Mitscher at Midway

I searched to see if this topic has been discussed here anywhere, and didn't see any mention of it. The topic I'm referring to are the (somewhat) recent revelations that Admiral Marc Mitscher's performance at Midway was not only abysmal, but perhaps criminal in nature. It's a somewhat long story, so I'll break it up into several posts and give the sources at the end.

As everyone is probably aware, the carrier Hornet's air group's contribution on the Battle of Midway's critical first day was almost a complete failure. Of the carriers' four squadrons, only one, the torpedo squadron (VT-8), even found the Japanese fleet. VT-8 was completely annihilated without scoring a single hit. (Yes, it is true that their sacrifice did help enable the successful dive bombing moments later).

The reason that Hornet's two dive bomber and one fighter squadrons did not find the Japanese is that the carrier's commander, Marc Mitscher, sent them off in the wrong direction. Mitscher apparently believed that the reported sighting of Nagumo's force included only two carriers, and that the other two must be operating some distance behind. So, Mitscher sent his squadron's towards where he believed the other two carriers were lurking, without apparently telling Spruance or Fletcher what he was doing.

VT-8's commander, John C. Waldron told Hornet's air group commander, Stanhope Ring that he was heading the wrong way after departing the carrier. Ring told him to shut up and follow orders. Waldron responded, "To hell with you guys" and turned his squadron towards where he knew the Japanese to be. Waldron's squadron found the Japanese exactly where they expected them to be and made a solitary attack, with unfortunate results for the squadron. Only one pilot survived.

Now, mistakes happen in wartime. The problem here is how Ring and Mitscher reacted after realizing that they had made a mistake.

Upon the return flight to Hornet, Ring sped up and left the formation behind in order to get back to the carrier first. Upon landing, he immediately rushed up to the bridge to talk to Mitscher. Most of the rest of the dive bombers landed soon after, but some, low on fuel, diverted to Midway. Ten Wildcats from the fighter squadron were unable to locate the carrier, ran out of fuel, and ditched in the open ocean.

Soon after Ring's return to the ship, Mitscher and/or his staff apparently began to cover up what had happened. The ship's log was changed to show that the course chosen for the air group was a mistake by Ring. Also, the heading was changed to make the course taken look like it wasn't as radical as it was in reality.

According to John Lundstrom in Black Shoe Carrier Admiral, Spruance later noticed the discrepancies in Mitscher's reports and noted in his own report to Nimitz on the battle, "Where Hornet's details of the battle differ from my own, Enterprise's report is the correct account." Lundstrom also states that Spruance likely privately told Nimitz upon his return to Pearl Harbor that there was something wrong with Mitscher's reports and logs.

If this account is true, then there are some ramifications involved. If Hornet's dive bombers had attacked with the bombers from the other two carriers, then perhaps all four of Nagumo's carriers would have been sunk in the first strike. If so, then Yorktown and Hamann likely would have survived the battle, along with their crewmen who died in Hiryu's and the submarine attack.

There is an even more direct result of Mitscher's cover-up, however. Because of the falsifying of his air group's course, rescue aircraft sent to look for the 10 lost Wildcat pilots were sent to wrong area. I believe it was four or five days later that a random PBY happened to sight the Wildcat pilots in another area. Eight of the 10 were rescued. The other two, although sighted earlier alive in the ocean, were not recovered. Thus, Mitscher's decision to conduct a cover-up may have left two of his fighter pilots to a lonely and lingering death in the open ocean.

Apparently aware to some degree of what Mitscher had done, Nimitz put him in the dog house by giving him a shore assignment. After 18-months Nimitz was apparently impressed enough with his performance that he sent him back out to help lead the Pacific Fleet to victory in the central Pacific campaign. Lundstrom speculates that Spruance's knowledge of Mitscher's behavior at Midway may have influenced the orders that Spruance gave Mitscher during the Battle of the Philippine Sea.

Interestingly, in Lundstrom's book there is a picture of Nimitz' commanders lined-up to receive their victory decorations after Midway. They are all smiling except Mitscher.

Sources:

I already mentioned Lundstrom's 2006 book Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. This story, however was first reported in 1993 by Bowen Weisheit, a fraternity brother of one of the VT-8 pilots killed in the battle, in a self-published book called, The Last Flight of Ensign C. markland Kelly, Junior, USNR. This book was apparently unnoticed or ignored until recently.

In 2005, Alvin Kernan wrote about Mitscher's and Ring's actions in The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons . The full story has been more recently published in 2008's A Dawn Like Thunder: The True Story of Torpedo Squadron Eight by Robert Mrazek. Mrazek states that when Walter Lord was researching Miracle at Midway in 1966-67, some of Hornet's Midway veterans mentioned what had actually happened, but Lord chose not to pursue the story.

I find it fascinating that, if true, the complete story about one of the last century's most important battles is still emerging.

 

Performance and probable causes, and not all just Mitscher's, were well known in US naval aviation circles; they just weren't talked about a whole lot, according to my source. Mitscher pretty well redeemed himself with his CTF-58 performance, though there were some quibbles there, too. Mitscher pretty much thought his career was over after Midway, but he had already been promoted to Rear Admiral before the battle and was one of the few early naval aviators to have stars, so there was, IMO, some political though given to rehabilitation opportunities.

Rich

 

Any cover up, IMHO, did not need to take place. Many people throughout the war made some very bad mistakes, and were not canned over the incident (Halsey, MacArthur).

I think it would be reasonable for Mitscher to assume that another carrier group was somewhere nearby. In Shattered Sword, Parshall points out that at no time did any scouting planes report the presence of more than two carriers, most likely due to cloud cover. The number of planes that attacked Midway early in the morning (100+) suggests to me that no less than three had to be out there.


As for VT-8, without trying to discredit their sacrifice, they had more of an impact in delaying the launch of additional CAP more than drawing off the existing CAP. Drawing the CAP badly out of position should be credited to VT-3 who, IIRC, attacked about three quarters of an hour later.

 

Yes, from what I understand, the series of isolated, sacrificial attacks by small US aircraft groups from Midway (including a group of TBFs that also happened to be from VT-8) and the carrier's torpedo squadrons served cumulatively to slow down Nagumo's preparations to launch a strike against the US carriers and ultimately to draw the CAP into a disadvantageous position when the US dive bombers finally arrived.

Lundstrom speculates that Mitscher's shore assignment likely saved his WWII career in another way by removing him from possible command at Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands grinders of '42-'43 derailed the careers of several task force and task group admirals, such as Fletcher's.

By the way, I've read a lot of books on the Pacific War, and I can honestly say that Mrazek's Dawn Like Thunder is one of the best. It reads like a novel without, apparently, embellishing or assuming too many details.

 

I would not go so far as to say there was a cover up. The battle was won and according to the USAAF they won it. Nimitz chose not to challenge that in public either. There was no point to be made. Had the battle been lost, then I'd suspect then Mitscher might have had some explaining to do. I've alway thought that he was teamed with Spruance in the 5th Fleet so someone who knew what to expect would be holding the reins.

After Midway Mitscher went to be ComPatWingTwo, a largely administrative patrol planes position at Pearl Harbor . . . and he took Ring along with him as his CoS. From there, in December, he went to ComFAir-Noumea - again, with Ring as CoS -and, in February 1943 to ComAirSols at the request of Adm Halsey.

He left there in July and took over ComFAirWest in San Diego. (Where Jim Flatley was Director of Training and Doctrine and my father, also just back from a tour with VF-11 in the Solomons, was Director of Fighter Training. Somewhere around here I've a picture of Mitscher pinning a gong, probably an Air Medal, on my father for activities in the Solomons.)

Finally, in January 1944, he went back west as CTF-58 under Spruance. Gus Widhelm was his Ops Officer until replaced by Flatley whom Mitscher specifically requested for the job.

Rich

 

I had forgotten about his AirSols command. When the tasking came down to organize a mission to kill Yamamoto, Mitscher's Navy fliers were having a hard time coming up with a plan that was feasible. To Mitscher's credit, when the Army fliers told him that they could do it because their P-38s had the range, Mitscher ordered his Navy aviators to support the Army's plan.

Mrazek questions whether Ring might have struck a Faustian bargain with Mitscher, by agreeing to take the blame for the Hornet's failed air attack in exchange for Mitscher protecting his career.

 

I have never heard about the USAAF claim to have won the Battle of Midway before. Where can I find out more of this absurd claim? I've read what I thought was a lot about the battle, but this is the first that I've heard of this business.

 

Hello Bobby. It's actually not that much of an absurd claim. Peter Smith goes into the subject in depth in his book Midway: Dauntless Victory. I found a review for you if you are interested.
Midway: Dauntless Victory book review by Daryl Carpenter, SUBSIM.com

 

Climax at Midway gives Gray’s (VF, CV-6) eyewitness account of Waldron’s flight to Kido Butai, given in about 1959, IIRC. Gray stated that Hornet and Enterprise’s torpedo groups flew the same course from their carriers to the target, gradually drifting apart over the course of time (Hornet’s TBD’s to the north, Enterprise’s to the south). Forced to chose, he elected to cover Waldron’s unit, which made a "beeline" to the target. He mentions nothing about himself or Waldron originally flying a course of about 270 degrees, or that Waldron made any major course corrections until virtually on top of Nagumo.

Seems tought to make this account square with Lundstrom's theory.

 

I haven't read Smith's book but I might now after reading that review. Since he used Kernan's book as a reference, I imagine that he probably covers Mitscher's and Ring's actions in the battle as well. It's interesting that he has the opinion like Wilmott that Japan should have concentrated on India instead of the war against the US.

 

We could start with:

Amongst The New York Times headlines June 11, 1942:
ARMY FLIERS BLASTED TWO FLEETS OFF MIDWAY– BIG BOMBERS WON
See Soviet And Britain Sign War And Peace Pact; Molotoff And Roosevelt Plan For 2D Front; Army Fliers Blasted Two Fleets Off Midway

Then there is:

“How Army Air Corps Won Battle of Midway – Pilots Deliver First News; Every Bomb Sank a Ship” from Mission History, Naval Order of the United States – San Francisco Commandery, June 5, 2000, pages 6-7. See http://www.navalorder.org/06-Jun-00 MistHist.PDF

“While the American fleet was still at sea following the Battle of Midway, Army Air Corps pilots and press agents were talking to reporters, and had been doing so for days, ever since their air strikes had failed to dent the Japanese ships on 4 June.

“Thus it was, that the New York Times ran a page-wide headline - called a “screamer” in the newspaper game - shouting ARMY FLIERS BLASTED TWO FLEETS OFF MIDWAY.

“Reporter Robert Trumbull wrote from Pearl Harbor ‘The Army pilots who actually dropped the bombs reported personally that they made hits on three Japanese carriers, one cruiser, one battleship or cruiser, one destroyer and one large transport.’

“In an editorial, the newspaper said ‘So far as we can now learn, the main damage to the Japanese fleet off Midway was inflicted by our land-based airplanes. The battle shows what land-based air power can do to naval and air power attacking from the open sea when that land-based air power is alert, well trained, courageous, and exists in sufficient quantity.’

“In a letter to Gen. George C. Marshall, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commander of the Hawaiian Department and military governor of the Territory of Hawaii, claimed that B-26 bombers had scored two torpedo hits on carriers, one carrier and possibly another was damaged by bombs, three battleships were damaged, a cruiser was sunk and another damaged, a destroyer was probably sunk, another carrier was set on fire, and two transports were set on fire.

“Emmons gratuitously added ‘I offer the thought confidentially that I do not believe that the Navy would have risked their three carriers in this battle against the superior hostile force which had four or five carriers had not they been assured of the support of land-based aviation.’ He boasted that the Air Corps ‘covered itself with glory.’

“As so often is the case, Washington took the early reports at face value. On 5 June, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson noted that ‘Apparently the American forces, mainly land based air forces, have won a surprise on the Japanese.’ The next day, Stimson wrote ‘Our big bombers have played a decisive part in the battle and the facility with which they have hit and injured capital ships of the enemy marks a great change in the previous view of high altitude bombing. The Navy got into it also with its carriers.’ He said it was the ‘heavy stream of these big bombers’ that carried the day.

“As the Navy’s ships straggled into Pearl Harbor, the true story of the Battle of Midway emerged, but that’s all it did. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, seeking to preserve inter-service amity, said almost nothing to contradict the Air Corps claims, and the American public believed that the Army had played the major role in the battle until well after the war.

“But even after the battle, people on the West Coast weren’t so sure a victory had been won at all. For the first six months of the war, the news had presented a seemingly endless succession of Japanese successes. The most recent news, that of the Battle of the Coral Sea, had been digested as something of a tie, if that. After all, USS Lexington, an irreplaceable aircraft carrier, had been lost, and no one knew that a Japanese invasion attempt had been thwarted."

And:

From Fortress Against the Sun, Gene Eric Salecker, (2001), page 206

“Having the advantage of flight, the B-17 crews made it back to Hawaii before any of the Navy personnel and on June 12 they gave their stories to the Honolulu Advertiser. Greatly exaggerating their success, the B-17 crews claimed that they had bombed an accumulation of seven battleships or cruisers, seven aircraft carriers, one destroyer, and two transports. The airmen believed that they had scored 22 direct hits, 6 probable hits, and 46 near misses. In addition they claimed that they had shot down eight Japanese fighters and damaged two more.”

And:

From “Army Air Forces in the War Against Japan 1941-1942,” Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 34; Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Historical Division. (1945)

pages 115-116
“When on the morning of 3 June naval patrol planes sighted a large concentration of eastward bound enemy vessels about 700 miles from Midway, the B-17 crews had already flown approximately 30 hours within 2 days. Six additional bombers were sent from Oahu, and at 1623, 9 B-17’s were ordered to attack the enemy force, now reported only 570 miles off Midway and approaching in 5 columns. Attacking from 8,000 feet with 36 x 600-pound bombs, the B-17’s scored a total of 5 hits and 5 near misses on 2 battleships or heavy cruisers and 2 large transports, leaving 1 warship and 1 transport burning and severely damaged.”

page 118
“Participation by AAF units became much larger than was expected, because of the early location of enemy carriers. For most of the personnel the Battle of Midway was their first combat action. Besides the handicap of inexperience, the crews in some cases had to contend with mechanical difficulties in their planes – difficulties which could undoubtedly have been eliminated if the situation had allowed for proper testing before sending the bombers into action. A further strain was placed on combat crews at Midway by the absence of sufficient ground crews. Even under these conditions, the B-17’s flew a total of 55 missions during the 3 days of the battle. They bombed a total of 7 battleships or heavy cruisers, 7 carriers, 1 destroyer, and 2 transports, resulting in claims of 22 direct hits, 6 probable hits, and 46 near misses. Ten out of 18 enemy fighters encountered were shot down and 2 were damaged. Two B-17’s and 2 B-26’s were lost at sea and 2 more of each type were damaged.”

And:

From “Operational History of the Seventh Air Force – 7 December 1941 to 6 November 1943,” Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 41; AAF Historical Office, Headquarters, Army Air Forces (1945) pages 14-17

“Actual combat began on 3 June 1942, when search planes discovered a Japanese task force bearing toward Midway. The Seventh Air Force’s first contact with the enemy came at 1623 when six B-17’s from the 431st Bomb Squadron with two from the 31st Bomb squadron and one from the 72d attached, attacked five Japanese battleships or heavy cruisers bearing 265º, 570 miles from Midway. They dropped 36 x 600-pound demolition bombs from 8,000 feet, scoring five hits and several near misses.49

“The first Army air action on 4 June occurred at 0710. when two B-26’s from the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron and 2 B-26B’s from the 69th Bomb Squadron (H), in conjunction with Navy torpedo bombers attacked an aircraft carrier from altitudes of 150 to 200 feet. The results of the attack were not observed, but one B-26 from each squadron was shot down by fire from either the many intercepting fighters of the extremely heavy antiaircraft fire from the carrier. One of the lost B-26’s was seen to launch its torpedo before crashing. The other two crash-landed at Midway riddled with holes.50

“At 0415M a formation of 14 B-17’s, composed of six from the 431st Bomb squadron, five from the 42d, two from the 31st, and one from the 72d took off to attack the targets bombed the previous afternoon. En route they reported another task force complete with many carriers approaching Midway from 325º at a distance of 145 miles. They were directed to intercept and climbed to 20,000 feet from which altitude they dropped 108 x 500-pound demolition bombs, registering seven hits and several near misses. Three carriers were reported on fire after the attack. Antiaircraft was heavy and at proper altitude, but generally behind. Enemy fighters did not seem anxious to close with the bombers, but of those that did two Zeros were shot down.51

“Late in the day of 4 June, Seventh Air Force bombers struck three times at the enemy. At 1810, two B-17’s of the 42d bomb squadron attacked a carrier force at latitude 31º0’, longitude 178º40’, dropping 16 x 500-pound bombs from 10,000 feet and scoring two hits and three near misses on a carrier that had been damaged by earlier American action. Three Zero inceptors were shot down, and one was possibly shot down.52

“At 1830, six B-17’s of the 23d Bomb Squadron en route from Oahu to Midway, each loaded with one-half bomb load and one bomb-bay tank, attacked the striking force bearing 332º, 170 miles from Midway. Eight 500-pound demolition bombs were dropped on a carrier and a destroyer. One hit and two near misses were scored on the carrier which was already aflame, and on hit was made on the destroyer which sank. Antiaircraft fire was heavy, and the bombers were intercepted by eight Zero fighters of which four were shot down and one was damaged. “Two B-17’s were damaged so that they were unable to drop their bombs.53

“Also at 1830 four B-17’s dropped 28 x 500-pound demolition bombs from an altitude of 20,000 to 25,000 feet on a heavy cruiser bearing 334º, 185 miles from Midway. They scored one hit and two near misses, with the results of 16 bombs unobserved.54

“On the following day, the first contact was made with the enemy when 5 B-17’s from the 23d Bomb Squadron and three from the 42d attacked the Japanese force at 270º, 130 miles from Midway. They made their attack in two elements of four planes each. The first element dropped 19 x 500-pound demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, getting two probable hits and three near misses. The second element dropped 20 x 500-pound demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, with one direct hit and four near misses. All hits were on two battleships or heavy cruisers. There was no fighter opposition and although heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered none of the B-17’s was damaged.55

“At 1815, three B-17’s from the 42d bomb squadron, with one from the 23d attached, attacked a heavy cruiser bearing 330º, 300 miles from Midway. Thirty-two 500-bpund demolition bombs were dropped from 16,000 feet, with two hits and three near misses. Immediately thereafter, three other B-17’s of the 23d bomb squadron dropped 24 x 500-pound demolition bombs on the same target from 14,000 feet, getting one hit and one near miss. There was no fighter interception and antiaircraft fire did no damage.56

“The last strike of the Battle of Midway was made at 1835 when 5 B-17’s from the 72d bomb squadron attacked a heavy cruiser bearing 320º, 425 miles from Midway. They dropped 15 x 600-pound bombs and eight 500-pound bombs from altitudes ranging form 9,000 to 12,500 feet, with results unobserved. One B-17 was shot down by the extremely heavy antiaircraft fire coming from the cruiser, and on other was forced down in the water because of fuel shortage. The crew if the latter was recovered.57

{footnotes 49 through 57 cite “Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 42-; consolidation of Seventh Air Force operations in AG 370.24 Battle of Midway (Special File); maps, CG VII Bomber Command to CG . . .” and the remainder is illegible on my copy report}

And same from page 18

“During the three days. 3 to 5 June, the Seventh Air Force conducted 16 B-17 attacks involving 55 airplanes and one torpedo attack by B-26’s.59 Targets had been battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, transports, and destroyers. Three hundred and fourteen 500- to 600-pound bombs and four torpedoes had been dropped from altitudes of 3,000 to 25,000 feet with a score of 22 hits, six probable hits, and 46 near misses. Antiaircraft fire had made the observation of results difficult, yet the known results were: One battleship or heavy cruiser hit and two set afire; three aircraft carriers set afire; three hits on carriers already afire; two torpedo hits on one carrier; one torpedo hit on another; one destroyer sunk; and one large transport set afire and another hit.60

{footnotes 59 and 60 are illegible on my copy of this report}

And

From “Hale’s Handful . . . Up From The Ashes,” Peter S. H. Ellis, MAJ USAF; Thesis for The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, June 2000, pages 18-23

“The Office of Information Services, in its Brief History of Seventh Air Force, 1940-1945, stated that in the course of the three day battle (3-6 June 1942) the Seventh Air Force ‘scored 22 direct hits and 6 probables’ on Japanese ships.41 However, this turned out not to be the case. It is interesting to compare the specific claims made by Seventh Air Force in a 13 June 1942 letter to General Arnold, and the actual results cited by Kenn C. Rust in his book Seventh Air Force Story In World War II.42 In his 13 June 1942 letter, General Davidson (acting Seventh Air Force commander on that date) stated that in action on 3 June 1942, 9 B-17s scored five hits, one probable hit, and four near misses - leaving two enemy vessels aflame.43 Rust points out, however, that only nine of the 36 bombs released fell near the enemy transport ships, and no hits were made.44

“Likewise, in outlining the action on 4 June 1942, General Davidson detailed the results of several flights of B-17s, highlighting no fewer than a dozen hits and an enemy destroyer sunk.45

“Additionally, he recounted a mission of four B-26s, armed with 2000-pound torpedoes, scoring two hits, but at a loss of two B-26s.46 Again, Rust points out that while this B-26 mission was the first torpedo attack by Army Air Force planes in history, and the combat was harrowing indeed, no hits were scored, and two B-26s were lost.47 Similarly, Rust points out that the best the B-17s were able to do on 4 June 1942 was put six bombs within 100 yards astern and five bombs within 200 yards to starboard of the enemy carrier ‘Soryu.’48 Finally, Rust states the final B-17 mission on 6 June 1942 claimed the sinking of a Japanese destroyer that turned out to be a US submarine, which fortunately dived quickly and was not hit.49 General Davidson’s letter of 13 June 1942 did admit the mistaken attack on the friendly submarine.50 Overall, General Davidson claimed 22 direct hits in his 13 June 1942 letter, against losses of two B-17s and two B-26s.51 However, Rust states that the lack of any hits obtained demonstrates the extreme difficulty of heavy bombers hitting maneuvering ships at sea.52 On the other hand, Rust argues that the Seventh Air Force made a significant contribution to the Battle of Midway, by wearing down the enemy defenses so that Navy dive-bombers could finish off the four virtually undefended Japanese carriers.53

“The exaggerated press reports ensued because the AAF bombers were the first to return to Hawaii from the Battle of Midway, and frankly, they took the credit.54 On 12 June 1942, {sic} one day before the naval task forces returned to Pearl Harbor, the New York Times published an article with the headline: ‘Army Fliers Blasted Two Fleets off Midway.'55 The problem, it seems, was that army aviators were not trained in assessing battle damage at sea, and at the height they were flying it was impossible accurately to determine ship types or to tell a hit from a near miss.56

“While censorship rules of the time may have played a role in the Navy not publicly disputing AAF claims, E. B. Potter points out that Nimitz ‘recognizing that the aviators made up in gallantry what they lacked in aim and damage-assessment, declined to contradict the Army’s extravagant pretensions.’57 Even after the battle had been carefully analyzed and it was clear they had not scored so much as a hit, Nimitz still declined to dispute the aviators, releasing instead a statement through his spokesman that Midway ‘was truly a victory of the United States’ armed forces and not of the Navy alone.’58

“However, this apparent graciousness can also be seen as a ‘kill them with kindness’ strategy, and the Navy was not the only one employing it. In an undated message to General Arnold, General Marshall highlights a naval flyer who while lauding the work of carrier-based aircraft in a press interview, also reiterated that ‘not one major ship in this war has been sunk by horizontal bombing.’59 {NB Thach?} General Marshall’s guidance to General Arnold is strikingly similar to the tack taken by Nimitz:

‘War Dept policy has been to make no repeat no comment publicly and not repeat not to mention the matter to Navy officials on the grounds that the indiscretion is so gross that the initial moves for correction should come from the Navy. This, your confidential information to warn you against comments, and to have you suppress possible comments by your people. Indiscretions of this nature will only do harm at this moment and will weaken our position whereas I believe that good will come out of the matter because of the highly embarrassing position in which the Navy Department has been placed.’60

“While it appears both these men were genuinely acting with gracious civility, it is clear that regardless of motivations, the services did not want to air interservice disputes in the public arena.

“Unfortunately, Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (who would soon be in Seventh Air Force’s direct operational chain of command) was not as understanding as Admiral Nimitz, and he never forgave the AAF for its exaggerated claims at the Battle of Midway.61 General Hale’s (soon to be commander of the Seventh Air Force) receipt of the Distinguished Service Medal for his bombing missions at Midway probably aggravated this tension, and Admiral Spruance’s attitude did nothing to help the already difficult interservice relationship between General Hale and his (soon-to-be) immediate operational boss, Vice Admiral John H. Hoover.62

“Additionally, the success of the Navy dive-bombers versus the apparent lack of success of the AAF heavy bombers established a paradigm in some naval officers’ minds (especially Admiral Spruance and Admiral Hoover) of what effective bombing should look like - i.e. lower equals better.63 This paradigm is at the heart of what appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding and/or lack of appreciation on the part of these naval officers for the nature of combat of land-based heavy bombers in the Central Pacific. There will be more to say on this issue in the next chapter.

“Meanwhile, on the last day of battle at Midway, 6 June 1942, the commander of the Seventh Air Force, General Tinker, led four LB-30 bombers on a night mission against Wake Island, hoping to catch some of the retiring Japanese fleet there.64 General Tinker’s plane became lost, crashed into the ocean, and no trace was ever found of the plane or the crew.65 Brigadier General Howard C. Davidson served as the interim commander of Seventh Air Force until Major General Willis H. Hale assumed command of the Seventh Air Force on 20 June 1942.66

Ellis’ Notes
37 Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1950), 288. 38
38 Ibid., 288; Brief History of the 7th Air Force, 1940-1945. USAFHRA 168.3041-7, 5; and Forrest Davis, “Hale’s Handful”, The Saturday Evening Post, 18 July 1944. USAFHRA 740.952.2, 0803.
39 Rust, 5 and Brief History of the 7th Air Force, 1940-1945. USAFHRA 168.3041-7, 7.40
40 Rust, 5.
41 Brief History of the 7th Air Force, 1940-1945. USAFHRA 168.3041-7, 7.
42 Memorandum from General Davidson to General Arnold, 13 June 1942. USAFHRA 740.306-5A, 0266-0272; and Kenn C. Rust, Seventh Air Force Story (Temple City, Calif.: Historical Aviation Album, 1979), 5 and 6.
43 Memorandum from General Davidson to General Arnold, 13 June 1942. USAFHRA 740.306-5A, 0267
44 Rust, 5.
45 Memorandum from General Davidson to General Arnold, 13 June 1942. USAFHRA 740.306-5A, 0267-0268.
46 Ibid., 0267.
47 Rust, 5.
48 Rust, 6.
49 Rust, 6.
50 Memorandum from General Davidson to General Arnold, 13 June 1942. USAFHRA 740.306-5A, 0269.
51 Ibid., 0269.
52 Rust, 6.
53 Ibid., 6.
54 E. B. Potter, Nimitz (Annapolis Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 104.
55 Ibid., 104.
56 Ibid., 98, 104.
57 Ibid., 104
58 Ibid., 105.
59 Message from General Marshall to General Arnold, undated. USAFHRA 740.1622, 0562.
60 Ibid., 0562.
61 Thomas B. Buell, The Quiet Warrior, a Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), 215.
62 Time extract, 16 April 1944. USAFHRA 740.293, 1; Buell, 215; and Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume Seven, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944 (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), 211.
63 Buell, 215.
64 Rust, 6.
65 Ibid., 6.
66 Mowbray, 9.”

And

From Wings of Gold, Gerald Astor, (2000), pages 110 - 112:

“That lesson was obscured in the first news about what happen, Nimitz’s first communiqué on the battle attributed successes to the “armed forces of all branches in the Midway area.” However; the Honolulu Advertiser ran a story that said, ‘The Army pilots who actually dropped the eggs reported personally that they made hits on three Japanese carriers, one cruiser, and one other ship that may have been a cruiser of a battleship, one destroyer, and one large transport.’ A mild caveat added that these were ‘incomplete reports.” Navy brass and aviators fumed when newspapers including The New York Times carried headlines such as ARMY FLIERS BLASTED TWO FLEETS OFF MIDWAY. The erroneous claims even fogged the minds of Washington’s military authorities. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimpson, basing his statement on preliminary information, attributed the victory to ‘mainly land based air forces,’ a position reiterated by Adolf A. Berle, the assistant secretary of state. The unhappiness caused a near riot when frustrated Navy veterans of Midway refought the battle at Honolulu’s Moana Hotel with a group of celebrating Army aviators.

“Months later, Jimmy Thach, having completed temporary duty in Hollywood making training films at the Disney and Warner Bros. Studios, was awarded two Navy Crosses and a Distinguished Service Medal in one ceremony. A press conference followed. The talk turned to Midway, and Thach said he was asked, ‘Weren’t the enemy carriers already hit before our carrier pilots got there?’

“Tongue in cheek, Thach replied, ‘If they were, they were repaired. They showed no damage because they were steaming at high speed into the wind.’ At that time Thach remarked on the difficulties of hitting a ship with high-level horizontal bombing, he was accompanied by Noel Gayler, who supported his argument.

“Thach pointed out that the Norden bombsight had originally been a device created for the Navy. ‘I was well qualified to discuss the problem of horizontal bombing because I had corns on my knees from kneeling over a Norden bombsight and undoubtedly had more experience with that kind of bombsight than any of the bombardiers in the B-17s.’ In his remarks Thach stressed, ‘We gave up horizontal bombing and I think the torpedo planes took the bombsight out of the planes because they could do better otherwise.’

“After the Boston newspapers ran an account of Thach’s remarks, the Washington press corps demanded to know why it had not been invited to listen to such newsworthy statements. For their benefit he was given a chance to face the reporters again. Thach reiterated his comment about the enemy fleet not having been damaged and the ease with which a ship captain could avoid a high-altitude, horizontally dropped bomb. ‘They said, a lot of ships have been sunk by the B-17s. I said ‘No, I don’t think so.’ As a matter of fact not one major ship has been sunk by horizontal bombing in this whole war, either in the Pacific or the Atlantic.’
{NB this appears to come from Thach’s oral history on file at the US Naval Institute}

“A newsman persisted, citing the case of Captain Colin P. Kelly who had been awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor {NB either Astor or the newsman in question is in error here, Kelly was awarded a Distinguished Service Cross, not a Medal of Honor} for sinking the Japanese Battleship Hiruna. {NB I believe this is Astor’s error “Haruna” not “Hiruna.” Thach would not have made that mistake.} That had supposedly occurred during the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Thach gracefully ducked by paying tribute to Colin Kelly for his courage and sacrifice, but refused to concede that the Army pilot’s B-17 actually sunk the Hiruna. In fact, that battlewagon had been part of the Japanese fleet attacking Midway. Postwar investigation showed that at best the bomb from Kelly’s Flying Fortress had damaged a large cargo ship.

“For all the efforts of Thach and others, the misplaced credit for the defeat of the Japanese at Midway would persist until after the end of World War II.”

{NB Astor was not one of my favorite writers, especially on naval topics. He had a tendency to get many details wrong – note Hiruna vice Haruna, above – and could make huge, grotesque mistakes in his reporting, but not this time in the overall tone of the above passages}

From the Honolulu Advertiser itself, in its Monday June 15, 1942 edition quoting from a broadcast made on the NBC radio network. See The Battle of Midway Roundtable

"AIR HEROES BROADCAST TO NATION - REVEAL MIDWAY DRAMA

"Radio listeners throughout the nation yesterday heard the dramatic story of the Army Air Force’s part in the Battle of Midway from the voices of officers and men who played heroic roles in the victory, as KGU took a 20 minute share in the nationwide Army Hour program broadcast at 10 a.m. through the facilities of the National Broadcasting Company.

"Several officers and men who saw action in the bomber attacks on units of the Japanese fleet appeared on the program, led by Brig. Gen. Willis Hale, who commanded the Army Air Force in the Midway action.

"Action Summarized
"Following is the script of the program broadcast to the nation, beginning with a summary of the action made by General Hale:

“The Battle of Midway was primarily an air operation,” General Hale began. “From the time the enemy was first sighted by air reconnaissance until he turned and fled three days later, our combined Army, Navy, and Marine fliers constantly pounded him from the skies, scoring hit after hit. In this time of only about 72 hours, we sank three or four of Japan’s best carriers. We hit a couple of their battleships before they had even fired a broadside. From the air we sank two Jap cruisers, as well as a number of destroyers and troop transports sunk or damaged,” General Hale said.

“The Battle of Midway definitely was a major defeat for the Japanese Navy. It is not the final chapter in the Allied struggle in the Pacific, but it was a chapter written the way Americans wanted it written.

"First Blow a Surprise
“The first blow was in the form of a surprise, as far as the Japs were concerned. Immediately upon hearing from a Navy patrol plane, our Flying Fortresses, led by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Sweeney, Jr., left Midway to go after the Jap fleet. This was on the afternoon of June third. Three hours later our B-17 Flying Fortresses located and bombed an enemy unit consisting of ships of the line which were convoying several transports.

“There were no carriers in this particular force. This was apparently the invasion fleet that was planning to come right on up to Midway to subdue or defenders and force a beach landing. In this first contact with the enemy, the B-17s unloaded bombs on a battleship, two cruisers, and a big transport. No more attacks were made that day. That was Wednesday.”

"Attack at Dawn
“Sweeney’s flight and had orders to attack some battleships. When we were 150 miles out, the order came to change our course and go after a more important target which had been sighted. It was a task force that included at least four carriers and plenty of supporting ships.

"Went After Carriers
“Our bombers picked up speed, and went in to get on the target. We were going after the carriers. They were in the middle of this fleet of almost thirty fighting ships. It was a sight we’d all been waiting for since December 7th-to get a chance at ‘em. We had to check our instruments-make sure we were all set. We up pretty high-about 20,000 feet, and using our oxygen masks.

“From where we were flying, it was quite a picture. Jap carriers were squirming around pretty fast, in a violent maneuver attempting to hide under clouds and to avoid our bombs. There were four of them at least, generally running abreast. I picked out one carrier, and we got direct hits on him. My trailing plane picked up his target-another carrier-and planted hits on him too. We then headed back to Midway, but the Japs were attacking the island, so we had to stay up for the all clear signal. We landed just before noon.”

“What about your second run on Thursday afternoon?” General Hale asked.

"Ran Curtain of Fire
“After we gassed up the planes, and loaded bombs, we went out after the carriers again. We ran into a curtain of anti-aircraft fire from heavy cruisers. It was dark when we got back to Midway, and we went right to work on the planes. And by the way-it’s hard enough by day to find that tiny dot called Midway, but at night, it’s like finding a needle in a haystack. However, our navigator did the trick. There was a lot of shrapnel on the runways, so we had to job fixing flat tires, along with the servicing jobs.”

“Then you and the other units made two more attacks the following day, Colonel Allen, four in all, the general asked.

“Yes, sir. We took off before dawn, Friday, with orders to attack eight cruisers, reported to be to the west, rather close in. but instead of being close in, they had withdrawn during the night. Our job was then to go after two Jap battleships which were damaged the day before. We found them, and our flight of four planes divided up the job. Two of us went for one ship, and two for the other. I think we scored at least two hits. Smoke began to pour out of the stern of one of the battleships as we left.

"Last Attack
“Our last attack was in the afternoon, after refueling at Midway. We located a cruiser, which we believed to be a decoy for the task force, so we went on about 75 miles to try to find the main body of the fleet. Unable to locate it, we returned to the cruiser and landed a direct hit on him, and came back to Midway.”

“Brooke, you ought to know what the B-17s will do by now,” General Hale said. “What do you think of them?”

"Well, sir, those fortresses are the finest ships I’ve every flown, and I think the Japs know what I mean.”

“Yes,” Colonel Brooke Allen.

“And you American workmen who built our planes and who will keep on building them can share with the men who flay them, the victory that is ours at Midway,” General Hale continued. “Those great bombers will do the job that has to be done, if we are to live in peace again. All we ask is that you keep on building them, and we’ll keep ‘em flying.

"Army History Made
“Army Air Force history was made in more ways than one in the battle of Midway. For the first time in history, an Army airplane used a torpedo in attacking enemy ships. And we sent four Army medium bombers out to launch torpedoes. These are two motored jobs. It was actually the first time that any of our Army fliers had ever dropped in hasted or anger. Even in practice they didn’t release their loads. But when the chips were down, when the opportunity came, they did a marvelous job. Three of the four planes scored hits-and that’s a good batting average for any man’s Army.

“The leader of the medium bomber flight was 26 year old Captain James F. Collins Junior, of Meridian, Mississippi. Captain Collin’s mission was a beautiful example of the cooperation among the services.

“You see, Collins was ordered to Hawaii from an Army field in the Midwest. Then he was ordered to Midway where he was under orders of the Marine command. His participation in the Midway battle was undoubtedly the most dramatic operation of our entire engagement. It typifies the courage and spirit of the Army Air Force under fire. So let’s hear his story.”

“What time were you asked to stand by for action at Midway, Captain Collins?” the announcer asked.

“At six o’clock on the morning of June 4th, we had definite orders that our four planes were going to be used in the battle, and to warm up our engines.”

“When you got in the air, could you see any Jap ships?”

"Sighted Fleet
“We were off the field by 6:25 and passed some Jap bombers as they were coming in, high overhead. One fighter was shot down. That was the first one any of us had ever seen. He exploded right over head. At 7 o’clock we sighted the Jap fleet, and six of our single motored navy torpedo planes going in for the attack with us. At 7:15, we were right in the middle of the Japs.”

“What was the first thought that came to mind when you saw all those Jap ships, Captain?”

“We had only one thing in mind, and that was to pick out the target. A carrier. We had to maneuver among several vessels-cruisers and battleships-15 or 18 ships in all, which formed a protective ring around the Jap carriers. These ships were throwing antiaircraft fire in a tight crisscross pattern while the Jap carrier target was all lit up like a neon sign, from the fire from the gun muzzles around the deck. The carriers fire right at you, while ships put up a curtain of fire. While we were passing through all this, we met the first bunch of Jap Zero fighters.”

“How many?” the announcer asked.

“It was a frontal attack-six abreast,” said Captain Collins. “We were at about a thousand feet at the time, and as they commenced to fire, we dove to 200 feet and passed under the fire. It was at this point I lost track of my number 2 and 3 wing men. Then as the antiaircraft commenced to pick us up at 600, we went down stairs again. We could see the water churning under and around us from the hail of gunfire.”

“It was sort of a game of hide and seek, eh?”

"Hit Carrier
“Yes, each fellow trying to outguess the next. So we changed our course to the right and hit the carrier about 20 degrees off her bow. She was endeavoring to turn toward us so we’d have a narrower target.”

“I take it she was outmaneuvered,” the announcer said.

“Yes, we hit her. We released from less than a thousand yards. I could see our number four ship piloted by Lieutenant Muri, slightly under us and to our left, making his attack. His navigator said that our torpedo hit the water cleanly, and when last seen was making a true run for the carrier. The speed of the plane had to be just so, otherwise the torpedo would be effective. So when the right speed had been determined, we let the carrier have the fish.

“Captain Collins,” the announcer asked, “what were the Jap fliers doing while you were maneuvering for the attack?”

“Well, they were on our tail all the time,” the captain answered, “until we got half way back to our Midway base. Our plane received a good many hits. My tail gunner had some plastic glass in his face caused by a shell explosion. Unfortunately, the pilots get most of the credit in an operation such as this, and the crew does all the work. If it hadn’t been for the three gunners and navigator we wouldn’t have gotten there and back. Now you take Sergeant Mohon of Crystal Springs, Mississippi, my nose gunner who did a neat piece of work when we came into the carrier for the kill. Sergeant, spare me a minute here, and give us a report on what was going on at your nose position.”

“Well, Captain,” said Sergeant Mohon, there isn’t much for me to say. All I did was to strafe gun positions on the Jap carrier in order to disturb their aim.”

"Saw Men Running
“And disturb their aim you did,” Captain Collins agreed. “As we got closer and passed across the carrier deck, we could see men running around on the deck dodging Sergeant Mohon’s fire. Then, there’s Lieut. Thomas Weems, my navigator. He probably had the TOUGHEST assignment of all. The Japs blew a lot of our instruments and it was his job to figure out which way was home from out there in the middle of the Pacific. My Co-pilot, Lieut. Colin Villines from Chicago, who is just 22, is standing right along side me here at the mike in case I have a crack-up. Villines, let’s hear what your voice sounds like on the gadget.”

“When I take to the air, Collins, I’d rather have a propeller and a pair of wings attached,” Lieutenant Villines said. “But I’ve been thinking, as long as you’re handing out bouquets, you’ve got to hand some to the Marines. We got to know the Marines pretty well at Midway. The boys in the PBY’s, the navy and Marine patrol boats were out 12 hours a day. In fact the cooperation between all the services was tops. Each type of plane had a special job to do.”

“It’s funny what comes to mind when you’re under tension and up to your neck in Japs,” Captain Collins remarked. “When we went through that hail of Ack Ack and fighter fire going in after the Jap carrier, Villines here shouted out, “If my mama could only see me now!”

“What did Captain Collins say through all this, Villines?” asked the announcer.

“Well, after we GOT the Jap carrier, he said HOPEFULLY, “Now, maybe we’ll get a day off.” There were three other men in the tail, Sergeant Raymond White of Altoona, Pennsylvania, Sgt. Jack Dunn of Chicago, and Corporal John Joyce of Taylor, Pennsylvania. The first thing Sergeant White could say when we got back to Midway was, ‘Boy, how I wish I had a beer’.”

“Say, Captain Collins, getting back to the Japs, how many Zeros did your crew tally?” the announcer asked.

"Gunners Modest
“I asked the gunners and they were pretty modest about it. They said three or four. Those Jap fliers were pretty good, wouldn’t you say, Villines?”

“Yes, I’d say so. But they’re human, in the sense that they want to live to fight another day. They stayed clear of our runs as much as possible.”

“How long were you in the air on this highly successful operation, Captain Collins?”

“About three hours. The planes took quite a beating by Jap gunfire. When we came into Midway to land, we found that the hydraulic system was wrecked. You know, our planes have a tricycle landing gear. We got the main gear down alright, but the front gear wouldn’t budge. Consequently we nosed over. Then right after we came in a fighter landed with just one wheel.”

"The number four plane in Captain Collin’s carrier mission was the only other plane of the four medium bombers to return to its base, an announcer explained. It also planted a fish on that carrier. This plane was piloted by Lieutenant J. P. Muri of Riverside, California, and Lieutenant Pren Moore of El Centro, California.

“Lieutenant Moore,” he asked, “tell us what happened as your plane went in to attack the carrier in formation with Captain Collins.”

"Gunner Nicked
“Just as we were going in for the attack, the belly gunner, Corporal Nello, got a bullet nick on his forehead, above the left eye. He ran up forward to tell us that the other two gunners were hit, and that the ship was on fire. He wanted me to go back and help him move the tail gunner, Private Early Ashley, who was badly hurt. He was pinned behind his gun."

“How about Ashley?”

“He was so badly wounded that he couldn’t move from his gun, which was jammed. I couldn’t move him, so I propped him up as best I could. He was suffering intensely, but was conscious, and even helped me load the gun. I gave him some sulfanilamide tablets to stop infection and finally got the gun firing again and went to work on the Jap Zero fighters. Our turret gunner, Sergeant John Gojee, was hit around the face, but he was able to carry on. Our plane was pretty badly shot up, too. The top edges of the wings looked like somebody had gone over them with a meat chopper. Then the gas tanks were shot up. But thanks to the bullet proofing and expert maneuvering of Lieut. Mori, we got back to Midway, even though our plane-old Susie Q, we call her-had more’n 500 bullet holes in her.

“By the way, that landing that Captain Collins made was one of the prettiest and neatest pieces of business I’ve ever seen. Oh, just a few moments ago, General Hale, we heard from Private Ashley from a base hospital on Oahu and he says he’s mighty anxious to get in the air again.”

"General Hale then concluded, “Now these are a few of the men who took part in the attack on the Japanese warships and transports which were steaming toward Midway and Hawaii. The Air Force is proud of all the men who took part in the battle. The way these men handled their planes and fought against the enemy is why millions of our people have had nights of anxiety turned into nights of rest and confidence. At this time it is fitting that we should hear from General Delos C. Emmons, Commanding General of all Army units in the Hawaiian Department.”

And lastly, my father was XO of VF-3 at the Battle of Midway and remembered well, and related to me, his, and everyone else’s dismay upon their return to Pearl Harbor on, or about, 18 June to find the USAAF had apparently won the war in their absence.

While the USAAC bombers and their crews performed their missions with élan and valor, in spite of publicized claims, not a single one of the bombs or torpedoes they dropped between 3 June and 6 June 1942 struck a single Japanese ship in the Battle of Midway.

Rich

 

So, from what I've read today re-enforces what I've read before. The USAAF participated in the battle, but did not win it, much less score any hits. It's just the manipulation of the press that I had no prior knowledge of, and after reading this, I still think that it was an absurd claim by any stretch of the imagination.

 

Exactly, but nonetheless the AACs claims in the national press in the days immediately after the battle, and lingering long years after, left the impression that they did all the work while the Navy was somewhat less involved. ARMY FLIERS BLASTED TWO FLEETS OFF MIDWAY - BIG BOMBERS WON is pretty specific.

Rich

 

Mr. Leonard,
sorry to post something unrelated. I have been trying to get in touch with you concerning a post that you did a couple of weeks ago. You posted excerpts from an unpublished history of the 2nd BN 13th Infantry. My grandfather was in Fox Company and I am really really interested in reading more from the book. Are you by chance related to Lt. Col. Theodore Leonard? I am very excited to speak with you. Sorry again to post something unrelated. I am just dying to see more of this book!!
-Geoff

 

Thanks for the info concerning the media circus surrounding who did and did not do what they said they did during the Battle of Midway. It's a shame that the USAAF would do something like that.

Well at least it's good to know that the media was just as pitiful back then as they are now. "Never let the truth get in the way of a good story."

 

I saw that, too ,and I'm not sure just how Mrazek got there. Ring was USNA 1923 and retired a Vice Admiral on 1 Nov 1955 after about 32 and a half years commissioned service. My suspicion, just based on service years, was that the promotion to Vice Admiral was a tombstone promotion. He had been awarded a Navy Cross, so he was eligible. At any rate, his Midway performance did not keep him from flag rank.

Rich

 

LOL, "the more it changes the more it stays the same."

See, I can write a short answer.

Rich

 

PM'd

 

Ring definitely doesn't come off very well in Mrazek's book. The anecdote about him leading the dive-bomb attack on the Japanese cruiser and his men finding out after the mission that he didn't know how to release his bomb is not very complimentary of his aviation leadership abilities. I would be interested in seeing something written on his performance throughout the rest of WWII.

 

Wow, this is the first I've heard of the USAAC involvment in the battle of Midway. I had always assumed that this was soley a NAVY victory.