Monte Cassino Question

Yep. It was us Kiwi's who drove the process resulting in the Abbey being bombed. I was in Cassino last year - the Italians didn't let me forget the fact....

The NZ Div represented a HUGE contribution in per capita population terms. They had already fought in Greece, Crete, the Desert campaign, Tunisia and taken heavy casualties. They were having major difficulties in getting manpower replacements from NZ (3 NZ Div in the Pacific being de-activated to act as a replacement resource for 2 NZ Div in Italy).

Freyberg was not going to accept a large Butchers Bill in return for preserving a historic building.

P.S We also bombed all 27 villages in the area immediately surrounding Cassino.

 

BTW, I recall having read that there was at least at one point a sign saying " No dogs or Americans!" Wonder if it still was there? or ever was?

 

It was the senior commanders of 4th Indian division who were going to attack up the hill who first mooted the idea of bombing the abbey not Freyberg and Mark Clark out ranked Freyberg as did General Alexander they could have said no and they didn,t.

All the allied Generals were responsible.

 

The New Zealand Division followed up the attack but only with one Battalion the 25th they sent 1 company up to capture Castle Hill and the other three into the town but they had no tank support because of the bombing and managed to get through the town as far as the Continental Hotel then bogged down.

The attack wasn,t followed up because the Divisional commander Ike Parkinson simply didn,t follow the plan which was to hit the Germans with a massive blow then pour 6th Brigade into the town as quickly as they could be sent down the roads he simply didn,t do it.

One company of the 24th was sent at around 5 o,clock hours after the bombing and the 26th wasn,t ordered to move until after dark,Parkinsons background was in artillary and had never commanded a division before and didn,t show much as a brigade commander when in charge of 6th brigade and Ian Bonifant who was in charge of 6th brigade had never commanded a brigade before he came from the divisional cavalry.

They simply didn,t carry out the plan that they had been given and the former Divisional commander Howard Kippenberger was furious about it and said after the war that it was going to be hard for us to write our own history of the battle because it was so badly managed.

 

The three major units of the Polish 2nd Corps were the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division (formed around Kopanski's SBSK veterans from the Tobruk fighting), 5th Kresowa Infantry Division and 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade.​

Beginning in September 1943, the 2nd Corps was moved to Italy and took up positions on Sangro River Line. Its activities were limited to occasional patrols as the British 8th Army did not want Germans to know that reinforcements were being brought in for a spring offensive on Rome.​

In May 1944 the 2nd Corps was in position to participate in the fourth battle for Monte Cassino. The Poles were given the difficult task of taking the monastery itself. The three previous attacks had been bloody failures; the monastery was situated high in the rocky hills and made an ideal defensive position for the crack troops of the German 1st Parachute Division.​

In contrast to the previous attempts, this offensive was to be launched against the whole length of the Gustav Line and would combine the efforts of both the British 8th Army and American 5th Army.​

In the early morning of 12 May 1944, following a two-and-half-hour bombardment, the Kresowa infantry attacked towards San Angelo and the Carpathian Rifles towards the infamous Hill 593.​

The artillery proved less effective than hoped for, and Polish loses soon mounted. The Carpathian Rifles gained a tenuous grip on Hill 593, but in a few hours' fighting had already lost 20 percent of their strength. Gen. Anders called his bloodied units back to their start lines in the evening.​

Although no ground had been gained Gen. Leese complimented the Poles, noting that without their sacrifices the British drive across the Rapido River into the valley below would not have succeeded. Polish 2nd Corps drew away reserves and artillery that would otherwise have been directed against British XIII Corps .​

On 16 May, XIII Corps nearly had the monastery cut off, and on 17 May the second Polish attack begun. This time Poles were supported by the Sherman tanks from the Polish 2nd Armoured Brigade. By nightfall they had a weak grip on Hill 593 overlooking the Monastery. That night most of the surviving German paratroopers began to retreat to avoid being captured, and on 18 May the Poles brushed past their rearguards and the 12th Podolski Lancers Regiment raised the red and white national flag over the Monte Cassino monastery.​

In the week's fighting the 2nd Corps had suffered appalling losses; there were 4,199 casualties, 25 percent (over 1,150 ) of these dead.​

Following the Cassino Battle, the 2nd Corps took part in the drive up the Adriatic coast, capturing Ancona on 20 July1944 and Bologna in April 1945.​

 

II: The Sequence of Events | NZETC

Until the second week in February the Fifth Army had scrupulously tried to avoid firing into the abbey, though undoubtedly some stray shells pitched in and around it. But from the night of 9–10 February the slope of Monastery Hill was heavily shelled by day and night without noticeable detriment to the enemy's posts there, but with considerable damage to the top floor of the abbey. Certainly not later than the 11th, and perhaps earlier, the possibility of bombing the abbey from the air began to be discussed. The Indian division's operation instruction, signed late that evening, recorded a request for the intense bombing of all buildings and suspected enemy posts on and near the objectives, including the monastery; and when he spoke on the telephone to Brigadier Dimoline about the same time, General Freyberg made no demur, but on the contrary expressed his willingness to recommend the bombing. He realised that it would be a controversial action, but thought it would be right if it meant saving lives. Shortly afterwards on the same night, his BGS (Brigadier Queree) put out feelers to Fifth Army about bombing the monastery.

 

No-one should be in doubt as to the military necessity of destroying the Abbey of Cassino. It's treasures had been removed by elements of the Hermann Goering Division in any case, so the damage done was to the structure itself and not the priceless relics within. German propaganda trumpetted this act as an example of European culture saved from the 'barbourous Allies'. Nobody seriously believed this line of reasoning anyway. Just another example of linguistic swill coming from German radio and the ministry of Josef Goebbels.

 

The trouble of war, especially back then where the whole world was at war, and with the new and destructive weapons they possessed in ww2. Nowhere was safe, and every vantage point was a possible observation point, or artillery battery, just waiting to be pounded by enemy aircraft.

In terms of the attacker, think of the lives they would save if the enemy really did hold such positions. In terms of the Abbey, what if the Germans had fortified the position? It commands a good area and it could stall the allies enough for the Germans to regroup or even counter attack.

Now if you look at it from another way, the Germans would have done the something in reverse positions

 

One of Freyberg's leading arguments for the bombing was that it would stun the defenders. It was thus of the utmost importance that the infantry assault should follow with the least possible delay, so that the Germans, if in fact they held the abbey, might be overrun while still dazed and shaken.
but this didnt all go to plan....

 

I have always wondered why instead of attacking at Cassino the germans strongest position where the enemy had high ground advantage and the frontages you could attack on were narrow so you could only atack in small numbers and most often without tanks support they didn,t attack closer to the coast where they could have not only had strong artillary and air support but also could have brought the Navies in with there hugh power to provide support.

 

In Rick Atkinson's book Day of Battle he states that the Germans were very careful not to go near the Abbey. He says, as some of you have mentioned, that the General Freyberg became obsessed with destroying the Abbey and that two American generals, Ira Eaker and Jacob Devers, later supported Freyberg in claiming that the Germans were using the building. According to Atkinson, Alphonse Pierre Juin and Geoffrey Keyes advised Clark not to bomb the Abbey. Also, according to Atkinson, Clark had been informed by the II Corps intelligence staff that 2,000 Italian civilians were sheltered in the building. Clark ordered it obliterated anyway. Needless to say, Atkinson doesn't appear to have a very high opinion of Clark.

 

Interesting articles, 1st from yr 2000, relating to bombing mission..
Error led to bombing of Monte Cassino | World news | The Guardian

http://www.s-p-q-r.org/cassino_files/Page481.htm

http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:BDPGL6ehUbkJ:www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc%3FLocation%3DU2%26doc%3DGetTRDoc.pdf%26AD%3DADA494330+error+led+to+bombing+of+monte+cassino&hl=en&gl=uk&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESian91F3WISOiP35zTxhnFGFz4zd4Tkw4_Q6fDyeiJRRPG_N7OOetQWP__Lo8pzmFtgYP5q4g_fGtkPEPZay6NgQtJFx0sjRZ33pWvapzWk3gMJF4XvHaxSJm13ZEZ3BHpyIOsI&sig=AHIEtbRl3wjjKz2Juedf-49FuCbxgnOHPg

 

Hi Steve,

sometimes at war there are some cities or places that has an special meaning for the Generals or Politician. The tactical value isn´t important for this places, so that a lot of soldiers have to die for an prestige object. The same like Stalingrad not neccessary but the name....

Regards

Ulrich

 

That is so true it,s like they get obsessed with it if they put in an attack and the first one doesn,t work they just can,t walk away from it and look for another avenue of attack they have to keep battering at the same point to try and force there way.

So sad for the men who have to do the actual fighting and make the sacrifice.

 

When you study the overall campaign for the Liri river valley you will see a larger obsession. The Allied commanders had become fixtiated on the Liri Valley & Route 6 that an north along it. The valley is necessary to advance northwards, as it is the only practical route for vehical supply convoys. but, as the main tactical effort it & the adjacent mountains have some significant disadvantages.

Note how the attacks by the French corps & the US corps through the Arunci Mountains on the west flank, and by Eighth army through the Appinennes to the east made the German postion at the south end of the Liri valley untenable. Kesselrings approval of the retreat from Cassino & related positions were based on the defeat of the German units covering the flanks of the Liri Valley. Had those positions been defeated sooner Cassino & the other mountains overlooking the valley would have been abandoned sooner.

Exactly why the flanking attacks were not made the main effort, and made sooner has a lot to do with the stalling of the Allied armies along the German Gustav Line & Cassino.

 

I have a book Cassino the Hollow Victory by John Ellis and it states that the British official history expressed some puzzlement over freybergs eventual decision to attack front on but points out that there is no evidence to show wht he abandoned the wide flanking manoveure outlined on feb 4th.

Well the reason it was abandoned was because the New Zealand division was basically a Panzer division with around 4500 vehicles we were fully motorised,we had no experience in mountain warfare and they didn,t know if they could supply the division in the mountains espically as it was winter.

I still can,t inderstand why they didn,t attack closer to the coast where they could have got out from under the powerful Cassino defences because it didn,t matter how many infantry you put in at Cassino the Germans on the highground with there MG42 and mortars,artillary could control the battlefield and mow your infantry down as they crossed open ground more often than not with no tank support.

The U.S forces made attacks into the valley at the Rapido in the first battle and the brits tried to cross the Garigliano.

I have been trying to find some good maps in my books and i noticed near the coast you have route 7 and i am wondering why they didn,t concentrate there effort there try and make a breach in the german line closer to the coast and get some armour onto route 7 because they were close to the coast they could have brought the ships in to provide fire support which they proved to be very good at salerno and Normandy.

I just like the idea because it gets you out from under the Cassino death trap.

 

Why didn´t they made a pocket of the Town of Cassino and the Mountain? If they had cutted the supply lines and went to Rome with more power, it were a matter of time til the German units were running out of sources. They needed only a "few" men, artillery and bombers. How long do you think the para´s and the other units were able to hold Monte Cassino? In my opinion not so long for the reason that your other troops had engaged Rome much earlier and FM Kesselring had to retread his troops to hold Rome. But these are only my cheap strategical thoughts.

Regards

Ulrich

 

The problem was to attack Rome we had to break into the Liri Valley and the Germans controlled highway 6 going through the Town with there artillary as well as the surrounding area they had the whole place zero in no matter what way you approached they could see you coming and just rain pre registered fire down on you and the frontages were so narrow you could only attack in small rifle company sized groups and most of the time with no tank support the place was a death trap.

Further along the valley you had to cross rivers and again the germans had them zerod in for mortar,artillary and machine gun fire and laced them with mines you look at the experience of the U.S 36th trying to cross the rapido it was a slaughter.

And at Anzio they tried to out flank and it was a great idea but they were only able to do a small landing of i think two divisions on the first day and the commander Lucas wasn,t confident about the operation and he had been told by Mark Clark not to stick his neckout so he didn,t move of the beach and the allies ended up trapped there.

It was as if every where the allies did an operation they did it piecemeal they were not deploying sufficent forces at any one point to achieve something decisive,when you look at the 2nd and 3rd battles for Cassino espically they were only corps size attacks two divisions attacking with one to exploit any breakthrough and with no diversionary attacks anywhere else the attacks were folley.

The weather also played a huge role in the first three battles for cassino there was so much flooding it made it extremely hard to use tanks which handed the allied infantry to the german machine gunners and the speed the rivers were flowing at made them hard to cross.

 

Eventually they did. Kesslerings decision to abandon that sector of the Gustav Line was due to the US 2d corps (85th & 88th Divs) & the French Expeditionary corps (4th Morrocan, 3rd Algerian, 2d Morrocan, & 1st Motorized Divs). Breaking the defence in the Arunci mountains and securing Route 7 on the coast. Kesselrings gradual abandonment of the Gustav Line including the Cassino position started weeks before the final Allied attacks on Cassino & supporting positions. Kesselring did not wait until the Cassino defense was surrounded, but intiated the withdrawl when it became clear the defense of the Arunci mountains was failing.

Look for Jackson's 'The Battle for Italy'. Old but still one of the best overviews of events. Jackson avoids the editorializing of many historians and its easy to pick the places and dates & other facts from his text. Hs maps are good for showing the units and manuver, tho to appreciate the terrain a good Atlas of Italy with medium scale topographic maps is needed.

Atkinson's 'Day of Battle' is ok for the US side of the battle but lacks the same depth for the other armies.

 

There was also Operation Strangle. The Allied airforces had been conducting a series of attacks on the German supply transport across Italy. They had expected it to succed in a few weeks. Instead it took several months. Eventually it did reduce the flow of supplies to the German Gustav line, shorting the defense on ammunition and construction supplies for building reserve & secondary positions. Conversely the Allies had accumulated a large reserve of ammunition & other items.