was the german assault on russia doomed to failure due to the vast geographics of the land?

Why did not Stalin sign the pact France and Britain was offering then even before the Germans offered any pact? By accepting this he would have made sure Hitler could not attack because that would have meant two-front war....By signing the Ribbentrop pact he made sure Germany would attack Poland. It did not hurt too much to make it sure Poland would be destroyed then?

I do know it´s all about power politics and little countries mean nothing when the big boys divide the countries....

 

Not sure what your point is Kai. Russia and Lenin were in a civil war and could not fight a war with Germany and succeed in the Revolution at the same time. Lenin (in order for his revolution to succeed) wanted peace and Trotsky wanted to continue fighting, there is your rift in the party. Lenin came out on top, ceeded to Germany's demands knowing fully well that Germany would not be able to keep those territories as she would loose the war because the U.S was now involved. In the end, Lenin won his revolution, Germany lost the war and her empire and Trosky killed.

I, such as yourself can only speculate. I would however assume Stalin did make that deal for several reasons.

Both (Germany and Russia) lost the war and their empires and wanted to get their territories back.

Both were outcasts.

Both needed to rebuild their militaries and used each other.

Russia, historically has always been closer to Germany then Britain or France so signing a trade agreement with Germany would only make sense (Russia was the friendliest country to Germany post WW1 in Europe).

Russia was not part of Geneva

Logistically, trade between these two countries would be far easier as they were neighbors.

There was no way to guarantee the prevention of war, by Stalin signing a pack with Britain or France. This did not stop Germany the first time why should it stop her a second time especially when Russia virtually had no military? This was a gamble that Stalin would have never made.

Russia had already been at war with Poland after WW1. Stalin had no love for Poland and as far as he was concerned she along with the Baltic States wer still part of Russia.

Signing the pact with Germany however, guaranteed Russia's safety until her military was ready or so he thought...

It is also important to mention that there are numerous sources stating that Stalin knew that war was coming and wanted Germany to fight it out with the rest of Europe and the U.S.. and when everyone was spent, he would just walk across "liberating" war torn Europe with Red Flags.

My thoughts at least.

 

The first one is that the Germans did conquer vast areas after the Brest-Litovsk which means in my opinion that they could have continued to conquer more. Of course they would have wanted to transfer troops to the west but they were not happy with "just the peace" which is why they attacked Feb 1918. But without accepting Germany´s all demands the war would have continued perhaps until the crule end of Lenin. He was just a tool for the Germans, just like the Germans were a tool for Lenin.

On the second one: Molotov-Robbentrop pact was not a trade pact only as the secret protocol proves. It´s good to see though you seem to agree that Stalin was pushing Germany and France/Britain against each other...

 

Several issue that no-one has mentioned here and that was the effect of Hitler's Einzatzgruppen and the Sicherheitdeinst on the local populations that came under German control post invasion. Many officers had reported to their higer ups that many of the locals welcomed the Germans as liberators from Stalins Regime.

If Hitler had decided to garner the support of the locals and that under German rule their lives would be better and even extend citizen rights (Exluding Jews of cause) to them and help produce materiel for the German cause it may have succeded, it is on record that many commisars were given up by locals willingly by local.

Another is that Hitler did not try to the best of his ability to allow the mass weeding out of captured Soviet troops that would willingly join the Wehrmacht to fight against Stalins regime. Time and time again he refused to listen to General Vlasov.

I have read that a large portion of the Soviet Red Army were penal divisions those division that were never given any orders of battle and so technically did not appear on the books, there are some speculations on the number of these penal division but it consistantly gives figures up over 125 divisions, this was also used in the Red Air Force, these troops came from Stalins purging the Gulags of any prisoner that physically fit enough to walk.

Yes i agree that Geographical logistics was a nightmare but it was not the be all and end all of Germanys loss in the Soviet Union. Oh and to finish up on, just as many Red Army troops died in that horrific winter of 1941/42 the loss of troops to the cold did not wholey belong to the Germans. The Soviet High Command was just as unprepared for that winter as anyone else.

v.R

 

Dunningan? For crying outloud, he is a wargame designer and he is being opposed by historians much more reputable.

The thesis that the Russians were planning a first strike is invallidated by Russian mobalization plans and war games from 1935 to December 1941, all of which were defensive, and envisioned a counterstroke into Germany only after the invading German forces had been decisively defeated on Russian soil. Adding urgency to Stalin's defensive orientation of his forces was that in the war game of 1941 Zhukov's OPFOR totally destroyed the Red Force in a mock German invasion. Why would Stalin attack a foe when he knew he was to weak to even defend himself?

If the Russians were staging an attack on Germany, then the disposition of Red Army troops at 1941 made no sense. Stalin deployed his strongest and most modernized Mechanized Corps in Belorus and Ukrain. The Carpathian as well as Romania and Hungary barred direct access to Germany. A more logical disposition for an attack was to concentrate in Poland but obviously that was not the case. Conversely, if Stalin was planning to fight defensively, then the deployment made perfect sense because those units would protect the grain and industry rich region from a German thrust. The Red Army did deploy in Poland, but it was a country that they freshly conquered, was politically hostile to Moscow and had no defensive line facing west to the German side.

North Korea in 1950 was a war of reunification initiated by Kim Il-sung. IIRC, he nodged and pushed and begged for Stalin to lend him help, which Uncle Joe eventually did, but compared with the Vietnam War the quanitity of materiel and manpower given to the NK forces were pitiful. The Chinese did not intervene until the Americans crossed the Yalu--inspite of repeated Chinese protests that this would constitute an unacceptable threat to China's national security and an act of war--and attacked on their own initiatve and resources.

 

If I recall correctly the Red Army tactics were at least in the 1930´s to early 1940´s to hit the enemy back to its territory and destroy their forces there, not to let them get on own territory. Something that tactically can change the way they should position troops if they were expecting an attack.

 

The aim of Barbarossa was to destroy the Sovjet army in the west in 10 weeks,before the Russians could mobilize,and with was left on tanks,artillery,ammunition,petrol to advance as far as the A-A line(Archangelsk-Astrachan):the war had to be won before september. But the Russian mobilisation began on june 22:in the firdt 1O weeks,the German strength was diminishing weekly by 33000 and the Russian was increasing 50000.They had to start again on a smaller scale(they were to weak to advance on a broad front) in octoberperation TyphoonThey attacked direction Moscow(using Moscow as a bait to lure the Russian reserves in the battle).But again they failed:the Russian strenth was increasing weekly by 78000 and the German one diminishing by 22000

 

huh?

 

Hello JagdtigerI,

yes that was Adolfs slight overestimation of things to come.

I am not sure about the numerical increase or decrease of Russian and German troops - but the comparisson sticks.

Also the objective goal after the 10 weeks anhiliation run across the Russian army was to end in a furher push (not within the 10 weeks) at the Archangelsk-Astrachan line.

Regards
Kruska

 

Hi Kruska,

I am aware of all this.

I was just really confused by his organization and the random troop numbers he was throwing around.

 

From what I've seen Dunningan does a pretty good job of researching things and has a better grasp of military matters than many "professionals" although he could easily claim that title himself. However I'd like to see exactly what he said and what his opponents are saying before I'd agree with either side here. If someone says he's being opposed by reputable historians my first guess would be that someone misunderstood what he said. (I note that you weren't the one that was using him as a source)

 

I thought so

Regards
Kruska

 

Barbarossa was Hitler's war alone. The Germans had fought on the Eastern front in WW1 and had rolled east for hundreds of miles against the Tsar's army (WW1 directly brought about the end of the Tsar and Stalin's communist rule) - the Russians negotiated a peace by 1918 and the Germans were then free to turn the troops thus freed against the West. Only the timely arrival of American troops turned the German western offensive into a surrender.)

No one else in Nazi Germany had much enthusiasm for invading the Soviet Union. The German General staff were of course students of history and Napoleon's icy retreat from Moscow in 1812 weighed heavily on any German intentions towards the East. One only has to look at a map of Europe and Russia in 1941 to see how the terrain simply opens up like a gigantic funnel to the east - most invaders in the past had not so much been defeated as absorbed by the vast emptiness of Russia.

Nevertheless the simple facts did nothing to dissuade Hitler from his plans. He did not make them lightly and in fact mulled over invading Russia for months if not years. But his final meeting with the obnoxious, coarse, and undiplomatic Russian foreign minister Molotov seems to have been what cinched the decision. It was his meeting in 12 November 1940 that convinced Hitler he needed to invade Russia to finish "the final struggle with Bolshevism". In the last week of his life (April 1945) he still recalled the meeting with outrage. Said Hitler "(Molotov) demanded that we give him military bases on Danish soil...he demanded Constantinople, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland...and we were supposed to be the victors." (The Second World War by John Keegan.)

All the objections stated in the post were brought up by all and sundry of Hitler's Generals and underlings including Herman Goering. Only a few Generals seem to have taken Hitler's side in the argument and it was their objections that caused Hitler to postpone the final decision for so long, (since Hitler knew they were probably right). Ultimately though, Hitler brushed aside all arguments and since in Hitler's Germany it was only his opinion that counted, he ultimately got his way. Taking note of the Stalinist purges in the 1930's, Hitler famously said "the armies are leaderless. The communist government is a house of cards. We need only kick in the door, and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."

Despite being shocked, the OKW obeyed their orders like good soldiers. Guderian tried to talk Hitler out of Barbarossa as well, but he soon realized Hitler would have none of it.

Guderian knew the Panzers would be key to the operation, and so would speed. He came up with a plan whereby the Panzers simply advanced into Russia, almost non-stop, destroying enemy strong points and grabbing up as much terrain in as short a time as possible. Tank losses and break-downs were simply to be left behind and repaired later, and the Panzer columns would need to be supplied by air drop. Guderian knew that it would be victory for Germany in 1941, or not at all. Ultimately Hitler and the OKW and OKH rejected Guderian's plan.

 

I'm not sure about that. East of e.g. Novosibirsk there's not really a lot of industry, or in fact much of anything. It would be kind of hard to sustain any kind of meaningful Red Army on nothing but trees, grass, cold and mosquitoes - although Lend-Lease coming in through Vladivostok might have kept the Soviets in the fight. However, for the Germans to push that far east (it's only half-way across Russia, but almost level with western Mongolia) would be... errr... challenging. Maybe they could ride there on fliegenschwein.

IMO the Germans were indeed doomed. The best they could hope to achieve would be to perhaps possibly maybe somehow manage to encircle Moscow and knock it out of contention by late 1941, if they focused their efforts and got lucky (i.e. Hitler had kept his nose out and they ignored all the 'grads). Unless that caused the Soviets to fold (which it likely wouldn't), then its still game over for the Nazis, but it might buy them a few more years.

 

Very good post. Only a small grievance regarding the bolded part. I think it's simplifying it too much. I believe the rise of Stalinism was due to a combination of factors not just WW1. Anyway, just a remark.

As for Guderian plan, I believe it would fail as Germany lacked a strategic supply of spare tanks. As the Panzer formations lost tanks due to various reasons, they lost their punch and while some tanks were being repaired others needed to take their place. IIRC, when Guderian asked Hitler for 1,000 tanks to replace losses, Hitler had only 200 to give him. This all leads to the discussion of wether or not Germany turning it's full industrial capability towards war would change the outcome of the campaign... My personal opinion is that maybe they could reach Moscow and the Caucasian oilfields and force a treaty on the Soviet Union. Maybe. Just considering they had the equipement to push farther into Russia and managing to keep their Panzer divisions and air armies up to strenght. Still, they'd have to contend with manpower shortages and the lack of artillery.
Have to go trough the numbers again...




Cheers...

 

I second that. The Tzar had adbicated long before LENIN was transported to St. Petersburg by the Germans. Then it was a couple more years of the Duma ruling (and badly) before they themselves were replaced by the Bolzheviks. I believe that term means "majority" in Russian, although they were far from a "majority party" by any stretch. Just as I recall the chain of events, sure could be wrong.

 

Tanks can not do the job alone. Infantry men are needed for support. On numerous occasions Guderian had to halt his advance in order to let the infantry catch up.

 

And let's not forget that shortly after Barbarossa was launched, Hitler (in his infinate wisdom) slowed tank production and accelorated U-boat production. He figrued the "house of cards" was going to tumble soon, and he would need more U-boats to "strangle" Britain into submission.

Tough to replace tanks when you have shifted the steel quotas from them to the Kriegsmarine!

 

It wasn't Hilter's fault, it wasn't the Wehrmacht's fault, it was Stalins fault

Yes Stalins fault,

he was supposed to do the same as France had done after the initial Blitz - beg for armistice -.

BTW, the above is supposed to be sarcasm. But Hilter took it for real.

Regards
Kruska