Stalin's Aggressive Plan in 1941

If the Soviet Union was about to invade Germany, why were all those maps in railcars and not handed out in mass to frontline troops?

 

Operational Secrecy is a must. Plans for Barbarossa were leaked months before the operation. Stalin did not want any of his disgruntled people running over to Germany with these maps.

 

Here is something that I stumbled on. Its from 09-01-09.


'No evidence' of plans by Stalin to attack Germany | Top Russian news and analysis online | 'RIA Novosti' newswire

 

Pure speculation.

 

It is exactly why they were kept in the railcars.
200 million of maps, covering territories to the west, south and north (till Berlin, Sofia, and Helsinki and so on) were destroyed in the railcars.
But there were another 100 million kept in divisions. In total 300 million maps were destroyed. Some captured by the Germans. They were 4 color military maps (mostly 1:25000).
Maps in the railcars just were waiting their time, considering high secrecy of the offensive preparations. And would have been given to troops, approximately, within few weeks time. All those maps were absolutely useless in defense. No maps – no defence.
During the war Soviet Union produced 700 million maps.
By the way, maps used by the Nazis were mostly produced during the spring of 1941.

Радиостанция "Эхо Москвы" / Передачи / Цена Победы / Понедельник, 02.03.2009: Александр Шаравин

 

Where are the German sources that valid the existence of a plan for Russia to invade. Surely the Germans would have used such evidence to support their invasion.

 

Many Soviet documents captured by the Germans during the course of the war, as well as German intelligence reports on the Soviet buildup in 1941, amply justify Hitler's decision to strike. Presented before an impartial tribunal, this evidence surely would have exonerated the German military and political leadership. Unfortunately, all of these documents were confiscated and kept by the victorious Allies.

In his lengthy December 11, 1941, speech declaring war against the United States, Hitler described in detail the Soviet menace, which was being aided and abetted by Britain and the (still officially neutral) USA. In this historic Reichstag address, the German leader said:

Already in 1940 it became increasingly clear from month to month that the plans of the men in the Kremlin were aimed at the domination, and thus the destruction, of all of Europe. I have already told the nation of the build-up of Soviet Russian military power in the East during a period when Germany had only a few divisions in the provinces bordering Soviet Russia. Only a blind person could fail to see that a military build-up of unique world-historical dimensions was being carried out. And this was not in order to protect something that was being threatened, but rather only to attack that which seemed incapable of defense ...
When I became aware of the possibility of a threat to the east of the Reich in 1940 through [secret] reports from the British House of Commons and by observations of Soviet Russian troop movements on our frontiers, I immediately ordered the formation of many new armored, motorized and infantry divisions ...
We realized very clearly that under no circumstances could we allow the enemy the opportunity to strike first into our rear. Nevertheless, the decision in this case was a very difficult one ...
A truly impressive amount of authentic material is now available that confirms that a Soviet Russian attack was intended. We are also sure about when this attack was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are perhaps only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that He enlightened me in time, and has given me the strength to do what must be done. Millions of German soldiers may thank Him for their lives, and all of Europe for its existence.
I may say this today: If the wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, Europe would have been lost ...
​

 

Or a logical conclusion after analyzing the facts presented before us.
My wife says that I think like Stalin sometimes!!!

 

Cheshire,

Where is the evidence of these maps ever existing? Where is the evidence that the allies took them? Had the allies really possessed these maps, would it not benefit the allies to expose them post WW2 in order to win more favor with the world against Communism?

Hitler wrote out his plans for the East more then two decades before war broke out. How do you explain this? Who or what is to say that Hitler simply didnt use all of these Russian military numbers to further his own agenda?

Also, Russia is more then 5 times the size of Europe. How big should the military of a country with such a gargantuan land mass be in order for you to accept the fact that she was not planning war? Germany was 50 times smaller then the Soviet Union, yet the Soviet Union only benefited from a 7 fold in tank #'s (most of which were garbage) and only marginally benefited from infantry #'s at the out break of war.

The fact is that if you use land mass as a comparison VS how many troops a nation needs to defend her soil, then it was clearly GERMANY not the SOVIET UNION who was disproportionately geared up for war. No reason for Germany to have over 3,000 tanks if she wasn't going to war not the case with Russia and the fact that even today Russia has over 22,000 tanks and has not invaded anyone is more proof of your and Suvorov's flawed premise.

 

Expect a knock at your door at about 3am tavarish!

 

Nevertheless, not a fact which is my point on this thread thusfar.

 

Yes Sir,
I try to be a free thinking man.

May I also complement you on your fine BBQ set up on your Avatar.

 

As we all endeavor to be.

You may....

 

I remembered I read about this some time,but forgot where,and now you made me find it again..It is so said in the book edited by Henrik Eberle and Matthias Uhl published in 2005.What they edited was previously top secret one copy book written in 1948/49 by NKVD officers for J.Stalin,it contained intelligence collected from two SS officers that were Hitlers personal assistants,later captured by the Red army.They were Otto Gunsche anh Heinz Linge. Anyway..The manoeuvres were not in east Prussia,but in Mecklenburg and Pomerania,and the motto was 'ost front',and Wermacht,as 'blue army' routed the enemy -'red army'.To many coincidences for my taste,but..

[/QUOTE]The presence of Western representative (you have a proof that they were pleased ? ),simply:they were military attachés and probably there was also a Russian one . This was and is standard practice .[/QUOTE]

I wouldn't call a standard practice the fact that chief of British general staff was present at manouvres(at the request of British attache in Berlin) displaying deadly,state of the art army of the country that by the treaty of Versailles practically shouldn't have any army!Moreover,Russians were not present.In Linges and Gunsches words British chief of staff Mongomery-Massingberd looked pleased because everything indicated that Hitlers fury is going eastward,toward Russia,as promised in Mein Kampf and numerous speeches.Most Hitlers associates also concluded that British high delegation and not a single word of protest were really a recognition of Hitlers ost politics and the strengthening of Wermacht.

[/QUOTE]About the Soviet Union willing to help Prague (can't spell the name of the country ) :how ? The Soviet Union having no frontier with Prague ,had to invade Poland or Roumania ,and the treaty with Prague stipulated that Russian help would only come ,after France honouring her engagements .[/QUOTE]

That's semantics.The fact is that USSR wanted to wipe out the Nazis in the time West idly and opportunisticly watched them grow.

[/QUOTE]And concerning 1939 (not contradicting you )Stalin had 3 options 1)doing nothing and ..getting nothing 2) fighting for a capitalist,anti communist and anti Russian country from which he claimed the Eastern part and that rightfully refused an alliance with Stalin (Poland ,but you knew already ) Btw:Stalin's price was the Baltic States,but the West refused to give them . 3) Collaborating with Hitler for a fourth division of Poland and getting the Baltic States .[/QUOTE]

I don't thin so.Stalin did have 3 options,but those were: 1)To wait calmly until whole might of Wermacht is unleashed against him,as Hitler promised countless times and is written in Nazi Bible. 2)Deal with the West which Stalin by that time totally mistrusted 3)Deal with Hitler,get his former provinces back and direct Hitlers fury to his other albeit lesser enemy- western capitalist democracies.
In 1939. Stalin considered it highly unlikely for West to declare war on Germany if they attacked Poland (as did Hitler).Because he thought they would tolerate anything,just as long Hitler was going east and leaving them alone.Just like they sacrificed Czechoslovakia,he was on the other hand sincerely willing to protect.Not for the sake of Czechoslovakia itself,of course,but to stop Hitler from becoming to powerful.When he did,Stalin arranged a deal with him.
Not to contradict you,of course..

 

So what you are claiming, is that there is evidence but for some reason the Allies surpressed the information.

Which means you have no evidence for your claim

What a load of codswallop, are we really expected to believe this drivel

ps; how did he manage to get hold of these 'secret documents' from the British House Of Commons when the Germans didn't have a single spy left in Britain, except for those who were really working for the British.

 

The presence of Western representative (you have a proof that they were pleased ? ),simply:they were military attachés and probably there was also a Russian one . This was and is standard practice .[/QUOTE]

I wouldn't call a standard practice the fact that chief of British general staff was present at manouvres(at the request of British attache in Berlin) displaying deadly,state of the art army of the country that by the treaty of Versailles practically shouldn't have any army!Moreover,Russians were not present.In Linges and Gunsches words British chief of staff Mongomery-Massingberd looked pleased because everything indicated that Hitlers fury is going eastward,toward Russia,as promised in Mein Kampf and numerous speeches.Most Hitlers associates also concluded that British high delegation and not a single word of protest were really a recognition of Hitlers ost politics and the strengthening of Wermacht.

[/QUOTE]About the Soviet Union willing to help Prague (can't spell the name of the country ) :how ? The Soviet Union having no frontier with Prague ,had to invade Poland or Roumania ,and the treaty with Prague stipulated that Russian help would only come ,after France honouring her engagements .[/QUOTE]

That's semantics.The fact is that USSR wanted to wipe out the Nazis in the time West idly and opportunisticly watched them grow.

[/QUOTE]And concerning 1939 (not contradicting you )Stalin had 3 options 1)doing nothing and ..getting nothing 2) fighting for a capitalist,anti communist and anti Russian country from which he claimed the Eastern part and that rightfully refused an alliance with Stalin (Poland ,but you knew already ) Btw:Stalin's price was the Baltic States,but the West refused to give them . 3) Collaborating with Hitler for a fourth division of Poland and getting the Baltic States .[/QUOTE]

I don't thin so.Stalin did have 3 options,but those were: 1)To wait calmly until whole might of Wermacht is unleashed against him,as Hitler promised countless times and is written in Nazi Bible. 2)Deal with the West which Stalin by that time totally mistrusted 3)Deal with Hitler,get his former provinces back and direct Hitlers fury to his other albeit lesser enemy- western capitalist democracies.
In 1939. Stalin considered it highly unlikely for West to declare war on Germany if they attacked Poland (as did Hitler).Because he thought they would tolerate anything,just as long Hitler was going east and leaving them alone.Just like they sacrificed Czechoslovakia,he was on the other hand sincerely willing to protect.Not for the sake of Czechoslovakia itself,of course,but to stop Hitler from becoming to powerful.When he did,Stalin arranged a deal with him.
Not to contradict you,of course..[/QUOTE]
Stupid me !!,off-course it was not in East Prussia:to transport a panzerdivision by sea to East Prussia ,but in the 2nd military district,I was to fast ,read 1st infantry division . But !when Montgomery-Massingberd (one of the old guard:hostile to the motorisation of the cavalry,hated Fuller and condemned his books,which he never read !,a colonel Blimp ) it must have been in 1936 at last (he retired that year ) and I should want to downsize the importance of the manoevres(with Pz 1:tin boxes without a gun ,from memory I don't know if there were already Pz 2 ).About the Soviets helping Czechoslovakia (at last ),I have to disagree :they had to invade Poland and-or-Roumania ,and that with an Army weakened by the purges;the fact is also that the Czechs accepted the German demands ,thus we will never know .Cheers .

 

'I should want to downsize the importance of the manoevres(with Pz 1:tin boxes without a gun ,from memory I don't know if there were already Pz 2 ).'
I agree that their machines were still weak,but three panzer divisions,worlds first all arms formations were used for the first time in coordinated fashion,achieving spectacular results.

 

May I join conversation?

I have to disagree with statement that Soviet army was in defensive formation. There is difference between offensive and defensive preparations and one rules out another - it is not possible to prepare for both at the same time. Why? How did defensive actions look liked in those years? Best example was Finland (Winter War).

There are minefields along the border with only small, very mobile units positioned there. First line of defensive fortifications are tens of miles away from border. Purpose of this is simple, one You already stated - gain time for mobilization. When aggressor moves deeper into enemy territory, every time he meets resistance he has to stop and ask himself: Is this main line of defense, or just a lone resistance point? Last thing he wish is to run unprepared into defensive fortifications filled with whole infantry divisions and artillery regiments - that would be a slaughter. There are also those "ghost" units that always strike, kill few men or destroy some tank and then disappear again when you launch counterattack. It is impossible for you to hunt them down, they know terrain much better then you. They also could lead you to some trap. It is historical fact proved in Winter War that even small country is capable to successfully defend itself for months (3 to be precise, exactly the number You pointed out as needed for USSR mobilization. ) against much larger opponent. And this opponent was USSR. I agree that Soviet Union had no defensive doctrine at that time, but if they wished to defend against Germany, they could simply copy one they fought against year and a half ago.

I do not want to say that Soviets prepared for assault on Germany (speculation), but its without doubt, they did not prepare for defense. Again, historical fact is that armies of Soviet Union were taken by surprise and at border. There were huge supplies of not only ammo for troops, but also oil and other resources, including maps of western territory, already mentioned above that got into German hands. Such accumulation of resources at border is absolutely against strategic defense preparations, but it is exactly thing you have to do, if you prepare for assault of neighboring country - your armies will need immediate resupplying so it is vital to have them already positioned near border and in trains if possible. Germans secured many such trains.

Conclusion:
If Soviet Union prepared for defense against Germany, then:
1)Position of Soviet armies was insanely stupid for defense - proved by history, so the General Staff and whole High Command was incompetent. (I personally do not think so.)
2)They could not be taken by surprise. That would be a joke, you prepare for defense and then you are surprised by attack.
3)Maybe You think up more?

If Soviet Union prepared for offense against Germany, then:
1)They would need to position millions of soldiers, thousands of tanks and aircrafts with massive supplies of oil, ammo and food very close to border. (This condition was met.)
2)They would make reconnaissance of German territory. (Not sure about this, but it is possible to read some memoirs of Soviet soldiers.)
3)They would build defensive fortifications visible from German side, to convince them about their defensive intentions. (This condition was met, as You already stated. It is worth noting that Germans did exactly the same thing. For example, Guderian spoke about this in his memoirs.)
4)Maybe You think up more?

So, does this prove that Soviets prepared for assault? Answer is no, obviously. Soviet offensive plans are just a speculations and nothing else. But we cannot forget that official version is version of USSR, totalitarian state which had no intention to tell the truth. It may be biased, so we cannot also rule out possibility that we may be very surprised after large-scale declassification of documents from 1939-1941. I would also like to point out that theory of USSR’s aggressiveness is not only Suvorov's idea, there are many especially Russian historians like Nevezhin, Danilov, Meltyukhov that support this idea as well and their arguments are much more relevant and based on documents. I would recommend anyone with interest in this theory to read their works. Lastly, I would like to place few numbers from one Soviet document[1] dated to 13 June 1941. These numbers were supposed to be met not later then in first half of July and all those units were supposed to be deployed between border and rivers Western Dvina and Dnieper:

Northern front
22 divisions

Northwestern front
23 divisions

Western front
44 divisions

Southwestern front
97 divisions

reserve armies in front zone
32 divisions

reserve armies of High Command
19 divisions

Total: 237 divisions

What is my point? Soviets did not have many options for what to do with such huge numbers at border. Possibilities:
1)Send all those troops with their supplies, tanks, aircraft, etc. back to the east where they came from. Quite encumbrance for Soviet railways - was their travel to the west just an expensive trip? It is not very probable they were sent on maneuvers so close to border, but I cannot rule out such possibility.
2)Stay where they were whole winter. Well, this would lead to epidemics, loss of moral and ultimately disintegration of forces.
3)Move west.
4)Maybe You think up more?

Again, Soviet aggressive plans are just and pure speculations, but interesting one, at least for me and I think it is good that people speak about them. Hopefully, declassification of documents will shed some light on this. And hopefully I will be still alive when this declassification will come to realization.

[1]1941 god. Dokuměnty. Book 2. Moskva, MF Děmokratija 1998, page 358-361


PS: Forgive me my English, it is not my native language.

 

some very good points ,but which not convince me totally . I can only answer them consisely for the moment .1)About defensive or offensive:there is a third possibility ffensive defense(in German:Vorwaertse Verteidigung :was in the eigthies the strategy of Nato ) which is mass all your troops at the frontier(for political reasons ) and if the enemy is attacking,begin immediately a counter-attack and drive him back on his territory and wage the war on his territory . 2)The main point of the Russian forces was in the south :a possibly explanation is a possible attack of Roumania(oil wells ) 3 ) about your figures ,maybe a minor detail:you are giving the strength of the Southwestern Front as 97 divisions,I have 80 divisions of a total (without Stavka reserves) of 170 ,but off-course fifferent sources will give different figures . 4)FRom Armchair General (the Russian Website of Amvas ) ,I have the following :Operational Forces (including the Far East,but without NKVD etc )2742881 men,Tanks and SP-guns :12683(serviceable :10508 ),Combat Aircraft:10266 (serviceable:8696 ) .Why these figures? Because the number odf divisions says nothing(the Russian divisions being much smaller than the German ones ) 5)Why I am not totally convinced:yor figures and also mines are saying nothing about the degree of preparedness of these forces . Were they ready ? And to which degree ? The personnel figures include 310240 reservists called up only recently ? Cheers

 

Thanks for response. I will post document from my previous post again with a little bit more of information, if it is not a problem.
More precise numbers of Soviet troops along Soviet-German border:

Northern Front
22 divisions (16 rifle, 4 tank, 2 motorized) and 1 rifle brigade

Northwestern Front
23 divisions (17 rifle, 4 tank, 2 motorized) and 1 rifle brigade

Western Front
44 divisions (24 rifle, 12 tank, 6 motorized, 2 riding [cavalry, not sure about translation ])

Southwestern Front
97 divisions (63 rifle, 20 tank, 10 motorized, 4 riding)

reserve armies in Front zone
32 divisions (22 rifle, 7 tank, 3 motorized)

reserve armies of High Command
19 divisions (13 rifle, 4 tank, 2 motorized)

Total: 237 divisions (155 rifle, 51 tank, 25 motorized, 6 riding, 2 infantry brigades)

Structure of Fronts:
Northern Front: 7. army, 14. army, 23. army
Northwestern Front: 8. army, 11. army, 27. army
Western Front: 3. army, 4. army, 10. army, 13. army
Southwestern Front: 5. army, 6. army, 9. army, 12. army, 18. army, 20. army, 21. army, 26. army

behind Western Front: reserve 22. army
behind Southwestern Front: reserve 16. and 19. army
reserve of High Command: 24. army, 28. army

When it comes to real numbers of Soviet soldiers I have numbers only dated to 1 June 1941 when call of reservists was only on its beginning. Here they are:

Leningrad Military District: 404 470 soldiers
Baltic Military District: 369 707 soldiers
Western Military District: 671 165 soldiers
Kiev Military District: 907 046 soldiers
Odessa Military District: 164 671 soldiers
Total: 2 517 059 soldiers
(There were still some reservists to be called out and also some divisions still on their way to the west.)

[1]Numerical state of Soviet tanks in Military Districts along Soviet-German border dated to 1 June 1941:

Baltic Military District: 1 616 tanks (78 KV, 57 T-28, 50 T-34, 691 BT, 527 T-26)
Western Military District: 3 295 tanks(97 KV, 63 T-28, 228 T-34, 661 BT, 1 381 T-26)
Kiev Military District: 5 836 tanks (278 KV, 215 T-28, 547 T-34, 1 819 BT, 1 894 T-26)
Odessa Military District: 1 114 tanks (10 KV, 50 T-34, 494 BT, 232 T-26)
Total: 11 861 tanks (Total numbers of tanks in Military Districts does not match with numbers in brackets. Difference is made by tanks of different or unknown type.)

Numerical state of Soviet tanks produced and given to Military Districts along Soviet-German border between 1 and 21 June 1941:

Baltic Military District: 0 tanks
Western Military District: 158 tanks(20 KV, 138 T-34)
Kiev Military District: 47 tanks (20 KV, 27 T-40)
Odessa Military District: 0 tanks
Total: 205 tanks

Total numerical state of Soviet tanks dated to 1 June 1941: 25 522 (22 431 serviceable, argument that everything was old and not usable is just a piece of Soviet propaganda)
Total numerical state of German tanks dated to 1 June 1941: 5 162 tanks (most likely all serviceable, speculation)

Real numbers in front line dated to 22 June 1941:
Nazi Germany: 3 384 tanks (reserve 2 tank divisions)
Soviet Union: 8 834 tanks (only in mechanized corps and another 1 768 tanks on movement to west again only in mechanized corps [Even Soviet rifle divisions had few tanks, 16 precisely, if my memory serves well.])

According to course (from Soviet point of view):
Northwestern course:
Nazi Germany: 574 tanks
Soviet Union: 1 402 tanks
Western course:
Nazi Germany: 1 936 tanks
Soviet Union: 2 223 tanks
Southwestern course:
Nazi Germany: 728 tanks
Soviet Union: 4 400 tanks
South course:
Romanians: not more than 200 tanks
Soviet Union: 809 tanks
(Numerical state of Soviet and German tanks comes from source in Czech, from one of our military historians. So because I cannot prove them from source in Russian or English, consider them hypothetical and maybe not absolutely accurate.)

So, these are numbers, unfortunately I have no source for artillery or aircraft. I would like to point out one thing especially about document I posted already before – this document dated to 13 June 1941 speaks already about Fronts. Soviet High Command on 13 June 1941 already prepared transformation from Military Districts to Fronts and Fronts are military wartime(!) formation. Such transformation takes place only when:
1)Nation is at war. (This was not true at that time.)
2)Nation prepares for war. (Whether its offensive, defensive or LJad’s offensive defense.)
3)Nation has very bad relations with its neighbour and there is real possibility of war with him. (Example is Japan, after brief conflict in 1939 Far East Front remained as Front for whole WWII.)
So, point 1 is out of question and same goes for point 3, relations with Nazi Germany were positive after Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Remains point 2. LJad will correct me if I am wrong about this, but when nation prepares for offensive defense, it has to be quite concerned about its neighbour’s intentions, it must feel threatened by him. Is that right? If answer is yes, it would mean that Soviets realized German preparations were aimed against them and not United Kingdom and so started their own defensive preparations (or preparations of offensive defense). But I think it is possible to prove this is not right by analysis based on released intelligence documents. Of course, anyone has right to agree or disagree with this analysis. (This analysis is not mine, but I absolutely agree with its conclusions.)

[2]First, numbers of German divisions and their deployment according to book by B.Muller-Hillebrand:

9.6.1940
Number of divisions: 15
(Eastern Prussia and occupied part of Poland)

21.7.1940
Number of divisions: 15
(Eastern Prussia and occupied part of Poland)

7.10.1940
Number of divisions: 30
(Eastern Prussia and occupied part of Poland)

21.12.1940
Number of divisions: 36
(Eastern Prussia, occupied part of Poland and allied Romania)

7.4.1941
Number of divisions: 81
(Eastern Prussia, occupied part of Poland, allied Romania and occupied part of northern Norway)

20.5.1941
Number of divisions: 98
(Eastern Prussia, occupied part of Poland, allied Romania and occupied part of northern Norway)

21.6.1941
Number of divisions: 124 (+ 14 divisions as reserve of OKH transported to Soviet-German border)
(Eastern Prussia, occupied part of Poland, allied Romania and occupied part of northern Norway)

These numbers are fairly accurate and document growth of forces in neigbourhood with USSR. What idea had Soviets and their intelligence about deployment of German forces?

Estimated numbers of German divisions in neigbourhood with USSR according to Soviet intelligence:

15.6.1940
Estimated number of German divisions in neighbourhood with USSR: 27

16.7.1940
Estimated number of German divisions in neighbourhood with USSR: 41

These two facts come from document: „Summarized note of 5. Department of the Red Army addressed to Peoples’s Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko”(Not sure about translation). This document was signed by Chief of 5. Department of the Red Army (before reorganization Main Intelligence Directorate), Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov.

25.4.1941
Estimated number of German divisions in neighbourhood with USSR: 97 to 102

This fact comes from document: „Special note of Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army about dislocation of the German armed forces along battlefields and fronts to date of 25.4.1941“. Document was signed by Chief of Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Lieutenant General F. I. Golikov.

15.5.1941
Estimated number of German divisions in neighbourhood with USSR: 120

This fact comes from document: „Considerations about plans of strategic deployment of armed forces of the Soviet Union for cause of war with Germany and its allies“. This document was written in May 1941 by Chief of Operational Department of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major General A. M. Vasilevsky.

Conclusion:
Soviet Intelligence had quite accurate information about deployment of German armed forces as they overestimated their numbers not more than by 20%. So how is it possible that Soviets were surprised by German invasion even so they had so good informations?

Answer lies in two documents, first is dated to 18 September 1940: „About strategical deployment principles of armed forces of the Soviet Union on West and East for years 1940 and 1941“. This document was signed by People’s Commissar of Defense, Marshal S. K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of Army K. A. Mereckov. Second document is again (15 May 1941) „Considerations about plans of strategic deployment of armed forces of the Soviet Union for cause of war with Germany and its allies“. First document can be found in book of Marshal M. V. Zakharov [3]. Second document can be found in book of Werner Maser [4].

In first document, Soviet Intelligence expects Nazi Germany to mass 173 divisions for possible strike against USSR, while the second document speaks already about 180 divisions needed for direct threat for USSR (Without consideration of German’s allied forces). Estimates of German divisions deployed in neighbourhood with USSR were much lower – just 120 in middle of May. There were 124 German divisions deployed at Soviet-German border (another 14 divisions were on their way to East) on 21 June 1941, day before start of Barbarossa. If we conclude that Soviet Intelligence would even in their June note overestimate real numbers of German divisions by 20%, their note would speak roughly about 165 divisions. And this number is still lower than what they expected as minimum for possible strike of Germany against USSR. This leads to conclusion that Soviet military and political high command did not expect Germans to start invasion of USSR with such small force. As we all know, first warning of possible German attack came from Moscow to Military Districts in the evening of 21 June 1941.

Conclusion:
Soviet Intelligence interpreted German concentration of armed forces as:
1)Preparations for invasion of United Kingdom. (Very probable.)
2)Defensive preparations for attack of USSR against Germany. (I do not think so.)
This leads to another conclusion – if Soviet High Command did not expect German attack, it would not waste time and resources for own defensive preparations or some kind of countermeasures, like LJad’s offensive defense. So, this raises question: Why were there 2,5 million of soldiers, almost 10 000 tanks, thousands of aircraft and artillery batteries and also vast resources of oil, ammo and others so close to German border? There is one possible answer based on document which authenticity is unfortunately unclear. I will try to translate it and post it here, but consider it hypothetical. It is possible that this document was just fabricated.
[5]
***
People’s Commissariat of Defense of USSR
General Staff of the Red Army

To Military Councils of Leningrad MD, Baltic MD, Western MD, Kiev MD, Odessa MD

Top Secret
Of Special Importance
11 June 1941
Seven copies

Only for information of members of Military Councils. Cannot be sent via radio or telephone links!
According to information gained from different intelligence and governmental sources, German forces will start large-scale operations against United Kingdom in period of 4 to 10 July 1941, including landings of large forces on British Islands through the use of airplanes and ships.
Based on this fact, demand for execution of military actions in national interest of USSR may occur based on change of military-political situation in Europe.
...
Staff of Military Districts (Fronts) and their subordinated army and corps staff will be ready by 1 July 1941 for start of offensive actions whereas they will complete their command-staff preparations. No other actions can be carried out without orders.

People’s Commissar of Defense of USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union
S. Timoshenko

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
General of Army
G. Zhukov

Member of the High Military Council
General Secretary of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee
A. Zhdanov
***

This document is very strong support for my previous conclusion. Unfortunately, its authenticity is unclear, as I already stated. There is also mention about “completion of command-staff preparations“ so for LJad’s question about readiness of Soviet divisions – I guess that Soviet units on Soviet-German border trained whole time (Speculation: Suvorov claimed, they especially trained offensive maneuvers like crossings of rivers and others.). It is just my opinion, but I believe that military units cannot just sit quietly for months – it would lead to loss of moral, discipline and it would weaken whole unit. It is necessary to keep soldiers busy with duties and exercises (Just my opinion.) to prevent this. So my answer is yes, they were ready to fulfill orders, but I may be wrong.

Again, documents which I presented here does not necessarily mean that Soviet Union prepared for offensive actions against Nazi Germany (Except the last one, but authenticity is unknown). But they raise quite a lot of questions which are unanswered by defenders of official version. Hopefully, declassification of main documents from 1940-1941 will occur soon, especially of operational plans of General Staff. This will hopefully banish shadows of lies and propaganda once and for all.

Sources of documents:
[1] Kolomijec, Maxim - Makarov, Michail: Preljudija k "Barbarosse". Moscow, Stratěgija KM 2001, page 63

[2] B.Muller-Hillebrand: Suchoputnaja armija Germaniji 1933-1945, Moscow 2003

[3] Zakharov, M.: Generaľnyj štab v predvojennyje gody, Moscow 2005

[4] W.Maser: Treachery – Hitler, Stalin and Second World War, Prague 1996 (Czech version)

[5] Bunich, Igor: Operacija "Groza". Ošibka Stalina - "ošibka v treťjem znake". Moscow, Jauza - Eksmo 2005, page 615-616 (2nd edition!)

[6] V.Beshanov: Kadry rešujet vse – surovaja pravda o vojne, Moscow 2006