How common was it for British infantry sections in Normandy to be armed with two instead of one brens (between an 8 man infantry section)?
Not common at all until *perhaps* the last year of the war. British and Commonwealth units tended to be rather light on automatic firepower in comparison to the very well equipped "elite" units of the German army (somewhat made up for by the high rate of fire the bolt action lee enfield could produce), though in general German squads tended to only have one MG as well as slower firing bolt actions and similar SMG levels. Problem with giving squads two Brens is bringing up the ammo to supply both. You could either cut the current ration in half to supply both guns or slap your riflement with double the amount of Bren magazines they were already carrying to supply the Bren. The brits seemed to have felt that their men were already carying enough stuff, a few extra bren mags would just make things worse. Thus sustainability was more important, enough ammo to keep one going for awhile than two for a short time. Plus the artillery based doctrine and the set piece attacks of the British and commonwealth armies meant that fire and maneuver, and ultimately supression, wasnt as reliant on machine guns when you had the complex artillery plans and almost inexhaustable supply of arty rounds the Brits had. In fact the British by Normandy had ordered their men NOT to fire during the advance since studies showed most of it wasn't even aimed, and it meant less ammo for the British/Commonwealth when the inevitable local German counter attacks began and the Germans would be much easier targets to hit. They were to follow the barrage as closely as possible in open order formation and be right on top of the Germans once it lifted, fire and maneuver tactics were than to be used as required to secure the objective and than defend it. I am sure the lack of automatic firepower hampered the British at times, at the same time their effective artillery based doctrine certainly gave them many benefits. During Normandy most casualties on the allies side and probably the German side, given the generally more effective artillery useage against them, were caused by shrapnel rather than bullets, so while automatic firepower tended to be somewhat weak in British and commonwealth units in the killing and surpression field it was probably made up for by arty based doctrine and complex artillery plans the British used.
I ran across a tactical guide for British infantry assault for an infantry section and it advocates concentrating one or two Brens (if available) together and firing at the same area for suppression. The riflemen group would advance forward.
To add to that, the British riflemen in Normandy (as part of an 8 man section) only carried 50 rounds for their rifles plus one or two bandoleers of 50 (but prioritized to refill Bren mags). Most of the sections' over 2,000 rifle rounds were carried in Bren magazines. Like the German section, the British section revolved around its LMG rather than prioritizing massed rifle fire like US garand armed squads.
The problem with double Brens is that it took two men to operate each gun - one to fire, one to reload -another Bren would men another No.2 gunner cutting down the number of riflemen. With a belt-fed mg you might get away with one No.2 serving both mgs but not with the limited capacity of the Bren mags which meant the No.2 had to be on the spot for quick mag changes.
The second bren would probably come from either the company or Battalion level. I dont remember which (I think it was the company level), but there were one or two extra 2 men bren teams available to be issued out to supplement automatic firepower of their platoons if required, though not near enough to boost it to two brens per squad. Another thing the Canadians, and I imagine the Brits as well, did was keep a fairly large pool of sten guns in each division to distribute when it was judged short range automatic firepower was needed for the task, and each squad would turn in a fairly large number of Enfields for Stens. As for the 50 rounds for rifles comment, that is a bit surprising. I was under the imperssion the standard was 100 rounds for rifles, as I have read one account of troops that were considered short on ammo only having some 60 or 50 rounds in stripper clips left. I imagine troops often carried more ammo into battle when possible. The Bren magazines were carried in seperate pouches though.
I think the bandoleers were full of rifle clips, but they were supposed to prioritize refilling Bren mags with them rather than feeding their rifles.
That is a pile of rubbish. The no.2 man does a lot more than feeding the MG. he also report to the gunner where he is hitting. With a belt fed MG the No.2 man is more in demand than with a clip fed MG. Infantry sections with two Brens were not that uncommon in 1944, and some units did use them earlier in the war. It varied a lot from unit to unit. Some of the prime impetus for such an arrangement was the regiment and the battledrill. The regimental system of the British army allowed for individual interpetation of the doctrine laid down.
Interesting. I knew about the British doctrine being quite flexible in regards to interpretation (ironic when one considers the "by the book" reputation the British), but I didnt realize equipment TOEs could differ as well.
A large part of the reason for that was 'we' never quite achieved an overriding doctrine for Infantry or armour. There was great debate from staff level downwards, still raging even past D-Day, on the 'correct' way to approach a given situation. Leading to so many schools of thought being fed in by so many units that had fought in distinctly different theatres, so the overall impression is one of 'Whatever works best at that point'. Some credit can perhaps be given to an excellent spirit of improvisation and self-reliance instilled at the Junior officer & NCO level. Hoping not to blow any nationalistic trumpet but this was, and is, something I feel perfidious albion have always been quite good at (a problem at that specific time was the opposition being not half bad at it either!). An aside - My favourite 'Double Brens', as remotely controlled on the Humber Scout: Also sometimes seen with the rare drum magazine fitted to the Brens, and even Vickers Ks as an alternative. ~A
The regiment was the learning arena for the young officers as far as tactics was concerned. Many young Lieutenants were in for a surprise when posted to their depots. The infantry manual did not offer SOP's but rather suggested how to work around the problem. Very few illustrations were in the books and much was left for the senior Sergeants in the way of educating young officers. The boon is that the nco's had battle experience and did well. However training the soldiers called for something else. Battledrill. The battledrill movement had it's birth at Bernard Castle under Wigram. Battledrill had been used during the great war as a way to educate the vast number of recruits beeing sent to France. In the years between the wars the British army was highly professional and the need for battledrill was gone. In the early years of the war, old campaigners such as general Alexander, Brooke and Montgomery advocated the use of battleschools to learn the troops the 'basic strokes'. The old guard felt that battledrills would stereotype the infantry, and junior officers would apply the drills when they would not be useful. However the Battledrills were a great success. Junior officers and nco's used the skills learned at the battleschools to improvise in tricky situations. Some units payed little heed to the 'lean on the barrage' doctrine favoured by the higher officers. The 5th bn Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry were in for a real change when George Taylor assumed command. He instituted a regime of training in fire and movement and battle inoculation, and laid down a bn doctrine. His bn only failed to get to their objective once for the rest of the war. Taylor won the DSO and a bar. As for British TOE differing. The british section consisted of ten men led by a corporal totaling eleven men. However three was to be LOB (left out of battle) to be used as reserves in case of casualties etc. By 1944 the standard section was listed as 10 man strong (Infantry Training part VIII: Fieldcraft, battledrill, section and platoon tactics 1944) The various manuals on tactics advice that the section arrange the equipment and organisation according to the task. For assaults the section was best suited to carry two Brens and Stens. The firepower was needed to fight the germans after the barrage was lifted, and to fight of the german counterattack. The manuals seem to fit with the overall image of the British army to improvise and use what works rather than following a rigid system. So why do we have the image of the plodding (useless) Tommy beeing beaten to dust? Historians will have to take the fall for that one. In 1944 the British infantry fought against crack german troops in superb defensive terrain. The British armour fought with barley numerical superiority against tanks that their own guns could not penetrate bar their sides. The manpower pool was dwindeling fast and the only soloution was to follow the interwar doctrine of using machines rather than men. Creeping barrages blasted the british infantry forward in France and Italy. A marked difference occurs in the autumn and winter when the British army goes into the low countries and Germany. Gennep, Goch and Cleve are just a few cities that were captured through first class infantry and infantry/armour cooperation. It is 28C and I need a beer.
Great stuff Jaeger. Like an idiot, Battledrill had completely slipped my mind (Having a drink or 3 myself today ). And if trying to pin down any sort of British doctrine it is, of course, a pretty substantial thing. Maybe so basically ingrained in Tommy that one too often takes it for granted. That's my excuse anyway... ~A
