Produce the Panther or stick with more Panzer IV/Tigers?

As for the Panther, I am convinced that it was a terrible economical and strategic failure for the Germans. The presence of a few hundred operational Panthers Aus. D & A ( Aus. D being a real piece of unreliable junk) did not change the strategic situation when it could possibly change(in 1943).

The Panthers available in 1943 were constantly breaking down and, although performing well when they were operational against Soviet attacks..were mostly abandoned. They played little role in supporting the hard pressed and ridiculously outnumbered German grenadiers in the East as they were mostly in the repair shop at that time.

But far more grievous than that was the tremendous expense and time it took for Panther production lines to rev up and the new logistical tail needed. Hitler stupidly delayed the attack at Kursk for more time to rush the Panthers into action. When they arrived on the battlefield, most broke down. It was still the Panzer IV/Tigers that produced results at Kursk, not the Panther.

The resources could have been used simply to build and train more Panzer IV and Tiger tank crews as this seemed to be the winning combination and far more realistic in 1943.

By the time the allies landed in Normandy in 1944, the Panther tank was already widespread and allocated in 1 out of 2 Panzer battalions in the Panzer Regiment. It was a more mature design by that time, but the war was already lost.

The Panther consumed 40% more fuel than the Panzer IV as well....and it is known that 2/3rds of German tanks were abandoned in the last year of the war.

And the vehicle's(now engaged in close range with a more flexible enemy) only true advantage seemed to be its strong front armor...and it was still very vulnerable to flank shots.

Finally, the use of more than 300 Panthers in the Ardennes within traditionally designed Panzer regiments made little sense. With the abysmal fuel situation and point blank range fighting it made no sense to deploy a vehicle that consumed so much fuel in the assault spearheads and was only slightly less vulnerable to A/T fire than the Panzer IV.

 

And if I remember correctly, two Panther companies from the 12th SS Panzer Division were essentially wiped out by American bazookamen in urban fighting in R (forgot the name of the town) early in the Ardennes offensive.

 

I'll agree with your hypothesis to a point. The Panther was expensive and a logistical problem. However the nature of warfare is that of accelerated evolution in the face of new designs and when confronted with the T-34 something had to be done.

To me the Panther was a better tank (if properly maintained) than either the T-34 or the Sherman. However given the strategic situation for Germany could a better solution be found...probably!

The Tiger was big and undoubtedly powerfull...given that the vast majority of 100+ kill Tank Aces commanded them even if the design was somewhat outdated by the time it entered service. Non sloped armour for example.

I'd be interested in discovering wether or not the Panzer 4 could have adapted more advanced design features. Like the Jadpanzer 4 could the Panzer 4 have adapted sloped armor into it's design? Could it have taken the stereoscopic range finder designed for the Panther 2? It was mechanicly reliable and reasonably well armed up until the last year of the war.

Could this have helped it stay on into 1946...I rather doubt it given that the Pershing, Centurion and IS-3 were entering wide spread service. If these features could have been incorporated prior to 1943 then it might have been possible to have had a more pronounced effect on the tactical situation in the immediate sence anyway.

All in all though given the determination of the Allies both East and West to see the Third Reich crumble I doubt any "super weapon" would have altered the outcome by more than a couple of months.

An interesting question though.

 

Thanks for the interesting response.

but,

Wasn't the Panzer IV long barrel roughly the equal (as far as armor and guns go) to the T-34/85?

And if they needed a better tank destroyer, then why at the very most not build limited numbers of a Jadpanther like design- and equip them into assaultgun/td battalion in the panzer divisions? The Jadpanther didn't have the reliability problems of the Panther and could keep up with Panzer IVs.

And Tiger I seems to be much more effective in the tank killing role than the Panther. It had 80mm strong side and rear armor. I can imagine that regular german grenadier divisions in the east would have readily welcomed two times more Tiger battalions in the rear...

 

"During the Lorraine campaign in September 1944, the German 5th Panzer Corps massed the largest concentration of German tanks seen since the battles at Caen and Mortain in July 1944. This counterattack force included over 300 tanks, with the majority being new Panther tanks.

Their opponet was the 4th Armoured Division, knwon as "Patton's Best", a well trained, well-led division which had become battle hardened since the fighting for Coutances in July 1944. From 19 to 22 September 1944, the 4th Armored Division broke the back of the German counteroffensive near Arracourt, destroying 107 tanks and 30 assault guns for the loss of only 14 M4 tanks and 7 M5A1 light tanks.

Two of the new panzer brigades were wiped out in the fighting, and by the end of the fighting for Arracourt, the 4th Armored Division had destroyed 285 German tanks and armoured vehicles for the loss of 25 medium tanks and 7 tank destroyers.

At the same time, the veteran French 2e Division Blindee smashed another panzer brigade putting an end to the largest German armor operation in the West until the Battle of the Bulge.

[The M4 Sherman at War: the European Theatre 1942-1945 (Steven J. Zaloga; Concord Publications Company: 1994)]

Note that the victory ratio was 32:285, or almost 1:9 in favour of the Americans.

Of the units in the 4th Armored Division, one unit in particular distinguished itself. This was the 37th Armored Regiment, commanded by Creighton Abrams (Lieutanent-Colonel, then Colonel).

Here is a description of the 37th actions around that time:

The 37th spent those days spreading confusion and terror in the German rear areas. From 19 September through 22 September 1944 the Germans tried to push the 37th back across the Moselle. It was one of the largest tank-to-tank engagements of the war, at Mayenvie, the 37th lost 14 Shermans while knocking out 55 Panthers and Tigers. Needless to say, the German counterattack was unsuccessful.

On 22 September the 37th's M4s swept south again through Coincourt and Bures to the Rhine-Marne Canal. Counterattack followed counterattack as the desperate Wehrmacht tried to dislodge the 3rd Army from its position, but as the toll of Panthers mounted, the attacks dwindled in intensity and finally ceased.

The 37th was relieved on 12 October 1944 by elements of the 26th (Yankee) Infantry Division. For its tenacity in the Moselle Valley, the 37th was awarded its second Croix de Guerre with Palm by a grateful French Government (it's first coming in Normandy). The 37th's tankers were pulled off line for a rest after 87 straight days of combat.

2nd Battalion, 37th Armored Regiment

The victory ratio for the 37th was 14:55 or almost 1:4."

"The most amazing thing about this battle was that the Americans had fought it with inferior weapons. They were armed with 75mm Sherman tanks, 3-in M10 Tank Destroyers, and the 76mm M18 Tank Destroyers. Most of the German tanks were Panthers.

Another point is that most of the American vehicles had seen continuous combat since Jul 44, and had been in the dash across France since Operation Cobra. The German panzer brigades, on the other hand, were fresh and armed mostly with factory new tanks. "


http://www.ww2f.com/battle-europe/25518-us-37th-armored-regiment-arracourt-battle-tanks.html

 

Yes, I know about the failure of the Panther brigades (basically an Eastern Front type unit) post Falaise. But I think their failure and inferiority was mainly due to very low level of training, their tactical organization (no sufficient combined arms units integral to their structure), & Hitler's emergency orders.

 

I should probably qualify my remarks with...I'm not a big fan of tank destroyers in any guise. I prefer the main battle tank theory so would naturaly shy away from taking destroyers into account. I mentioned the Jadpanzer 4 only because it was based on the Panzer 4 chassis and incorportated sloped armor.

Being in the field in 1943 I probaly wouldve welcomed more tanks over individualy superior models. German tactical doctrin catagorized warfare as being a team sport in which the whole is greater than the sum of it's parts. Sadly ironic (Or rather a blessing) that they seem to have forgotten this vital tenant when reviewing the Panzerwaffe in 1943.

The same question could be applied to the Tiger. Could advanced design features have been incorporated into it's design thus giving greater longevity? I believe they could have "tinkered" with it and produced a winner that could have kept the Panzerwaffe viable into 1946 (If of course there could have been a equal counterpart in the air). This is all hypothetical so why not have fun with it.

So in short to answer your question. Despite my favoring the Panther it would have made strategic sence to focus on producing greater numbers of a proven upgradable design than to try and put somthing into the field before it was ready.

Consider this: Those who master tactics will inevitably loose out to those who have a grasp on strategy given sufficient time. Realy this is the heart of the question.

P.S. Before anyone points it out to me. I'm aware of the inherent contradiction in my arguement and my advocating the Panther above other tanks. But since this debate is hypothetical and the Panther actualy existed I am allowing myself some creative licence here...deal with it!

 

Without extensive reworking to its drive systems the Panzer IV had pretty much been ungraded as much as it could before serious power to weight issues took hold.
The Oct.1937 Aust A was fitted with a Maybach HL120 12 Cylinder engine that could produce 300hp at 3000 rpm. This machine weighed 17,300 Kg.
The May 1942 Aust G was fitted with the very same engine and transmission and weighed 23,500 Kg.
With further ungrades to keep these machines competitive with emerging Allied tanks, the Panzer IV tanks were getting to the end of thier chassis upgradability.
Power to weight ratio was no longer there and to further increase capabilities of the Pz.Kpfw.IV would give it the same issues that the heavier Panthers and Tigers had to contend with
Info taken from http://afvdb.50megs.com/germany/

 

By late 43 and 44 ths PIV was like the me-109, still dangerous but being outclassed. I feel the tiger was a waste of resources. I think germany would have been better off switching tiger production to panthers and keep building the PIV's. I dont think the tiger offered any major advantage over a panther and used more fuel and took longer to produce. The tiger was not as mobile as a panther and the 75 on the panther could pretty much take out any allied tank.

 

I think the best defensive tank of WW2 was the Tiger I with it's 11-12:1 combat kill ratio against enemy tanks (mostly Soviet). Half were abandoned during retreats and breakdown so the final tally is around 6:1. It was a short range vehicle with half of the range of a Panzer IV that performed its intended role (defense, breakthrough) pretty well.

The Panther didn't have that sort of record..and it had vulnerable side and rear armor which lead to heavy losses.

Nevertheless, the Panzer IV seemed to perform better on the offensive than the Panther due to its size and much superior reliability. Tank vs. Tank actions are secondary when battalions are deployed for the exploitation role in the attack.

 

Another thread relating to the subject, maybe worth a shufti:
http://www.ww2f.com/what-if/20263-german-favour-mark-iv-main-battle-tank.html

Happy Christmas,
Adam.

 

Thanks for the excellent link and posts, guys!

 

On the subject of the mark V price, it was just 20k reichmarks more expensive than the PzIV. ANd despite all things, it had a higher battlefield survivability.



Cheers...

 

The Panzer V also used 40% more fuel (and the Tiger, 60% more fuel) than the Panzer IV. For the Germans retreating and on the defensive, this was a serious problem.

 

Just making friendly banter:

I think the Panther was plenty good enough compared to the Tiger at '44. While the V didn't have the killing power of VI E/B at extreme range, most fighting occurred well under 1,000 meters. Since L/70 was lethal out to 1,500 meters against all allied medium tanks, a well emplaced Panther could halt an attack as well as any. I haven't read too much about 2,000 meter engagements. Actually, the 75 L/70 is a more powerful anti-armor weapon than the 88 because the former's velocity was significantly better at usual battle ranges. This becomes significant when Russian armor began to overmatch German tanks technically, such as the IS-2 M44 that could not be defeated by Tiger I's 88 at any range but the 75 L/70 could do it at 600 meters.

Considering the superior speed, more potent gun (under combat ranges) and superior frontal armor, the Panther was in my opinion of greater use than the Tiger of any model.

Of course, it isn't exactly a fair comparison since the Panther was of a new generation of German tanks.

 

I agree with you highly on this point. A good tank crew is ALWAYS worth more than a good tank.

I think that if the Germans had simply produced more Pzkpfw. IVs and AT-Self Propelled Guns, then it still would have been far better than mass-producing Panther or Tiger tanks.

 

I find it interesting that at the height of their power..the German Panzer Crews in 1941 destroyed almost 21,000 Soviet Tanks with over 1,700 being the superior T-34/KV models.

They only deployed a little more than 1500 Panzer III/Panzer IV short barrel with the rest being virtually useless(in armored combat) light tanks (Panzer II/38t, etc.)

 

I'm aware of the excellence of the Panther's gun, but the Panther has much more vulnerable side and rear armor than the Tiger. Also, I think the Panther has slower turret rotation than the Tiger (I may be wrong on this).

 

What are you basing these figures on? Are you certain these are combat losses?

 

The real problem here is that Germany never really had a coherent plan for upgrading their tanks to a new generation. The Panther represents what is really an emergancy design brought on by the discovery of the T 34 and KV 1.
If you look at the German design history, their first generation tanks (Pz I to IV) were what they started the war with. The Pz I and II were really interm models that were not going to be standard but were forced into service for lack of the standard III and IV models. Without the infusion of the Pz 35 and 38 Germany would have been in serious trouble for really useful tanks in 1939 to 40.
The Germans then began development of a second generation of AFV weighing 30 to 50 tons. The only one of these to go into production was the Tiger I. The rest were dropped when the T34 appeared. The Tiger was in development for nearly two years before it became a production vehicle, going through many changes in design up to that point.
The Panther was really a remodelled and rush design to replace the extant 30 to 40 ton designs on the drawing boards. It was rushed in design but still required nearly 18 months to go to being an operational vehicle. Even then, it proved very unreliable due to the rushed nature of its development.

If you look at US development of AFV their situation is very similar. The M4 Sherman becomes the standard in 1941 and is in production by 1942. There are a number of replacement designs such as the M 23 and 25 for it but these are either deemed insufficently better or too unreliable for production.
The result is that the Sherman's replacement, the M26, is nearly two years in development only going into production by mid 1944.

The point here is that Germany was no different in terms of a timeline in developing new AFV than other nations. In this respect they were far better off either developing something from an existing design or in just making more of what they were already producing than developing a new vehicle from scratch like the Panther.

The two I would propose are:

1. A "stretch" Pz III. This is the same chassis widened about 15 cm and lenghtened by adding one additional road wheel. A larger engine is installed and the hull has some sloped armor incorporated. This design only needs a new transmission designed for it.
The suspension is identical to that of the Pz III at least initially.
With a slightly larger turret ring it can take a 75/48 gun and has better automotive perfromance than the Pz IV. The armor would be sufficent to protect it from the T34/76

2. The second is an improved Pz IV. This is the same vehicle with a beefed up suspension that is spaced out from the hull to allow wider tracks. The transmission is initially the same with later variants having more horsepower (lenghtened stroke, increased compression, or other automotive tricks to get more power out of the same motor) and a new transmission that replaces the current design.
The turret is remodelled on the Panther II design and has a 75/55 gun that is more capable than the 48 but uses the same ammunition.
With sloped armor it is improved in resistance to the T34 and M4. But, since it is essentially the same chassis it is a quick upgrade.