From the Greatest Generation, by Tom Brokaw, "He says now he believes the U.S. Army was successful in part because officers and men weren't afraid to question authority. 'They often improvised, they came up with their own plan, they reacted to what was happening in the field instead of just blindly following orders like the Germans. That's one of the reasons the Germans lost.'" Interesting that this guy states G.I.s didn't follow orders and the Germans blindly did. Never read anything like that before. Is that true?
Welcome to the Forum! I think it is most certainly true and accurate. The German and Japanese Armies, at the beginning of the war, consisted primarily of professional soldiers. The Officer corps of both militaries were the products of military training schools (academies) and years spent in the military. Many German and Japanese officers had no other goal in life than to be a military officer.This strict military caste system did not lend its self to improvisation or deviation from the chain of command and often resulted in the "micromanagement" of the troops lower on the chain of command. By contrast the US military was primarily a conscript army consisting of non professionals. While the Majority of the Generals/ Admirals had attended a Military Academy (West Point, Annapolis, VMI) the Majority of the Field Grade officers (Colonel and below) were the products of OCS and ROTC programs. US Officers, for the most part, were reservists whose obligation to serve lasted until the war was over and they returned to civillian life. For the most part American officers were more concerned about the safety of their men than they were about advancing their military careers. US officers were often charged to improvise and develop their own plans of attack ( this is illustrated quite well in the "Band of Brothers" when Lt. Winters is charged with silencing the guns at Breacout Mannor ). By contrast the charecter of Lt. Sobel would be best described as "Chicken Sh*t" i.e. relishing his authority for the sake of advancing his own interests. I hope that answers your question, I am sure that there will be others that add their 2 cents as well.
Hello. I think if you want to look solely at the differences between the US Army and the Heer you could take a look at Martin van Crefeld's "Fighting Power". As for formerjugheads post, I think it is grossly overgeneralizing and wrong on several points: The german army was also a conscripted one since 1935. Before that it was professional but limited to 100.000 men. So they only picked the best of the best and were able to form a nucleolus of highly trained and skilled officers and NCO's. As for officers having no other goal in life, thats the fate of every professional soldier, isn't it? And everyone with even the slightest clue about the Prussian and later the German army would know about the term "Auftragstaktik" and the almost unique amount of independence low-level German NCO's and officers enjoyed, normally found only on above-average/elite units in other army's at the time. You seem to know something about he US army but little about the Heer, so why draw comparisons? The preservation of manpower was key to Prussian and later German military doctrine ever since, because of the size of Prussia and it's strategical situation (think of the traumatic Seven Years War). In WWI there a numerous examples of Germany offering land to save blood. The exception from the rule came when H. gave his famous "Halt!" orders, but that's another story. The US system you describe was essentially a copy of the Prussian one of the 19th century, copied all over the world, especially after 1870/71. I would advise you to read Crevelds book, too.
I would say not. I should perhaps begin by saying I'm no fan of this 'greatest generation' theorising of Mr Brokaw's, but it's a fact that the German side were exceptionally good at giving localised command decisions over to their junior leaders and men on the spot. The Kampfgruppe system alone perhaps gives the lie to any suggestion otherwise. There may have been problems in the higher/staff echelons with the old 'Fuhrer orders' restricting the real military men, but quite the contrary for many lower formations. I think it's probably nonsense to assert that the German Infantryman or tanker of WW2, SS or Heer, did not 'react to what was happening in the field'. The US may have become as adept as any other army at eventually allowing appropriate tactical freedoms to it's lower ranking members, but in many of their major engagements do appear to have suffered somewhat from the opposite problem - An issue seemingly bound up with such large forces of new/inexperienced troops being deployed, and one that thankfully they overcame very rapidly. ~A
That is not the assertion I am making at all and I apologize for presenting it as such. I am more referring to the conduct of overall operations than I am individual actions. I am not going to argue your opinions; but, I will defend mine and expand what I have said previously. There are many examples of Hitler making decisions that would have been better left to local commanders: At Stalingrad: Paulus failed to act at his discretion. At Normandy: (1) Rommel and Von Geyr had their bickering, in re: panzer deployments, arbitrated by none other than Hitler. (2) Hitler held the deployment of reserves at his own discretion. (3) 21 Panzer division not moving from Caen for 14 days I am sure there are other instances than Normandy and Stalingrad where such inactions occured; however, these are off the top of my head. Hitler meddled in matters that were well below his paygrade and I feel that his meddling was often further perpetuated by his Generals and passed down the chain of command. Now, I am not saying that the Heer and SS did not have their share of "Free thinkers" however, I do believe they did this at their own peril. IN the US military Operational Plans were developed at a "Corps" level and Objectives were assigned to subordinate units throughout the Corps down to company level objectives. Corps Commander would issue an order to Division Commanders, Division Commanders would develop objectives for their Regimental commanders, Regimental Commanders would give objectives to the Battalion Commanders and Battalion Commanders would further assign objectives to Company Commanders. Each commander would then develop an operations order that would be compiled into the larger Operations order. The Corps commanders would not meddle in the planning of operations at the Company level and President Roosevelt would certainly not meddle in the affairs of his generals. In Re: Conscripts, While the Heer was conscripted in 1935 the quality of the conscript pool was different than the conscripts in the US. While the German Army adhered to the letter of the Treaty of Versille they did not abide to the spirit of the treaty. During the '20's and early '30's youth groups were "militarized" and their curriculum consisted more and more of athletics, marksmanship, orienteering ( land navigation ) and an emphasis was placed on discipline and sacrifice. The groups were even structured the same as military units. There were also "Glider" and "Model Rocket" competitions that were sponsored by the government. By contrast the US did not place as much of a "martial" influence on their youth during the same time period. In anycase, it is just my opinion and we can debate the minutia of it if you wish and my only point is that the German and American Armies had very different views as to the ways war should be conducted. Brad
Whooa boys. We need to establish the various levels of command before drawing any conclusions. Tactical Operational Strategic The tactical level revolves around engagements and battles. This is the sphere of battalions up to divisions. The Operational level revolve around Campaigns and major Operations. This is for Corps and Armies and Army Groups. The Strategiclevel revolve around Theatre goals and the National Objectives. This is at the national command level. For the Germans they were miles ahead on the tactical level in the early years of the war. They would win battles and do well on the smaller scale. At the Operational level they did well until the end of the French campaign in 1940. In my opinion the French campaign was the finest modern example of manouvre warfare. Dislocating the allies by the push through the Ardennes and using the "extraordinary force*" to fight the battles that they needed to and avoiding the ones they could. The goals of the campaign were unchanged throughout the campaign, and all units worked in accordance of the goals. Later on the Germans would deviate massivly on campaign goals and loose accordingly. This was done from the top (Hitler) during the opening of Barbarossa (Panzer units taken away from the drive to Moscow and pushed south), and from field commanders such as Rommel in North Africa. (advancing beyond the operational goals) The strategic level follow the pattern of the operational goals beeing changed, rendering planning wasted. The Germans intended to use a combined arms doctrine founded on the basics of manouvre warfare. They built their army accordingly. As impetus points out the Aufdragstaktik/mission command is focused on giving the men the commanders intention with a desired endstate, and then the men are free to figure out how to reach the endstate. To make this work all are required show initiative and make on the spot decisions. The germans also payed lipservice to Von Clausewitz comments on that all combat is a battle for time. Decentralised command and mission command ensured that the germans would get on the inside of the OODA loop of their enemies. But in spite of all their panache and good gear they lost. A war isn't won by winning battles. It is won on the Strategic level. The Allies had clear and defenite Strategic goals. On the Operational level they only changed campaign goals if there was a massive shift going on, (Such as North Africa when 8th Army was ordered towards Tunisia) rather than on the whim of the head of state.
I wouldn't say that US GI's didn't follow orders. I think that the US military was less disciplined as a whole when compared to the German/Japanese Army and would therefore be more apt to question and or improvise in the absence of direction or clarity. Don't misconstrue that as my saying that the US Military in WW2 was a mob. I am merely saying that the German/Japanese military took things, such as adherence to orders, more seriously than the Americans.
