Was Hitler right to attack the USSR in 1941?

Supply via aircraft is rather probelmatic in the long run or for large formations.

1) Who says they wouldn't have air superiority?
2) Why wouldn't they risk it? Have you looked at what percentage of German fighters would have any chance at all vs a B-29 near it cieling?

 

Amen. The two atomic bomb attacks were sent unescourted against Hiroshima & Nagasaki, despite the presence of several hundred enemy fighters based near the target area.

 

Greater numbers of aircraft means far greater protection for Axis shipping to North Africa.
It also means that air transport can supply a lot of what went by sea freeing up shipping for armour specific supplies.
4 armoured divisions can be supplied with what is available.

 

With no war with the Soviets in 1941 in such a case the Germans would have air superiority in the Med.

 

The Japanese didn’t send interceptors to engage the raid at Hiroshima for example as it was only one of three aircraft approaching and thus not thought to be a bombing raid as the Americans expected they would.

 

He could have not attacked at all and saved all those lives. But then again, if I had to choose a time to attack, it would have been early in spring of 1942, so that the ground forces would be able to move without the wet mud and snow, and also to allow time for improvements on armor/aircraft.

 

In my opinion, with Hitler and Stalin in command, Germany and the USSR could not have been able to remain next to each other without conflict arising for any extended period of time. Hitler's dislike of the Slavic people was made very clear in his speeches as well as in Mein Kampf.

Accepting the circumstance that conflict is bound to arise between the two countries, summer of 1941 was perhaps the best chance Hitler was ever going to get to be victorious in a short, well-organized attack. The Soviet army was really in disarray, with the purge and the fundamental problems exposed in the Winter War. Plus many Soviet divisions were not at more than 2/5th strength. They were no where near the fighting force that they would evolve into by 1943. So in some respect I think that yes, Hitler was correct to seize that opportunity in 1941 and attempt to achieve a victory over the Soviet Union. The reasons for the the ultimate failure of the invasion can be discussed in other threads.

However, with all that being said, I want to make it clear that I do not believe that Germany could ever have been totally victorious against the USSR. The battle would have to be quick, not unlike the 8-12 week timetable set for Barbarossa, and Germany would certainly not receive all of Russia. Furthermore, the attack would have to be much better prepared and executed than it actually was, in terms of managing the logistical problems. However, with a successful Barbarossa , Germany sits in a much better position than waiting around for 1943 when the Soviet might possibly attack them.

 

Does anybody know the total % of the divisions that were at 2/5 strong? Zhukov put it in his memoirs:’ many of our divisions were 8,000 strong, about ½ of German strength”

In 1992 Russian General Command Historical Analysis “1941 – Lessons and Conclusions” states that Supreme Soviet issued order 16/158 -starting in May 1940 Soviet Red Army Western Military Districts in Peace Time will have 98 Divisions of 12,000 and only 3 Divisions of 9,000.

In early summer 1941 additional 802,000 troops were mobilized. For a total 21 Divisions of 14,000, 72 Divisions of 12,000 and 6 Divisions of 11,000.

We are told Germany started the war with about 190 Divisions (give or take a couple). Here is how I’m able to break them down: 84 Infantry, 17 Tank, and 13 Motorized. For a total of 114 front line Divisions. To that Historians add 9 Divisions of rear area Paramilitary Police and 4 Divisions from Norway.

There were also additional 24 Infantry, 2 Tank and 1 Mechanized Divisions of High Command Reserves that got to the front at the beginning battle for Moscow.

There were 36 Divisions from Finland, Hungry, Slovakia, Rumania and Italy. Of these I think only 16 Divisions from Finland were front line capable. The rest were only good for thievery and partisan operations.

Russians had 149 Divisions (7 Cavalry Divisions and 12 Airborne Brigades are listed as 7 Divisions)? Historians do not include 10 Antitank Artillery Brigades, 16 Divisions of Second Strategic Echelon and 154,000 NKVD troops.

German forces invading Russia in 1941 constitute a maximum concentration of troops that 88 million strong German nation can assemble.

By contrast what Soviet forces faced Germany is probably a minimum that 200 million strong Russia was able to call to arms. Toward the end of July Russian Army (even with heavy loses) had 235 Divisions.

After declaring General Mobilization on 23rd of June Russians called up 5.3 million within a couple of weeks.

So as I said before: Surprised Attack was Hitler’s only choice in 1941.

 

Oh, no. Much less.

 

I would say that ideology of Nazism prevented Hitler from winning the war. German occupation policy was really unwise. In the beginning of the war there were places where German troops were met with flowers and "bread and salt" (by Russian tradition), they were regarded as liberators. So, if Hitler intended to improve people's life, he would have obtained significant support and wouldn't have faced "the amazing patriotism of the Soviet nation". But Germans treated Russians as sub-humans, and contrived to make Soviet people fight for Stalin and communist government.

 

I voted NO

Delaying Barbarossa until 1942 would have been a better option for Germany.

Suzie, Sunny971 made a very good point earlier in the thread. German forces were simply in too many places at the same time (around Europe and North Africa) to mount a decisive attack on Russia in 1941.

Operation Case Blue, The German re-offensive in 1942 shows the Russians were still taking huge losses, even by a German Army that had suffered 400,000 casualties in the battle of Moscow.

The point being, that the Russians were no more better a fighting force in 1942 than they were in 1941.

A better prepared and equipped German Army 1942, pushing on in May might have made a difference.

That said, it would have been important to talk the japanese out of attacking Pearl Harbour and show a build up of troops along the soviet border (not attacking) just to keep Russian troops tied up in Siberia

 

I guess that you aren´t right...Stalingrad.

How many T 34 and KV -1 in 1942? plus the 5.000.000 men and +15.000 BT-5? tanks lost in Barbarossa.

Polikarpov I 16 and Katiuska replaced with Mig 3 and Lachmovich, Suturmovik ... And that winter the Western allies are about to gather an overwhelming force in North Africa. El Alamein and Torch.

May 1941 was the moment, but the wermacht wasn´t able to reach the victory.

 

Hi Efestos

You missed the point.

The initial successes of Case Blue highlighted that the Soviets were no more a fighting force in 1942 as they were in 1941 even against a weakened German Army......hence my thoughts that Barbarossa would have been better delayed a year.

 

Ah ha, but in 1942, the Germans too suffered worse casualties in Russia than they had the previous year. Perhaps an argument can be made that these casualties were incurred due to Russias ability to learn and adapt.

Guderian certainly thought so, as he wrote in his memoirs that the Russians were learning quickly...

P.S.

While German numbers in 42' might increase by a couple hundred thousand, the Red Army numbers would increase by as much as several million. Also, the Red Army troops would be far better equipped and supplied than they had been in 41' In 1941, when the Germans encountered a few sprinkles of T-34's here and there they were shocked and terrified of the new tank. Walther von Reichenau (who replaced Von Rundstedt) said "If the Russians ever produce this tank on an assembly line, we will have lost the war." Now imagine what might have occured had the Germans encountered not 2 or 3 thousand but 10,000 or 15,000 T-34s.

 

Well, if Hitlers goal was to end the war quicker invading the USSR was the right thing.

GB

 

Artema...

How much "amazing patriotism of the Soviet people" was at the end of a gun barrel?

A fight for survival is just that. Patriotism is a slogan, both in East and West, to justify the decisions of governments to send their people off to war, rather than solving political problems with state policy.

War is only state policy in a different guise after all. What state policy failed in the Soviet Union that lead the Stalin Administration to finding itself in the position it did? Could another policy have been enacted to keep the Soviet people from having to participate in WW2 at all?

And furthermore, what state policy guaranteed that war from the Soviet perspective? How did Germany and Russia arrive at that point, where a fairly close military co-operative can be thrown away for a knock down, dragged out war for survival?

I would say that the answers to all these questions reside in the mind of the "Maximum Leader" himself. Appealing to the "Patriotism of the Soviet People" strikes me as a very cynical move by a politician that had painted himself into a corner from which the only exit was military action. Popularizing this conflict was the natural move to make from an equally cynical Party machine. They needed to justify it, for the pure reason that it could so easily have been avoided, and probably would had Russia not been controlled by a paranoid mass-murderer.

Lucky for the regime that the grip on the people was so TIGHT that it could survive something like "Barbarossa" from a Napolean with a telephone.

 

about the Germans suffering worse casualties in 1942 than in1941:yes and no
absolutely :yes some 1.1 million in 1942 and some 830000 in 1941
relatively :no;if one would comparing the 27 weeks of fighting in 1941,with the 52 weeks of fighting in 1942,then the figures are:
in 1941:some 31000 weekly
in 1942:some 20000 weekly .

 

With the benefit of hindsight we have today in 2010, of course the answer is no, since it ended with the destruction of Germany and the third Reich. But to one man, the only one who mattered at the time, Barbarossa seemed not only unavoidable, but winnable.
Most German Generals received the news of the planning for Barbarossa with grave misgivings - even Herman Goerring tried to talk him out of it. But as Goering said "The Fuehrer has now made up his mind, and no power on earth can change it".

A better strategy, in retrospect, had been presented by Grand Admiral Raeder. He proposed in 1941 that Russia should be left alone for the time being, and that the British presence in the mediteranean should be attacked. The rewards to be gained were quite large - control of Egypt and the Suez canal, the oil fields of the middle east (from which an attack on the Russian's southern flank could have been launched later), and possibly even German control of Gibralter. These gains would have been incalculable to the Germans, and at a much lower cost then Barbarossa. There's no way to tell what the outcome of the war would have been, if only Hitler had left Russia alone for a few years...

 

sigh,sigh,:that the strategy of Raeder was impossible,useless and wasteful has been demonstrated several times on this forum,by Carl Schwamberger a.o;(see :Yes or no,Germans take Gibraltar)