Belgium joins Allies, April 1940

I'll admit here I've never quite understood why Belgium remained neutral right up until the end, but let's suppose a meteorite falls on King Leopold about a month before the German invasion. Everyone else realizes that the Germans are coming, and they allow the British and French into the country a little early.

Allied victory, 1940? I think so. Not only would they be able to slow things down a bit and avoid the wild racing around that happened in May, but even if things still went wrong the British would probably be able to withdraw to the south instead of across the Channel.

Under these conditions, maybe Churchill would have been a little less stingy with the air power.

And would the Netherlands follow suit?

 

In the end the Germans would still win because of the lack of coordination and communications between four countries, alsthough the cost for Germany would be much higher.

 

I agree with Von Rundstedt. There is no way the war could have ended in 1940. Belgium was not strong enough to make a major impact (while not denying their definite contributions) on the entire German military, and while it might have delayed the fall of France, there was still a lack of British-French-Belgian coordination. Also overall the general sense was that the war would be small and end with in months. It wasn't until the fall of France the world started to be concerned by Germany and eventually the rest of the Axis.

 

Ya the conventional wisdom is the Wehrmact & Luftwaffe had just too much of a edge in 1940. So, barring the Allies rolling snake eyes with two dice theres two remaining questions. First how badly are the Germans attritioned. Second is the German victory weak enough that the French government agrees to relocate to Africa rather than ask for terms.

In the first case the Wehrmacht and particularly the Luftwaffe may be beaten up far worse than most folks would anticiapte. ie: the actuall permanent losses of aircraft was somewhere between 35% & 40%. During the campaign losses of aircrew were somewhat less, tho severe, but a significant portion were recovered when France agreed to a cease fire. Permanent losses in tanks vary according to how one defines loss but at a minimum roughly 20 - 30% of the valuable MkIII & Mk IV tanks were severely damaged. Artillery ammunition sufficed for the campaignas it was fought, but consumption outran the ability of production and reserves to sustain a long campaign. Infantry casualties were not light. A 1973 magazine artical by Al Nofi gives 155,000 killed and wounded for the entire six weeks. Aside from severe losses in the airbourne divsions in the first week the bulk of those losses seem to have occured in the last 3-4 weeks of the battle. That is the German took over half their losses after the truncated French army got its feet back on the ground.

Belgium joining the Allies in April, even late April, can cause several things. Obviously the French and British can move north and dig in across the defense zones they had planned. With Allied units well forward the Belgian are going to follow their original plan and fight a delaying action along the Meuse river north of Liege, and in the eastern Ardennes. Historically the Belgians chose to make a rapid fighting withdrawl, judging correctly their units in the forward screen would be destroyed without imeadiate reinforcement and support from the French. Thus the German armored corps had their first two days march handed to them with little fighting. Had the combined French and Belgian screening forces made a stand they would have suffered severely and the overall German advance through the Ardennees resembled the 10 May fight at Bodnage Belgium.

More important is the Belgian Army will be well along in mobilization. Instead of half or onethird strength formations on the first two days of the campaign there will be battalions at 75% to 90% strength in the forward and main defense zones. Most will be in their battle positions rather than milling about the armorys or barracks. And, the critical bridges across the Albert cannal will be defended by reinforced companys rather than a corprals guard.

A denser perpared forward defense slows the German advance by a few critical days. In the opening week of the campaign the French command sems to have been running 48 hours behind events. Slowing the Germans by 48 to 72 hours allows the French command to cope with events occuring at a pace it can handle. Consequently the Germans have fewer days of easy pursuit and exploitation and more of actual battle.

None of this is guaranteed to save France. What it is likely to do is kill a lot more Germans, destroy a lot more aircraft and tanks, and give Reynaud a chance to remove the French government to Africa, as he was attempting to do when the ceasefire came.

 

Okay I am confused why would more English and French in Belgium hurt the Germans more, remember that the break in the line came south of Belgium and North of France. The more in the pocket the better for the Germans. If anything this could have hastened the defeat of the allies in 1940. IMO.

 

I agree. The Ardennes would still have been lightly defended and the German would still have broken through and possibly bagged more divisions.

 

Churchill makes the point in his book that the problem wasn't so much that there was a breakthrough, but that there was no strategic reserve to counterattack. Many of the best Allied units wore themselves out racing north. I'm thinking that if Belgium goes for the Allies, enough mobile units could be kept fresh that when Churchill asks, "Ou est le mass de maneuver", he's met with more than blank stares. (sorry if I butchered the French spelling - going by memory here.)

 

What about a coordinated attack at the base of the German spearhead, as was tried but didn't really get too coordinated. No dice?

 

You make a point if (big 'if') the French and British were coordinated of which from what I have read, were not. I don't think they ever agreed on a common strategy

 

A decade or so ago I got ahold of a French OB/position map for 10 May. It displayed the starting position of every French divsion in NW France, and its 'battle postion' for the Dyle plan. The divsions assigned to the Stratigic Reserve are clearly designated and the reserves of the individual armys can be inferred. Using that I went through my books on the campaign and noted when each divsion of the reserve was ordered to the battle zone and where. This made it clear the problem was the French senior commanders were far too slow in ordering up these divsions.

Here is a rough outline of the initial half measures.

10 May, first day of the campaign.
The 71st infantry, a third rate class B unit was ordered back to the 2d Army. It had just been withdrawn from the Sedan sector a few days earlier for a month of combat training. It spent the next three days returning to its original position and arrive in time to be outflanked by Guderians Corps. Its regiments were moved about again in a attempt to counter attack and cover the east side of the bridgehead. The 10th PzDiv attacked and the untrained reservists disolved in confusion when the commander tried to withdraw them.

The 1st & 2d DCR, the assualt armored divsions with the heavy B1 tanks, were both ordered to the Charleroi area to act as reserve for the 1st and 9th Armys. The 1st arrived at Charleroi on time. The commander spent the next three days receiving orders assigning him to the Army Group reserve, to 1st Army reserve, back to AG reserve... he finally got orders to 9th Army on the 14th, and subsequent orders to participate in a corps size counter attack on a German bridgehead at Dinant. After a long night march the tanks and artillery arrived at the assembly area north east of Phillpeville, where they waited half the morning of the 15th for the fuel trucks. Just as the first refuelers arrived Rommels 7th Pz came pounding down the road and the French franticly attempted a defense. After about four hours the advance guard of the 5th PzDiv came up on the 1st DCR left flank and the divsion was destroyed as it ran out of fuel. A North African infantry divsion was part of the 9th Army reserve and was susposed to counter attack with the 1 DCR. As Rommel got past the 1 DCR's right flank in the afternoon he caught the NA Div on the road marching east. After losing a few tanks to their advance guard he overran the infantry and artillery columns on the road.

The 2dDCR was stalled when its railroad cars for transporting the tanks did not show up on time. Its orders were then changed assigning it directly to the 9th Army. As it moved north several days late its scattered columns were caught by the 6th & 8th PzDiv on the 15th of May. The tanks fought in small groups until they ran out of fuel and ammo. The artillery and infantry regiments managed to escape back south with part of their companys intact. Both DCR were well trained and caused the Germans significant casualties. But, both were caught without any support on their flanks and unable to resupply. In both cases the German armored divsions out numbered them over 3-1 in tanks.

11 May
The 53rd Infantry Div, another B unit, was posted near the junction of the 2d and 9th Armys. In between the bridgehead of Guderians corps @ Sedan and the bridgehead of the 6th & 8th PzDiv near Montherme. The 53rd recived three or four changes of orders in the next five days, moving it from one defensive assignment to another. Eventually it was caught by Guderians corps just as the exhausted infantry were starting to dig in far west of the Bar River. The barbed wire still rolled and piled, the mines not laid, the AT guns not dug in, the artillery not registered, the communications only half operating. The 1st and 2d PzDiv went though it like a pair pit bulls with a feather pillow.

13 May
The 3rd DCR and the 3rd Motorized Infantry Div were assigned to 21st Corps HQ and ordered to join 2d Army. Enroute they recived a plan for counter attacking the Sedan bridgehead on the 14th of May. After a long 20 + hour march and assembly the two divsions were nearly ready for a late afternoon attack. Then the corps commander Gen Flavigny canceled the attack contrary to his orders. That evening and night (the 14th) the two divsions were reorganized in a defense. Then on the 16th May they were ordered to concentrate for a attack towards Sedan. The efforts to concentrate the tanks were thwarted by the corps commander constantly ordering detachments sent off to deal with incursions by the German 10th PzDiv. the samll local attacks were individually sucessfull, but not strong enough to break into Guderians rear. The 3rd Motorized was a relatively elite unit and should have given the Germans hell. But, it was never allowed to concentrate and like the 3rd DCR its battalions were scattered on minor missions.

I could keep going on but everyone has probablly got the picture by now. There were several other divsions that were ordered out of reserve between the 10th and 14th May. All were as misused as those I have described. The bulk of the French reserve sat idle until about the 15th & 16th. My take is the battle was lost by the 16th. All seven armored divsions in the Sickle Cut manuver had broken out by that date, the German motorized infantry were on their heels, and the leg infantry were starting to cross the Meuse River as well. If the French had got it together in the first four days they might have accomplished something. The Germans suffered significant casualties in the first week, but the defense was just not strong enough to keep it up and real help never arrived. Of the 16 divsions in the 'Stratigic Reserve' only five or maybe six got orders before the 15th of May. That is six days after the battle started.

 

Churchill was speaking to Gamelin at that moment. Gamelin responded "There is none" and was refering to his understanding that all the units in the former stratigic reserve had been committed to the battle by that time. This conversation occured around the 18th or 19th I think. Gamelin may have also been trying to convey that with three of his armys nearly surrounded in Belgium any remaining reserve was irrelevant.

In any case Churchill was speaking with the wrong man. While Gamelin was the senior French commander he was responsible for all French forces across the globe. Georges, commander of the North West Front was the man responsible for fighting the battle there. While Gamelin usually gets the blame Georges was the senior guy who made the bad calls in the actuall execution of the Dyle Plan and in dealing with the German manuver. Well, he had help from Billotte, Corap, and a few others. All Gamelin did was order the plan started. Then he stepped back to let Georges run his own battle.

 

Thanks for the really thorough reply, Carl. It's hard to read that stuff without thinking about all the mayhem that could have been prevented if the French had had better luck, or something. I guess that's why I posted this what-if.

 

If the Allies follow the Dyle plan there would be more combat units sent to cover the Ardennes than to central Belgium. the Belgian had two more motorized divsions that were susposed to deploy on or east of the Ourthe-Neufchateau line (which was fortified). The French 2d & 9th Armys had four more infantry divsions that were susposed to deploy forward to reinforce the five mechanized cavalry after the main defense zone along the Meuse River was set. Two to four weeks delay wopuld find the Belgian border defended by four full strength motorized divsions rather than two partially mobilized divsions. They would be backed up by between six to nine infantry (mostly motorized) and mech cavalry. These were to be deployed in a deep zone of entrenchements, rather than encountering the German mech corps in a suprise meeting engagement.

Certainly this does not stop Kliests Panzer Group, but the Pz Grp takes a lot more than the 5-10% casualties it actually did in the three short days it took to cross the Ardennes. Guderian seems to have thought it would take a week to make that same advance against a proper defense. Even if just two days are added it gives the French army commanders, Corap & Huntzinger and the Front Commander Georges the extra hours they needed to react. This is why Guderian and Kliest were so frantic about crossing the Meuse river at the earliest opportunity, tho this meant using untried methods. The numerous map exercises they had run the previous winter had convinced both of them that allowing the French just a extra day or two could wreck the Sickle Cut plan. They off a bit in that estimate, but were correct in that each day the advance was delayed the balance tipped away from them.

Elsewhere, positioning the 7th Army forward near Antwerp allows it to easily sieze the critical Scheldt Estuary, and the roads north to the Dutch inner defense. Holding the sea channel to Antwerp means the Germans cant actually cut off the Allied left wing as one of the largest ports in Europe is securely in Allied hands. The Germans can make a likely effort with their own right wing to drive the Allies away from Antwerp and the large Dutch ports, but the effort will require weakening the follow on forces of the Sickle Cut manuver. The German army is not quite strong enough to do both. further more once the 7th Army accomplishes its first mission the bulk of it can revert to the stratigic or operational reserve of the Allied left. Its mechanized corps (including a armored divsion) is available days sooner to move south to the main battle.

In general the German breakout is delayed by a couple days minimum and loses twice the tanks, aircraft, and artillery ammunition accomplishing this. In theory this loss and delay could be greater, but that requires the Allies, particularly the French to make some tough decisions correctly about where and when to deploy their reserves. Its really tough to guess what Corap Georges might have decided.