Battle of Dien Bien Phu: Strategic, Operational and Tactical Failure This strategy research project is a case-study examination of the battle of Dien Bien Phu during the French-Indochina War of 1946 to 1954. This battle was the decisive event of the war. The paper focuses on: French failure to craft a viable strategy for winning the war or this battle against their enemy, the Vietnamese communists or Viet Minh; French operational errors that helped ensure their defeat at Dien Bien Phu; and the most important tactical mistake that the French made fighting the battle. Studying the lessons learned from this battle and French failure at each level of war - strategic, operational, and tactical, will add to the professional understanding of future United States Army War College students and other interested military officers. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu: Strategic, Operational and Tactical Failure
if you want to see a reaily good film about( dien bien phu ) about the french in vietnam try .. jump into hell ..a very good account of the french best krieg
And another The Generalship of General Henri E. Navarre during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu This study examines the generalship of the French Commander-in-Chief in Indochina, General Henri E. Navarre, during the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. This thesis employs a model of generalship from the United States Army doctrinal publication, Field Manual 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels, to analize the actions of General Navarre. Through the application of the model, this thesis tests whether American doctrine supports or refutes the judgment of history. The conclusion reached is that the defeat of the French forces at the battle of Dien Bien Phu was largely due to a failure of senior level leadership on the part of General Henri E. Navarre. Navarre, Dien Bien Phu, Generalship The Generalship of General Henri E. Navarre during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu
Pardon me for finding this a bit amusing, if not highly ironic, considering the outcome of the US involvement in Vietnam. What I find most intriguing, is this obsession within the US military to view past failures on the part of the French as a topic of study to avoid the same mistakes, often concluding that we (the US) naturally prevailed where the French failed. This instantly reminds me of the Pentagon's request at the beginning of the 2003 Iraq war, that as many generals and officers study the French involvement in the Algerian conflict, ostensibly to teach them to avoid protracted fighting in Iraq, and how not to become involved in a prolonged occupation and counter-insurgency war in Iraq. I dare say that the "lessons", whatever they were thought to be, were not very well learned. If anything, in both cases, I remember reading how the French advised us in both cases not to become involved for those very same reasons, lessons we should have learned.
Yes - that's the other book I've got but haven't read ! I agree that the above points are very interesting - logistics, guns,bombs, tanks, aircraft, tactics etc etc etc - what seems to be missing are the salient points that a) the French higher political and miltary orders didn't seem to have clearly defined war aims ( whereas the Viet Minh certainly did ). And b) , really, the French troops on the ground just would have preferred to be somewhere else. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, fighting for their country ( as they saw it ) were prepared to go that further mile.......
Do you know that some of the men who fought in Indochina were Ostfront veterans who joined the Foreign Legion after the war? I saw a great film about the Algeria War the other day called "Ennemi Intime" There were Monte Casino veterans on both sides and former brothers in arms who once opened the road to Rome and were now killing each other. This war was the first time copters and Napalm were used on large scales. From 1954 to 1962 27.000 French lost their lives v.s 500.000 Algerians. It gives you an idea of the Massacre. I'd advice watching "the Battle of Algiers too". I have a great respect for the Vets ( from both sides) who fought this war.
A brilliant book Martin, reads like a novel. Took me 2 days to read it, couldnt put it down. The battle itself I rate alongside your other love Arnhem for personalities. Many of the guys had been there before a few years previously, some had been through a similar mill at Bir Hikheim outpost in desert I probably got spelling wrong, but again, Frenchmen surrounded, cut off, fighting to the end, well getting out of that one anyway. I never go with the long oft repeated French surrender merchants, Lille in 1940, and the Dunkirk reaguards for example prove that wrong. Certainly Coraps army broke and ran, but with their setup and formation etc they could do little else. Most Brit troops in 1940 saw only the useless mouth running few saw the guys holding the line while we evacuated. Few saw the lines on the mole of the fighting rearguard left to surrender.
Some remarkable pictures in 'The last Valley', still on my 'to read' heap after insistent recommendations by friends.. French Soldiers, some with German military backgrounds, wearing Denison smocks, while assembling Chaffees. An 'interesting' time. Cheers, Adam.
Many more books to read! A whole life won't suffice now. Many of the Dien Bien Phu veterans were sent to Algeria later. I know veterans who have fought both wars. They often have the feeling that they fought forgotten wars.
The French had a good use for the SS. They enrolled them in the Foreign Legion and shipped them to Vietnam to fight the Viet Minh. And not having to declare your past helped in hiding the identities of these former German troopers.I have heard of two books on them. "Devil's Guard" & "Recall To Inferno, Devil's Guard Two. But I don't know if they are ficton or not.
Fiction but based on facts. As long as they were not guilty of (war) crimes they were free to apply. The selection was severe though (and still is) .Many Ukrainians were enrolled too. they could not return to their country so their best option was the Foreign Legion. Amazing when you think some of these guys fought from Barbarossa in 1941 or (even earlier) up to Algiers in 1962.
