What if...the Japanese had landed troops in Hawai'i immediately after bombing Pearl?

It was sarcasm

this comming from an "author" who hasn't cited a single source. Hindsight is 20/20 and all of the short commings you are exploiting in your "ATL" were unknown to the Japanese in 1941.

You missed that the entire premis of this thread is : What if...the Japanese had landed troops in Hawai'i immediately after bombing Pearl?

After the Air Attack everyone was at "quarters" and "Standing To" to repel an amphibious assault. As soon as the first bombs fell everyone was "wide awake". The Army had two divisions, that's 6 Infantry regiments, that's 6,000 troops, with nothing better to do than stand watch and look for Japanese invaders. There was also a Marine Brigade on Maui another 1,500 troops.

You have an untenable argument.

 

True enough but if I can get my 1st Landing Wavw (1LW) troops ashore and thus "grab the high ground" of the Koolau Mo8untain ridgeline, my ATL Japanese will have a fighting chance. Even more so if the CF's 8 (or 9) battleship bombardment of the 22,000 US Army ground troops sleeping at Schofield Barracks (and the 3,500+ at Fort Shafter) has been at all effective.

Please remember that while it may be a tough fight, my ATL Japanese will likely have the ability to (weather and thus surf permitting) make addditional landings by surprise behind any defensive lines that the Americans might establish. Even if my Japanese do NOT choose to do so, Oahu's defenders will have to keep large (but still eating) reserves out of combat, "just in case" they do.

Only for Dec.7'41. Provided that my 1LW can clear and hold some protected beachfront, the next night's landings (Dec.7-8'41) will bring ashore the remainder of the 7th Division's heavier elements and hopefully another entire Divison freed up from the now postponed OTL Luzon invasion instead.

If all goes "according to the ATL plan" the night of Dec.8-9'41 will see the landing of all of the heavy Japanese artilery that historically was used for the OTL invasion of Luzon and the pounding of Bataan and Corregidor etc.

I envision a temporary floating replenisment support "base" being established in the somewhat sheltered waters of the French Frigate Shoals a few days after a successful Japanese lodgement is established on Oahu. Similar to what the OTL Japanese did in Staring Bay near Kendari.

A shuttle service of regular tankers, ammunition ships, provisions vessels and aircraft transports etc would anchor there to await the scheduled arrivals of mixed division sized groups of KB carriers and CF battleships.

Two anchored seaplane tenders would support a flock of floatplane fighters and some long ranged Mavis or Emily flyingboat scouts for security purposes. A few anti-subamrine minefields and nets with ASW DD back-up would give some measureof protection against American submarines.

If moored in between, the five cranes of an IJN Chitose class seaplane tender would make quick work of lifting cargo from a transport up onto a carrier or battleship deck. And would give workspace for the assembly/testing of crated KB replacement warplanes.

Once Maui is made secure, the FFS temporary replenishment base will be moved to a bay there. As the Puuene Airfield is expanded.

On a more medium term note, my ATL plan includes an invasion of the nearly completed American airbase on Johnston Island, some 750 miles SW of Oahu for late on the afternoon of Dec.7'41. This delay to ensure than any USN forces near to Johnston are given time to be drawn away back towards Pearl Harbor before the Johnston force approaches. The IJN warships involved have already been identified on my previously posted IJN warship allocation listings.

Invasion as well as construction troops would be included so that (with the help of "properly motivated" US PoWs) the airfields reclaimed coral dryland runway construction could be finished by the time that IJA troops on Oahu and Maui could have rendered Bellows Field, Kaneohe NAS and/or Puuene Field on Maui safe for the use of Japanese land based warplanes. Such would be staged in via Johnston and Kwajalein in the mandated Marshall Islands so as to relive some of the stress placed on the KB's carrier aircraft and pilots.

Some shipping is allocated to bring the supplies/support personnel needed to establish a Japanese Mavis/Emily flyingboat scouting service at the already operating ex-American seaplane base there, Johnston NAS.

I have indicated that up to 1,687,000 tons of shipping (plus otherwise idled tankers) could have ben provided under my ATL invasio scenario so, no, I wouldn't think that more would be required. Please see below ...

Historical vs. ATL Japanese Cargo Tonnage Allocations

Operation....................... OTL..........................ATL

China/Korea.................707,658.....................707,658
Thailand.........................6,650........................6,650
Kra (Malaya)..................46,453......................46,453
Singora (Malaya)............84,877.......................84,877
Patani (Malaya)..............47,781.......................47,781
Kota Bharu(Malaya).........26,751.......................26,751
Malaya (2nd Wave)........485,000.....................485,000
Aparri (Luzon).................37,694..............................0
Vigan (Luzon)..................28,049.............................0
Legaspi (Luzon)...............38,623..............................0
Borneo...........................47,345.......................47,345
Mindanao.......................80,899......................120,000
Lingayen(Phi)................379,457...............................0
Lamon (Phi)..................111,972...............................0
Gilbert Isl.......................31,029...............................0
Wake Isl........................17,034...............................0
Guam............................36,969...............................0
IJN Aux Cruisers..............72,414...............................0
Hospital Ships.................33,491........................25,118
Sub Tenders...................75,510........................59,812
Gunboats......................167,866......................167,866
IJN, all others..............1,498,176...................1,498,176
Civil Economy, Cargo.....1,714,543...................1,714,543
Civil Economy, Pass.........840,000......................840,000
Purchased from Germany...........0........................46,126
Maui Occupation Force.............0........................28,342
Johnston Island Force..............0........................18,718
Johnston Seaplane Base...........0..........................6.752
Puunene Air base.....................0........................21,694
Puunene Air, Phase II................0.........................7,189
Construction units....................0........................19,954
FFS/Maui Replen.Naval Base.......0........................28,081
Fresh Water unit......................0..........................2,043
16th, 48th ID (reinforced)..........0.......................199,012
1st Heavy Artillery Brigade.........0.........................87,436
Diahatsu Transport Unit............0.........................18,000
Air Ops Supplies, Jan................0.........................14,692
Haw Food supplies, Jan.............0...........................4,496
7th Infantry Division.................0.........................68,000
1st Artillery Resupply................0.........................19,391
7th, 16th, 48th ID Resupply.......0.........................37,500

Unallocated cargo pool..............0.......................203,942

Total............................6,616,241...................6,616,241

Please see my reply just above. I retain 204,000 tons of unallocated shipping and would point out that many of the large fast cargo-liner passenger ships can cross from Japan to Hawaii in 7 days at 20 knots for a 2.5 week turnaround time, if necessary.

 

So you are diverting troops and supplies from the invasion forces of the "OTL" to your "ATL" ?

Whats the turn around time for the US resupplying and reinforcing Oahu?

Beings it is only 2,390 miles away from the west coast it will take only 4 days for the first reinforcements to reach Oahu a day on each end to either load or unload and that makes for a 10 day round trip.

You can pretty much garuntee that within the first 2 weeks every US and British Naval asset is going to be redirected to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and American War Policy will be: "Japan First" instead of "Germany First" in the "OTL".

So, that means by the end of December the Imperial Japanese Navy will cease to exist.

Japan will capitulate by the middle of January 1942.

US and Brittain devote all of their attention to defeating Germany and the war in Europe ends June of 1943.

The war ends so quickly and unceremoniously that there is no need for women and migrant laborers to enter the work force. Women remain happily at home and there is no "Baby Boom", like occured after WW2 in the OTL, so there are no "Baby Boomers" to have a "Summer of Love" which means there are no "Led Zeppelin", "Jimi Hendrix", "Beatles", "Janis Joplin" , "the Doors"or "Woodstock". Haight/ Ashbury remains just an intersection in San Franciso.

Of course then you have to consider Russia and their historic unwillingness to compromise wich leads to aggression between the US and Soviet Union and a new war begins in 1944.

IN 1945 B-29's drop the Atomic bombs on Vladivostock and Stalingrad. The Soviet Union ceases to exist. There is no "Cold War", no "Space Race". The wars in Korea and Vietnam never happen. Fidel Castro never comes to power and Israel becomes a non contested sovereighn State and there is peace in the middle east. Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden never come to power and there are no wars in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Bottom line is that if Japan put all of it's eggs into the basket of occupying Hawaii the world would be a much different place.

And by the way.....some of the first units to recive M-1 Garands were the 24th and 25th Divisions in Hawaii...........the Japanese and their Arisakas wouldn't stand a chance.

 

Happy to ...

The KB does the same as in the OTL EXCEPT that 1.) the two BBs assigned to it are replaced north of Oahu by 2 additional heavy cruisers so that the BBs may participate in the bombardment of Oahu 2.) it launches it's first wave earlier into the darkness so that they begin to bomb Oahu just after sunrise, at 0615 instead of the OTL's 0755. 3.) a 3rd wave air strike is launched at about 1330 hours and returns to the KB's carriers after sunset at about 1730 for a night landing via the IJN's carrier night light landing systems.

The CF's 8 (or 9) battleships slip down the eastern coast of Oahu, at high speed, to a bombardment position just outside of Kaneohe Bay, escorted by two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers (the 40x24" torpedo packed Oi and Kitikami), the light carrier Zuiho (for CAP purposes after sunrise) and 10 destroyers. They will each catapult launch gunnery spotting float biplanes, escorted by Zuiho Zeros, just before sunrise, so as to be able to begin their area bombardments at 0615.

They are followed at 20 knots by 2 Asama Maru class 17,000 ton cargo liners, each loaded with 3,400 lightly equipped infantry and daihatsu landing craft replacing their regular lifeboats. One enters Kaneohe Bay and the other is to anchor just off of Bellows Field.

Also following along behind the CF are 3 of the larger size "patrol boats" each carrying two daihatsu landing barges and 250 JSNLF troopers, One will put it's troops (and a pair of 47mm AT guns) ashore just SE of Opana Point at Oahu's NE tip as a coastal highway blocking force. The
second will land some 250 troops on the beaches just to the south of Fort Ruger, at Diamond Head, while the third puts another 250 down on either side of the Black Point home of Battery Granger-Adams.

Last but not least off the east coast is one of the smaller "patrol boats" with only one daihatsu and 125 JSNLF troops which will land at Kailua Bay for pick-up by Honolulu Consulate staff. Bound for the heights of the Pali Pass with a heavy radio transmitter and generator.

Down Oahu's western coast will come the brightly lit Tatuta Maru on her officially approved Honolulu Harbor visit schedule.

Following well behind in her wake will be a darkened 250 trooper "patrol boat" which will put it's JSNLF troops and demolition trained combat engineers ashore in the darkness near the Lualualei Ammunition Depot for some demolition action there after sunrise. Also to be dropped are the USN's twin 800' tall radio towers located there which allowed Oahu to communicate with US warships all over the wide Pacific.

The last of the 6 "patrol boats", with only 115 JSNLF and 10 combat demolition engineers aboard, will place them on a west Oahu beach near Nanakuli for pick-up by members of the Honolulu Consulate staff. For delivery to Fort Barrette's 2x16" CAC guns.

The two western shore JSNLF units will be pulled out just as soon as they have completed their demolition efforts, provide that they survive longer than that. The eastern shore JSNLF will be reinforced by the IJA troops from the 2 cargo-liners and all will hopefully be reinforced by another division later the next night.

Save for the USS Ward gateguarding the PH entrance channel and the USCGC Taney doing the same off of the HH entrance, there weren't any.

The SR 270/1 radars were air search only and had no surface search capability.

Mine was fine all three times that I sailed the area many years ago but please remember that at the time that we discuss, it was still peacetime on Oahu. The island would still be well lit up that night and all of then USCG approved aids to navigation would still be in place and functioanal as my ATL Japanese quietly slipped in. Including two east coast lighthouses.

As previously mentioned, neither the USS Ward's gunfire, her depthcharge explosions nor her TWO radio messages raised any PH alarm whatsoever.

IIRC the Japanese destroyers at the Battle of Savo Island clearly outspotted several of the USN's "at war" defenders with drastic results similar to what I would expect in a similar night meeting situation off of Oahu. I think it clear that the IJN was superior in night fighting to an "at war" USN so I can only expect even worse for the USN should any of their warships be surprised in the peacetime darkness.

As previously mentioned, neither the USS Ward's gunfire, her depthcharge explosions nor her TWO radio messages raised any PH alarm whatsoever.

I think it unlikely hat the Japanese 7th Infantry Division will win back it's honour, first lost at Nomonhan, at Oahu.

I wasn't aware that the CAC had any 90mm guns until well after Dec.7'41.

All that says is that a row of guns was placed along the beach for CAC target practise. Not that they were a permanent defensive installation, nor that their positions were registered . Another interpretation could be that the guns were dropped there for just one day a year and just banged off 10 rounds before being towed back to their storage barns.

More importantly, no other sources mention a permanent CAC gun battery in that location.

Your own source above provides:

"Under the defense plans of 1941 there were three stages of alert. Alert Level 1 was designed to protect critical military and civilian installations from sabotage, Alert Level 2 was designed to defend against a sea and air bombardment and Alert Level 3 was to defend Oahu against an all-out air, sea and land attack. The Hawaiian Department had conducted full and partial exercises over the years of the various elements of the defense plan to include defending against an air attack with both fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery and the quick movement of ground forces from Schofield to pre-designated defense positions on the beaches of Oahu.

However, on November 27 1941 reacting on messages from the War Department emphasizing the need to take careful precautions against sabotage and assuming there would at least four hours warning of an approaching attack force from the Navy, the commander of the Hawaiian Department ordered all Army units to Alert 1 status which was an anti-sabotage configuration."

and

"The Hawaiian Department went to Alert Level 3 as the attack occurred and as early as 0930 units of both divisions began quickly moving to their assigned defense sectors.

With the possibility of a Japanese invasion, the first order of business was to quickly construct permanent beach fortification including pillboxes and revetments as well as stringing thousands of yards of barbed wire on the beaches. Because a goodly portion of the defensive positions were on private land the Army had been unable to construct more permanent defensive fortifications at these locations. No such restrictions existed after the attack and an intense effort was undertaken to improve fortifications covering likely amphibious landing sites."

These quoted passages clearly indicate that Oahu's defenders were NOT watching out to sea for invasion landings at dawn on the morning of Dec.7'41 and only began to deploy out of Schofield Barracks to their assigned anti-invasion beach locations as of 0930 hours.

Please consider that some 60 odd years later the details can often be confused in the human memory of eyewitness accounts. Could you be sure whether you were stringing barbed wire in December of 1941 or January of 1942, some 60+ years later ? I'd think it unlikely.

 

It was not the Japanese merchant flleet that was idled by the Alied embargo but rather her tanker fleet. With no nation willing to sell oil to Japan, 49 of her fast new tankers were idled with no cargoes to carry.

Also please remember that I do not propose the invasion of Hawaii IN ADDITION to the historical Japanese invasion schedule. It can only be carried and supplied INSTEAD OF the invasions of Luzon, Wake, Guam and the Gilberts along with the purchase of stranded German cargo ships, the cancellation of Japan's Armed Merchant Cruiser program etc.

 

I know, so I turned it into a compliment.

I provided CDSG.org as recently as my posting #97 here. And several more previous to that. 'Tis not my fault that you don't bother to read them.

Talk is cheap. How about providing a list so that I can discuss each point with you. I have tried hard to exclude information that the Japanese didn't have before Dec.7'41 although I will certainly admit that I credit Yoshikawa and his associates with being able to collect more data than they did in the OTL, had the Japanese taken the decision to invade Oahu.

An interesting point. I just didn't consider it a viable scenario. Even if the first Japanese invader was to set foot on Oahu beach sand at 0756, just one minute after the first OTL bomb fell, his transport would have been spotted by the "counter-clockwise around Oahu" three PBY air patrol than took off from Kaneohe NAS at 0630 every morning and flew around Oahu some two miles offshore.

At the very least, while it may be untenable, we've had 100 or so intersting posts discussing it.

That is totally new information to me. Can you provide a source with further details ?

 

Just time for a quick response now.

That's against Japanese doctrine and indeed they were pretty light on HE rounds at this point in the war I believe. If there is a potential engagement with US BBs they certainly are not going to be concentrating on shore bombardment. If the KB reaches it's launch point just north of Oahu per the historical time line there's no way it's escorting BBs can reach Hawaii before the launch.

That sounds like a disaster in the making.

I don't believe the Oi and Kitikami were in that configuration at the time. There may not have been enough type 93s for them if they had.

By this point in time the alarm will have been given. Where is Zuiho and how is this coordinated?

This by the way is just the sort of thing that the army is looking for. Perhaps in more force than they expect but...


You still haven't explained who left Japan when and how they coordinate. I count at least 4 separate forces so far leaving Japan.

 

Your "indications" are wrong and also completely the opposite of what actually historically occurred. Those 12" coastal mortars proved all too murderously effective when used against unprotected Japanese troops during the Battle of the Points on Bataan. According to the Belote Brothers book "Corregidor" and "Paul Bunker's War" the Japanese were both appalled and terrified at the highly destructive effects caused by those mortar shells falling almost silently into their midst. The massive impact explosions caused high casualties and instant demoralization to the Japanese invaders to the extent that a number of them committed suicide rather than face additional bombardment from weaponry they could find no source of.

By late mid-day on 7 December, those mortars plus the even more highly destructive 240mm howitzers would be in action against the Japanese landing beaches, because by that time, US aerial reconnaissance would have rock hard evidence as to the true location, depth and width of the invasion.

Lastly, your scenerio represents the ultimate perfect battle plan without any visits or intrusions from Mr Murphy that would alert the American forces. The larger and more complex the battle plan, the more likelyhood of many numerous visits from him. All that it would take is for a Captain of MP's to respond to the unmistakable sound of an anchor chain being let out, to turn his jeep search light onto the Japanese ocean liner anchored offshore from Bellows Field. A few warning shots soon degenerates into a firefight and the cat is out of the bag. Of course, you take none of this into account.

 

No you have merely created a waste of bandwidth with your false assumptions and misrepresented data.

Territory of Hawaii MCAS Ewa MAG-21 VMB-232 VMJ-252 Rear echelon, VMF-211 Rear echelon, VMB-231 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor 1st Defense Battalion less detachments on Johnston, Palmyra and Wake Islands 2d Engineer Battalion 3d Defense Battalion 4th Defense Battalion 2d and 3d Platoons, Company A, 2d Service Battalion Rear echelon detachment, 6th Defense Battalion

( December 07, 1941 - U.S. Marine Corps Aircraft, Units and Bases )

I have no problems citing sources.........in your 20 or so posts you have cited no sources and have refered to only one.

So here are some more:

The Japanesse to the Germans that preparations for taking Singapore would be completed by the end of May and that war with the United States could not be ruled out. Meanwhile, Admiral Yamamoto was concerned that when Japan moved against Singapore and into the Indonesian Achipelago, the U.S. could send its forces out from Pearl Harbor and hit Japan's forces on their flank. In early 1941 Yamamoto announced to his colleagues that simultaneous with Japan's invasion of Southeast Asia and the unhappy event of a war with the United States, Japan should cripple America's Pacific fleet by an air offensive. This he believed would damage American civil and military morale, perhaps to the point of rendering the Americans helpless and would prevent the U.S. from launching "disturbing air strikes" against Japanese cities. Such a mission against the Americans, Yamamoto admitted, would be risky and, with much at stake, divine assistance would be needed.
Invading Hawaii with troops was rejected, although it would have given the Japanese greater control over the Pacific. Japanese intelligence was over-estimating the size of the American forces in the Hawaiian Islands. The Japanese believed they could not spare troops from their invasion to the south, and adding troop transports to the strike force against Hawaii would slow it to eight knots and, they believed, perhaps cause its detection by the United States.

(Pearl Harbor and War in Southeast Asia )

So, you admit that you "embellished" the intelligence gathering abilities of your two consulate workers. You can not misrepresent available data to reach a desired outcome, as that skews the entire experiment.
Your thesis is based on events taking place in a precise order with exact results wich does not allow for mis- representation of actual facts and or abilities.

You have wasted this forum's time and bandwidth with your ridiculous proposal and false representations.

I am not impressed with you or your "study".

Good day

 

If they weren't punching holes in Japanese ships.

 

I know the feeling. And I have many more posters to respond to than you do.

Would they not be at their best at the start of a war rather than 1/2 way thru one ? Had the Japanese actually been planning a pre-invasion bombardment of Oahu, do you not think that might have ordered up a few thousand rounds more of HE from the factories ? They had been planning the OTL air strikes against Pearl Harbor since the US Fleet moved there from California in mid-1940. In that case the Japanese dreamed up and produced their shallow water torpedo AND their 16" AP battleship shell bomb, so why do you feel that they couldn't supply some more HE shells for their battleships ?

As per the OTL, the KB's warplanes will get first crack at the USN's Pacific Fleet. In my ATL scenario, only after those air strikes are over would the CF turn it's attentions away from the US Army and USAAF airfields to further pummel the USN's damaged survivors. The "Decisive Battle" doctrine of the IJN had always maintianed the idea that the enemy's main battleline would be weakened by aircraft, submarine and surface torpedo attacks made at night BEFORE naval gunnery combat was joined. My scenario attempts to honor the spirit of their doctrine as much as is possible while still invading Hawaii.

Perhaps the KB's 2 battleships are replaced by 2 heavy cruisers a day or two earlier so that those 2 BBs might join up with the CF in time to arrive off Kaneohe Bay on schedule. Come on man, it's not that tough a concept. The IJN had been co-ordinating ship movements since it came into existance.

I don't see why ? Every Japanese carrier had a night landing system installed since the Hosho was first fitted in 1934 and all IJN pilots were trained in night take-offs, flights and landings as a standard part of their training. All of the IJN warplanes came from the factory fitted with a radio compass that would allow them to home in on a radio beacon throught the darkness. Prange records that Fuchida historically used the one installed in his Kate to guide the first KB strike through the early morning cloud cover to Oahu.

Standard operating procedure (SoP) for IJN pilots.

Imperial Cruisers disagrees with you.

Immediately after my previous mention of Oi and Kitakami (which you obviously read since you just objected to it), I indicate that the light carrier Zuiho travels WITH the CF battleship group in order to provide CAP services.

Not at all true as per the other poster's recent source on the US 25th Infantry Division. Short had only called a Level 1 anti-sabotage alert, not a level 3 anti-invasion alert. In the OTL, Oahu's defenders had been focused INWARDS against sabotage since the November 29th war warning had arrived from Washington. No one was watching for ocean landings because Adm. Kimmel's long ranged PBY patrols were supposed to give adequite warning of the approach of any enemy.

Sorry, I didn't realize that was what you were asking for.

Far more than just 4 since my ATL continues with most of the historical Japanese opening moves save Luzon, Guam, Wake and the Gilberts.

Since the OTL Japanese somehow managed to co-ordinate the passages of several hundred vessels, of both warship and cargo types, to the PIs, to Thailand, to Malaya, to Guam, to Wake, to the Gilberts etc as well as the historical raid on Pearl Harbor, I just don't see a problem with them doing the same fine co-ordination job for the mix of Japanese forces that I specify for my ATL scenario.

Same ships, just different destinations.

 

Shore bombardment was not doctrine for the Japanese. In a previos conversation on one of these boards it was pointed out that some of the Japanese BBs didn't even have bombardment ammo at the start of the war. I'll see what I can find on this.

It's a matter of both scale and doctrine (philosophy if you will).

A battle plan that requires your opponents to make mistakes is a poor battle plan. If the Japanese ships are spotted even a couple hours befor dawn there's a very good chance of a naval engagment and by the way there goes any surprise for the air attack as well.

The final leg of the KB to Oahu was a high speed run in to the launch postion. In order for the CF to get to it's objective on time it's got to get at least a 10 and more like a 12+ hour lead on the KB. (and it sure better hope they can launch ... a weather problem and the CV and company is going to be mighty embarrassed. Note that this also puts them in observation range of search planes on the evening of the 6th.

And what happens if just a few B-17 manage to show up while this is underway? They weren't usually very effective but target moving in a straight line at a constant speed with no cross wind .....

The conversion was done earlier than I remembered, you are correct. However I don't want to be on one of those anywhere near shore batteries.

But a lot of what you are suggesting this first wave do is essentially sabotage. Trying to sneak around with silenced pistols and such.

Except that the timeing is a bit more critical. If one group is spotted the whole show may be given away. If one group is late it may all collapse. Then there still the problems with the massive numbers of ships and personel that "go missing" and the times that they do.

 

Sorry that you feel that way.

Maybe I am going blind but when I go to the source that you provided just above, I see NO reference at all to 1,500 US Marines being stationed on MAUI on Dec.7'41 ?? Lots on Oahu to be sure but no mention of 1,500 (unknown to me) being on MAUI.

And you accuse me of misreprsenting data ? Your own source doesn't even back you up. That is truely a pathetic state of affairs.

A review of the OTL. So what ? This dicussion board is supposed to be about discussing "what IF" scenarios. There ARE certainly going to be divergences from the purely historical facts when an alternative history scenario is presented. THAT IS THE BASIS OF THE WHOLE IDEA.

Say what ? My ENTIRE scenario is an "embellishment" of the historical facts. In case you don't remember, the OTL Japanese NEVER DID decide to invade Hawaii on Dec.7'41. The ENTIRE thing is a FICTION. Stem to stern, top to bottom, beginning to end, start to finish. As is any ATL.

The question is, do my readers find that the changes that I have made to the OTL, in my ATL scenario, have a "reasonable" probablity of happening, or not. You obviously feel, NOT. As is completely your right to do.

I feel however that your belief is based on your NOT knowing the realities of the OTL. For instance, there were NOT 1,500 US Marines stationed on the Hawaiian Island of MAUI, as you so recently claimed. And is proven by YOUR OWN source.

My postings here are an attempt to educate my readers as to those realities, as I understand them at this moment. That is not to say that a new source, presented to me for the very first time tomorrow, might not change my opinions. One of the reasons that I post is to have new and unknown sources brought to my attention, for my further education.

I try to write an ATL scenario with the MINIMUM number & magnitude of changes needed to accomplish my scenario's objective, since it seems to me that this approach will tend to make my ATL scenario more, rather than less, believeable.

Unfortunately for me, Oahu is such a huge undertaking that MANY chages to the OTL are required. All that I can do is to attempt to minize each one in an attempt to keep the whole, still believable.

I think that most of my readers here clearly realize that I am presenting a fictionalized account, even if you don't yet grasp that basic ATL concept.

That indeed may be true, as only time will tell but at least the sources that I present support my own debating positions while yours, didn't.

Believe me, the feeling is mutual.

Happy Trails !

 

You are going blind...........Marines were stationed in Maui and not the Island of Oahu even though they were part of PACOM Hawaii. There was not enough room on Oahu. The Airwings Rotated between Kaneohe and NAS Maui.

Well then let me provide you the text :

"Invading Hawaii with troops was rejected, although it would have given the Japanese greater control over the Pacific. Japanese intelligence was over-estimating the size of the American forces in the Hawaiian Islands. The Japanese believed they could not spare troops from their invasion to the south, and adding troop transports to the strike force against Hawaii would slow it to eight knots and, they believed, perhaps cause its detection by the United States."

( Pearl Harbor and War in Southeast Asia )

If you embellish one point the entire argument is false as it is "fruits of a poisoned tree" and is therefore inadmissable because it calls into question your credibility.

No......the majority of your responders (readers) do not agree with your ATL as you have completely fictionalized the the information available to and the capabilities of the Japanese prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

You divert men and equipment from assaults that were successful in the OTL and use them for your ATL. There is no way that the US Navy is going to "miss" an invasion fleet steaming towards a US Territory.

You assume too much

"Your Readers" ? You have 40 posts and now you think you are some kind of Dahli Llama? You have no readers, you have rebukers here. The problem is that you are too egocentric to realize your thinking is flawed. The Japanese even knew that the invasion of Hawaii would be a fruitless waste of time and equipment.

You can not fictionalize any portion of the OTL or Change any part of the OTL. You can not change things that historically occured.


I am still waiting for your response to my post #103 (
http://www.ww2f.com/what-if/32850-w...diately-after-bombing-pearl-5.html#post403901)

 

Sorry Jeff.........I didn't see this until after I posted. I'll let myself into the cooler.

 

Thank you for these 2 new-to-me sources. Could you provide page numbers so that I might not have to read each cover-to-cover inorder to find the relavent passages ?

Since my KB is "hanging around" for a 3rd air strike (instead of running away as they did in the OTL) and some of the CF's 9 battleships have just aided in the working over of the USAAF's airfields at Wheeler and Hickam, just where are these US recon planes going to come from ? Remember that Bellows and Kaneohe NAS are already overun by the Japanese invaders too. The Marine field at Ewa gets the benefit of the OTL KB bomber and fighter weeps that now don't have to be directed against those pulverized airfields. AFAIK that only leaves tiny dirt Haleiwa intact and it had only a fighters on Dec.7'41, no recon planes.

Are you surprised ?

When I read Nagumo's OTL Pearl Harbor attack orders on the internet, I don't read any "Murphyisms" there either. I believe that Yamamoto trusted the long experience of his command staff officers to enable them to sort out any problems arising without the need for his own micro-management.

All too true.

But just look at the LACK of OTL American response to the historical Japanese air attacks on that morning. Despite many opportunities to raise an alarm warning of Japanese attack, the entire US defensive system on Oahu was caught "flat-footed". That is why I discount American reactions to my ATL attack plans. History suggests that no one on Oahu believed that "those nasty little Japanese would dare to attack Hawaii" so that when presented with evidense that the Japanese were indeed DOING SO, the American defenders universally did NOTHING to broadcast any alarm.

Why would that historical American mindset be any different on my ATL Dec.7'41 ?

Because I see the situation as unfolding completely differently.

First, how would an MP Captain, driving a jeep thru the darkness of a peacetime liberty Saturday night, possibly hear the rattle of an offshore anchor chain over the noise of his own jeep's engine AND the sounds of the roadside surf ?

Considering that his Level 1 Alert orders from General Short ordered him to be watchful for sabotage, why would he be mentally expecting any beach invasion of his island fortress home ?

Were he to unexpectedly spot a darkened ocean-liner just off shore, would he not drive closer to see if it was somehow in trouble and thus in danger of grounding ?

Would not the lauching of a "lifeboat" into the darkness towards the beach seem to him to be the expected action of a ship already aground ?

To add to his confusion would be his knowledge that the officially approved visit of the Japanese repatriation cargo-liner Tatuta Maru was scheduled for just before dawn that very day. Just in case you don't remember, the anchored Asama Maru that we now discuss was the Tatuta Maru's identical sister ship.

Why in heaven's name would he possibly even consider firing any pistol warning shots at such a "stranded looking" ocean-liner ??

Without a (modern day) cellphone in his pocket, how might he call for aid ? Since the surf conditions would not have been too horrendous, would he not wait for a few minutes to talk to the first "lifeboat" passenger ashore, before driving off for help ? All the better to accurately report the situation clearly so that the best level of aid could be sent. Why panic everyone in Oahu's medical services by sending every available ambulance, if only a powerfull tugboat was needed ?

Sadly, the sight of a silenced pistol would be one of his last. No good deed goes unpunished.

No body would be found, save by the sharks and the invading Japanese would find a good use for the MP jeep and uniform. An officer's no less.

As I said, I see the situation unfolding differently that you do. I think that my storyline unfolds in a way much more in tune with the historical events on Oahu that day than does your assumption of a overeager Captain shooting up a civilian ship with a pistol, for no apparent reason.

Both are fictional and either could be right. Or neither. It really comes down to which outcome our readers find more probable, doesn't it ?

 

Truely a disturbing development for a general discussion board named What If?

Could Slipdigit please let me know if this is indeed the official policy of this discussion board ?

I cannot understand how anyone could present any What If? here if that is truely the case.

 

Well considering this is the original thesis for discussion:

You seemed to have strayed as far as possible from those parameters.

I am still waiting for a response to my post #103 or are you conjuring up something else to divert attention?

You can not manipulate facts and historical events to fit your assumptions.

IF Japan had headed to Hawaii with a group large enough to occupy Oahu they would have been detected.

IF Japan had diverted resources from the Historical Opening Attacks of the War they would have failed miserably. They would not have captured Singapore, The Phillipines, Guam or Wake. They would have been defeated by the end of December.

Your thesis has been proven unsound again and again. No Manipulation of facts is going to change that. Even the Japanese thought it was a bad idea at the time.

You have taken portions of the Naval Investigation, wich occured after 7 December 1941 and provided it to the Japanese as "intelligence" gained by agents working for the Japanese Consulate.

Accept defeat, fall on your sword and walk away....it doesn't get any better from here on out. You put up a good fight; but, your logic was unsound.

And by the by, where would your English Speaking Super Ninjas get American uniforms and what silenced pistols would they use?

Here is an interesting article about a Japanese Invasion attempt in the summer of 1942:

( Milne Bay; See! the Japs can be beaten )

Your premise even obfuscates the actual IJN / IJA Amphibious doctrine of the time.

( World: Technique of Invasion - TIME )

So inorder for your ATL to even be considered Japan would have to rethink the way it conducted amphibious warfare.

Here is an account of the Japanese amphibious attack on Corregidor in the Spring of 1942:

( Hard Way Back )

Why would the Japanese be any more successful in an invasion of Oahu? It took almost 6 months to capture Corregidor and Bataan.

Here is a discertation of the invasion of Borneo wich was successful. It is easy to see why Japan felt that an invasion of the Hawaiian Islands would not be feasible.

( The Invasion of British Borneo in 1942 )

Oahu was anything but and undefended soft underbelly.

Again you have put up a good fight; but, once again another forum has repelled your attempts at self promotion. Even though this thread is a "What If" format we expect a more sophisticated approach to thinking than what you have offered here.

In order for your "What If" proposition to be successful you have to alter the Historic events and the Historic Responses and thinking surrounding those events.

It is very easy to say that Country "A" could invade Country "B" when all of the shortfalls of Country "B" have been scrutinized for 68 years. I am sure that Yamamoto, had he lived through the war, would have woken up one morning and said: "If I only knew" ; but, that is not the case and the Imperial Government of Japan does not get a Mulligan.

The third wave of attacks were not launched; because, Nagumo did not know where the American Carriers were and he wanted to recover his aircraft while there was still enough fuel and ammunition, to mount a defense, if the American Carriers arrived at Pearl Harbor before they could retreat.

You do not give the US enough credit. The bottom line is that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was successful because the US did not think it would be attacked from the air.