German strategic blunders

It has always amazed me that the German army, so brilliant at the tactical and operational level during World War II, was so inept at strategy and grand strategy.

Part of the reason for this seems to be that the German army was geared for quick and decisive campaigns, as in France in 1940, rather than the long, grinding industrial wars of attrition which characterized the first half of the 20th century. There is also Hitler's well-known interference in military decisions that proved so fortunate in the case of the war with France and so disastrous in Russia and North Africa.

There remains the fact that German strategic planning for the most part ranged from unimaginative to disastrously unrealistic. The plans often display overconfidence, a lack of appreciation of enemy strength and capabilities and a failure to grasp the logistics requirements of the campaign.

Certainly lack of imagination was displayed by the Germans' original Plan Yellow for the invasion of France and the Low Countries. While the Germans were obviously concerned about avoiding the French Maginot Line by invading to the north of it, their plan had the main thrust coming through Belgium, exactly where the Allies expected it, an running into the strength of the French and British armies as well as extensive fortifications.

Only the fact the Manstein was able to gain the ear of Hitler for his alternative of moving through the Ardennes prevented what was essentially a rerun of the German World War I offensive, with the Netherlands thrown in. While the Germans may have been successful with this approach, it certainly would have been a bloodier and more protracted victory than resulted from Manstein's plan. In one of the few inspired German strategic plans of the war, Manstein's scheme worked beautifully. It kept the approach of German forces the the Meuse River concealed by their routes though the "impassable" Ardennes. It encouraged the French and British forces to execute their planned movement into Belgium to defend the Dyle River line, thus putting them deeper into the trap laid by the German thrust across the Meuse. And it struck at the weak hinge between the Allied forces in Belgium and the French deployed behind the Maginot Line.

From there, it was all downhill. When the Germans had defeated France in June 1940, they realized that a plan was necessary for knocking the British out of the war. Why they didn't start such contingency planning in September 1939 is mystifying. But beginning in July 1940, they began planning for Operation Sealion, the amphibious invasion of Britain.

The plan they came up with was ambitious and totally unrealistic. It called for a landing on a wide front with nine divisions, plus a supporting airborne division. An operation on such a scale would have strained the resources of the Allies in 1944, and was totally beyond German capabilities in 1940. Because they lacked the purpose-built landing craft that made Allied invasions so successful in both Europe and the Pacific, the Germans intended to conduct the troops across the Channel with a motley collection of coastal steamers, tugboats and barges.

With only a thin screen of warships to protect this teakettle invasion "fleet," the German invasion plan would have been impracticable without absolute control of the air. One can only imagine the slaughter that would have been inflicted on these craft by the Home Fleet; even a channel storm could have wreaked havoc on them. The German army, unused to amphibious operations as it was, seemed to view the operation as nothing more than a river crossing. But traversing a 21-mile stretch of water, under attack from the air and possibly the big guns of a battle fleet, would have been altogether different. The plan was possibly never intended seriously; if it had been attempted, the myth of German invincibilty would have been sunk along with thousands of its best troops.

While considering German strategic failures, it is interesting to speculate on a road not taken that could have led to Britain's demise. Instead of planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union, and leaving Britain unconquered and threatening a second front, the Germans could have pursued a Mediterranean strategy. With only a small percentage of the resources they poured into Russia, Germany could have moved south and driven the British from the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East. They could have worked out an agreement with Franco for the capture of Gibraltar from the landward side, taken the key British stronghold of Malta, instead of the bloody and pointoless assault on Crete, and landed a strong and well-supplied force under Rommel in Libya to drive eastward across Egypt, capture the Suez Canal and take control of the Middle East. While not certain of knocking Britain out of the war, this strategy was certainly worth trying with the limited resources available to Germany, and it would have avoided the two-front war that Germany found itself in after Barbarossa.

As for Barbarossa itself, it was another example of unrealistic planning that underestimated the enemy forces and the logistics requirements of a massive campaign. It could only have worked if the plans for a lightning campaign, conquering the Soviet Union in a few weeks or months, had been realized. But the blitzkrieg that had worked so well in France would have to work on a far larger scale in Russia. With the lack of tanks (only about 3,200) and motor vehicles in general to commit to the campaign, the Germans ran into a problem with the deep penetrations and pockets their armored forces formed in Russia. While the tanks surged far into the Soviet rear areas, their largely leg infantry had difficulties keeping up and maintaining the walls of the pockets thus formed.

Since German planners had known about Hitler's intention to invade Russia since the previous summer, it's difficult to understand why production of tanks, assault guns and other vehicles was not stepped up. A more mobile German army would have given the Nazis a better shot at their only real chance of victory in Russia: a quick campaign wrapped up by the capture of Moscow in the fall of 1941. Another problem for the German troops was the failure, through overconfidence or incompetence, to provide winter clothing, leading to many unnecessary casualties in brutal winter of 1941-42.

One of the factors leading to the Barbarossa disaster was the failure of German intelligence to provide basic, accurate data for the campaign. German estimates gave the Soviets only half the divisions they in fact had and badly overestimated the condition of the Soviet road net. More astonishingly, considering the close cooperation of the German and Soviet armies in the years following World War I, the Germans were caught completely unaware of the superior Soviet heavy and medium tanks - the KV-1 and T-34 - that they encountered in Russia.

After their bitter defeat at the gates of Moscow frustrated their hopes for a quick conquest of the Soviet Union, more strategic failures would follow. The 1942 offensive against Stalingrad and the Caucasus was, thanks to Hitler, a classic case of strategic overstretch. It led to the loss of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad and nearly cost the Germans their Army Group A in the Caucasus. The 1943 Kursk offensive was again a completely unimaginative attack against the sides of a Soviet-held salient. Any chances of success were ruined by several months of delays so that Hitler could throw his cherished Tiger tanks into the attack.

The failure at Kursk not only wiped out German armored reserves, it opened them up to a devastating Soviet summer offensive that threw them back across the Dnieper River and led to the loss of Kiev. From this point, strategic planning became pretty much a thing of the past for Germany, with the initiative passing permanently into enemy hands on the Eastern Front and defensive operations in the West as their enemies closed in on the borders of the Reich.

Although Germany began the war brilliantly with the invasions of Poland, Norway and Denmark, France and the Low Countries and the Balkans, it failed both because of lack of resources and the intelligent use of those resources. Failures in campaign and war production planning early in the war condemned Germany to defeat despite the operational and tactical brilliance of the German army.

 

I am sorry,but several of your points are not true
1)The Mediterranean option :the whole war in North Africa had no strategically value for the Germans:they never could reach the Suez Canal (due to the logistically difficulties ) and even they did? What then ? There was nothing that had any military value in the Middle East .
2)Barbarossa :the conditio sine qua non for Barbarossa to succeed was that the Soviet mobilisation could not have effect before september,this assumption was false .
About the increase in tanks and trucks :it did not happen because the Germans were incompetent,but because the German economy could not do it .There was no way for the Germans to have a more mobile army and a more mobile army could not operate in Russia .Neither the Germans nor the Russians had a mobile army,they had both a mainly WW I army .
About the T 34 and KV tanks :most of them were destroyed in 1941 .
The lack of winter clothing :there was no such lack,but the winter clothing did not arrive at the frontdue to transport difficulties .
3) About Kursk:there were only very few Tigers engaged;the delay was due to the weather and transport difficulties . The mythical importance of Kursk is nonsense:the German casualties were 57000 men and less than 3OO tanks .

 

I still have no idea how the germans would ever be able to take the soviet union as a whole I just don't see it. Going straight into the heart of the soviet union in my opinion was just suicide. To me it was just a massive undertaking that seemed to be impossible task. I have often wondered if the german forces coming in had the same amount of men and supplies as the red army did what kind of outcome would have played out.

 

Both opponents had in june 1941 the same amount of men :roughly 3.3 million men (strategic reserves included ),but of course the Soviets could mobilise millions of reservists;thus the trick for the Germans was to defeat the Soviets before they could mobilise these millions .The Germans were convinced that it would take the Soviets at least two months to do it ,but these millons were mobilised and send to the front from the first day on . Result :in september Barbarossa had failed,there were more Russians on the front than in june .
The problem of the supplies was not only the amount ,but also to send them to the front .

 

Oh I did not remember how many forces of men both side had thanks for the information. Another reason for the germans for losing on the russian front trying to slaughter every single person they found to be sub human. That took a lot of good men they could have used to defeat the soviet union. Those groups that where sent out to kill millions of people still makes me sick when I think of what they where doing.

 

The greatest strategic blunder was that Germany did not put the nation in total war status until 1943. If they had started mobilization of all available resources(human, industrial, military, natural, technological) in 1940, the outcome of operation Barbarossa could have ended in soviet defeat.

 

The Germans mobilized all available resources in 1940 (Tooze is a good source )and in september 1941 the Russian army in the West was destroyed,but the Russians had put a new army,and at the end of november this army was also destroyed,and ...the Russians put a new army .

 

The number 1 reason for the German military's 'ineptness' was HITLER! He dictated all of the strategic directives. German generals had not choice but to follow orders and make do.

 

No doubt some of the decisions hitler made during the end of the war just where crazy. It always made me wonder what was going on in his mind when he was making certain decisions that where devastating to the german war movement.

 

Certain decisions :some exemples ?

 

One that comes to mind; D-Day, due to Hitler's paranoia, he doesn't allow big decisions to be made at field level. And, since he doesn't get his lazy ass out of bed until about noon, precious time is lost in organizing a solid a defense. There were Panzer divisions able to counter the allies, but could do nothing but sit and wait for Hitler to get out of bed.

 

I thought that Hitler's decision to retire successful generals such as Manstein due to their criticisms towards him were big dents in the war effort.

 

Having seen on AHF a report that Hitler was awake on O8 H,due to an appointment on O9 H,I am sceptical;but of course the story of the sleeping Hitler is very known,due to having been popularised by The Longest Day .

 

I too agree that the whole Russian invasion was a bad idea that would have ultimately failed regardless of equipment, men and planning. Manstein in his book "Lost Victories" doesn't think this but does claim that if Soviet Russia was to be defeated it would have had to be defeated both militarily and "from within". German policies of ruthless Germanization and social cleansing policies like the "final solution" made this second part impossible from the outset. I wonder what course the war may have taken if Germany never invaded the Soviet Union at all but collaborated with them to divide up the content and make the German Soviet Pact of 1939 permanent, regardless of their striking ideological differences?

 

In a coalition with the SU,Germany would always be the weaker,the junior,depending for survival on the SU;Germany would always take the casualties and the SU would always have the choice to change from partner and ally with the UK and the US .

 

In fact that is not quite correct. They could have ordered more equipment in 1940 and 1941, but they didn't. Those years national disposable income was 150 billion RM but total war effort was 50 billion RM in each and expenditure on munitions was only 15 billion RM. They could certainly increase that to, lets say, 70-80 billion RM (most on munitions) and cut civilian consumption severely.

The 1943 level of munition production could be reached in 1941 and the 1944 level would be surpassed by 1942 (25.000 tanks per year, 50.000 planes).

Anyway, the german way is the inverse of the american: They ordered equipment and ammunition (just in time system) when they needed, not when they could. In comparison the americans had ordered by 1942 more equipment than 1941 national income! (i.e.: that would be the equivalent to 130 billion RM in munitions ordered in 1940!).

Strategic decisions:

Germany could defeat the USSR. But first they would need to gather better intel of soviet forces. Them they would have to trace a 2 campaign plan, because the USSR was too big for 1 operation. Them they would need to take moscow.

By 1943 that was no longer possible. In that case the correct strategic decision would be of strategic retreat, to destroy soviet forces and capture prisioners in counter attacks, the idea is that the soviet armies could not establish defensive positions in the same way as they did historically at Kursk. Them they would be able to reach a stalemate and a armistice.

With any of these two events, their forces them could be relocated to the western front to destroy any invading forces and resources would be freed to maintain airsuperiority over the reich.

 

Well, at least germany would have survived. From hitler's point of view that would compensate (he thought that the USSR could be defeated in 4 months).

 

With this union the German army would have only one remaining foe to deal with...Britian. I disagree with an earlier comment that an amphibious assault on the British mainland (Operation Sealion) would not succeed. The Japanesse were to demonstate in the Pacific (Malayia and the Phillipians) that simultanious amphibious landings could be very successful on a small scale. I belive that a German multi-service amphibious assault on Britian in 1940-41 would have been successful. I also believe that the civilian population of Britian would not have been willing to sacrifice themselves in proportionate numbers as the Russian civilians did. With Britian out of the war perhaps the US may have held their neutral status. During the prewar years Communism was perceived as a greater threat then dictatorships in the west.

 

I think that the vast majority of strategic blunders can be laid at Hitler's feet.

In previous campaigns to the invasion of the Soviet Union, the strategies were laid down by his generals (such as Manstein's plan to invade France), and these wars were over before Hitler could meddle in them...except for his totally insane insistence that Dunkirk be left for the Luftwaffe when it could have been easily captured by panzer troops, which was a war-changing event.

After the war against France, he did not scale up armored production at all, opting to increase u-boat production instead and keep civilian manufacturing efforts at a high level. He did this although the experiences in France clearly showed panzers were the war-winning technology, and that German tanks were in many ways inferior to their French counterparts.

In Russia, the war not quckly won, giving Hitler, a military amateur, time to meddle in it's smallest Detail. Field Marshal Von Kluge once stated sacastically that he needed to get Hitler's permission to move his sentry to a different location outside of his tent. The campaign was longer, and he interferred with it constantly. His decision not to capture Moscow at the earliest possible moment is a prime example. His decision to continue the offensive in horrible weather of the late Fall without warm clothing, thereby leading to the German army being savaged in the winter of 1941/42. His no-retreat dictates at that time, at Stalingrad, and in numerous caldrons over the next 3 years. His constant underestimating of the Russians. His refusal to allow elastic defensive practices, and his insistance on holding onto every square meter of conquered land with inadequate forces, hogtying his commanders' ability to defeat the Russians.

The war in Russia continued for 4 years in spite of Hitler continually making the worst possible decisions from a strategic standpoint on that front. With a sound military mind responsible for the conduct of the war, I believe things would have went much differently, although with the great probability that the end result would have still been an eventual German defeat.

 

Wow i am late any way middle east no millitary value? First off oil plus taking the middle east would had destrous effects for commonwealth troops in india. Also the move mybe just my be made turkey join the germans and by by to any chance of allied shipping. lets remember if barberossa was launch from the south out of turkey well russia lose like most of thier oil supplies.(sorry for spelling)