Aggressive Officer Leadership

yes,i did not understand him right,thanks for pointing me in the right direction.
i can answer the last one for you,the germans never class rommel as a hero compared to the how the allies classed him as a hero,my father told me so.
when i said germans, i mean both militray and the german public that never look at him as a hero.

 

Officer Leadership:

In airborne units General Officers jumped with their men. We did not havethe usual gaggle of Staff Officers. On many occasions the line officers had to pull staff duty for drafting a field order. It was an article of faith in the regiments that anyone above the Rank of Major was a Military Manager. Our most sgressive senior officers ended up wounded. Ijuries and wounds cause us to have 3 different regimental commander in 6 month time. Jounior officers were most of the officer casualties. Most long service officer had Puple Hearts with OLC.

As Ever,

Walter L. Marlowe
( Airborne all the Way)

 

Wolfy,

The Americans actually did prefer their generals to be close to the front, just that the army did not want them to risk their lives unduely. I think the fact that the US Army had never lost anything bigger than a division in an encirclement had more to do with the small number of generals KIA then doctrine or attitude.

Maurice Rose of the 3d AD for example almost always led from the front and had numerous close brushes with death. He has had his convoy ambushed twice by panzers; his HQ had been hit directly by German artillery and the fragment lodged itself on his map; he was wounded twice in action as a general and refused evacuation or treatment both times until the immediate crisis had been resolved. Once, he and his party of five fought a gunbattle with their pistols and SMGs with a group fifteen German soldiers. When the rest of the division showed up Maurice was just about done, having captured 12 of his attackers.

General L. Collins thought a world of Rose and said that he was the best tank division commander in the west when he died. He was killed near the town of Paderborn leading the division at the front at 1945, at the eve of a great triumph: his men force marched 100 miles in 24 hours and sealed the fate of 300,000 German troops at the Rhineland Pocket.

Mystery still surrounded the exact circumstances of his death. The German tank commander, a young man who was evidently green and very nervous, popped out of the panzer's hatch with a machine-pistol. Rose was said to have told a fellow officer that he would never be taken alive; whether he was surrendering his arms or made good his promise, no one knew. He reached for his holster, and the German shot him dead with a burst. His driver and the artillery officer accompanying him made a run for it. His unit went on with the Paderborn Operation.

As for the German generals:

Though the Wehrmacht did encourage officers to lead at the front, I suspect a lot of their dead senior officers simply got overran by the Russian tanks as other have said. A good number also perished from allied fighter bomber's strafing runs. Marcks of the 21st Pz Div comes to mind; Rommel and Kluge both came near to being killed by the fighters.

There are few things that are more demoralizing and disruptive of military command than the death of a general.

There is also the matter of the German officers not neccessarily having a say in the issue. Some of the later war Volksgrenadiers were so poor that generals had to lead them in person. I'd be damned if I can remember his name, but there was one late war German general of a mechanized unit who had to fight tanks with a panzerfaust! Good officer, but if you can't find any volunteers for antitank duty, you are really in trouble!

 

hi marlowe,by you're name being blue,i am thinking you are a real ww2 vet?

were you one of the laeders in you're airbourne group?

for some one to be chossen to be the leader,do they go by the soldiers personalities? like how tough and aggressive they are to be chossen?

i won't bother you to much

regards

 

I do not know about the Soviet structure but with the Germans, the unit's chief of staff could and did actually 'command' the unit. This allowed the commander to go up to the front of which Rommel, Dietrich, Heinrici, von Manteuffel, Halder and many others often did. This structure actually helped Dietrich and Himmler (when he commanded Army Group Vistula) as they were militarily deficient and they were provided with a competent chief of staff who actually ran the show.

This could explain why there were some General officers closer to the front and suseptible to enemy fire. Many a times Dietrich and Rommel found themselves in a ditch due to enemy fire.

 

Officer Selection in The Airborne:

Senior Airborne Commanders were told to exercise great care in the selection of Junior Officers. The had the authority to transferr officers out without having to specify why. This required very close supervision of commanders. Most commanders learned quicklt that if the personelle changed two often the Senior Officer was changed. Talent was needed and treasured. We had a large group of bright,young,atheletic officers.
As Ever,

Walter L. Marlowe
( Airborne all the Way)

 

This is correct. Let's see the numbers for the total amount of men mobilised (and, just of of curiousity, the overall casualties):

Germany (1939-1945): 13.500.000 (13.488.000 casualties).
USSR (1941-1945): 34.476.700 (14.700.000 casualties)

I'd specify: combat details, since everything about logistics was neglected and left over to subordinate clerks...

Though T. A. is right on the matter, on the scale of German operation and the casualties taken in the brutal fight in the east, only one general was killed in action at Stalingrad, whilst one was missing and one comitted suicide. 7 more were flown out (because of wounds, illness or any other reason) and 28 others surrendered (of whom 7 died in captivity).

 

This is correct. Let's see the numbers for the total amount of men mobilised (and, just of of curiousity, the overall casualties):

Germany (1939-1945): 13.500.000 (13.488.000 casualties).
USSR (1941-1945): 34.476.700 (14.700.000 casualties)

I'd specify: combat details, since everything about logistics was neglected and left over to subordinate clerks...

Though T. A. is right on the matter, on the scale of German operation and the casualties taken in the brutal fight in the east, only one general was killed in action at Stalingrad, whilst one was missing and one comitted suicide. 7 more were flown out (because of wounds, illness or any other reason) and 28 others surrendered (of whom 7 died in captivity).

 

Glantz's figures for total Red Army casualties is 29,629,205

 

Red Army Casualties, 1941-1945



Total Armed Forces Losses, June 1941- May 1945


Killed in battle or died during evacuation: 5,187,190

Mortally wounded (and died later): 1,100,327

Died of illness (non-battle): 541,920

Missing in action or captured: 4,455,620

Non-mortal wounds: 15,205,592

Non-mortal illness and frostbite: 3,138,556

Total Armed Forces Casualties: 29,629,205



Equipment Losses, June 1941- May 1945

Tanks and self-propelled Guns: 96,500

Artillery: 218,000

Aircraft: 88,300

Soviet Losses in the Major Battles of the War


The Defense of Kiev (July-September 1941): 700,564 casualties; 411 tanks, 28,419 artillery pieces, and 343 planes



Battle of Smolensk (July-September 1941): 344,926 casualties; 1,348 tanks, 9,290 artillery pieces, and 903 planes



The Defense of Moscow (September-November 1941): 658,279 casualties; 2,785 tanks, 3,832 artillery pieces, and 293 planes



Siege of Sevastopol (October 1941-July 1942): 200,481 casualties; no data on equipment losses



Rzhev-Vyazma Offensive (January-April 1942): 776, 889 casualties; 957 tanks, 7,296 artillery pieces, and 550 planes



Kharkov Offensive (May 1942): 277,190 casualties; 652 tanks, 1,646 artillery pieces, and n/a planes



Battle of Stalingrad (July-November 1942): 643,842 casualties; 1,426 tanks, 12,137 artillery pieces, and 2,063 planes



Stalingrad Offensive (November 1942-February 1943): 485,777 casualties; 2,915 tanks, 3,591 artillery pieces, and 706 planes



Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive (November-December 1942): 215,674 casualties; 1,655 tanks, n/a artillery pieces, and n/a planes



Kharkov-Belgorod Offensive (March-August 1943): 255,566 casualties; 1,864 tanks, 423 artillery pieces, and 153 planes



Battle of Kursk (May-July 1943):177, 847 casualties; 1,614 tanks, 3,929 artillery pieces, and 459 planes



Lower Dneipr Offensive (September-December 1943): 754,392 casualties; 2,639 tanks, 3,125 artillery pieces, and 430 planes



Leningrad-Novgorod Offensive (January-April 1944): 313, 953 casualties; 462 tanks, 1,832 artillery pieces, and 260 planes



Crimean Offensive (April-May 1944): 84, 819 casualties; 171 tanks, 521 artillery pieces, and 179 planes



Belorussian Offensive (June-August 1944): 770,888 casualties; 2,957 tanks, 2,447 artillery pieces, and 822 planes



Baltic Offensive (September-November 1944): 280,090 casualties; 522 tanks, 2,593 artillery pieces, and 779 planes



Budapest Offensive (October 1944-February 1945): 320,082 casualties; 1,766 tanks, 4,127 artillery pieces, and 293 planes



Vistula-Oder Offensive (January-February 1945): 194,191 casualties; 1,267 tanks, 374 artillery pieces, and 343 planes



East Prussian Offensive (January-April 1945): 584,778 casualties; 3,525 tanks, 1,644 artillery pieces, and 1,450 planes



Vienna Offensive (March-April 1945): 177,745 casualties; 603 tanks, 764 artillery pieces, and 614 planes



Berlin Offensive (April-May 1945): 361,367 casualties; 1,997 tanks, 2,108 artillery pieces, and 917 planes



Prague Offensive (May 1945): 52,498 casualties; 373 tanks, 1,006 artillery pieces, and 80 planes





Source:

Glantz, David M., and Jonathan House. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. (Lawrence, Kansas: UP of Kansas, 1995)

Glantz, David M. Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster. (Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1998)

Glantz, David M. Zhukov's Greatest Defeat: The Red Army's Epic Disaster in Operation Mars. 1942 (Lawrence, Kansas: UP of Kansas, 1999)

 

Sloniksp

Good post shame i ran out of salutes

Steve

 

No problem mate just use the scale!

 

Airborne Officers:

The majority of the junior officers Lts and Capts. were not professional soldiers but a large percentage after the war stayed in the reserves. They were selected on their intellegence and their atheletic ability. You had to be able to prefom as well as or better than the men you led. As a rule most of the officers were larger thantheir men I do not know why. I am six foot tall and I was at Maximum heigt for WW Ii Paras in US.

How agressive we were I leave up to the Historians.

As Ever,

Walter L. Marlowe
( Airborne all the Way)

 

Thank you for your outstanding personal insight, Mr. Marlowe.

 

How about me?!?! I found your source broken down into categories. The very same one which I believe me and you had our first encounter.




Cheers

 

Thanks, I just gave you a salute. I have When Titans Clashed as well.

 

Thank you, Mr. Marlowe! And not only for your post, but also for your services to freedom!

Also, during D-Day, I've read there were many incidents in which officers equaled or even outnumbered the men during the actions right after the jump. What can you tell us about that?

Best regards.

 

Dear Hedi:

I was both a platoon commander and a company commander. Airborne Officers were required to be agressive by the nature of their work. We were not great administrators but very good at attacking enemy positions. I hope this helpfull. Most of my fellow junior officer were very good atheletes.

As Ever,

Walter L. Marlowe


( Airborne all the Way)