Stalin's Aggressive Plan in 1941

I do understand you're trying to approach this from a pragmatic view Oleg, and do salute your dedication to the thread and offering an alternative point of view, which I think is very healthy and good exercise for us all.

However just with respect to the strategic air force of the Soviet Union prior and during the invasion, I think a historical context must be added, and the simple recognition that roughly one third of the entire Red Air Force contingent was strictly designated strategic air forces by both the Soviets themselves and the international community. What's more a very effective one at the time.

Believe it or not when the TB-3 entered service 1932 and through the mid-thirties this was a high performing heavy bomber unlike any other.

The DB-series is and was a long range strategic bomber. It is not a "heavy bomber" by comparison to the midwar period four engine "heavies" of the west, but in 1940 it was. Consider the Vickers Wellington for an accurate comparison, the British "heavy" of the time and the DB has better range and a 25% heavier combat load.

The SB was a "fast bomber" and headed the pack in 1936, and is along the lines of the Heinkel, and again is a strategic bomber, though it is a medium range one, so like the Heinkel falls into the category of "fast, medium bomber"
It is an exception to the rule that the Luftwaffe used special project Heinkels, the Dornier and Junkers Ju88 in the tactical bombing role. But classically the Heinkel is like the SB, a strategic bomber with medium range, designed to level bomb strategic targets and troop concentrations.

Yes very few Pe-8 were constructed, though it was used in conjunction with (typically Naval Aviation detached) DB bombers in wartime use.

I think you're using the measure of mid-late war strategic bombing put in play by the US and England, comparing early Soviet types to these four engine behemoths.

But at the start of the war, the Soviet strategic bombers compared very well to others in service around the world, both qualitively and in quantity and the fact remains the VVS was comprised in a very large part of strategic air forces.

The lines got blurred later, after 1943.

It is more likely they were the SB type. Like I said the entire fast medium bomber air force of the VVS was decimated within the first two weeks of the invasion. German reports roughly outline, "shooting them down in droves," whilst many, "simply flew in line formation with no attempt at evasive manoeuvres, often without even enough crew on board to man their defensive guns."

 

After re-reading this thread, why is Slon the only one who has provided a source? Despite repeated requests by both myself and Slon.

 

Exactly what I was thinking!

 

The beloved trick of the Soviet propaganda – making emotional and unsubstantiated statements, claiming that all offensive weapon on the eve of the war were broken down, or in shortages, and, of course, soldiers were not experienced (while having behind unique and unrivalled offensive operation - Winter War, Finland( 1939-40) - and advanced offensive (not defensive!!!) weapon, ) soviet propaganda just refused to make any comparisons with German weapons, which was really pathetic and obsolete.
Soviets created myths about “obsolete” weapon, and spread it around the world, in order to hide real intentions and crimes.

How one would understand what kind of weapon USSR had before the war in reality (not in the soviet propaganda), without possibility to compare it with what Germans and other world had?
But during the last decades the truth has been revealed. And usage of fairy tales about obsolete weapon (or in shortages, broken down, and so on and so on) is simply useless.
Soviet propaganda: shortage, obsolete, worn-out, broken-down. And the whole world in unison: Yes, of course, if the Soviets are saying it themselves, why should we argue, even if it is complete nonsense, then be so.
And nobody ask question. How it happened that the Soviets had an advanced weapon without analogues in the whole world in huge quantity, and at the same time everything was obsolete or in shortage.

Furthermore, when they point out that thousands of tanks were abandoned during the German invasion as argument, it just proves obvious truth: Red Army was taken by surprise. All troops and weapons with ammunition were concentrated among the west borders, preparing offensive attack. Red Army never had any plans for defense. The excessive amount of weapon and ammunition were destroyed by mass bombing or captured by Germans and turned against its muster.



Comparing Pz-I and T-37, T-38, T-40

The T-37A was received by the Red Army on August 11, 1933. It weighed 3.2 tons, its crew consisted of two men, and it had bullet proof armor. It was armored with one DT machine gun, had a 40 – horsepower engine and a maximum speed of 36 to 40 km/h on roads and 6 km/h in the water. The T-37 A was a light tank- but light doesn’t mean bad and obsolete. The T-37 was the first amphibious tank in the world to be regularly used by troops. Even if the T-37A really was a bad tank, its inclusion in the armed forces still meant a technological breakthrough of historical importance, because there was nothing comparable or close in the armies of other countries at the time.

The German Pz-I was accepted by the army a year later – in 1934. It had almost the same weight -3.5 tons, the same crew – two men, the same bulletproof armor, and the same caliber machine gun. Only it could not float. It turns out that Germany does not have and never had amphibious tanks. Stalin on the other hand had amphibious tanks in the early ‘30s.
France did not have amphibious tanks at that time. Britain also had none before of during the war. The birthday of American tank forces in July 10, 1940. The Red Army tanks were crushing the Japanese Sixth Army at Khalkhin-Gol and were “liberating” Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bessarabia, and Bukovina. America at that time had no tank troops at all. After the defeat of French and British troops on the continent, American generals realized that it was time to get off horses and to think of crating tank troops. A year later, in June 1941, the United States had less than four hundred tanks.
These were weak, old-fashioned machines, very tall, with a very light armor and a multi-tiered distribution of completely obsolete weapons. The most powerful tank weapon of American tanks in 1941 was the 37-mm cannon. Even this was mounted only on some tanks. The majority of American tanks had only machine guns. America had no amphibious tanks at the time.
So, the difference we have is: in America, something resembling and amphibious tank appeared by the end of the war, while in the Soviet Union, amphibious tanks were enlisted in the armed forces long before the war’s beginning.
So, what the nature of the “light and obsolete” T-37A?
Here is some information about it. In August 1935 seven T-37A started out from Leningrad, traversed several tens of kilometers on caterpillar tracks, then sailed along the river Luga, through impenetrable weeds, then on the river Shelon and Lake Ilmen. There was a storm on the lake. The distance across the lake was 55 kilometers. The tanks crossed this distance in 8 hours and 15 minutes. Then they came to the river Volkhov, the Novoladozhsky Canal, and the ferocious, treacherous river Neva. All seven tanks reached the finish line by the Petropavlov fortress. In eleven days they had crosses seven hundred kilometers, six hundred of them by sailing – all this without a single accident or even a breakdown.
There were 2,627 T-37A tanks produced (almost all fully functioning). In 1936, production of a perfected T-38 amphibious tank began. This tank continued to be produced in series until 1939. Around 1,500 T-38s were built, illustrating the importance of amphibious scout tanks to the Red Army. Some were up-gunned with a 20 mm ShVAK cannon
The Kremlin historians called this tank obsolete as well. But how could a tank be obsolete, if there were no analogous tanks in the world, and its age was only between two and five years?
December 19, 1939, is the brightest and the most remarkable day in the history of world tanks design. On this day the Red Army received and enlisted an entire spectrum of new armor-tank weaponry – the three newest tanks: the light amphibious T-40, the medium T-34, and the heavy breakthrough KV tank. The T-34 is the best tank of all time. The KV was the most powerful tank in the world during the first half of World War II.
But the T-40 was no worse than these. In its class, it was also the best in the world and also had no equal.
The T-40 had a new, never-before-seen body shape, weighed 5.5 tons, and was armored with two machine guns: the large-caliber DShK and the regular DT. A variant of this model, the T-40S, was armed with 20-mm automatic cannon instead of the DShK.
By the June 22, 1941, Hitler had on the eastern front 180 tanks in the under-six-ton category. Not one of them was amphibious and not one of them could compete with the Soviet light tanks. Stain, on the other hand, had more than 4,000 tanks in this weight category. All of them were amphibious. Among them were T-40s, which not only were amphibious, but also were capable of using their large-caliber DShK machine guns (and of course the 20-mm cannons) to pierce the armor of German Pz-I tanks. Moreover, German Pz-I production was stopped in 1938, and these tanks not only were obsolete but also heavily worn-out, while the T-40 tanks were still in production, the paint not yet dried on many of them.
Foreign experts, those who understand even a little bit about tanks, talk about the T-40 with sigh of high regard. The vast majority of the T-40s were less than a year old. Some had left factory doors on June 21, and some were still in the factory courtyard. When did they have time to become obsolete? When did they have time to become worn out?
On June 22, 1941, on the eastern front, Hitler had 3,350 tanks in total of all types, all of them obsolete and among all of them not a single amphibious one, while Stalin’s amphibious tanks alone numbered over 4,000.
The fate of Soviet amphibious tanks is a sad one: they were of no use in defensive war.
Where would they sail? Upon orders from Commissar of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko, and the chief of the general staff, General of the Army Zhukov, tens of thousands of tons of spare parts for the tanks, hundreds of thousands of tons of ammunition and fuel, were brought out to the very borders of the country. In the first hours of the war, all this fell under fire or in the hands of the enemy. Soviet tanks were left without fuel, ammunition, or spare parts. Four thousand light amphibious tanks demanded a large amount of fuel and had little use in defensive war. Therefore, commanders easily parted with them: they ordered what was left of the fuel to be pumped into medium and heavy tanks. The light ones were blown up, burned, broken, sunk, or just abandoned.
The best (and only) in the world, Soviet amphibious tanks in 1941 became unnecessary and played no role in the war. But why does nobody ask the question: why then were they developed and built? What were they prepared for? Why did Stalin need four thousand amphibious tanks, which he could not use in defensive war? Where was comrade Stain planning to sail?


Complete World Encyclopedia of Tanks, 1915-2000 (Minsk: Harvest, 1999)
British and American Tanks of World War II (New York: ARCO,1969)
A.V. Karpenko, Review of National Armor-Tank Technology, 1905-1995 (St. Petersburg: Nevsky Bastion, 1996)
“Military and Numerical Composition”
Shmelev, The Tanks’s History.



The preparation for carrying out the offensive war is the only one reasonable explanation of a military catastrophe of historical proportions occurred in the region around Kiev: 665,000 Soviet troops were encircled and captured by the Germans, and near Smolensk, 310,000 Soviet soldiers and officers were surrounded, considering big mistakes that were made in the first days by High Command (sending troops in constant attacks).

 

You forget that Japan had control of Korea and Manchuria, so therefore they did have land borders up against potential enemies, China and the USSR.

 

Yes Sir,
My point is that they got their new borders by waging aggressive war with their neighbors. If Japan was a peaceful nation like England and USA they would also need Strategic Bomber Force.

 

Well thank you for the source on the tank information, but I have yet to see any evidence that Stalin intended to attack either Germany or Japan. I have this information from Stalin’s Wars: from World War to Cold War, 1939-1953 by Geoffrey Roberts

Pg 69.

This sounds to me more like defensive preparations in response to the massive number of Axis troops along the border.

Now to your credit the book does go on to say on pg 70

However, just because the SU was preparing for an offensive war, does not relate to preparing a preemptive strike on anybody. Let’s go backwards just a few pages to page 62

Emphasis mine


Going forward again to pg 70-71 in regards to on offensive war with Germany

The book then goes into how Stalin tried his own form of appeasement in regards to Hitler.
The book states:

And not to mention:

I ask does any of these actions sound like a policy a country would take to start a war with Germany?

Does anyone have any documented evidence that Stalin intended to invade Germany at any point in 1941 or 42?

 

I concur. All I have seen is a posting of the size and amount of weapons that Stalin had. Nowhere do I see that he was actually preparing to invade. Preparing to counter an attack is way different and anybody would be a fool not to prepare. I want to see a source that will show Stalin actually preparing to invade the West. Anything else is rubbish. Making a very long post that just gives room to speculate in the direction that Stalin 'intended' to invade is worthless.

 

These posts reminded me that the other day I was thinking of that discredited book Icebreaker. Concerning that book, I would say the bulk of the real evidence actually shows the opposite of that book’s premise. Stalin was certain that Hitler wasn't such a "fool" as to open a second front without making peace or defeating the British before attacking the Soviets on his eastern border, especially as the USSR was shipping grains, POL, and alloys to the Nazis. Stalin was almost in denial when the reports first started coming in, so he was far from launching or preparing his own invasion, he was in fact doing the opposite.

While there are some neo-Nazi sites (ihr.org for example) which dearly love the book Icebreaker by Suvorov, the bulk of the more academic historians reject it, and its supposition. The neo-Nazis embrace the idea since it makes Hitler appear to be "only defending Germany from the god-less Communist hoards"! These next statements aren’t all my own, I read them elsewhere; that said it (Icebreaker) flies in the fact of numerous truths, i.e.:

Marxist Theory:

In traditional Marxist theory, militarism is normally seen as a form of social control and a component of imperialism, delaying the emergence of a class-conscious international working class or proletariat. The activities of the Communist International in the period preceding the First World War show clearly that Communist parties and the political Left in general were opponents of militarism. Once the first communist regime took political power in the Russian Revolution and survived the Russian Civil War, a major line of debate in the USSR during the 1920s was how the world's first socialist state should relate to other nations.

The view of Trotsky was that a communist revolution could succeed only by continuous revolutionary activity in other nation-states. The notion of socialism surviving in a single nation-state was considered ridiculous and self-contradictory. The remaining capitalist powers would swiftly move to crush the USSR (the experience of western intervention on behalf of the Whites in the civil war was not forgotten). Since the bourgeois nations would be more powerful, they would probably succeed in destroying socialism. However, if the working classes of these countries could understand that a war of conquest in support of capitalism was not in their class interests, they would not support such a war and socialism would survive through the process of revolution abroad.

Stalin, on the other hand, argued that 'socialism in one country' was feasible if properly managed. His subsequent program of militarizing the whole Soviet economy was simultaneously a means of maintaining his totalitarian power and ensuring the survival of the Soviet state without regard to the internal politics of other nations.

It is important to note that Stalin's approach flew in the face of most Marxist thought up till that point, but that neither the Trotskyist view nor the Stalinist view can be reconciled with Suvorov's thesis. Neither approach envisioned the use of conventional armed forces to wage an aggressive "first strike" or premptive strike war.

Soviet Diplomacy Under Stalin:

Under Stalin, Soviet foreign policy in the late 1920s through at least 1939 was essentially defensive and very cautious. The USSR sought alliances with western powers, in particular seeking to re-establish the traditional anti-German alliance with France. For a multitude of reasons, these efforts failed. One of the main reasons was that the USSR was considered a pariah state prior to June 22, 1941, and the other European powers were reluctant to enter into any serious negotiation with the Stalin regime. Also, one effect of the Great Purge was that western militaries came to regard the Red Army as a worthless ally. They were thus not eager to reinstate the traditional east-west coalition against Germany which had existed during the "Great War".

Prior to the rise of the Nazis, joint military training facilities existed in the USSR, in which German and Soviet soldiers developed nascent versions of the tactics and weapons that would come to prominence in WW2. However, these joint endevors occurred during a period when Germany was weak, under the Weimar Republic, and were shut down once the Nazis came to power.

The Soviet view was that as efforts to 'surround' Hitler failed, and as the western powers seemed to allow Nazi expansion in Central Europe (as long as it was not aimed westward), some accommodation had to be reached with Germany in order to buy time. Stalin knew the USSR was not ready to fight Germany, but the massive rearmament and reorganization programs begun in 1939 might begin to bear fruit by 1942. The goal of the Nazi-Soviet nonagression pact was primarily to buy time and space which the USSR could use to prepare for the German invasion they feared was inevitable. The rights of the populations of Central Europe were trampled as a result. This was not, of course, fundamentally different from the Franco-British approach up until Munich. Consequently there is little in the basically opportunistic diplomatic record to support Suvorov's thesis, and much to contradict it.

The Historical Record:

The author’s (Suvorov’s) view that a Soviet invasion of Germany was imminent in 1941 is not shared by the vast majority of the historian community. A noteworthy refutation of his thesis is contained in Col. David Glantz's work Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. Glantz views Suvorov's argument as "incredible" on a variety of fronts:

1) Suvorov rejects without examination classified ex-Soviet archival material, and makes highly selective picks from memoirs. There are thus basic methodological problems.

2) Suvorov's thesis is strongly contradicted both by ex-Soviet and German archival material.

The facts simply do not bear out any argument that the Red Army was prepared to invade Germany; on the contrary, the appalling lack of readiness, poor training level, and abysmal state of deployments show that the Red Army was unprepared for even static defense, much less large-scale offensive operations. A proof for un-preparedness is naturally the combat experience of Red Army throughout 1941. Glantz's conclusion is that "Stalin may well have been an unscrupulous tyrant, but he was not a lunatic".

On the other hand, one may point at certain methodological problems concerning Glantz' study, too; it depicted only Red Army's lack of readiness, not comparing it to its enemy's. One can hardly say Germany was ready for war in 1939 (the conscription was re-established 1935 and real tank production began only after the seizure of Czech Skoda factories), but it didn't prevent Hitler from unleashing major military conflict.

Although Suvorov claims that an attack date of July 8, 1941 had been selected, this is contradicted by the overwhelming mass of evidence. There were no stockpiles of the fuel, ammunition, and other stores held in forward areas as would have been needed if an invasion was about to be mounted. Major ground units were dispersed into small garrisons rather than being concentrated at railheads, as they would have been had they been preparing an invasion. Units were not co-located with their own transportation assets, leaving, for example, major artillery units immobile. Air Force aircraft were parked in neat, tightly-packed rows along their airfields rather than dispersed. Over 50% of all Soviet tanks required major maintenance on June 22, 1941. If an invasion were being planned, these maintenance tasks would have been completed. Most Soviet armor units were in the process of re-organizing into new Tank Corps; the German invasion caught these units in the midst of this reorganization. Such a large-scale reorganization is inconsistent with an impending invasion.

And in order to get a better idea of who this fellow is, remember that is his nom d’plume. Victor Suvorov’s real name is Vladimir Rezun. If you look up Rezun, you will find out who we are dealing with here.

 

Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defense, in holding #16, register #2951, case # 241, pages 1 through 16. Top secret: Special Folder

At present the Kremlin archives contain 215,000 “Special Folders”. Nobody has access to them. In addition there are hundreds of thousands of documents labeled “Secret,” “Top Secret,” and “Top Secret: Of Special Importance.”




On May 8, 1940, German radio announced that talk of two German armies being transferred to the border with Holland was a “ridiculous rumor”, being circulated by “British inciters of war”. After this, the German armies crushed and occupied Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and the greater part of France. The German radio announcement of May 8, 1940, and the TASS announcement of June 13, 1941, match almost word for word. Hitler did not believe Stalin’s TASS announcement because he had himself disguised the preparations for a sudden attack using the same exact tricks.

The TASS announcement of June 13, 1941, was meant to stop rumors of imminent war between the USSR and Germany. Stalin decisively fought these rumors. The same problem stood before Hitler at the same time. Preparations for war are difficult to hide. People see them and express all sorts of hypotheses. On April 24, the German naval attaché in Moscow sent a warning report to Berlin, stating that he was combating “obviously ridiculous rumors of an impending German-Soviet war”. On May 2, Ambassador Schulenburg reported that he was also fighting rumors, but “everybody who comes to Moscow from Germany brings not just these rumors, but can even support them with evidence.” On May 24, the head of the foreign press department of the Ministry of Propaganda in Germany, Karl Bemer, in a drunken state said something undesirable about relations with the Soviet Union. He was arrested immediately. Hitler personally took care of this case and, according to Goebbels, gave this event “too much consideration”.

On June 13, 1941, Molotov summoned the German ambassador and related to him the text of the TASS announcement. The announcement stated that Germany did not want to attack the USSR, and the USSR did not want to attack Germany, but “enemies of Germany and the USSR interested in unleashing and broadening war” were trying to make them quarrel and were spreading provocations and rumors of imminent war. In the announcement , these “enemy forces” are listed by name: “the British ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Krips,” “London”, and “the English press.”

It is reasonable to suppose that on June 13, 1941 there was a meeting in London between the Soviet ambassador I.M. Maysky and the British foreign minister Anthony Eden. Indeed, the meeting was held, and, surprisingly, in a friendly atmosphere. Discussion revolved around a serious issue: measures Britain would take to aid the Red Army “if in the near future a war between the USSR and Germany begins.” Among other specific measures were military operations by the British air force, the transfer of military supplies, and the coordination of command between the two countries.

On June 13, 1941, Stalin’s diplomats were laying the foundations of what would soon be called the “Anti-Hitler Coalition”. From the British point of view, there was nothing wrong with this picture: at that moment, Britain was involved in a war against Hitler, and had full rights to talk with anyone about joint efforts against him. But the Soviet Union had signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany, and immediately after that an agreement of friendship. If Soviet leadership thought that these documents no longer suited the situation at hand, they should have had them annulled. But Stalin did not do this; he assured Hitler of friendship and in the TASS announcement denounced the British ambassador and press for “wanting to broaden war.” At the same time, talks in London were under way concerning a military alliance with Germany’s enemy, and about specific military measures against Germany.
It is surprising that the talks in London both sides used the phrase “if war begins” instead of “if Germany attacks.” In other words, those talking did not exclude the possibility that the war would start not with German aggression, but in some other way.
It is interesting that at the talks in London, the USSR was listed first: “if a war between the USSR and Germany occurs.” The same words were used in the TASS announcement: “rumors of imminent war between the USSR and Germany.” Why not say the opposite, between Germany and the USSR, if one supposes that Germany will be the aggressor?

 

Emotional and unsubstantiated statements...? If I didnt know any better I'd guess you were describing your own post. Your shallow opinion is clearly based on your dislike of the Soviet Union and not on any actual historical facts or evidence which exists and has been open to the public for decades. The very same evidence which has been widely accepted by the leading historians around the world, none of which agree with you. Do you know more then these historians? Do you think that you simply uncovered something which they hadn't?

But a comparison had been made. Ribbentrop act allowed both nations to cooperate militarily. Germans knew of what weapons the Russians wielded and the Russians knew of what Germany had... In fact when the Red Army engineers went over to Germany less then a week before Germany invaded, to look at their new tank (Panzer IV) they were surprised at how inferior it was to their new tank ( T-34).

Other then the T-34's, KV series and the new Katyusha rockets all else was obsolete. Including the Soviet Military doctrine!

Rubbish

Yes

Wrong. Out of the roughly 20,000 tanks, only half were stationed in the West. Another 6 or so were in the East awaiting a Japanese attack, and around 3 or so were broken down.

Yes, floating is very important for determining a quality of a tank. So important in fact, that production for these so called tanks ceased to exist after 36. Not to mention that the Panzer I had two machine guns not one which the T-37 and the T-38.

The T-40 was such a marvel that less then 250 were made.

The Japanese were up against Zhukov along with 500 tanks and 50,000 Russian and Mongolian troops. They themselves were outnumbered in virtually all aspects and coupled with a surprise pincer movement never had a chance. Not to mention that the Japanese had worse tanks than what the Russians possessed.

And it was Japan which attacked not the other way around.

No there wasnt. STOP READING ICEBREAKER. There were however, 1200 built.

The production for the T-38 stopped in 1936.


If you read the last sentence of the second paragraph in Wikipedia the very same sentence will appear....." Around 1,500 T-38s were built, illustrating the importance of amphibious scout tanks to the Red Army." Interesting how you pic and choose what you post....

T-38 tank - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Well the fact that its armor was only 3-9mm, it had no cannon and it was slower then its adversary might have something to do with it. The fact that 1936 was the last year of production on reinforces this fact.

Just because Stalin had 20k tanks does not constitute a preparation for an offensive war. Russia has 23,000 tanks today, according to your logic, she must then be preparing for war?

Ha me too! What Chief wrote was at best based circumstantial evidence. Which is why historians such as Glantz and Erickson tear Suvoruv (author of Ice Breaker) a new one.
He has been labeled as a failed historian and using him as a source has become a sign of ignorance.

I wouldnt hold my breath waiting for a source, there is none in existence.

 

While many Western researchers (the exception being Albert L. Weeks) ignored Suvorov's thesis, he has gathered some support among Russian professional historians, starting in the 1990s. Support for Suvorov's claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge as some archive materials were declassified. Authors supporting the Stalin 1941 assault thesis are V.D.Danilov, V.A.Nevezhin, Constantine Pleshakov and B.V. Sokolov. As the latter has noted, the absence of documents with the precise date of the planned Soviet invasion can't be an argument in favor of the claim that this invasion was not planned at all. Although the USSR attacked Finland, no documents found to date which would indicate November 26, 1939 as the previously assumed date for beginning of the provocations or November 30 as the date of the planned Soviet assault.
However Edvard Radzinsky noted that a document about the Soviet surprise attack on Nazi Germany was actually found and preserved in the Military-Memorial Center of the Soviet General Staff. That was a draft drawn up by Georgy Zhukov, dated May 15, 1941, and signed by Aleksandr Vasilevsky and Nikolai Vatutin. The plan of preemptive attack on Germany stated:
"In view of the fact that Germany at present keeps its army fully mobilized with its rear services deployed, it has the capacity of deploying ahead of us and striking a sudden blow. To prevent this I consider it important not to leave the operational initiative to the German command in any circumstances, but to anticipate the enemy and attack the German army at the moment when it is in the process of deploying and before it has time to organize its front and the coordination of its various arms".
The plan drafted by the Soviet command included a secret mobilization of the Soviet forces at the Western frontier. The objective of the offensive operation was to cut Germany off its allies, and especially Romania with its oil required for Germany to conduct the war. The document about attack on Germany and Romania was also mentioned by Dmitri Volkogonov who however did not consider it as a final proof of the Soviet intentions.
One of views was expressed by Mikhail Meltyukhov in his study Stalin's Missed Chance. The author states that the idea for striking Germany arose long before May 1941, and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941. Providing additional support for this thesis is that no significant defense plans have been found. In his argument, Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan (“Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies” (Russian original)), the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War II. The last version was to be completed by May 1, 1941. Even the deployment of troops was chosen in the South, which would have been more beneficial in case of a Soviet assault.
In Stalin's War of Extermination, Joachim Hoffmann makes extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. The book is also based on open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials. Based on this material, Hoffmann argues that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own attack when the Wehrmacht struck. He also remarks that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 has long been known and analyzed. Colonel Valeri Danilov and Dr. Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents which might indicate Soviet preparations for an attack almost ten years ago in an Austrian military journal (Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers concluded that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941, reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army.
In 2006, a collection of articles (entitled The Truth of Viktor Suvorov) by various historians who share some views with Suvorov was published. It was followed by two more books, called The Truth of Viktor Suvorov 2 and 3
Several politicians have also made claims similar to Suvorov's. On August 20, 2004, historian and former Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar published an article in The Wall Street Journal titled When Will Russia Say 'Sorry'?. In this article he said: "The new evidence shows that by encouraging Hitler to start World War II, Stalin hoped to simultaneously ignite a world-wide revolution and conquer all of Europe". Another former statesman to share his views of a purported Soviet aggression plan is Mauno Koivisto, who wrote: "It seems to be clear the Soviet Union was not ready for defense in the summer of 1941, but it was rather preparing for an assault....The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive, but for offensive aims." Koivisto concludes: "Hitler's invasion forces didn't outnumber [the Soviets], but were rather outnumbered themselves. The Soviets were unable to organize defenses. The troops were provided with maps that covered territories outside the Soviet Union."

 

Try this....


The Failed Historian - THE RUSSIAN BATTLEFIELD


Its all about Vladimir Rezun AKA Victor Suvorov.

Here is something which he writes in his books and gets criticized over.

"Here some will interrupt me: why didn’t the Soviet advantages manifest themselves in June of 1941?..
<...>
The Red Army was preparing for an aggression, and so its tanks were assembled on the border itself. The German attack was so sudden that the tankers were gunned down before they could reach their machines, while the tanks themselves were destroyed or captured without crew. (Our own surprise attack could well produce the same effect on the German side, except that the Germans had seven times fewer tanks and so the task of destroying the enemy tank arm was simplified.)"
([“The Last Republic”, Chapter “How to equate prison and Kremlin rations”, p. 399)

Criticism...

One has to be a complete ignoramus to write something like this! Does Rezun seriously believe that all 24 thousand Soviet tanks were parked within 500 metres of the border with Germany, and as such the Red Army tankers just couldn’t get to their machines in time? If so, can he perchance deign to offer up a shred of evidence of this “fact”, something he never bothers to do in any of his books? And for the record – “kitchen logic” does not serve as valid evidence. Neither do any hearsay recollections of some unidentified source – Rezun’s “Western experts” come to mind – purportedly saying something to someone at some point in time.

One does not need to be a genius or a military academy graduate, or to draw on some ultra-secret source, to prove the falsehood of Rezun’s assertion. One glance at any map displaying actual deployments of Red Army armored forces on June 22, 1941 should suffice. Such maps tend to be easily available, as the “Kremlin-Lubyanka historians” had never made any efforts to conceal them.

 

I was born and raised in the USSR. I studied history in Russian school and was told of great sacrifice of Russian People. My grandfather went from Moscow to Stalingrad. Pictures of Vasily Zaytsev, Aces Pokryshkin and Kozhedub filled our books.

I will say that Russian people almost by themselves with great courage and sacrifice defeated Nazi Germany. Western world should be forever grateful for that.

However I will also say that Soviet System was based on lies and only lies. Well a lot of control and terror too!!! Everything that was written by Soviet Historians was according to the party line. As far as TASS goes the only thing that you should believe are Soccer and Hockey scores. TASS is the government line and there is little to no independent thinking at all.

 

Yes under Stalin, people were told only what they needed hear or what the Govt thought they needed to hear. Terror under Stalin was rampant yes.... But accurate records were kept by the Soviet leadership. Many records locked away in Soviet Archives began to surface after the Soviet Union collapse. Many of these records began to surface simply to eradicate the Russian WW2 myths which were being talked and written about in the West. There are no records which show or suggest that Stalin was going to attack Germany in 41'

What part of the USSR are you from Oleg?

 

Born and raised in Moscow.

 

The Naval Institute Press, (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland) has published new book by Viktor Suvorov

The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II, 2008.

“A remarkable book. A delayed bombshell that includes very pertinent new research and discovers Suvorov has made since 1990. He makes savvy readers of contemporary and World War II history of a mind to reexamine the Soviet past in terms of what historians call ‘present interest’. None of the ‘new Russian’ historians can match his masterful sweep of research and analysis.”

ALBERT WEEKS, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, New York University, and author of Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941

“One of the last great secrets of World War II is why Nazi Germany succeeded in surprising Soviet Russia in June 1941. Did Stalin ‘trust’ Hitler or was he just afraid? Was the Red Army simply outmoded and doomed failure? Instead, Victor Suvorov ably argues, Stalin, ‘The Chief Culprit’ of World War II, was caught just days before launching his own assault into Central Europe. Thus the Red Army’s offensive posture rendered it uniquely vulnerable to attack. Suvorov cogently explains the rationale behind the whole huge, crude machine that was the USSR: to forge the weapon to conquer all of Europe. All of Stalin’s policies, including the Nazi-Soviet pact, were intended to bring about that Soviet victory. None of this absolves Hitler, but Suvorov removes the last vestige of Red righteousness regarding World War II.”

JOHN B. LUNDSTROM, author of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal



More support from Daniel W. Michaels

Suvorov's The Last Republic (review)

World War II History vs. Modern Politics: 06/27/07

 

Rezun’s books are actually a very easy and interesting read. He is a fine writer and publicist, and knows a good deal about human psychology. It is all too easy to believe a man who can effortlessly explain very complex issues. Of course, serious historical works tend to include numerous questions that have no simple black-and-white answers. Not so Rezun’s books. His writing betrays no hesitation, not a hint of doubt.

The Failed Historian - THE RUSSIAN BATTLEFIELD

Anyone can publish a book and endorse it for the right price. He has never and will never be taken seriously in an academic community. PLEASE READ MY SOURCE.

Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz,[9] and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev, Lev Bezymensky and Dmitri Volkogonov. Many other western scholars, such as Teddy J. Uldricks,[6] Derek Watson,[10] Hugh Ragsdale,[11] Roger Reese,[12] Stephen Blank,[13] Robin Edmonds,[14] agree that the major Suvorov's weakness is "that the author does not reveal his sources" (Ingmar Oldberg[15]) Cynthia A. Roberts is even more categorical, claiming that Suvorov's writings are based on "virtually no evidentiary base"

The most controversial Suvorov's thesis is that the Red Army made extensive preparations for an offensive war in Europe, but it was totally unprepared for defensive operations on its own territory. Thereby Suvorov essentially reiterates the argument put forward by Adolf Hitler in 1941.[6] According to Jonathan Haslam, Suvorov's claim that "Germany frustrated Stalin's war"[17] "would be comical were it not taken so seriously"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Viktor_Suvorov

 

Dabro pajalivat Oleg.

 

I don't need to do this. I've read enough, believe me. I was born and rised in USSR-Russia.

Dima