German vs. Russia - No England.

I disagree. 13/55 is just under 25% of all of Japan's battleships, carriers, and heavy cruisers. If you include those that were out of the war due to those attackes then its ~33%. Looking at it another way ~350,000 tons worth of submarines sunk nearly their displacement in major combat vessels and nearly their displacement again in lighter warships (total of over 577,000 tons). That's pretty effective in my book.

"absence of proof is not proof of absence". If you make a statment like that you should be willing to back it up.

If you want me to list where I got the numbers above I can/will but unless you dispute them I don't see the point. 2 historians do not the majority make. It's even possible I would agree with them in the context of which they made those statments while not agreeing they are accurate in generall. For insance you said earlier:

But why does he say the efforts were wasted? They certainly seamed to be sinking warships. Was it perhaps because he thought that they were better employed at sinking cargo ships? That doesn't mean they weren't effective vs warships just that they were better employed vs cargo ships.

But how much slower and where and was it enough to affect the performance of subs that much? Clearly the Japanese were less active than they might otherwise have been but you implied that this possible slower cruising speeds made a big difference in the number of sub sinkings.

Well let's see what you said:

Sure looks like it to me.

So your referance doesn't support your earlier assertion. Which is what started this whole line of conversation.

The fact that there were numerous unsuccessful attacks does not negate the fact that there were numerous successful ones. I was illustrating this point by bringing up the analogy could also be applied to bombs and shells. IE successful attacks were outnumbered by unsuccessful ones no matter what type of attack was made. Indeed have you ever looked at how many bullets were fired for every fatal wound?

 

All right Im not sure what this has to do with the topic but I like seeing trying to outwit the other

 

But not nearly as effective against major warships as other agencies, namely surface and air attack.

I guess you've been so busy beating your own drum, that you missed the fact that I did back up my statements with two different sources.

BTW, I notice you still haven't cited a source for any of your assertions. The only conclusion I can arrive at is that everything you have said is simply your opinion.

Promises, promises. Two historians may not be a majority, but they're 100 per cent more than you've cited. And they do support my points. If you think their quotations were taken out of context, then it's up to you to explain why. So far all we've heard are your opinions.

Blair says the efforts targeting Japanese warships were wasted because the attacks so often failed and so infrequently sank a major warship, that greater impact could have been made on the Japanese war effort by spending more time attacking merchant ships which could be sunk by subs. It is precisely because subs were ineffective in sinking major warships that he arrived at his conclusion. That is very clear from the text of his book and it is certainly NOT taken out of context.

Everywhere but in the immediate vicinity of Singapore and the NEI where there was enough fuel reserves not to matter. And of course slower cruising speeds for warships would make it easier for them to be tracked and attacked by subs and that would increase sinkings of warships by subs; that's not rocket science.

I never claimed that Shinano was steaming at reduced speed because of the fuel shortage. I claimed that the loss of the Shinano was a classic example of a warship which was lost because it was steaming at a speed, and under conditions, which allowed a sub to track, and gain a favorable firing position. And the reference I cited supports that position implicitly. It matters not whether the slower speed was due to a fuel shortage, boilers not being available, or a faulty judgment by the skipper; slower speeds put warships at risk of successful attack by submarines. Higher speeds made them more or less immune.

First you bring up an issue which does nothing but muddy the water.

Then you accuse me of actually raising the issue, and claim it is irrelevant.

Then when that doesn't fly, you claim it is relevant after all, and try to confuse the issue even further by citing a fact which is germane only to personnel engaged in land warfare.

What nonsense.

I stand by my position that the number of unsuccessful sub attacks against major warships compared to the number of successful sub attacks against major warships, is so high as to force the conclusion that subs were not effective in attacks against major warships.

 

I never claimed they were. On the other hand they were more effective than anything other than carriers and on a per ton bases more effective than carriers. But my argument was never that they were the most effective weapon merely that they were an effective one. Indeed there was a synergy between the various components of the US navy that allowed all of them to be more effective together than they would have been individually.

Well you listed two sources that you said backed up your statements. I don't have them and you didn't produce any quotes or even chapters or page numbers so perhaps they do and perhaps they don't.

Ok what do you want me to quote a source for? The only really important things are the number of Japanese warships sunk, the number damaged, the number and tonnage of US subs, and the tonnage of Japanese warships sunk. And for my conclusions to be correct the numbers can vary by at least 10% and not effect the conclusions.

I don't even have the quotes so it's kind of hard to do.

Ineffective in comparison. Not necessarily ineffective as an absolute. From what I've seen I would tend to agree there were times when large numbers of subs spent a significant amount of time fruitlessly chasing Japanese warships.

Then by the same logic the number of unsuccessful attacks by aircraft vs major warships means they were not effective against them and the same holds true of surface engagements.

 

Well at least we are arguing about history. and not B-E fantasies. I think DA will even agree with me on that.

 

I absolutely concur!

I would venture to state that more useful information has come out of our debate than from the totality of B-E's posts.

I have never said subs weren't able to sink major Japanese warships. But just because they managed to sink a few over the three and one-half years years of World War II doesn't mean they were effective weapons compared to other agencies, they weren't.

Silly me!

I assumed you were enough of a scholar to realize that your local library would be able to get you the references cited, and serious enough about learning some things you don't know to make the effort to check them out. Even if you don't know how to use the library, it's possible to look up much of the data online (see; Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine ... - Google Book Search).

"The considerable effort -- there is no way of figuring the precise number of patrol days involved -- expended in chasing Japanese capital ships from glamorous ULTRA reports was likewise largely unproductive."

Blair goes on to analyze the results of US sub attacks against major Japanese warships in 1942, as almost a complete failure. Of 23 contacts with Japanese CV's and BB's, only 14 actual attacks were made and these resulted in slight damage to only 3 CV's and 1 BB.

"Only two major Japanese naval vessels were sunk [by US subs] in all of 1942. Dinty Moore's (S-44) heavy cruiser Kako and Dick Lake's (Albacore) light cruiser Tenryu." (see; page 372 of "Silent Vuictory")

If that is what you would consider "effective", I'll pass.

Of course, later in the war, US subs did somewhat better, but the overall performance has to be judged over the entire three and one-half years of war, and the 22 Japanese major warships sunk, works out to an average of just 6.2 vessels per year. Not a great, or even really significant, record.

How about some of your assertions; that the Japanese Navy didn't tend to slow down later in the war because of the oil shortage.

Or that the number of unsuccessful air and surface attacks was comparable to the number of unsuccessful sub attacks.

Or that US subs waited off major Japanese shipping ports and thus were able to "pick off" a number of major Japanese warships in those places.

Try doing a little research. You've made assertions that my position is incorrect, or at least inaccurate, let's see some of the authorities that support your opinion.

Ok, I'll agree that US subs did sink some major Japanese warships, but were ineffective by comparison to surface and air attack and would have been more usefully employed in attacking merchant ships and only attacking warships as tagets of opportunity.

Let's see some numbers here. You wanted to know which of your assertions I wanted documented, here is a prime example. Cite some references supporting your opinion that surface and air attacks against major Japanese warships were no more effective against major Japanese warships than sub attacks.

 

Well I'd consider 25% of the total available major warships to be more than a few. And as I showed at least on a tonnage basis they were more effective than any other ships.

I agree in 42 they weren't very productive as far as attacks vs major combatants. However if you look at the number of warships of DD size or better sunk during that period there contribution is by no means negligable.

But the much larger surface navy didn't do a whole lot better now did it? Especially if you rate it on either a per vessel or tonnage basis.

I never asserted that. I simply stated that I hadn't seen evidence of it. You were the one who asserted the contrary.

Ok let's look at one example. The first wave of attacks vs the Yamato's final sortie. There were ~280 planes in that attack 132 were fighters but at least some may have had bombs. There was no air opposition. They got around 30 hits on the force but only 3 on Yamato. So that's at best 1 hit in every 5 attacks if we look at attacks only on Yamato it's significantly worse. For Battleships at significant range 5% hits was considered pretty good that's 1 in 20.

Kind of hard not to unless you are going to throw out all the history books.

On what basis do you say this? Effectiveness is best measured in production for resources consumed. Subs got a signficant number of warships of all classes except BBs for a pretty minimal expenditure.

I have never contended otherwise. Indeed I believe a fair number of their successful attacks vs warships were actually attacks of oppertunity although in some cases when they were deployed as scouts rather than vs merchants.

Ok looking through some of the TROMs on the combined fleet site.
In particular I more or less randomly chose FURUTAKA's:
Imperial Cruisers

1 February 1942: Task Force 8 (ENTERPRISE, CV-6) raids Kwajalein and Wotje in the Marshall Islands. ENTERPRISE's Douglas "Dauntless" SBDs of VB-6 and VS-6 and TBD "Devastators" of VT-6 sink a transport and damage light cruiser KATORI

Not clear how many planes attacked warships or major warships but none sunk

4 May 1942:...

Tulagi, Solomons. ... Task Force 17's YORKTOWN (CV-5), ... launches three strikes, comprising 99 planes, at ... Tulagi Invasion Force. YORKTOWN's TBD torpedo planes and SBD dive-bombers sink destroyer KIKUZUKI and three minesweepers and damage four other ships.
No major warships sunk.

7 May 1942:... the SHOHO is attacked by 93 SBD dive-bombers and TBD torpedo-bombers from Fletcher's YORKTOWN ... SHOHO is sunk

1 success so far.

8 May 1942:...YORKTOWN and LEXINGTON find Hara's CarDiv 5. They damage SHOKAKU severely above the waterline and force her retirement. ZUIKAKU's air group also suffers heavy losses.

No sinkings so by your measure no success here.

9 August 1942: The Battle of Savo Island.

No Japanese warships sunk.

23 August 1942: ... a Consolidated PBY "Catalina" patrol plane of VP-23's "Black Cats" boldly, but unsucessfully, attacks FURUTAKA in broad daylight.

No success.

11 October 1942: The Battle of Cape Esperance:
...About 90 shells hit FURUTAKA and some ignite her Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedoes that start heavy fires. The fires draw more gunfire.

12 October 1942:
At 0228, the FURUTAKA sinks

So we have numerous attacks by airplanes and 1 major warship sunk.
We have two fairly large surface actions and 1 major warship sunk.

When you compare the ordinance, fuel, and equipment expended it doesn't look to me like surface and air action was a whole lot more effective than subs.

 

Not in absolute numbers and certainly not when the length of time it required is considered. And no you did not show tsubs to be more effective on a tonnage basis. You asserted that, but I recall no citations.

Well, what were the numbers? How many DD's did subs sink in 1942 as opposed to other agencies?

On the contrary; the non-submarine Navy did quite a bit better in 1942. Against one heavy, and one light, cruiser sunk by US subs, the rest of the Navy sank 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 3 heavy cruisers and one light cruiser in 1942

And I supported my assertion with citations, so I guess that is one issue resolved in my favor.

First one example proves nothing. I cited statistics covering ALL US sub attacks during an entire year, not just ONE example. Second, comparing individual plane attacks is a like separating out the torpedoes fired from a single torpedo tube aboard a sub; it's meaningless. What was the success rate for the carriers involved? And I want to see the numbers for ALL carrier attacks , as well as ALL surface attacks.

Well, if you can't prevail on the basis of the defined debate, change the rules. Sorry, but unless you can cite the relative cost of sinking each enemy warship by the agency responsible, I don't accept that. So, what did it cost to sink each of those 50+ major Japanese warships based on US weapons production costs? I don't think you, or anyone else has those numbers.

But you don't know for sure? In fact, according to Clay Blair in "Silent Victory", more than a 100 ULTRA reports were sent in 1942 alone instructing US subs to target major Japanese warships. Not a single one of these resulted in a sinking.

Completely meaningless.

Blair tabulated every US sub attack that was made againt major Japanese warships during WW II in arriving at his conclusion that subs were not particulaly effective against major warships. He accounted for every sighting, determined the number which resulted in an actual attack, and recorded the number of actual sinkings which resulted.

If you want to prove that surface and air attacks were no more effective, you are going to have to tabulate every surface and air attack and determine the number of sinkings. Then compare the results of that research with the sub attack numbers. Ancedotal evidence doesn't cut it and that's all you have presented here,

 

It has been interesting reading all the posts on this thread.

IMHO some seem to have missed the point.

In discussing a the German Eastern Front campaigns etc., how it went wrong for them etc. And the fact that German in the fFirst World War failed because it was a two - front war.
Hence, it should be an interesting discussion as too how successful a German campaign would be in Russia without a 'Western Front' to worry about.
So from that point of view - it is irrelevant how likely or unlikely a British 'surrender' would be - take your pick.
Nazi Germany losing was in a sense dependant on two people - Churchill & FDR.

My Scenairo - Churchill flew to France in mid May to discuss the worsening situation with Weygand & Reynaud - but en-route his aircraft is shot down by marauding German Fighters, result pandemonium and paralysis. No Dunkirk - German holds vast no's of British soldiers as POW's.

Possibly France 'gives in' earlier - followed by Britain (please for the sake of thread).
Joe Kennedy on the one hand, and Charles Lindbergh on the other would be saying now that the European Civil War had finished, and we can all relax! Perhap, US industrialist would come to see what business could be done!
Lend-lease? Surely in OTL that came later, as a way of FDR doing what he could get away with to help Churchill and Britain. It is therefore a matter of personal opinion if the US passes legislation for L-L for Russia. As long as the US had assurances re: the RN, they would be 'happy', - similar to Churchill and the French Navy!

So now we come to Germany - it:
- a better Luftwaffe - no BoB losses men & aircraft,
- no distrations:
- not in North Africa - Rommel etc available on Eastern front (north, central or south?),
- no Balkan adventure - means can launch attack earlier,
no Crete invasion - means German paratroops available for Eastern Front drops,
- no RAF Bomber Command air attacks to worry about, not a problem in 40/41, but later an increasing no of flak guns that can be used elsewhere.
On the downside - Russia may be more wary that they are next!

So given these sort of circumstances, with Russia isolated can Germany win? Whatever 'win' means!?

 

yhat Germany failed in the 1st WW,because it was a two-front war :that's something I am sceptical about:because that's implying that 1)without Russia,Germany would win in the West 2)without the UK + France Germany would win in the East .
But,of course,that's all off-topic .

 

The advantages for the Axis in this scenario will be very great indeed.

Germany will be able to re-deploy its occupation forces from the West, North Africa and the Balkans.
The Balkan campaign will not delay Barbarossa meaning an invasion on May 15th or June 1st (if climactic conditions are a factor) instead of June 22nd.
Even if Mussolini does invade Greece they will be no need for German intervention as they will be no British threat of deployment in the Balkans.
Mussolini will have extra forces to deploy in the campaign with no build up in North Africa or East Africa.
However with Europe at peace Mussolini may decide against a Greek invasion or with extra transport now available stick with his original plan for the invasion of Yugoslavia.
Mussolini would then be able to contribute far more forces to the war in the USSR.
With Britain out Franco may even declare war on the USSR too.
The Italian and German navies would have a free hand against the Soviets and the Turks may well be pressured to allow passage into the Black Sea.
The German and Italian air forces wont have the loses of the Battle of Britain or other campaigns against the British to worry about.

How this would effect the campaign would I think be as follows -

1941

Moscow is surrounded and attacked with resistance ending in early 1942 when the Soviet counter offensive fails to dislodge them.
Leningrad will be surrounded and sieged more effectively than in our time line.

1942

Assuming Hitler still wants Soviet oil or at least to deprive them of it the invasion of the Caucasus will prove successful.
With the loses at Moscow it is likely that Stalingrad will be placed under siege rather than occupied.
The Soviet counter attack would not be as successful (the Caucasus would be held) but would still inflict heavy damage on Germanys allies.
This could be alleviated with the re-equipping of their allies with a large amount of 88mm AA guns from Germany as anti-tank weapons.

1943

With the minor Axis allies getting 88's, Mk4 tanks in large numbers and superior Italian fighters coming on line they will start to be able to hold their own against the Soviets.
I would expect a Axis offensive to come from North and South on the banks the Volga trying to cut off as many Soviet troops as possible.
The West bank of the Volga and Karalia would likely be secured in this year with a well planned holding action for the Winter.

1944

With Axis production starting to peak and large numbers of Caucasian troops freeing up the Italians, Germans and Romanians for a push East across the Southern Volga into Southern Russia and Central Asia.
Rebellion in Central Asia and the over running of large food producing areas in Southern Russia would bring the Soviets to the table on German terms.
The Soviets would give up all land west of the A-A land and may well surrender Central Asia too.

If Hitler wanted all land to the Urals I would think several years more fighting would be needed to secure that.

 

If the Japanese were still stupid enough to occupy Indo-China this may well bring about war with France.
If they are even more stupid they will attack the British Empire and the USA in 1941. Then they would face the combined might of the US and Royal Navies.
On balance with the changed circumstances and new options the Japanese would likely instead buy Oil from or through the Axis powers and consider their options of finishing off China or invading the USSR when the time seemed right.

 

Maybe not as off-topic as you thought. For all that people compare Hitler's Russian campaign to Napoleon's, the closest analogue to WWII is WWI, in which Germany and her allies totally defeated Russia despite a massive ongoing commitment in the west (and maintaining the world's second largest navy, for all the good that did them). Of course there are differences on both sides like the shortcomings of the Tsarist regime or Germany's virtual disarmament up until 1935, but it's a strong argument that Germany might accomplish another Brest-Litovsk one-on-one.

 

More likely he's involved in his own wars in the Balkans.

Why would he do that? And how much do you think it would help if he did?

What makes you think so? There's even less axis presence in their sphere of influence and allowing the axis to do so it tad amount to entering the war. Note that Turkey didn't enter even on the allied side until it was very clear that it was much in their interest to do so and the costs would be minimal no none.

Nor would they have the advanteges of the lessons learned in that campaign.

There is little evidence that this would happen. The increased forces you posit aren't going to help the logistics situation much and starting early may mean they are slogging through the mud early in the campaign giving time for the Soviet resistence to stiffen. Certainly expect taking Moscow in early 42 is rather odd. If they don't take it in the fall they are going to have problems taking it during the winter.

why?

Why?

??? They can't put it under siege unless they cross the river. If they cut it off then they can take it.

No point in going further.

 

I would expect he would.
However if he picks Yugoslavia he will have victory before the invasion of the USSR.
If Greece it will be longer but he will have more forces to bring to bare against her.
Still he would have victory and thus deploy a larger force in Russia.

Because Franco is a man dedicated to the battle against Communism.
His infantry numbers would be of use.

If Turkey does not do so it may well find itself in a war.

They will have learned enough from the invasion of Poland, Norway and France.

The Logistics levels available can cope with more divisions.
If the wet is considers to bad in late May then the offensive would begin when dry on June 1st.
Which still gives them an extra 22 days of good weather campaigning.
Besides no matter how muddy nothing is going to be capable of holding back the initial German attack.
Moscow will be surrounded in autumn but taking the city will take much longer.

 

Leningrad will be surrounded and sieged more effectively than in our time line.

More troops to surround it and more Soviets poured into the battle of Moscow

Quote:
1942

Assuming Hitler still wants Soviet oil or at least to deprive them of it the invasion of the Caucasus will prove successful.

More troops and more armour and less of both for the Soviets.


Quote:
With the loses at Moscow it is likely that Stalingrad will be placed under siege rather than occupied.

Of course they can.
Anything trying to cross the Volga to supply Stalingrad will be targeted.

 

I don't see that as at all conclusive. He may rather a hash of it historically and it's not at all clear that any additional forces he might have would make a difference. In part it would depend a great deal on why Britain isn't in the war. It's possible for instance that attacking Greece could bring the British back in. In any case he still has to gaurison his African possesions.

Why would he? I really don't see any real push for him to do so. There's just not much for Italy to gain being a minor ally of Germany in this situation. I'm also not at all sure Hitler would even push for it.

It's not at all that clear he's dedicated to anti-Communism. Indeed historially he was more intereted in steering clear of the conflict. Furthermore his infantry is pretty poorly equipped especially for war in the East. That means that it would fall to the Germans to equip it. I can see perahaps another division or so of volenteers but not much else. That way he has little to loose and just about as much to gain.

Perhaps but it's going to take a while for it to reach that stage and Germany isn't really well equipped to invade Turkey.

That's why they cut production of aircraft prior to the BOB. None of those involved an extended arial campaign like the BOB and the war in the East. If they commite the same mistakes vs the Soviets they did in the BOB the LW is going to be hurting by fall of 41.

Historically it couldn't cope with what they did have. Adding more troops is going to make it worse.

How are they going to know? The evidence was they had little appreciation for the effects of mud on the Soviet road network and the areas where they would have had trouble weren't right on the border. Besides are you going to have all your forces just sitting on the boarder for a month waiting for the word to go?

That's not at all clear. If the intial advances aren't as quick then the Soviets have more time to stiffen their defences so the battles further along are tougher and slower and it compounds.

This is far from clear. To surround Moscow is a big step beyond what happened historially and given the constraints I just don't believe it.

 

Why add more troops vs Lenningrad when they could be used elsewhere? Especially if you are getting closer to Moscow than historical. More Soviets means more German troops at Lenningrad???? your logic in this case completely escpaes me.

But is it enough more? or by this point is it even more?

They did that historically it didn't work. To put Stalingrad under siege they need to cross the Volga and secure it's eastern bank oposite the city.

 

Hitler never had a chance to destroy the Red Army, not even if he used all its initial might against USSR, his better chances were to take strategic targets to lower the moral AND take the USSR territory as if he was a saviour instead of a tyrant, people admired Hitler early in the war, Stalin was feared and hated by his own people, they were pissed off and would had used any excuse to dipose of him, still Hitler was dumb enough to enter the USSR with his "aryan supremacy" ideology and treat the people there like ****, like someone said to win a battle you have to destroy the poeple will to fight to do it you have to either force them into surrender (IE completely crush the nation's army and defenses, something Hitler couldnt do) or convice them, I really think if Hitler won the people of the USSR as the saviour who would treat them with justice and dipose of Stalin, the USSR would had ended with the fall of Moscow if Hitler was able to take Moscow and entered the USSR as an hero in my opinion having fallen Moscow and the Kremlin that were symbols of Stalin's power massive uprisings would had followed along the Soviet Union, people would had joined to fight along with the Germans etc.

My question really depends if this Hitler is smart enough to know you can only push people so far, or the retard impossing his "aryan supremacy" ideology on conquered territories, even if the army of said territory is bigger than your's.

If I was him knowing that I had no chance of destroying the Red Army I would had entered the Soviet Union as a hero that came to save them from Stalin and then take all targets that were symbolic to Stalin's power, hoping I can end this war with the fall of Moscow. Of course that just in this case, if I could chose the strategy for all the war, I would had just crushed Britain and wouldnt mess with the Soviet Union thus winning the war.

 

Unfortunatly for both Hitler and the Slav's he wanted to de-populate the East and re-settle it with Germanic people.