Questions Regarding Operation Market Garden

Dear WWII Forum members,

I am a student from New Zealand, and I'm in the middle of a large research assignment involving Operation Market Garden. The general idea of this assignment is that I formulate several 'focusing questions', then "demonstrate initiative to select and record relevant historical evidence from a range of different sources, and organise it in accordance with the focusing questions"

Basically, I also have to 'go the extra mile' in my researching; therefore, I can't simply spend a lot of time on websites and reading books. Lately I have been emailing professors, museum curators, website authors, etc. Every extra source of information is a bonus to me in terms of marks, but I've also found that I am deeply interested in the debate that still exists over Operation Market Garden. Whereas a website will give me a few facts, a history professor might have a personal view radically different to another, and this is something which makes me profoundly more drawn to the subject.

Upon discovering this, a popular forum dedicated to discussion about WWII, I felt that I could make for even further debate on the operation. While, ultimately, this is for an assignment, I hope that all who are kind enough to reply will themselves too be interested by the topic and my questions, and enjoy the discussion. Here are my focusing questions:

In Operation Market Garden, what was the tactical importance of the Allied objectives of capturing numerous bridges, such as Arnhem Bridge and Nijmegen Road Bridge; and how did the extensive use of paratroopers by the Allies affect the level of success of these objectives?

In what ways did the actual operational course of Operation Market Garden deviate from the planned operational courses, intended by Allied and German strategic commanders?

What influence did the outcome of Operation Market Garden have on the strategic course of World War Two; how important was this influence; and how did this compare to the strategic impact of the Operation intended and hoped for by the Allies?

Thank you all very much for taking the time to read this. Also, if you know of any other sources I could look to for further information, please let me know.

Matt

 

Matt,

although you express how you "can't simply spend a lot of time on websites and reading books" I really think reading one or maybe two books on this operation might be the best start, esp. as it will produce more informed questions which in turn are more likely to stimulate a public response.

No offence but as it stands it does look as if you know nothing about this operation beyond it's name, which won't neccessarily encourage anyone to engage with you and help you to go that extra mile.

Good luck,

 

Thank you for the replies,

WotNoChad,

I understand that my questions are very basic; unfortunately it is difficult to come up with specific, informed questions which will still allow for the same level of relevant evidence to be acquired. We are encouraged to do a small amount of preliminary research in order that our questions make sense within the topic we have chosen, but not to be too specific. I felt that by creating broad, simple questions, I might be able to conduct research related to the more interesting and debatable questions that fit into one of the broader ones.

For example, if I found an interesting piece of information regarding the question, "In what ways did the apparent internal conflict between Montgomery, Eisenhower, and other Allied commanders contribute to the failure of Operation Market Garden?", I might then be able to use such information in my own broad question, "In what ways did the actual operational course of Operation Market Garden deviate from the planned operational courses, intended by Allied and German strategic commanders?"

For my above question, it's possible to consider: the deviations; why Market Garden failed; how it could have succeeded; effectiveness of planning etc. Though I admit, if I could separate my interest in the Operation from the expectations placed upon me by the assignment marking schedule, my questions would definitely be more cutting. I'm sorry about that.

Also, when I said that I "can't simply spend a lot of time on websites and reading books" , I meant that I couldn't pass by only reading books and visiting websites. Books are a particularly valuable resource, and I have read widely from them on the suject, but I must collect evidence from a wide range of different types of sources, as well as different sources.

Slipdigit,

Thank you for that correction, I've changed it to operational importance. Thanks also for drawing my attention to the search feature.

Regards,

Matt

 

Matt, you may wish to look at aspect in which fuel resources (or the lack of) combined with the long supply line from the Normandy beaches affected decisions and tactical efforts at this point in the fighting in Northwest Europe. Operation Market Garden has to be viewed against the losses incurred by the British and Canadian troops and their lack of replacements as they went through Normandy and opened various Channel ports (although none had the deep water necessary for adequate shipping of resources). Personalities certainly had an effect, but so did the desire to shorten the course of the war - hopefully completing the entrapment of much of the German army (sorry I'm not good with recalling the exact names and numbers of the German divisions as others on the Forum are) that had not been completed at the Falaise Gap.

 

Please don't think we're being dismissive, kokolios, but 'Market-Garden' was an incredibly complex operation which has raised controversies which have raged ever since - and now that most of the surviving veeterans have sadly passed away, will continue to be debated by military historians for ever.

If you tap 'Arnhem' into this Forums' search facility, you will find several hotly-debated threads going back at least seven years. One contributor to the Forum is a published author and battlefield guide and several of us here have walked the battlefield in depth.

I'm afraid that you're not going to be able to get away from the books - I have literally a complete shelf of books about 'Arnhem' and trying to answer even one of your points could take pages.

What have I learned after all that reading, walking and talking to veterans ?

It was a great plan 'on paper' which would certainly have worked - except for the Germans.

 

In Operation Market Garden, what was the tactical importance of the Allied objectives of capturing numerous bridges, such as Arnhem Bridge and Nijmegen Road Bridge; and how did the extensive use of paratroopers by the Allies affect the level of success of these objectives?

Matt,
The above came from your first post/question.....in short the tactical objective of capturing the bridges was to get to Germany quickly and using airborne troops to 'seize and hold' until relieved by ground troops and continue the advance to the Ruhr was realistically the only option otherwise the Germans could have done what the Dutch Army did or example at Arnhem in 1940 by just dropping the road bridge into the water.....your post is not that easy to answer...and as my friend Martin says the plan was good on paper but flawed with several weaknesses and IMHO if launched perhaps two or three weeks earleir when the German Army in Holland was in disarray might have worked.....I'll stop there otherwise we could be here all day!

 

Excellent Martin.

 

Snatched defeat from the jaws of victory

 

The first and last posts may interest you

Operation Market Garden-What really went wrong? - World War 2 Talk

I thought I would come back and visit this thread now I have read nearly a 750 pages about Operation Market Garden by no means an expert but I feel far better informed.

Funnily enough I think the programme has got a lot of it wrong or certainly placed to much effort on some things that really in my opinion didn't have that much effect on the outcome of the battle.

I made some notes as I read through two volumes of the battle as I always intended to come back to this thread and subject you to my opinions-albeit a bit more educated about what happened. It was interesting to see that only one person (Apologies if I missed anyone) had picked up on something which I had felt had been overlooked, certainly by me anyway. Over the years as I pondered every now and then what went wrong I never considered the German Army. It started to dawn on me about half way through reading the books that the Germans actually put up a bloody good fight- Not just in Arnhem but along the whole front. I think this is essentially has been missed by many.

So my first point that resulted in the outcome was the German Army and their fighting spirit in Holland. Even with all the 'Bad luck' bestowed on the Allies taken into consideration it would have only delayed Market Gardens success and not resulted in a failure to secure the final objective.

Having DZ/LZ's so far away from their objective effectively split the 1st Airborne in half greatly reducing their fighting capabilities.

The use of or the lack of use of the captured airfield at Oud Keent near Grave on D-Day by the 82nd this could have been used to bring in the 52nd Lowland Divison into the battle and used to bring much need supplies to the battle. When it was finally decided to be used it again was too late. A big missed opportunity in my opinion.

The weather undoubtedly played a part in the outcome of the whole operation with supplies and further troop deployments greatly delayed. The Polish drop at Dreil and the 325th Glider Infantry at Nijmegen being two of the most significant.

Much has been made of the lack of advance my British ground troops in Market Garden. The delay of the Guards Division at Eindhoven for example for some 10+hrs and spending the night there. In reality this would have had little effect if any on the outcome, they would have only had to wait longer than they did at the bridges at Son and Nijmegen. However I do think that if any blame is to pointed at ground forces then it would probably be more fair to aim it at VIII Corps and XII Corps advance on the flanks of XXX Corps who's main purpose was to protect the flanks. Due to XXX Corps advancing far quicker than the other two Corps this left the supply route vunerable to attack and resulted with the main route being cut at Son and with far greater consequences at Veghel on at least two occasions. To put the flanking Corps progress into some sort of perspective they advanced an average of 3 miles a day with very little resistance. I accept they had harder terrain to advance over and received less support than XXX Corps but many do feel that they could have achieved more mileage per day given their circumstances. Whilst on the subject of ground troops being cautious another significant delay in XXX Corps advance was the speed at 43rd Wessex Divisions reaction to support the Guards Division at Ressen on the 21st and it appears to have lacked a sense of urgency on the 22nd.

One thing I'm left to wonder is the lack of Air to Ground support in the Arnhem area and what effect this would have had on the battle. Fighter and ground attack aircraft were used with great effect except for one day to protect the transports, fending of German fighters and attacking ground targets like flak units. However none were really used to harass the movement of ground troops into the Arnhem area like they did so well after D-Day. 1st Airborne established radio communications with the 64th Medium Artillery at Nijmegen and used them to great effect calling in artillery strikes on German positions and breaking up German attacks often calling in the artillery on their own positions. Aircraft were first used over Arnhem on 24th September and again on the 25th when Typhoons, Mitchells and Bostons attacked German targets. All proved successful but unfortaunately too late to change the outcome.

A lot has been mentioned before in the past abot the lack of working radios, operational maps falling into enemy hands, Browning using up valuable resources taking his HQ into Nijmegen and the like but I think in the big scheme of things they had a minimal effect on the overall outcome and can be defended almost as easily as they can be criticised.

Well I can't think off a better way to end this post than to give you a quote:

Andy

 

First of all welcome to the forum matey.

Ok, now I think first of all you need to tell us what you know of the Operation based on the questions you have posted that way we can better understand where about's you are up to.

Now as Martin said don't feel we are dismissing you or your questions, we are here only to guide you to the answers especially when the answers are only simple. The harder questions sometimes require you to have access to more informative books and websites which many of the members here have, however the members on this forum will not just qive the answers away unless they feel that you yourself are at least trying to help yourself especially since it is an assignment.

I think ince you update you answers we will be hapy to help.

 

Good post, Andy.

Although I don't wish to join the ranks of those who over-rate the Germans, one has to grudgingly admit that generally they reacted very effectively at Arnhem.

It's striking how small, fortuituously- ( for them !)placed ad-hoc Kampfgruppen were able to react swiftly and impede vital points on the Airborne Forces' advance routes to Arnhem ( eg KG Spindler at Wolfheze who decisively countered the Recce Corps' Jeep 'race to the Bridge' ).

Before we beat ourselves up too much, though, consider the Ardennes three months later - where small, resolute groups of US forces managed to to exactly the same thing to, for example, KG Peiper.......

 

Purely personal view...And it may not have affected the operation in the overall picture of things. And I know we dont want to bog the questioner down on incidentals.

But on looking at this in much the same way over the years as everyone else has.

The paras as a regt, learned a vital lesson at Arnhem that has been ingrained on them ever since and can be seen in their operations since.

They always were an agressive formation. They didn't lack any of that.

Movement in my view...Forget 30 corps oft critisised movements.

The intial speed to march to get to the bridge, although hampered by original planning, was in my personal view not as it should have been. Elements of 2 para and Hq troops and support tps did as we know get there...But the initial 24 hours of movement by 1 and 3 para do in my own personal view show too much hesitation. Resting for the night, stopping under fire...I have to ask myself...if this was a German force...how they would have responded and how they would have treated any blocking forces..

Get up, get on, move. That was after all what this operation was all about...And it has hung around the para regts temperament and training to do this day.

 

Martins allowed...He had a day where someone attacked the Battle of Britain movie, and I posted a link making fun of the Dam buster raid....Martin has been fighting a rearguard action....He was defending the bridge without a cutlass...

 

Whoooooops !

That'll teach me to answer 'off the cuff' without checking my books.....

 

Martin,

I'll forgive you...are you well????

 

Hi Matt,

I am sure you have read it, but I found it very helpfull (at least to understand why it didn't work) to read:

"It never snows in September" by Robert Kershaw.

A pageturner to say the least.

Cheers & Happy Easter!