Was FDR to blame for Pearl Harbor?

or duped?

 

Sources request usually brings silence in my view. No sources then we can make our own mind up on the story. Then again I suppose there are discredited sources which is an all new ball game. But as long as there are folk about to point out the errarta as on here then most of us can see the wood through the trees. FDR, does not deserve some of the embelishments some would heap on him. I sometimes wander just who was the enemy of the time. It certainly was not the likes of FDR.

 

Could have been doped, but still that would be better than dumped I guess.

I'm glad that I'm not the only one here to pick up on these subliminal messages....

 

I agree with you Lou, and Opana Pointer with every point made. Years ago, I was one of those conspiracy theorists concerning the events surrounding the debacle at Pearl Harbor. To me, FDR let the attack go on to get into the war. But much, much independant study and discussion over the years led to my conversion to the reality of the events. Now when I read of posters such as Rebel and the recently dishonorably discharged Delrob, I think back on how silly I was to subscribe to that line of thought, and to defend it with zeal and fanaticism. Hopefully the more time those people stay here, the more they can be exposed to the facts, so that they can sort through the fiction. Who knows.

 

Submarinamal.....I cant even spell it let alone be clever enough to use it...

 

Haven't forgot, or disappeared. Overwhelmed this weekend. Continuing to work on it. Will post something very soon.

 

Kudos on staying with this Rebel. I have to say I agree with Op and Lou on this but my But I'm glad your not taking it personal. Good you wish to prove your point but sometime you may wish to hang a white flag in good grace. As we all have to at some time on here. But I for one am still interested in your response.

 

That's sort of like challenging a one-legged man to a butt-kicking contest....

Yes, I am interested in new revelations too....

 

butt kicking contest...is that one of those yaaall southern type games. .

 

Here ya go.

To answer an inquiry a few pages back concerning “what was left out” of the investigations of the attack. The military intercepts were left out. The only transcripts reviewed by the panel was, the diplomatic (purple) transcripts. Diplomatic messages were sent in the Purple, Tsu, or Oite codes; naval communications in one of 29 codes called the Kaigun Ango, the most important of which were the 5-Num (naval operations), SM (naval movement), S (merchant marine), and Yobidashi Fugo (radio call sign) codes. Stinnett conclusively demonstrates that American cryptologists (code breakers) had broken all four naval codes by October of 1940. (American intelligence had broken Japanese diplomatic codes even before: Tsu in the 1920s, Oite in 1939, and Purple in September 1940. As a result, cryptologists could intercept, decipher, and translate almost all Japanese diplomatic and military radio traffic within a matter of hours after receiving them. The decryption (decoding) and translating was done at three cryptographic centers: Station CAST on Corregidor in the Philippines; Station HYPO on Oahu; and Station US in Washington

In 1944 Thomas Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate, learned that the United States had intercepted and decoded Japanese messages before the attack. He was planning to make it a campaign issue until General George Marshall convinced him otherwise, telling Dewey that with the war still going on, "American lives are at peril."

FDR appointed a five man board of inquiry, headed by associate justice Owen J. Roberts. Because of the need to maintain military secrecy the Roberts commission was unable to conduct a full examination or a public discussion of the Japanese naval intercepts. As a result NONE of the Navy’s intercept operators testified or produced their radio logs and documents. Nothing was revealed about them.

Source – PHPT (Pearl Harbor Part) a 39 volume transcript of the eight official US investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack.

For the full report of the Proceedings of the Roberts Commission, see PHPT ‘s 22 and 23 (testimony), and 24 (exhibits)




Now, to the implementation of the eight action items in McCollum’s memo.
There was no “official” record of FDR acknowledging the memo. The memo was dated 10/7/40, and addressed to Navy Captains Walters Anderson and Dudley Knox. Anderson was the Director of the office of Naval intelligence and had direct White House access to FDR. Knox was a naval strategist and chief of the ONI library. He served as a mentor to Admiral Ernest J. King, another of FDR’s military advisors in 1940-41. Note: This is the same Walter Anderson that FDR placed in charge of the battleships in Pearl Harbor.

The paper trail of the McCollum memo ends with Knox. There is no official record that Anderson or FDR ever saw it. However, a series of secret Presidential routing logs and collateral intelligence information in the navy files offer conclusive evidence that they did indeed see it. Beginning the very next day, they were systematically put into effect.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson is on record favoring the policy. In Stimson’s diary entry of Nov.25, 1941, where the FDR war cabinet discussed “letting Japan fire the first shot.” The cabinet believed this would unite the American people in the war effort. See PHPT 11, p. 5421

Action A - Make arrangements with Briton for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore. Arrangements were made for US use of Rabaul’s Simpson Harbor, a British possession in New Briton in the south pacific, and USN advance Pacific Base F. Orders came from Admiral Harold Stark, FDR’s Chief of Naval Operations. See special secret file NB/AB “F” (4), Special Advance Base- Pacific “F” in RG 181, Twelfth Naval District, National Archives, San Bruno, California. Base “F” leasing arrangement was in process at the time of Pearl Harbor.


Actions B and G - urged the Dutch to cut off Japanese access to natural resources in Southeast Asia. See the summary of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages routed to FDR, 10/16/40. Lt. Cdr. McCollum entitled the summary: “Japanese plans to seize the Dutch East Indies.”, and routed it “Original to Aide to the President..” FDR met with Dutch Foreign Minister Eelco Nicolaas van Kleffens and US Undersecretary of State Sumner Wells during a 70-minute conference in the Oval Office, March 19, 1941. See White House usher diary, 3/19/41, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, NY. See photo of van Kleffens and Dutch Ambassador to the US Alexander Loudon – after concluding the presidential conference outside the oval office, and van Kleffens comments to news reporters published in KnickerbockerWeekly, March 31, 1941, p. 13. For Dutch –Japanese negotiations see the account by Dutch negotiator H.J. van Mook: The Netherlands Indies and Japan. (London: George Allen &Unwin Ltd., 1944).

Action C - Give all possible aid to the Chinese Government of Chiang Kai shek.
On September 25, 1940 the Administration approved a 25 million loan to China’s US recognized government, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai shek. See Breckenridge Long, The War diary of Breckenridge Long (University Of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 132. On April 15, 1941, FDR issued an executive order authorizing US Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers to voluntarily serve with the Flying Tigers air force. The flying Tiger openly trained in Burma for air combat with the Japanese. Action C continued into the fall of 1941, when President Roosevelt sent his personal advisor, Henry F. Grady to join a special US commission formed to provide additional support for China. The group was headed by Major General John Magruder, former US Army intelligence chief. See the Magic background of Pearl Harbor (Department of defense), Vol. III, narrative, p. 266, item 566.

Action D- Sending US Cruisers in provocative moves against Japan.
Documentation that links FDR with this action item included the following: first discussion in the White House Feb 10, 1941. Present were President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, General George Marshall, Army Chief of staff, and Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval operations. Stark warned FDR that the cruises “will precipitate hostilities,” PHPT 16-2150 and PHPT 33 p. 1203. FDR advocated the cruises; see Stark in PHPT 33, p1203. FDR called them “pop up cruises” according to Admiral Stark. See B. Mitchell Simpson, III, Admiral Harold R. Stark (university of South Carolina Press 1989) pp. 101, 102.
Admiral Kimmel wrote to Stark on Feb 18, 1941 and said the proposed cruises were “most ill advised”, PHPT 33-1199; “I fought but the decision may go against me.” Stark to Kimmel Feb 10, 1941 PHPT 33-1197.

Winston Churchill sent a message to FDR advocating the dispatching of US cruisers to Singapore on Oct. 4, 1940 in Warren E Kimball ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: the complete correspondence, (Princeton University Press, 1984)

Three pop up cruises can be documented. (1) The first sailed during March 15-21, 1941. See testimony of Vice Admiral John H. Newton who led a task group of four USN cruisers: USS Brooklyn, USS Savannah, USS Chicago, and USS Portland. Together with a squadron of 12 destroyers sailed into the central and south pacific adjacent to Japanese territory. Newton told the Hart investigation of Pearl Harbor that his orders were highly secret and directed to him verbally., PHPT 26-340. the presence of US warships was leaked to the Aussie newspapers, which announced the ships arrival in news dispatches. The news reports were picked up by the Japanese consulate in Honolulu and forwarded to Yosuke Matsuoka the Foreign Minister in Tokyo. See the consulates intercepted message to Matsuoka at PHPT 35, p. 431, and PHPT, 37 p. 1026. (2) A second cruise took US warships to Central and South Pacific regions adjacent to the eastern Japanese mandates; see RG 24, deck logs of USS Salt lake City and USS Northampton, July and August, 1941 Archives II. A copy of Japan’s protest was forwarded to FDR.

Action E – Send submarines to the orient.
See letter re dispatch of US subs to Manila, from Admiral Harold Stark to Admiral James O. Richardson, November 12, 1940PHPT 14 p. 971, and US Assistant Secretary of state Breckenridge Long, War Diary, p. 155, Long writes that 12 Submarines were sent from Honolulu to Manila.

Action F – Keep Main strength of US Fleet in vicinity of Hawaiian Islands.
Should be no argument here. This is why Richardson was relieved of his command. He was opposed to keeping the fleet in Hawaii. He fought against it in Washington and lost. Thus, the two-ocean navy was created at this time The Pacific fleet was stationed at Oahu.

Action H – Complete embargo of Japan.
The president issued a total embargo on July 26, 1941. See Executive order 8832, Federal register this date in National Archives I, 7th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington. For Japanese reaction to Action H, see The Magic Background of Pearl Harbor (US Department of Defense, 1977), Vol.II Appendix, p. A-226, item 447. See also discussion concerning Japanese embargos by FDR, Sec of State Cordell Hull, Undersec of state Sumner Wells, and asst. Sec of state Breckenridge Long in War Diary, Oct 10, 1940.

 

Yes it is, sort of like head butting. That's not sticking your head in someone's butt, but like running at your opponent while he runs at you, and the both of you pound their heads together like the mountain rams do on the animal shows. It's a short game.

 

Good to see you fell back on information discredited by the academic community. Stinnet hasn't proven anything. The JN-25 code was not broken untill 1942. There are no records that even a single message (via the 5-Num code or JN-25) sent at anytime in 1941 had been read prior to 7 December .

 

Here is a review/ rebuttal of Stinnett's book "Day of Deceit" by RADM Richard E. Young, USN(ret).

It is an all text pdf file so it loads quickly. I don't think RADM Young likes Stinnett.

http://www.studio3d-zine.com/Stinnett.pdf

 

A question, just out of curiousity:

Are there military files from the period that are still classified? For example, are the daily Hypo working logs from, say, October 1941 to December 7th 1941 open to historians? (Not the summaries, the actual logs and all associated worksheets). Are the logs of all listening posts in the Pacific open in the same timeframe? That sort of thing.