Japan decides against Midway and invades Australia instead

I apologize, it wasn't my intent to ignore. In fact I thought I had mentioned it but on going back and reviewing my posts I saw that I hadn't. Meant to but somewhere between thinking it and typing it I must have gotten sidetracked.
I thought that what was left of the British Far East Fleet retired to the coast of Africa when the Japanese attacked Ceylon. It was reduced to a very small force and except for the Invasion of Madagascar, the major naval units spent their time in the Mediterranean until they started returning to the Indian Ocean in 1944. I did not think that Britain would have sufficient assets to augment it sooner, because they will need to make up for the U.S. vessels redirected to the Pacific.
I'd be interested in knowing more about their assets, and how you think they would have or should have been employed.

 

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Let it be noted that this reference to Glenn239 is your opinion. I have not made any comments on Glenn239's posts or opinions, pro or con, unless I specifically replied to him. I only stated, "I have no control over what parameters Glenn239 uses to frame his discussion..." in explaining that I was using the original time frame as proposed by T.A. Gardner.

I wrote:

Devilsadvocate responded:

The Yorktown did rush back to Pearl Harbor. After she was damaged she retired towards Noumea. The original purpose of the battle was to stop the Japanese Port Moresby Invasion and to protect the Australian supply line. While both sides retired from the immediate vicinity of the battle on 08May the Japanese maintained a presence until the 11th. "both sides had retired from the immediate battle area. The Japanese sent Zuikaku back for a few days, even though her aircraft complement was badly depleted, but they had already called off their Port Moresby amphibious operation and withdrew the carrier on May 11th."1
Enterprise and Hornet arrived in Noumea this day also, to provide a naval air defensive force. Yorktown withdrew on this date, as soon as reasonably possible. While a ship can be run at flank speed for short periods, any extended movement (like 3600 miles) is done at cruising speed. This is because extended high speed runs cause damage to the ship and it's machinery. Only if the potential reward greatly outweighs the damage that will be caused by not doing so will a ship do this. She could have made this run to Pearl at 25 knots as you suggest. Her hull damaged by near misses and shored with timbers would probably have given way, but lets not mess with those pesky realities. If she didn't sink, then she'd have to be drydocked for an extended period for overhaul. Since Nimitz was needed her quickly and badly, not likely. You need to look at these issues from a military perspective. You have to consider all operational and tactical factors before speculating what could/should have occurred. It should also be noted that Nimitz rushed Halsey, with the Enterprise and Hornet, to Coral Sea, hoping to reinforce Lexington and Yorktown, for the confrontation with the Japanese. They left Pearl on 30Arpril and arrived on 11May in Noumea. 11 or 12 days sailing time(depending on their actual hours of departure and arrival), for undamaged ships. 16 days is not an unreasonable sailing time for a damaged ship to make the trip.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

USMCPrice wrote:

I have previously stated that the U.S. would have had four carriers by 12 or 13 June. If that's what you're saying, then we agree. If you're stating that it could have happened earlier, then the only way it could have happened is if the U.S. used one carrier without her battle damage repaired and the other without stores, planes and munitions.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

She had actually been sent to Bremerton for repair of torpedo damage. It was decided to simultaneously upgrade her AA fit. She was finished on 22May and sailed for San Diego arriving on 25 May. She lacked stores, munitions, avgas, aircraft and aircrews. (Her original squadrons were being loaded on Yorktown at Pearl Harbor for the Midway fight)
She took these on in San Diego. On the 26th of May she was ordered to PH to augment Nimitz's carrier force but couldn't leave until 1June when these preparations were completed and she had gathered an escort. So you might shave one day off her arrival time, no more is reasonably possible.

Devilsadvocate wrote:

Now I haven't addressed the Ranger because she was of limited utility. As for Wasp, how is your assertion of ordering her to the pacific in early May any different than my

or

BTW, if we do use my option of skipping the Norfolk repair/overhaul period for the Wasp, she would only be available for a limited period before the delayed repairs would have to be undertaken.

1-http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/coralsea/cs-5.htm

 

No, Yorktown did not "rush" anywhere. Shokaku immediately retired on 8 May and left for Kure, a distance of 3370 nm. She arrived in Kure on 17 May. Yorktown stayed around the Coral Sea until 11 May. She then steamed to Pearl Harbor, arriving on 27 May. It is 3625 nm from Noumea to Pearl Harbor;at 18 Knots that is just under nine days steaming; Yorktown spent 16 days between Noumea and Pearl Harbor. That is, by any measure, a rather slow trip. Yorktown was capable of 33.6 knots; her damage at Coral Sea did not affect her propulsion plant nor her hull so she was quite capable of steaming at 30+ knots for extended periods of time. Had the Yorktown "rushed" to Pearl harbor, as the Shokaku did to Kure, she could have arrived at Pearl Harbor on 14 May, allowing two weeks for repairs before the date on which she historically returned to Oahu.

Which means the USN still considered her battleworthy and capable of flight operations, otherwise she would have retired immediately, as the Shokaku did.

The propulsion plants of combatant ships are designed and built to be operated at high speeds for extended periods of time. It does not cause damage to do so, and, in fact, carriers tend to operate in the higher speed ranges as a matter of routine because operating aircraft safely requires it. Yorktown's structural hull integrity had not been impaired (if it had, she would not have remained at Coral Sea for three days after the battle) and she could have safely operated at top speed; even at a slower speed of say, 25 knots, Yorktown could easily arrived at Pearl Harbor on 15 May had she retired on 9 May. I'd like to have a source for your assertion that Yorktown's hull was damaged to the point that she had to reduce speed. Incidentally, combatant ships operate at cruising speed primarily to save fuel and make frequent refueling (especially of destroyers less of a burden).

Nimitz knew Enterprise and Hornet wouldn't be able to get to the Coaral Sea in time to have any influence on the battle; he sent them there to act as a backup force in case a disaster occurred for the US carrier forces. It's true that a normal passage for a combatant ship, from Coral Sea to Pearl Harbor, or vice versa. is around 11-12 days, but that is at cruising speed. In any case, Yorktown took a full 16 days for the passage, so it was by no means in a hurry.

If you stick to the historical time line that is true; the USN could have had four carriers in the area by early June. But that would be an unlikely scenario. Given the performance of US intelligence at Midway, it has to be assumed that a similar performance would produce advanced notice of the Darwin invasion. With that in hand, both Nimitz and MacArthur would be expediting every process that would affect the availability of US forces. The AA refit of Saratoga, for example, would be accelerated, or shortened as necessary, to get her finished, reprovisioned, her air group replenished, in time to be in the South Pacific before the invasion. The recall of the Wasp and Ranger from the Atlantic could similarly be timed. So it would be possible for he USN to deploy as many as five or sic CV's in the South Pacific in time to oppose the Darwin invasion. You can't change the historical factors for one side only and expect to have any semblance of a logical A-H.

Not true. If Saratoga was a critical ship, she could have been reprovisioned at Bremerton, and her air group flown up to Seattle, and then flown aboard as she left for the Pearl, saving at least three days right there. Her escort could have been formed from destroyers (DesDiv 82) belonging to the 13th. Naval District (Seattle), thus, she would have arrived in time to reinforce Spruance at the Battle of Midway.

Who says Ranger was of "limited utility"? Ranger operated 86 aircraft could do 29.25 knots, and displaced 14,576 tons std. displ. By comparison, Wasp operated 74 aircraft, could do 30 knots, and displaced 14,700 tons std. displ. Ranger had no stowage for torpedoes (although it could be improvised) nor did Wasp initially, but had a larger hangar than either Lexington or Saratoga, and was entirely capable of operating the latest USN planes. At the very least, Ranger was the equal of the latest British carriers in aircraft capacity and offensive power, and would have proven useful in many roles in the Pacific.

The Wasp could have operated for months in the Pacific without undergoing her scheduled refit/overhaul period. After all, the Japanese carriers had done so for almost six months. The Akagi, Hiryu, and Soryu never did get their refit/overhaul period before they were sunk at Midway

 

The scenario is that Coral Sea has been fought but Midway will not be. Lexington has been sunk and the damaged IJN’s 5th CAR DIV will again become ready for action by late July 1942. Hiyo commissions on the 31st of July, attaining operational capability perhaps a month later. .

Carrier balance going into August 1942 will be eight IJN fleet carriers (Kaga (72), Akagi (63), Hiryu (63), Soryu (63), Shokaku (72), Zuikaku (72), Hiyo (54), Junyo (54) = 513 aircraft, plus Ryujo (36) and Zuiho (28), for a grand total of about 577 aircraft (authorized). US carriers are Enterprise, Hornet, Yorktown, Wasp, Saratoga of about 400 aircraft.

Because the Royal Navy had just got its teeth kicked in by Kido Butai in the Indian Ocean Raid. If the RN retreated in that circumstance, it surely wasn’t dumb enough to come over to Timor and offer battle against the Japanese there.

 

The pattern of Malaya and Luzon says the IJA would seize airbases at Darwin on the first day, with IJA air units ferried in from Timor or elsewhere for not later than the second day. Once IJA fighters are ashore in strength, the IJN is clear. IJN carriers might be committed for about two weeks, and be available for a new operation in July 1942.

In August 1942, Allied LBA defences on the Hawaii-Australia route were Swiss cheese in against Kido Butai’s striking power. It was only American carriers that gave these outposts strength to defend themselves.

Note that at Midway, four IJN carriers were well on their way to annihilating the very strong Midway air forces, if not for the intervention of Fletcher’s carrier forces. If four IJN carriers could dismember a power American base of 120 aircraft, it would make short work of 40 aircraft or 60 on Samoa.

 

T.A. Gardner set the timeframe for the Darwin invasion as "late May early June ". So what does the IJN order of battle in late July, 1942, have to do with anything? Or are you arbitrarily changing the time period to suit yourself?

The IJN never had 8 fleet carriers; Hiyo and Junyo were converted auxiliary carriers that did not operate with the Combined fleet until Midway. if either Hiyo or Junyo are included with Kido Butai, the maxmum fleet speed would be about 23 knots.

In early June, 1942, the IJN carrier lineup would be Akagi (63 aircraft), Kaga (72 aircraft), Hiryu (63 aircraft), Soryu (63 aircraft), Junyo (48 aircraft), Ryujo (38 aircraft), and Zuiho (30 aircraft). The total aircraft would be about 377 aircraft

Also you forgot about the Ranger. If the US carriers are operating with full air groups, their total combained aircraft would be more like 485 aircraft.

If the Japanese are planning a major invasion for the May/June time frame, it's unlikely that the Indian Ocean raid would be executed. It's more likely that the IJN carriers will spend April, 1942 refitting, replenishing air groups, and training. The RN may not "offer battle" on it's own, but it would be likely to send some ships to "show the flag" to the Australians, who at this time are beginning to feel abandoned by everyone but the Americans.

 

Luzon and Malaya were planned pre-war, Darwin was not. As H. P. Willmott points out in "Empires In The Balance", not a single operation planned after the beginning of the war was successful for the Japanese. There were huge gaps in their intelligence systems and the staff work after the beginning of the war rapidly deteriorated.

And the difference between Luzon, Malaya, and Darwin is that there were no Allied air forces to strike at advanced Japanese air bases with sustained bombing in Malaya and on Luzon; at Darwin there would be In fact the Allies would hit back on day one with escorted bomber strikes. These would suppress the effectiveness of any Japanese air bases in the vicinity of Darwin. The Japanese could only provide air cover from Timor or from carriers off shore.

Therefore, it's reasonable to assume that the Japanese carriers would be committed to sustained air operations for at least two to three weeks, if they can even manage even that (they never did historically). Their air groups would be severely depleted at the end of that commitment; unlike the American carriers, they would have to return to Japan to train new air groups, a lengthy and time consuming process. The Japanese carriers, assuming no losses, might be available by the end of August for further operations.

It matters not of what the American defenses on the sea route between Hawaii and the South Pacific, were made; they could have been composed of corrugated chicken fat for that matter. The IJN carriers were no more capable of attacking them than the US Pacific Fleet was of "rampaging" through the South China Sea in 1942. April had taught Yamamoto a stern lesson; to raid far into a remote region (in this case, the Indian Ocean), opened up the Home islands to unopposed attack. The same went for the South Pacific Islands, even more distant from the Home islands than the Indian Ocean.

Not only was it nearly impossible for the Japanese to raid far into the South Pacific, but to capture any of the islands there would only set up an impossible logistical situation. Fiji for example, is 3,884 nm from Tokyo; to support a major air base on Fiji would demand shipping far beyond Japan's ability to provide.

As I pointed out once before, the IJN carriers shared a common failing with the American carriers; they can't be in two places at once. If they are west of Australia, supporting an invasion of Darwin, they can't be 2,000 miles east of Australia attacking a bunch of remote South Pacific outposts. It was really futile for the Japanese to think they could "cut" the US sea routes to Australia, a quick look at the map demonstrates they might bend those routes but they couldn't break them. Nimitz knew that and so did Yamamoto .

 

August is about the earliest that a coherent form of response from the Allies will be forthcoming, assuming an invasion of Darwin in June 1942.

The Midway Operation did not prevent the Indian Ocean Raid, so there is no reason to suppose another op in its place that is even less imposing upon the IJN would prevent the Indian Ocean Raid.

You can say that a million times if you wish. Your time projections on an invasion of Darwin are inflated so they are ignored; the IJN will be available for its next op by July.

Yes, forget about the Ranger.

 

That’s nice. If the IJA invades Darwin, the leading units will capture airfields on the first day and IJA air units will be operating from them by D+1.

As just stated, Nagumo was well on his way to tearing Midway’s strong defenses to shreds, if not for Fletcher. Since all the bases in the South Pacific that summer were weaker than Midway’s, a Japanese force consisting of up to eight fleet carriers of 577 aircraft (by August 1942) would be capable of rampaging through the entire area, destroying the infrastructure supporting any advanced USMC invasion force. The only force capable of parrying such a blow would be the US carriers. But if Nimitz places his carriers to defend a Guadalcanal offensive, he accepts a head-on fleet battle on Yamamoto’s terms without a chance of surprise.

Obviously, the IJN does not have to occupy any bases in order to destroy the logistical train supporting an invasion of Guadalcanal. All they have to do is sail around Guadalcanal and smash the supporting bases.

 

Hmmm, you certainly have strong ideas, Glenn239. And your posts have generated equally strong and well explained replies.

You say Japanese aircraft will be operating on captured airstrips around Darwin from D+1. Okay, I'll grant that point but how many of those planes would still be flying after sustained combat operations?
Replacement planes can be ferried by air along with their pilots but not the fuel needed to keep those planes flying.
The Japanese would have to devote a lot of their shipping assets to keep their forces supplied. Naturally, they would suffer losses. And the Allies would jump at the chance to hit Japanese ships in a known transit corridor.
And it also takes fuel to ship fuel. And Japan didn't have an inexhaustible supply. Japan did capture the East Indies but historically, the Japanese weren't able to exploit their captured jewel properly. Another point, the Japanese had a limited number of tankers and the Allies were making these ships a priority target. So, even if as you say the Japanese had aircraft flying from D+1, most of whatever number of aircraft remains after weeks of sustained combat would be grounded for lack of fuel.

Another thing: with the Japanese forces, both naval and land, firmly identified at fixed locations, such a situation would allow the Allies to concentrate the rest of their forces to hit the Japanese defensive belt in other areas. Remember, the Japanese had the advantage early on because they had mobility. The Allies didn't know where the Japanese would hit next in the early months of the war. But once the Allies know the approximate location of strong Japanese forces, the Allies could "dance" around them and hit the Japanese weak spots.

And finally, all the Japanese have to do is sail around after smashing the islands the US used for its logistical train? Hmmmm.
This means that the Japanese would have to keep ships on constant station there to prevent the US from reestablishing the logistical bases. Ships from that station will be in transit for their home port while those that have reached their home port would be undergoing maintanance. Also there would also be ships already in transit to relieve those ships current on station.
The Japanese support and logistical infrastracture, at least in my opinion, can only sustain this type of operation for a limited time.
I'll keep it simple for you: The answer is fuel. The more ships at sea, the more fuel is consumed.
You have good ideas but they would even be better if you can tailor fit them to logistical reality.
It would be better for the Japanese to consolidate what they have won first before thinking of anymore expansions if they didn't mount the Midway operation. This would probably stretch the Pacific conflict by several more months, maybe even by a year. Otherwise, it's really a logistical nightmare for Japanese supply officers to keep up with the voracious appetite of combat operations.
Keep posting those ideas, Glenn239. The replies are, more often than not, quite educational. I learned that when I was a noob here.

 

Gosh, that's an awful positive statement. It assumes everything will go perfectly according to the supposed Japanese plan. Darwin, and it's airbases will be under air attack as soon as the Japanese are able to land, if they are able to land. The port, with a single small wharf, will have been destroyed by the retreating Allies. Planes can be flown in maybe from Timor, but as Falcon Jun points out, what about gas, ordnance spare parts, and ground crew? They have to be brought in by ship and that won't be so easy. Especially since that single small port, with minimal facilities has to support the supply requirements of not only the aircraft, but also the needs of 2+ Japanese divisions, and do it while under air attack.

You are in a fantasy world; Japan never had eight fleet carriers. Six was the maximum number of Japanese fleet carriers that were ever able to operate together. I've posted this information repeatedly, and cited an authority to support it; your failure to correct your information makes you look ignorant.

Nagumo was in the process of destroying Midway's air defenses, but he had not completely succeeded. If he had, the Japanese were still a long way from completely neutralizing Midway's defenses. Nagumo found out he couldn't linger off Midway and aircraft can be quickly replaced. But that really isn't the question, the question is how can the Japanese have four or five fleet carriers supporting the Darwin invasion for a month or two, and simultaneously deploy those same carriers to attack any Us forces near Guadalcanal or Fiji, or Noumea, or New Zealand, or anywhere else? I wasn't aware the Japanese had developed the capability of their carriers to be in two places at once?

Yes, a feat they never seemed to be aware of. It would have been so easy for the Japanese to call a time out at Darwin, dash over to New Caledonia or Fiji, or Samoa, or New Zealand, launch massive air attacks completely destroying the infrastructure on those islands, like they did at Pearl Harbor and Ceylon, then simply nip back before anyone realizes they are gone. Funny how the Japanese never seemed to grasp the possibilities there; not nearly as smart as you are, I suppose.

 

I would think that a discussion on IJN carrier logistics getting a little too detailed. But if you want one, then post your logistics model and we can discuss it.

Don’t tell me, let me guess. You don’t have a logistics model, right?

 

It assumes the original scenario. If Darwin is too heavily defended then the premise of a low cost diversionary invasion is not possible. If Darwin is, as historically, poorly defended, then an invasion of the size being contemplated captures the port and fields quite quickly.

With Midway, it was mid May 1942 before the US identified Midway as the target. Darwin is too far from anywhere for a 2 or 3 week ‘heads up’ to be of much assistance.

If Nagumo with four carriers and about 220 aircraft was well into the process of destroying the aerial assets of a base with about 120 aircraft, then what assumption can there be other than that a base with say, 60 aircraft would be quickly knocked out by an attacking force of up to eight fleet carriers 577 aircraft?

The original IJN plan for 5th Car Div in the Moresby offensive called for 5th Carrier to conduct air raids on bases all over the Coral Sea in support of the invasion force. After losing four carriers at Midway, the IJN no longer contemplated such tactics.

 

LOL! Perhaps, but I can't see the IJN telling the IJA, "Go ahead and invade Darwin in early June; our ships will show up in a couple of months to help out. Don't worry about the Americans, they can't possibly get their act together before August.

In reality, the only reason you're using an August date is because the Japanese numbers look much better by then. In reality, the IJN would have to be there from Day One or the invasion isn't going to happen. The Allies would start moving their troops, ships, and planes into position as soon as their intelligence began pointing to northern Australia as a potential battle ground. If Midway is any guide, that would be about late April or early May. By June, there will be an entire reinforced division of Allied troops in, or near, Darwin, plus numerous air units on the nearby bases.

Less imposing?? The Japanese committed the major portion of the Combined Fleet to the attack on Midway, despite the fact that the target was two tiny islands in the middle of nowhere. For a 2+ division invasion of a Port that they must expect to be heavily defended, they will commit the entire Combined Fleet; the IJA will demand it. That means either the Indian Ocean raid gets cut or the Port Moresby operation is scrubbed; the IJN can't support a major operation each month for long.

My time projections are inflated? I'm using the original scenario time frame. How can the IJN be ready for it's next operation by July when you don't even have them showing up at Darwin until August? You can't have it both ways, just as the Japanese carriers can't be in two places at once. If the Darwin invasion takes place in early June, the IJN will have to be committed until the Japanese achieve air superiority with land-based planes. You haven't presented a compelling argument that that will ever happen, let alone before July. Historically, the Japanese never did achieve air superiority over Northern Australia or New Guinea with land-based planes.

 

Actually, the Australian codebreakers identified Midway as the target early in May, but King didn't believe them because of advice he got from his own codebreakers in Washington. Nimitz began reinforcing Midway in mid-May and managed to do quite well. The Australians would have been able to start reinforcing Darwin at least two weeks before any invasion. They had, already in Australia, several Australian divisions to draw from, plus two American divisions with artillery, support and service units, not to mention 80,000 trained militia troops. In two weeks, at least 150 American fighters and 50 modern American bombers plus RAAF aircraft could have been deployed to the forward airfields around Darwin. Two weeks would be enough time to get the combat elements of these units into position and dug in around Darwin

If the Allies have only two weeks notice, the Japanese, especially if they fail to notice the Allied buildup around Darwin, could be in for a very bloody and nasty surprise.

Well, the assumption would be that the Japanese don't have eight fleet carriers and never did, that they can't be attacking a base defended by 60 Allied planes at the same time they are committed to supporting an invasion of Darwin, therefore the Allies don't have to worry about their other positions thousands of miles to the East. Even the mighty Kido Butai, all six carriers worth, never figured out how to be in two places at once.

After losing the services of 5th. Carrier Div. in the Coral Sea, it was no longer possible, anyway whether they contemplated it or not.

 

Falcon Jun – your logistics model please. After a whopper of a post like that, don’t be telling me that you have no model upon which you arrived at your very strongly worded conclusions

 

Because of Watchtower.

If we go with the carrier balance in early June 1942 we have Enterprise, Hornet and Saratoga (240 a/c), with Yorktown available in the South Pacific by July 1st vs. Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Junyo, Ryujo, Zuiho (411 a/c) with Zuikaku and Shokaku following by early July and Hiyo following in August.

The timeframe has the invasion of Darwin in late May or early June. The Allies are able to react strategically by August.

Sorry, I was under the assumption that Darwin was not connected by rail to the south. Your saying there was a rail connection to Darwin?

What would that leave in terms of US aircraft elsewhere, and how long to get their support units to Darwin?

Midway removed the possibility of IJN carrier raids into the Coral Sea and SPO.

 

No, if US intelligence picks up the hints that Japan is getting ready for a major invasion, as would be likely, the US could have both the Ranger and the Wasp in Australian waters before the beginning of June, so the US line up could be Enterprise, Yorktown (she could be dry docked in Sydney), Hornet, Saratoga, Wasp, Ranger, for a total of 474 aircraft. Long Island could also be moved to the Pacific in May, but would probably be used to ferry fighter aircraft between Hawaii and Australia.

The Japanese carrier line up in early June would be Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuiho, Ryujo, and Junyo, for a total of 379 aircraft. Shokaku, and Zuikaku were being repaired and reconstituting their air groups until near the end of July, so they don't become available until around the first of August and then only with fairly green air crews. Junyo wasn't commissioned until 3 May, 1942, so if she is included, it is only with the provision that her air group is as green as grass, as is her crew. Hiyo was not commissioned until 31 July, 1942, and needs at least a month or so to shakedown and train her crew, so she cannot be counted until early September, at the earliest

Some rule you made up?

There were already substantial US troops and aircraft in the area; Two divisions in Australia, another on New Caledonia, and another just moving to New Zealand, There were large numbers of fighters in Hawaii and on the West Coast which could be ferried to Australia within two weeks, and then flown to forward operational air bases within easy range of Darwin. There were significant numbers of US aircraft already on their way to Australia which would arrive by early June, and which could easily reinforce those units in place at the operational air bases south of Darwin.

Given a warning period of two weeks to a month which is reasonable considering the state of US and Australian intelligence in the Spring of 1942, the US "strategic" reaction is going to start before the Japanese even get their feet wet. Granted the full force of the Allied reaction probably won't be felt until mid-June, but there were enough troops and planes in Australia already in May to stop the Japanese invasion of Darwin, if not throw it back into the sea.

So do you still think the IJN can afford to wait until August to show up and help the Japanese Army? If so, I will flat out predict that the IJA troops in Darwin won't starve; they will either be dead, or chowing down on Allied rations in a prison camp somewhere.

Well, if you had read my earlier posts you would know I am not claiming a rail connection to Darwin. Why would you think a rail connection with Darwin is necessary?

There was a rail head at Alice Springs south of Darwin, and another at Mount Isa to the southeast of Darwin. From those two rail heads, roads which could accommodate heavy truck traffic went north and northwest to the town of Larrimah (Birdum), where there was a rail head leading to Darwin with a branch going south to Broome. In February, 1942, A US engineer battalion with their equipment, made it from near Adelaide in South Australia to Katherine, just 150 miles south of Darwin, in just six days. They then began improving the roads and transport facilities in the area. By May, it was possible to move sizable military units overland quite quickly by rail and truck and keep them supplied, as well.

It would leave the rest of Australia with little air cover until the middle of June when further US reinforcements would arrive. But, with the Japanese heavily committed at Darwin, this would be of little import.

Some support units were already in the vicinity of Darwin at the operational air bases. Others could be flown in within a day. The heavy equipment items would go by rail and truck and would arrive within four or five days

Actually, The Coral Sea battle pretty much much discouraged the Japanese from operating there; they never again operated carriers in or near the Coral Sea. The battles of The Eastern Solomons and the Santa Cruz Islands both took place to the North of the Solomons.

 

Well, as a matter of fact, the logistical model can be right in this forum where it has been discussed numerous times in various threads. I'll use the search function again and point out the relevant threads and I look forward to your comments. You do have good ideas, though, so let's explore them together and let's find out where they will lead, okay?

 

Been through the search thread and there are numerous posts relevant to the Japanese logistical problems. The most relevant, I believe, are the Guadalcanal posts. If the Japanese couldn't support their forces already on that island, it would mean that the Japanese won't be able to support a larger undertaking, such as an invasion of Australia even if the Midway battle didn't occur, Glenn239.