Poland, France, and the UK at the start of the war

OK Guys, please bear with me for a moment. This question has been bugging me for years, and I am unsure of what the answer is. I am very weak in the ETO and especially the Russian front. Britain and France had entered into an agreement with Poland for mutual defense. I believe each had a separate treaty with Poland, but not sure. On 1 Sept 1939 Germany invaded Poland. On the third of Sept. France and Britain, as well as some other Commonwealth Nations, declared a state of war with Germany. So When Russia invaded Poland from the East on the 17th, why didn’t the Allies live up to the promise and declare War on another country threatening the territorial integrity of Poland?

 

The Russian public reason for entering Poland was to save the ethnic Russians that settled on the Eastern side of Poland. They were there to protect them. Behind closed doors, I read, the Western allies did not want a war with the Russians.

The Russians only lost over 700 dead due to the fact that the Poles actually thought the Russians were moving in to save them and fight the Germans. By the time the Russians moved in, the British and French realized there was not much that could be done for Poland.

 

Probably because Germany was more than enough for them to handle and it would have been very tricky diplomatically for France and Britain to declare war on Russia also. The Soviet-German non agression pact meant that declaring war against Russia might have instantly made Russia an ally of Germany (and enemy of France and Britain) rather than simply a co-belligerant.

Moreover there was no practical way, due to geography, for Britain and France to assist the Poles militarily in 1939 as they were not strong enough at that time - so these countries could do little more than what they did, declare war and prepare to attack or be attacked by the Germans.

 

Poland had serious reservations about a multi-national pact which involved Russia, which was suggested originally by Litvinov in early March '39. By late March the British government decided to side with Poland, with Halifax approaching France and Romania (The nations Russia originally suggested) to see if they'd be interested in it, France said "Yes".

Very good point Marc. Also the Allies had been trying for decades to get Revolutionary Russia onside against the Germans, and failing. One interesting point is how in the 20's many Wehrmacht officers had actually helped train Russian forces so they might have a reasonable army. Unfortunately for many of those officers this worked against them and their careers doubly; in the field they ended up fighting against that army, while at home the Third Reich regarded them as very suspect for their training connections.

 

I believe the Franco British guarantee to Poland only covered an attack by Germany on Poland. I don't think they bound themeselves to protecting Poland from the Soviets.

 

I've sort of put this together in my own head over the years, and in some areas it seems contradictory even to myself. The history of Poland in the 20th Century is complicated to say the least, and I’m no authority nor do I claim to be one. That said, it should be remembered that before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1918) pre-Versailles, the Tzarist Russia Empire included most of Poland, all of Finland, the Baltic States, and the Ukraine. Then following the Treaty of Riga of 1921, between the USSR and Poland, a semi-truce existed. The war between Poland and the USSR (1919-20) had been precipitated largely by the demand of Poland that its eastern border of 1772 be restored. The treaty terms, which fixed the Russo-Polish border, did not satisfy the claims of the victorious Poles exactly, so in their weakened military state (the USSR had yet to finish its own civil war battles until late 1921) they awarded Poland large parts of Belorussia and the Ukraine.

Reclaiming those "portions" of historical "Russia" may have sort of seemed "semi-justifiable" even in the eyes of the western democracies. And let us not forget that the new "Poland" had been right in there at the "feed bin" picking up a little chunk of Czechoslovakia while the "Munich Pact" (Peace in our time) was being hammered out and signed!

Even so, as far as Poland is concerned, as early as March 31, 1939; Prime Minister Chamberlain made this statement:

"In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to this effect.
I may add that the French Government have authorized me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government."

This was a PLEDGE of assistance only, and was formalized with the; "Agreement of Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and Poland" in London, August 25, 1939.

This can be read in its entirety at:

The Avalon Project : Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy

It does seem inconsistent that Germany was declared against, but the not the USSR; diplomatically and legally it isn’t so much so. The pact finally signed with the Poles "assured" British and French aid if they were attacked by a European power. Meaning, without naming them, the German Nazis. The Polish state had only been "re-organized" post Versailles, and after Hitler's moves against the Sudatenland, in the Ruhr, and with the Austrian inclusion into the Greater Reich, it seemed "prudent" to let it be known that further expansion (by Hitler) into Poland would NOT be tolerated. And the "aid" was couched in the terms of "all support in their power", so that was up to the nations sending the aid.

Don’t forget that when the declaration of war was lodged against the Nazis, it was two full weeks before the Soviets invaded from the east. There was literally NO point in declaring war against another "nation" which the British and French HAD NOT identified in the original guarantee of Polish independence. The assurance was only opposing European aggression into Poland as part of the declaration.

While Ribbentrop and Molotov were settling their own "non-aggression" pact, the Brits were attempting to get the Soviets to join in an alliance to halt ALL Nazi aggression (as mentioned above). The Brits and French were caught off guard completely by that "Stalin/Hitler" business, and equally unable to alter the diplomatic agreements to include a declaration against the Soviets (no matter how pointless) in the midst of German aggression.

Add in that it is possible that the whole world, not just the European powers didn’t really think this local "border dispute" would escalate into the world war it became. The border clashes in the Far East between the Japanese, the Soviets, and the Chinese was also rather ignored as a "local problem".

Neither the British nor the French had much to offer the Poles other than rhetoric at any rate. The British had used the one year of time between the Munich Accord, and the Polish invasion to build up their own military which had been languishing for the past decade. The French were fully committed to a defensive stance a’la the last war, in their expensive Maginot Line.

A declaration of war against the Soviets would have been meaningless and would have complicated any slim chance (mis-guided or not), of bringing the Soviets over to their side and opening up a second front against Germany. Remember a pact of "non-aggression" isn’t a treaty of alliance, the secret section which promised the Soviets the eastern section was unknown, and Hitler’s own Mein Kampf had high-lighted the folly of a two front war. Mis-guided or not, it wasn't impossible according to what was known in the west at the time.

Consequently it was "realpolitic" not to go to war against the Soviets. Like it or not, war is politics. It might seem only fair and principled that the British/French Alliance should have declared war on the Soviets. In real terms it would have been pointless. The French and British were having difficulties getting neighbors like Belgium to break their declared neutrality and allow Anglo/French Divisions to set up defense on Belgian soil. That stance had worked so well for the Belgians in WW1, opps it didn’t that time either.

The French were too busy trying to convince the British to put more troops in France let alone consider any further Eastern adventures, the British (Chamberlain) could only get the French to agree to a joint declaration of war on Germany if they promised to mobilize and send the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) to France, and that their commander (Gort) would be under French military (Gamelin) control.

The British could not give more troops in a Polish defense against either the Nazis or the Red Army, for the simple reason these did not exist. Britain did not have a mass standing army and only began to assemble one at the beginning of 1939 when it refurbished the BEF. Britain is buying every chunk of war material it can economically and legally, while increasing its own "defense" spending for home production of war material the largest defense spending output by any democratic nation up to that time. That year they also initiated a "conscript" system, but they were as yet untrained. The British Army in 1939 really was a comparatively small, professional force, and in and of itself it was a fine and well trained group, especially the BEF.

Taking nothing away from the "reserve" and Territorial Army groups, but only the core of the BEF sent to France in 1939 was the group established and still extant after the Boer War. At the outbreak of war in 1939 the British Expeditionary Force was dispatched (in name) to France and was composed of 12 divisions in total size, but in reality the true size of the BEF only included four regular (BEF) infantry divisions and 50 puny little light scout tanks which had trained together as a "unit" (this was the real "BEF"). As one of the longer standing/existing units in at least name in Europe, it was the best for the moment the British had surely, but rather tiny in both numbers and equipment compared to anybody else. The problem was that the other men in the supplemental eight (8) divisions were poorly trained and equipped.

By May of 1940, one more regular and five more divisions from the Territorial Army arrived to supplement the artificially enlarged BEF in France. So now there were about 395,000 British, Commonwealth, and Dominion men in France and on the Belgian borders with about 240,000 assigned to front-line service, most of whom had NOT worked together but were simply attached to the BEF. The tank strength had grown to a two-battalion infantry tank brigade (100 medium tanks) and two cavalry light tank brigades (200 light scout tanks). Even by May of the next year the British strength had grown, but as events would expose was not up to the task of battling the Nazis, let alone both the Nazis and the Soviets even if they could get there.

Then how about this little supposition of my own; the Poles may have been too proud to ask directly for a foreign army to be deployed on their soil, I wonder about this since they refused the Soviets "right of passage" when the USSR asked to transit their territory to aid the Czechs when the Nazis expanded out of the area granted them in the Munich Pact. The Poles said NO, and thus the Red Army couldn’t cross Polish land to aid the Czechs, probably a good idea in retrospect as getting Soviet forces out of an area peacefully proved problematic in the future.

While the Poles were certainly aware of the deteriorating state of the peace, it seems to myself they may have been placing more trust in the French and British being able to "draw the Wehrmacht away" from their borders with a declaration of "war" once they were invaded. They had after all, before the invasion on Sept. 1 implemented the Peking Plan.

The Peking Plan was implemented three or four days before the Nazis invaded Poland, and (in retrospect) was a wise decision since the only major Polish Navy warship (a destroyer) which stayed behind was sunk by the Kreigsmarine on the third day of open warfare. This plan evacuated the three best of the Polish Navy’s destroyers to the UK. They arrived there within hours of the Nazis invasion. In September of 1939 the Polish Navy consisted of 5 submarines (I think four of these also served with the RN), 4 destroyers, and various support vessels and mine laying and clearing ships. Those evacuated served alongside the Royal Navy with distinction, and only one of the destroyers set to Britain was lost during the war. However all the Polish Navy which stayed behind was either sunk or captured and pressed into Nazi service.

Does this just muddy the water further? I hope so, I have never been able to figure it all out either. As Lincoln said when he was faced with the prospect of War with Great Britain over the seizure of Confederate agents from a British ship: "One War at a time, Gentlemen, one war at a time".

 

The gurantee was for any invasion from a 'European' power. Polish Ambassador Edward Raczyński reminded Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax of the pact, he was bluntly told that it was Britain's business whether to declare war on the Soviet Union.

 

Just to muddy waters a bit more remember the intervention plan in Finland and the one to bomb the Baku and Batum oilfields. Both came pretty close to being implemented and could have changed the course of the war dramatically.

IMO while it may be true some had hopes for an anti-fascist alliance in 1939, it was not the only alternative examined though the anti soviet shift may be due to the soviet moves against Finland and later Rumania that happened after the close of the Polish campaign.

And the "we could do nothing to help Poland" does not really stand up to closer examination, getting troops to Poland was a military impossibility but the western allies enjoyed a big numerical superiority on the western front during the early part of the campaign and the disparity was even greater if you think most of the German forces were reserve formations with reduced combat effectiveness, practically all the best troops were in Poland, not just the motorized forces but also the better trained infantry divisions from (lower number welle formations). A lot more than what was done historically could have been attempted, though it's far from certain Poland could have been saved.

 

I've never been convinced by this idea. To make any dent at all in the conquest of Poland, effective intervention would have had to happen during the month of September.

On 1 September, the French Army was not ready for any kind of war, much less offensive operations over hundreds of kilometers. The French had to mobilize their army, which took time.

Much of the Franco-German border was fronted by the Rhine River. Considering Allied capabilities in 1939, I don't think an amphibious assault across the Rhine could have ever been in the cards. The only option available is where in the French made their limited offensive -- into the Saar Region. But even here the terrain is awful for offensive operations. (See Google Maps for a rough view) Ignore the Autobahns (they didn't exist in the Saar region in 1939) and look at how relatively few roads penetrate that hill mass (very steep forested hills and ridges, BTW). While the area of the Rhine Valley near Karlsruhe looks promising, it is actually screened by a deep forest that was studded with Siegfried Line bunkers and antitank defenses.

This lack of avenues of approach for a motorized army meant the Germans really only had to defend a few corridors to prevent a French advance in the region. They had more than enough troops in Army Group C to pull that off.

Consider 1944. The same border was defended by a mish-mash of German troops. A considerably better equipped Allied army was still stopped in the area of this border for months because of logistical problems and the strength that the fortifications lent the German defense. In 1939, the French had their own logistical issues because they weren't yet mobilized and in any case would have had to develop techniques to defeat the Siegfried Line defensive works.

I have no doubt the French generals looked at their maps and made the same observations. The British and French politicians promised Poland something their militaries could not deliver, hoping it would bluff Hitler into backing down. In a face-saving gesture, the French made a minor offensive into the Saar and occupied a minute region of Germany for a while.

Cheers

BW

 

It Was historical Poland there was no Belorussia ( Poland from 1772 before partitions: Plik:Rzeczpospolita Rozbiory 3.png – Wikipedia, wolna encyklopedia).
Poland only want a border from 1772, and it was after the Russia attack us, so i do not agree and its a lie. they dont give us nothing, it was polish before partitions.