Japan in Barbaross'a equation????

Just how much of a chance was there of Japan going to war with the SU right after Barbarossa started? If that happened how long could the Soviets hold out? Could the Allies still get enough LL through Murmansk/Archangel & Iran since the Vladisvostock route would be untenable?
IMHO one of the biggest things the Allies did to help the Soviets was help keep Japan out of their hair but I maybe wrong have been before.

 

Such a prospect was virtually nil in June 1941, in my opinion.

The Japanese had already decided, in July 1940, that their critical interests lie to the South and all their preparations between July, 1940, and June, 1941, had been to effect such a course.

"On 4 July 1940, chiefs of the 2d and 8th Sections of the Army General Staff accompanied by section members and Military Affairs Section members of the War Ministry, called on the Naval General Staff to submit a draft of "The Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" as an opinion agreed upon by both the Army General Staff and the War Ministry. This had already been submitted to the War Minister and the Assistant Chief of Army General Staff with the explanation:

The Army's estimate of the situation:


1. The establishment of a European-African bloc by Germany
and Italy was inevitable.

2. Great Britain would oppose the German-Italian bloc using
India and Australia as rear bases to secure a supply
line in the South Pacific Ocean in cooperation with
America.

3. Expansion of the American Navy would be completed in
several years and a strategically and economically
Anglo-American bloc would be formed in the south.

4. If the above estimates proved correct, Japanese economy,
which was greatly dependent upon Great Britain and
America, would be seriously affected and Japan would be
placed in a difficult position unless she decided
immediately to take the initiative in laying the
groundwork in the south.

5. Japan could not carry this out under existing conditions,
and the prerequisites to the successful execution of this
plan were:

a. Security from the menace of Soviet Russia.
b. Early settlement of the China Incident.
c. Political alliance with Germany and Italy.

Japan must form an economically self-sufficient zone, including the Southern Area, establish a powerful political structure and institute a planned economy"



http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/146/146chap1.html

By late June, 1941, two of the three preconditions for this policy had been satisfied, and the Japanese were already moving to extend their occupation of French Indochina into the southern portion of that country; this would place Japanese military forces in the positions necessary to make an invasion of Malaya, Borneo, and the NEI, possible. Japan could not afford to embark on both the Southern operation and an attack on Soviet Asia, and therefore had sought and signed a neutrality treaty with the Soviets.

Japan did not rule out an attack on the Soviet Union at some point in the future, and some factions in the IJA advocated an immediate offensive against Soviet Asia, but the reality was that Japan was committed to attacking and seizing the Southern Resources Area before the United States could complete the massive naval expansion it had started in 1940. After about October, 1941, the Japanese reckoned that the USN would be too powerful for Japan to even contemplate a conflict with the US and the window of opportunity for Japan to size the required material resources found only in southern Asia and the western Pacific would be closed. Without those resources firmly under Japanese control, a successful attack on the Soviet Union in Asia would be impossible.

 

As DA says, probably nil. I suspect that after the Imperial Japanese got their "hats handed to them" twice in the Far East by the Red Army under Zhukov, and Hitler broke his anti-commintern pledge he had signed with the Italians and Japanese, the Japanese had little to NO interest in aiding Hitler or the Nazis. Hitler signed his "non-aggression" pact just as the Japanese were getting their butts kicked by the Soviets, and Hitler (their supposed friend against the Soviets) teams up with the Soviets.

I doubt the Japanese wanted anything to do with Hitler in any real "helping him" fashion, and there wasn't anything in the Far East of the USSR they could use for themselves (as mentioned). They would use him and his nation’s technological expertise, but they wouldn’t risk troops to help. They certainly no longer trusted him or the Nazis in any substantial way. And they couldn't afford to "waste" effort for no gain for themselves.

 

Thanks guys I'm not that familiar with the politics of the SU & Japan in 1941 and just wanted some answers.

 

Excellent point. The Japanese were well aware that their power and successes relied on the Imperial Navy, not the "ground game" sort of speak. They knew where their bread was buttered, and it was out to sea. It would have been foolish to think they could have made any gains at all against the Soviets, especially as mentioned before, the way the territorial battles went before the start of WWII.

 

From what I´ve read the Japanese were really shocked by the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, and the Japanese would not really trust Hitler again. Also the Japanese made the pact of non-aggression in spring 1940 with Stalin. The Japanese naturally had plans for attacking "any direction" but in July-August 1941 they had realized Hitler was not going to win the Barbarossa as he promised.If the USSR had collapsed the Japanese would have invaded the USSR , I think.

 

The "Japanese" were not a single cohesive group. There were various factions within the military structure vying for power. The primary support for a venture against the Soviet Union came from the ultranationalist Kodoha political faction which, were the dominant party prior to the 2.26 incident. After the failed coup of the incident in 1936 where radical junior officers under the Kodoha influence attempted to overthrow the government, the faction's influence basically ceased to exist due to the purge of its top leaders in the organization. Thus died the support for waging war against Russia. This vacuum allowed the opposition, the Toseiha political faction which included Tojo Hideki to take control of the army and further their views of a "southern advance" in the Pacific. So basically, there was no real serious movement for a war in the north by the time Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union because the Japanese army was already under the influence of a party that was focused on a campaign in the Southern Territories.

 

The Japense remembered Khalkin Gol. Zhukov slaughtered the Japanese up there and the Imperial Army dared not go north again. Even with the Wehrmacht to fight the Red Army was stronger, better trained and better equipped at 1941. Open warfare with mechanized forces was not something IJA wanted or could do.

 

They not only remembered their losses during their two operations against the Red Army, they also remembered that the Soviets didn't move all that many of their troops and weapons to the defense of Moscow is as commonly assumed.

Here is a short run-down of the Soviet Forces remaining in the Far East shortly before and then after Operation Barbarossa had been launched:

Soviet troops in the far east on 22 June 1941:

17 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 3 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, and 12 fortified regions organized into five rifle corps and four rifle armies.

Soviet troops in the far east on 1 January 1942:

19 rifle divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 rifle brigades, 1 airborne brigade, 2 cavalry regiments, 1 rifle regiment, and 12 fortified regions organized into four rifle corps and five rifle armies.

Apparently, even when units were sent west, they were replaced by new formations, so the Soviets didn't really let down their guard vis-a-vis Japan. There are also artillery and tank units listed in the order of battle, what is listed above are the major combat formations, and does not include units assigned to the Trans-Baikal Front.

Source for the data is:

Index of /BoevojSostavSA/

This was translated for me by a fellow poster at the now defunct Historic-Battles forum a few years ago, and I keep it on file just because it is so interesting.

The Japanese couldn't afford to engage this Far East portion of the Red Army, especially as it was supplemented by about 80,000 Mongolian regulars supplied with Soviet weaponry. Coupling this with the divided power base in the Japanese Central Command (as mentioned by Karma) and it is pretty easy to understand why the Japanese were loath to "aid" the Nazis in their ill-advised attack on the Soviet Union.

 

Japan had also nothing to gain in a war with Russia and absolutely did not want to do what Hitler did; stuck between Russia and the U.S.....

 

Yep, couldn't have said it any better (BTW, they even took German U-boot crews as prisoners).

Regards
Kruska

 

Why look at who decided to show up...

 

Well, after all it's christmas season - right? happy new year to you and all the other guy's

Regards
Kruska

 

A "whatif?" scenario with Japan attacking the Soviet East in 1941? Not good for the USSR and Stalin was certainly worried ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Sorge ). Fortunately for the Allied cause the Japanese Imperial army was focused on the South at the time. A little known battle at a place called Khalkin Gol in 1939 had a decisive effect on events. The Battle of Khalkhin Gol
JeffinMNUSA

 

That rather depends on a number of things. If the Japanese intial assault is repulsed with enough losses the Soviets may actually be able to move more troops West. On the otherhand it probably means that the US isn't going to be sending much LL through the Pacific and Siberia at least early on.

 

The SU had nothing to fear from Japan
1) Japan had signed a non agression pact with the SU in april 1941
2)there was no oil in the SU Far East :Japan would only waste its last economic resources by attacking the SU ,while the Japanese economy was strangled by the USA
3) In 1939 the SU had defeated Japan .