Roosevelt Conspiracy?

Did FDR really know about the incoming Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese? Did FDR use the attack to bolster moral and catapult the United States into World War II? I'd like to hear your opinion on this issue.

 

There is a cottage industry which consists of writing books and articles claiming Roosevelt knew of, and suppressed, prior information about an attack on Pearl Harbor.

No serious or reputable historian takes these claims seriously. Only conspiracy theorists give them any credence.

See;http://www.ww2f.com/sacred-cows-dead-horses/28474-pearl-harbor-conspiracy-rebuttals.html

 

Only conspiracy?

The only question is, WHERE the US expected or wanted the Japanese to fire the first shot. That they (US) might not have envisaged Pearl as the target, maybe the Phillipines, or simply misjudged on the timeline for the Japanese attack on Pearl would be another question.

Both the United States and Japan knew that they were going to war with each other over control of the Pacific. The only question was who would fire the first shot.
Stimson recorded in his diary for November 25, 1941--before the bombing of Pearl Harbor--that he, Roosevelt and other high-ranking officials met at the White House to discuss "how we should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.

Stimson told a congressional committee five years later:

In spite of the risk involved...in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's minds as to who were the aggressors.

I wasn't aware that Stimson was a conspiracy theorists

Kruska
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Er, all that statement means is that the Roosevelt administration was unwilling to attack Japan pre-emptively, or consider prior Japanese actions in e.g. China to be sufficient provocation. Which shouldn't be any surprise at all.

Saying that there needs to be a casus belli for a war, vs saying that the admin desired the US to suffer a massive Japanese surprise attack, are two completely different things.

 

Correct, so how to get the US involved was the question - give the US a reason to shoot back at the attacker - right?

However there is a very big difference between "unwilling to attack Japan" and "manouvering the Japanese into attacking".

This sentence already implies the thought of letting the Japanese attack a target - certainly a US Target - otherwise how would the US ensure to

The American people in general couldn't give a rats ass about what the Japanese had been doing since Manchuria. - neither had they in regards to the Nazis. Only an attack on a US target could swing around public opinion.

So which US target was it that the US government anticipated or were watching to be attacked by the Japanese that they (the US) had thought up to "maneuver them [the Japanese] into"? (conspiracy theory)

Or were they (the US) still thinking about one when the Japanese had already choosen it? (conspiracy theory)

Or did the US simply and naively brush aside all their intel means and information whilst comfortably drinking CocaCola, eating burgers and smoking LuckyStrike? (History version).

Regards
Kruska

 

I don't think that's at all accurate. There was a considerable reaction to the events in China as reported by the press and survey's showed prior to PH that the majority of the US population supported military action vs the Japanese.

That's hardly the "history version". The Pacific was under a War Alert and a Japanese attack was widely anticipated, however the attack on PH was not.

 

Hello Biak,

The conspiracy theory is a wide ranging issue from knowing of PH - right up to enforcing a PH disaster. As for my part I simply could imagine that parts of the US government knew about a planed attack on PH. It could be very possible that they wanted the IJN to get within a desired range.

Something went horribly wrong in the chain of command (see the famous telegram) and many other issues and suddenly it became an unforseen attack.
In view of the losses sustained, of cause no government on this planet would admit to such a blunder if it had happened as such.

I certainly am not one of those who insist that this what happened, but I would also not categorically outrule such a possibility.
(Especially not after the preceding events of the 2nd Iraq war) and numerous other "incidents" involving the US government since WWII.

Regards
Kruska

 

I think it is highly unlikely that Roosevelt would do such a thing. If he knew this were to happen wouldn't he have mobilized troops sooner so that the United States would be ready to counterattack.

 

lwd

Would you have any sources for this US population support - I would be very interested to see or read about it.

Besides PH, IMHO there were only two other viable targets, - to secure and observe these three shouldn't be a problem at all - unless for some reason the other two were somehow obviously outruled. - which in turn only leaves PH.

What does "Pacific was under a war alert" actually mean? AFAIK there wasn't even a constant airpatrol over and around PH - why?

Regards
Kruska

 

Hello Biak,
You bet

As for my part I would certainly outrule a version that proposes Roosevelt having known about the attack and ordered to stand by and watch.

Regards
Kruska

 

Here are a couple of interesting links to the Congressional Pearl Harbor Hearings, as reported in Time magazine in 1946.

See:

PEARL HARBOR: Gleanings for History - TIME

and:

National Affairs: PEARL HARBOR: HENRY STIMSON'S VIEW - TIME

Which starts off with this:

Nov. 7. Cabinet meeting this afternoon. The President opened with telling the story of Lincoln and his Cabinet—how he polled the Cabinet and found them all polling NO and then he said, "The Ayes have it."

With that he started to have what he said was the first general poll of his Cabinet and it was on the question of the Far East—whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be.

He went around the table—first Hull and then myself, and then around through the whole number and it was unanimous in feeling the country would support us. He said that this time the vote IS unanimous, he feeling the same way. . . .

Nov. 25. General Marshall and I went to the White House, where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself.

The President brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked, perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. . . .

Later one will find this testimony from Sec. Henry Stimson on page two:

Dec. 7. Just about 2 o'clock, while I was sitting at lunch, the President called me up on the telephone and in a rather excited voice asked me, "Have you heard the news? . . . They have attacked Hawaii. They are now bombing Hawaii. . . ."

My first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people.

Re-reading from his diary, Henry Stimson summarized:

With the aid of "hindsight," I [have] reached the opinion that the War Plans Division of the General Staff would have placed itself and the safety of the country in a sounder position if it had transmitted to General Short more information than it did. . . .

Then later in the article:

The War Cabinet agreed that the U.S. must fight if Japan 1) attacked U.S., British or Dutch territory, or 2) moved her forces in Indo-China west of 100° longitude or south of 10° latitude.

 

The whole conspiracy idea though could also viewed as a 'white suppremicist' idea i.e. you (the Japanese) only succeeded because we (the US) conived to let you.
It ignores all the planning, inteligence gathering, wireless inteligence, secrecy, training and weapons development that the Japanese used to launch their attack.
The US at the time seemed to have some sense of - it can't happen to us - they wouldn't dare!
Although, a 'war warning' was sent - there was no reason why Pearl Harbor couldn't have institued 'searches' if only via training flights. General Short was more afraid of 'sabotage' than air attack (although the USN carriers had simulated it) - he could have done otherwise.
And, even when it was known of the Japanese on Pearl, the US in PI still managed to get their aircraft caught on the ground.
So Conspiracy - no.

 

GO KRUSKA...

"The American people didn't give a rats arse...."...ROFL

Maybe American business interests in China did. With whole chunks of the former China rapidly dissappearing to the little men from Nippon, the U.S. commercialists that had been pouring money into China since the end of the Boxer Rebellion probably got cold feet and wanted some way for the U.S. to become involved. With their future potential markets dissappearing and the "New Deal" well in place, what else could they do?

Besides, America could well have sat back and made a fat profit from being the "arsenal of Democracy" (they would then be referred to by the history pundits as "the arse end of democracy"), so why go to war and risk american boys when the factories can work day and night to pull the rest of Europe out of the poo?

Don't forget that Russia and England essentially fought WW2 with loans provided by the United States. Without American financial help, both countries would have collapsed economically....but I suppose they both did AFTER WW2 anyway, so the end result was the same, just that America had to enter the war a whole lot earlier than they did during the war of 14-18.

Anyhow, I thought Kruska's cynicism was worth a salute!

 

Well, someone in power must have cared a bit about what happened in China, because the members of AVG (Flying Tigers) were discharged from the US Military establishment and allowed to be recruited by China to fly against the Japanese. This argues against the total indifference implied above. Planes, guns, vehicles and the attending support and supplies were sent to China as well, at a time when public sentiment favoured isolationism.

 

Actually the isolationist position had peaked in about 1937, but after the conspicuous failure of the "Munich Agreement", and silliness of appeasement appeared, it began to wane. Then at least one nation they had held up as an example of the success of their stance; "neutral non-involvement" (Belgium) was over-run by an even more aggressive Germany in spite of a promise by Hitler not to do so.

Then they pinned their hopes on the defensive stance of a strong (military) as in France, it too fell to Nazi aggression. So the ambivalence of the public mood in the late thirties clear into 1941, became more and more evident as the Nazis overran western Europe and Scandinavia; signed "non-aggression pacts" with Stalin’s Soviet, drove the BEF off the continent, and then attacked Britain by air.

In one of the last pre-war polls during the last weeks preceding Pearl Harbor, Gallup's interviews concluded (less than a week before the Japanese attack) that while about one-quarter thought war was avoidable and could be forestalled if not eliminated, slightly more than one-half of Americans expected that "the United States will go to war against Japan sometime in the near future." Earlier a similar percentage had expressed a "willingness to risk war with Nazi Germany in favor of Great Britain." This was shortly after that lying snake Hitler had once again ignored a treaty and or pact and invaded the USSR in mid-41! In short order Hitler had made and broken "non-aggression pacts" with Poland and the USSR, promised to observe Belgian neutrality, and over-run it, invaded both Denmark and Norway, and defeated France.

In short, from a historical point of view using both hindsight and then existing public opinion, it appears probable that (even if the Japanese had not taken the initiative), the American public would soon have endorsed the U.S. entering the war anyway. Thus, in the period directly preceding Pearl Harbor, Americans were shifting gradually, but more and more rapidly away from their prior mood of introversion/isolation to the mood of extroversion/intervention.

As an amusing aside, those polled in the land-locked mid west and mountain states were the staunchest "isolationists". Likely feeling safe so far from the ocean shores. Those polled on the coast-lines had a more realistic and pragmatic approach, in that they favored building up our defensive forces (conscription and weapons purchase), but only for self-defense. The smaller group of total pacifist isolationists were against any war at any cost, while the greater share were for self-defense, and retaliation if attacked, but not declaring war unilaterally. These polls were taken of voting age male and females in the US prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.


Gallup poll #248, Question 3 (mid-Sept 1941), 55% of Americans believed that the country was already involved in the war. As shown in Question 5K and 5T of the same poll, a little over 1/2 of all Americans believed FDR was doing the right thing with his actions (that 55%), while about another 20% believed he hadn't gone far enough. A near complete reversal of the numbers from early 1941 when only about 17% favored going to war!

Furthermore, in Question 6 of Poll #248, 60% of Americans approved of the decision to fire on German submarines. Finally, a great majority of Americans answered in Questions 11K and 11T that American democracy and German fascism could not co-exist. Now, while in that same poll the vast majority answered they did not want to declare or go to war unilateraly at the time, they approved of FDR's actions (you can also check out Gallup Poll #248, Question 13 to see that 2/3 of Americans support FDR's policies in general as well as his foreign policy specifically).

In Gallup poll #250, Question 3K (conducted October 7th, 1941), now 66% of Americans believed the US should continue to help the UK even if it risked war in Europe. In Question 3T of that poll, the same 66% ratio of Americans now stated that it was more important to defeat Germany than to stay out of the war.

The in mid-November (15th) 1941. Gallup Poll #253, Question 1K was: Which of these two things do you think is the more important -- that this country keep out of war, or that Germany be defeated? Keep out of war, 32% favored this; Defeat Germany, 68% favored this.

Additionally, according to Gallup Poll #254, Question 3 (conducted in late November 1941), 73.58% of Americans now believed the United States should "take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means risking a war with Japan."

I think that response more closely reflects American public opinion than any other. Not just that we would end up in the war, or have to fight eventually, but that the Axis, with Germany at the head were going to have to be dealt with. I myself think that Japan was still regarded as a poor and minor player in the Axis Power structure, only equal to or even less important than Italy.

I would guess the majority of Americans absolutely knew we would have to deal with the Axis militarily before the middle of November 1941. And only 32% were in favor of staying out of war (at any cost) even before the Pearl Harbor attack. That sneak attack only sealed the deal.

One must also not negate nor ignore the influence of Madama Chiang Kai-shek. She was not only the daughter of the wealthy Soong family, she was an American educated college graduate, and an outspoken Methodist and closely tied by marriage to the leader of the Chinese Independence movement of Dr. Sun yet-sen who was the Chinese George Washington who had ousted the Dowager Emporess. Madame Chiang struck a chord with the China missionary society, and FDR couldn't ignore her or the Protestant community either.

 

Hello brindirt1,

Would you by any chance know about the overall % of Americans who took part in the Gallup poll #248?

If the above result would actually reflect the majority of the Americans, plus the anti Nazi stance of FDR, than it would be even more surprising if not to say very difficult indeed to understand why the US couldn’t be bothered to take up arms since 1931 in regards to China or 1938 in regards to Hitler.

Hello Sgt. Quincannon,

Sorry but “The flying Tigers” can’t really be taken into account such as it would give a very wrong picture about the “real” contribution of the US government or public. A good 40% of the Spanish Interbrigades consisted of German and Austrian nationals.

So the Germans/Austrians as such were willing to get into war against Franco and Fascism?

US support towards China? Well let’s rather agree of American support towards Chiang Kai-Shek, in order to ward of the communists rather than simply fighting the Japanese.
Interestingly it was the Germans who trained and supported the Chinese National Army for almost 20 years, (Chiang’s son Chiang Wei-kuo was the one who wore a Wehrmacht uniform) and due to the Axis Tri-pact in 1941 had to abandon this support, which had been dead and reanimated in between 1938-1941 mostly on behalf of Chiang Kai-Shek.

It was only after the US entered the war, that Chiang received about $US 2 billion, or that the US as such supported the Kuomintang in regards to fighting the Japanese.

Regards
Kruska