Was Hitler right to attack the USSR in 1941?

I believe Operation Barbarossa executed in 1942 would have been a better option based on several factors that would have favoured the Axis.
-With a full year more to gather intelligence and plan the logistical piece the entire operation would have been far more successful.

-The Red Army was unlikely to make significant improvements considering that the purges were still going on and its gains in new equipment do not equate that well with improved capability with such flawed and inexperienced tactical leadership.

-Another year allows the Deutsches Reaichsbahn (German State Railroad Service) to greatly expand its capacity and more importantly its plan to support the field armies.

-With the US entering the war in Dec. 1941 but not sending Lend Lease to the Soviets I find it unlikely that the Nazis declare war on the US. This makes it a very hard sell for Roosevelt to actively get the US into the European war, thus greatly altering the dynamic of 1942 (historically speaking). This also rules out Lend Lease to the Soviets for most if not all of 1942 because not only are the Soviets/US not at war with Germany, but the Soviets are still actively trading and supporting Germany.

-This in turn has great effect on North Africa, where the Axis has more means available and no Torch landings to contend with.

I would believe that the Axis could effectively destroy the best Soviet armies and equipment upon reaching Smolensk as they almost did historically, but now with a better logistical plan (hypothetical) they would have the strategic range to reach Moscow in strength before defenses could be formed (as historically).

 

Hello Black6,

The major flaw in German intelligence was the fact that they failed to acknowledge civillian boot camp (the actual term which escapes me but it is similiar to what Israel has now). This allowed for up to 14 million civilian men to receive at least basic training and allow them be recruited in case of war in the shortest time possible. It was this very system which allowed the Red Army to grow consistently as the war progressed, regardless of casualties sustained. There was simply no way for the Nazis to ever uncover that in their intel.

Regarless of the purges, new officers were always being trained. Had Germany waited another year before launching her offensive, the Russian NCO's would had an additional year of training.

Russia and Germany do not have the same track width. In order for German trains to operate on Russian rail, the trains had to be lifted and their wheels changed to fit the width of Russian rail, this is the case today as well. It is for this reason that a German train could not travel non-stop from Minsk to Berlin. Bottlenecks occured on the borders and adding more locomotives does not solve this problem.

Hitler declared war on the U.S. because of Japan not Russia. Why would Hitler not declare war as he historically had, especially when this means he could have sank US ships supplying GB? Also, LL amounted to about 10% of what Russia needed. Most of this 10% began to arrive in 1943.

North Africa is irrelevant, but I would still like to know how?

And before speaking of oil, please read previous posts in this thread regarding the issue.

A major reason as to why the Germans were so successful in 1941 was because they caught the Red Army completely off balance. Approximately half of the Red Army was not at her post when war with Germany broke out and an equal amount lacked supplies, food, and weapons. This would not have been the case in 42'...

Never in history had the Red Army been as vulnerable as she had been on june 22, 1941. As our very own TRIPLEC has correctly stated, "the decision to attack in 1941 was either fortuitous, or a stroke of genius."

Glantz writes: Had the Germans decided to invade a year or two later or a couple of years earlier, they would have met their match".

 

i agree that the pact was to get both nations breathing space, but if Stalin knew concretely of Hitlers Intentions, why did he refuse to believe intelligence reports that German divisions were massing on the border in the weeks leading up to June 1941?

surely he would have done to defend the frontiers?

 

I guess the Nazis changed the railway gauge to european standar. But no as fast as they needed.

??????? ?????????? --[ ??????? ??????? ]-- Stolfi R. H. S. Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted

I guess the article that quote should not be entirely correct. What´s your opinion? It reports a so fast regauge of the railways. It sais the logistics failed for the trucks.

 

One factor which might have jaundiced Stalin's opinion of the warning from the west before Barbarossa was launched was the Hess mission to Great Britain the month before.

He had great suspicions that the "capitalist/colonial" west was attempting to get him to strike the Nazis first, so they could claim he was the aggressor, and unite against the "hated Communists" in the east. What if Hess had arranged a deal with the British for them to join in an attack on the USSR? He had precedents for this afterall.

The British and Americans had landed troops on Soviet soil in the early days of the USSR, and had been pretty much outspoken opponents of the Soviet system. Much as the Fascists/Nazis were.

Not an entirely unfounded/unsupportable rationale.

 

True enough, but I wouldn't call it a major flaw in intelligence based upon the concept of a campaign concluded in 6 months or less. The man power pool of the USSR only comes to bear if they survive the initial attack.

Indeed new officers were being trained, but were also being elevated several echelons beyoned their basic capabilities. This was the reality of June 1941 and a single year would very little to rectify the situation and the purges to a limited degree were still on going. To complicate the issue of limited experience was the parallel issue of prolific tranfers of officers that made training as a unit next to impossible and therefore unit readiness was terribly low.
Soviet NCO's became more competent by necessity as the war progressed, another year without this necessity does nothing to advance their effectiveness.

A monumental piece of Barbarossa planning is often overlooked as the campaign unfolded... (think about this one for a minute): The DR was actually not involved in the campaign planning beyond the build up for the attack. The Wehrmacht created its own paramilitary rail units (undermanned and under equipped) to convert track. This created a political power struggle within the upper levels of the Reich's military infrastructure and led to gross inefficiency of efforts and assets when the campaign began. Imagine a year in advance to work this out, the net effect is Army Group Center reaching Smolensk with a strong enough logistical support base to continue on towards Moscow with minimal pause (nothing like the supply crisis of July/Aug 1941).

According to Zhukhov the Soviet Union would not have survived the 2nd year of the war without American steel, food and gunpowder arriving when they could not make enough for themselves. So the issue of LL is not how much arrived, but what arrived and when relative to Soviet needs.
Thats a whole different thread to be broken out perhaps.

I'm not talking about oil, just more Axis assets available to pressure the British with. It puts the British in less of a position to assist the Soviet Union.

The combat capability of the Red Army compared to the Axis forces opposing it wouldn't change much in an 11 month period. Both would make favorable changes and the dynamic between them would remain pretty close, however the key issue of the ability to sustain the strategic offensive would be decisive for Army Group Center. In a year the Germans would become more mobile and the Soviets more concentrated west of the Dnieper River, this plays into Axis plans. The counter-attack plan that the Soviets had in place with their three strategic echelons wouldn't be any better coordinated in 1942 than it was in 1941 (I doubt it personally).

 

The primary flaw in German plans whether executed in 1941 or '42 is that they hinge on a sudden collapse of Soviet command structure and will to resist. German victories up to this point (Poland/Denmark/Norway/Low Countries/France/Yugoslavia/Greece) had two things in common. They were against states that were relatively small and were predominatly democratic. Once their deployed armies were defeated and their capitals were within range of German artillery, they had no more room to counter German arms. Further their political make up tended to require them to act in the best interests of their populace.

In the Soviet Union you had a nation that had nearly limitless land to trade for time and a totalitarian government that was convinced that survival of that government was the best interest of the populace.

 

The author(Stolpi) has not only supporters(and that is the euphemism of the year)
Whatever:the (German ) statistics are contradicting Stolpi:
on 30 september,there was a shortage of 1300 Panzer and Sturm Geschuetze,of 25000 PKW and LKW,there were big shortages of MG,Pak,....
For the Pak 3.7cm,the losses for july were 729 ,the replacements:100
Human losses(sickness cases not included) were at 30 september :540000,replacements were 270000.
Thus,the credibility of the quote leaves much to be desired .

 

Agreed, Stolfi's chapter on logistics is severely flawed in its assumptions, calculations and conclusions.

 

I have read Stolfi's Hitler's Pazers East and I must say that his writing style is dense indeed. He often repeats his arguments over and over again. He also seems to rely on small unit actions to bolster his larger arguments. Despite its lack of elegence, the claim that AGC could have reached Moscow before winter seems possible. What happens after that is another issue.

 

The primary flaw in Barbarossa planning was in the assumption that the majority of the Red Army could be destroyed west of the Dnieper River AND the Wehrmacht could move forward beyond Smolensk before the Soviets could recover. The Abwehr did very little intelligence gathering into the strategic depths of Russia to ascertain Red Army dispositions, this led to the flawed logistical support plan.

 

it was of course a flaw,but,the assumption was the only possibility for the Germans to win .If you were the chief of Fremde Heere Ost(I think it was colonel Kinzel),would you go to Hitler and tell him:we have to cancel Barbarossa,because the assumption is wrong :we can not destroy the Red Army west of the Dnepr and we can not move forward beyond Smolensk,before the Soviets can recover ? You know wat happens with messengers of bad news .
Besides:the problem was that,although the Red army was destroyed west of the Dnyepr,the Soviets were able to replace that army with another,the speed of the Russian mobilisation was totally unexpected by the Germans .Simply put,in september,the Germans had te restart Barbarossa,with a weakened army,far from its supply depots .

 

I will never accept this denigerating number (10%) since Zhukov himself didn't put it that low, and the L/L started to diminish in import only after early 1944 when the Soviets had begun to recapture both land and resources it had lost to the Nazis.

The first of the Lend/Lease shipments started arriving in the USSR in late Oct., early Nov. of 1941; before the US was even in the war. That was because L/L stuff which was on its way to Great Britain was diverted to the USSR instead of going to the Brits.

American aid alone, received by the Soviets not just "shipped", looks like this from October ’41 through June ’42 (before the Nazi Stalingrad offensive), NOT counting the military equipment bought outright by gold transfers before and after June, 1941 when FDR un-froze the Soviet assets in America, nor that contributed by the British after the Soviets were included in the Lend/Lease Act. In those nine months alone, L/L and non-L/L shipping totaled:

All aircraft types; 1,285.
All AVF types including tanks; 2,249 (mostly light Stuarts and the sad M3 Lee/Grants).
Machine-guns, all calibers; 81,287.
Explosives, in pounds; 59,455,620.
Trucks, all types; 36,825.
Field telephones; 56,445.
Telephone wire; 600,000 kilometers (375,000 miles).


All BEFORE Stalingrad was attacked!
But this stuff couldn’t have helped Stalin, right? This stuff couldn’t have filled some of the gap the Nazi destruction of Soviet material had created could it?

Despite the overall tank production of the USSR, which exceeded that of Britain 3-4 times, the British sent approximately 14-15% of their total tank production to the Soviets, and this early enough in the war that the British Army had a serious shortage of tanks in North Africa.

The Valentine may have been under-gunned but was actually fairly reliable, and was sent in numbers that approximated those of the Shermans. Canada sent virtually its entire Valentine tank production to the USSR, almost 1,400 tanks – the Valentine on display at the Canadian War Museum is courtesy of the former USSR. And while it's fair to mention the P-39's and P-40's, don't forget the Hawker Hurricane fighter either. BTW Canadian Car and Foundry manufactured almost 1,500 Hurricanes (CCF had been associated with Grumman before the war, switched to producing Curtiss SB2C Helldivers for the USN after the Hurricane run). Lastly, despite the allied L/L material assistance, never overlook the fact that the Soviets won their own war.

The Initial Problems Facing Soviet War Production


At the time of the German invasion on June 22, 1941, the Russian armaments industry was in the process of being modernized and expanded by Stalin's programs of industrialization. This was preparation for, among other things, what Stalin felt was an inevitable conflict with Hitler's Germany. In basic terms this involved the overhauling older Tsarist-era factories as well as building new ones. This was enhanced by negotiating deals with more modern industrial nations such as Germany, Italy and the USA for modern machinery and more efficient manufacturing technologies. Most of the existing industrial plants were in European Russia, but the new factories in the 1930's were built in cities along the length of the Volga River east of Moscow, and especially east of the Ural Mountains. Stalin and his planners felt that they should be out of harm's way, due to the perceived and real fear of invasion. The German invasion did in fact result in many factories that were in western Russia being evacuated east to escape the Axis advance but several were overrun before they could be evacuated.


An additional significant factor affecting production was that the population of the Soviet Union had relatively low education levels and technical expertise, as well as their bureaucratic system of centralized administration. The lack of a consumer driven market economy resulted in a lesser range of materials being produced and particularly effected the development of specialized equipment such as radios, radar and advanced optics. They also needed to further develop western methods of better quality control standards and mass-production techniques.


Soviet Weapons Losses in 1941 (The First Six Months Of The War)


One of the most compelling reasons for Western Allied assistance to the Soviet Union was the incredible heavy losses of weapons and equipment caused by the German invasion. The following few examples illustrate the severity of the Russian losses. The percentage of Weapons available, lost by Soviet Forces during 1941:


56% of all Small-arms and Machine guns.
69% of all Anti-Tank guns.
59% of all Field guns and Mortars.
72% of all Tanks.
34% of all Combat Aircraft.


Approximately 20,000 Tanks and 10,000 Combat Aircraft were lost by Soviet forces in this period.

All of these factors, combined with suffering the above heavy combat losses, obviously caused serious shortfalls of equipment for the Soviet armed forces during their initial year of the war with Germany. From the Western Allied point of view something needed to be done if the Soviets were going to keep up the fight against the Germans. When Stalin met with the Western Allies, after forming an uneasy alliance with them, he asked for their assistance. The British and the Americans both stepped in to keep Russia in the war. This was done even though the Allies and especially the Soviets had been suspicious of each other's intentions since before the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. The existing American program of Lend-Lease was now extended to include the Soviet Union with other nations in the war to defeat the Germans.

Throughout the war attempts by the Western Allies to coordinate war production with the Soviets were also frustrated by Stalin's suspicions and secrecy. The U.S. and British basically agreed that Russians could order what they needed and the Allies would do their best to get the war material to Russia. This was done by direct convoys to Murmansk, overland through Iran, and from Alaska to the Soviet Far East. The large number of cargo ships moving long distances through dangerous waters resulted in the German U-boats and Luftwaffe sometimes extracting a heavy price for getting the material to Russia.

The American and British shipments most notably in the Northern Arctic route resulted in the loss of 58 ships and damage to many others. That was just over 7% of all ships that sailed to the USSR. These shipping losses and damage to others, represented a loss of approximately 5,000 vehicles, 4,000 aircraft and over 200,000 tons of other war materials.

Despite this most of the Lend-Lease materials that were sent in 1941-42 were received when they were needed the most. Additionally, some of the equipment and materials were sent without that much regard as to how useful it would be. While the shipments included much equipment the British and Americans considered to be obsolescent or obsolete, the Russians were for the most part grateful to receive it. Most items were put to use by the Soviets despite disparaging comments about some of the tanks, aircraft and anti-tank guns.

After the war the Soviets through Zhukov were more forthcoming about the more useful items. Explosive materials, 100+ octane aviation fuel, trucks, waterproof telephone wire and radios had in particular played an important part in their war against the Germans.

Earliest Lend-Lease Artillery Shipments


The Russians felt that they had sufficient production of field artillery and mortars, and knew their production would increase due to manufacturing facilities resuming output after being relocated to the Urals and Siberia. They did need AA and AT guns more urgently but after receiving the first shipments of British and American AT guns they were not impressed with them. The Soviets did not request any further numbers of them. The Soviets were however satisfied with the Allied anti-aircraft guns and requested them to supplement the low numbers of Soviet AA guns produced through-out the war. Factors that resulted in desiring Allied AA guns were probably due to receiving them with superior aiming equipment than their own and Soviet difficulties in manufacturing AA guns.


British Gun Shipments Qty. Shipped----Qty. Received
2-Pounder Anti-Tank 636, - 525*
6-Pounder Anti-Tank 96, - 75

U.S. Gun Shipments; Qty. Shipped---Qty. Received
37mm Anti-Tank 63, - 35
57mm Anti-Tank 400, - 375
37mm Anti-Aircraft 424, - 340
40mm Anti-Aircraft 5,595, - 5,400
90mm Anti-Aircraft 270, - 240
*88 - 2-pdr. guns were lost in the sinking of a single July 1942 shipment.

Additionally, the Allies shipped 2,400 miscellaneous field guns and mortars, 81,000 machine guns (both field and aircraft types), and misc. flame-throwers, rifles, pistols, hand grenades and mines.


Lend-Lease Ammunition And Explosives


The Allies supplied 317,000 tons of explosive materials including 22 million shells that was equal to just over half of the total Soviet production of approximately 600,000 tons. Additionally the Allies supplied 103,000 tons of toluene, the primary ingredient of trinitrotoluene (more commonly known as TNT) while Soviet manufacture totaled 116,000 tons. If the Allies had not shipped these amounts of explosive materials, the Soviets undoubtedly would have had even more serious ammunition problems in addition to all their other shortcomings. The Soviet's ammunition shortages, mainly early in the war, caused them to be conservative with artillery shells and reinforced the use of their field guns in direct fire mode. This was done even though it brought greater risk to the artillery crews and their guns. The shortage of radios, field telephones, faulty communications wire further exacerbated the Soviet lack of artillery flexibility until the Allies provided more communications equipment. The Allies shipped, in addition to explosives and ammunition, 991 million miscellaneous shell cartridges to speed up the manufacturing of ammunition.


Lend-Lease Armored Fighting Vehicles


There were differences in opinions as far as lend-lease tanks were concerned. The Kremlin officials were generally happy with them initially to bridge shortfalls between Russian production quotas and their heavy combat losses. The Soviet tankers who used them on the other hand, had a fair share of disparaging comments in particular for the British tanks and the U.S. Grant tank. When the Soviets received some of the more advanced tank models like the M4 Sherman/76 they began to realize that some Allied tanks had some features that were superior to their own. Allied tanks that had a stabilized gun, radio, and were very reliable vehicles made a great impression on the Russians.

Armored Fighting Vehicles in numbers; Shipped---Lost at sea-----Arrived:
Bren Carriers 2,560, - 224, - 2336
M3 Halftracks 1,178, Unknown, - 900 est.
M3A1 Scout Cars 3,340, - 228, - 3,092
M15A1 .37mm AA Guns 100, - 0, - 100
M17 4 X .50 AA Guns 1,000, - Unknown, - 900 est.
T48 57mm A-T Gun Carriage 650, - Unknown, - 575
M10 76mm Tank Destroyer 52, - 0, - 52
M3A1 Stuart 1,676, - 443, - 1,233
Valentine 3,807, - 320, - 3,487
Churchill 301, - 43, - 258
M3A3 Lee/Grant 1,386, - Unknown, - 1,200 est.
Matilda II 1,084, - 252, - 832
M4A2 75mm Sherman 2,007, - Unknown, - 1,750 est.
M4A2 76mm Sherman 2,095, - Unknown, - 1,850 est.


There were at least 417 U.S. Medium Tanks And Halftracks Lost At Sea. A detailed accounting is not available. Total tanks delivered came to approx. 11,000 and 8,000 other AFV's. Soviet total production numbered approx. 98,000 for all AFV's.

Just as a reference - the Germans started Barbarossa on June 22, 1941 with approx. 3,500 tanks and assault guns (including the old PzKw I's).


A point often overlooked is the proportion of tanks that Allied Lend-Lease shipments represented. The British shipped some 14% of its own total tank production to Russia in 1941-1942, when it needed them most for its own forces in the Middle East who were also short of tanks. Most of all Canadian AFV production was also shipped to Russia arriving in the first year and a half of the War when they were sorely needed. These tanks supplemented Soviet production at a critical time. Here are some problems Russians noted concerning the tanks that were sent even though the British did make good use of them in Africa:


A-12 Matilda - Though it had a good reputation as a well-armored vehicle (especially the side skirts), it suffered from being slower than Russians preferred; having poor cross country speed in addition to having a small 2-pounder main gun. The Soviets only used them on a limited basis for this reason.


Mk III Valentine - A design by Vickers that was submitted to the War Office on Valentine's Day In 1938, from where this tank got its name. Mechanically it was one of the most reliable British vehicles ever manufactured, but again suffered from poor cross country speed and the same small 2-pounder main gun. So, here again the Soviets only put it to limited use.

M3 Lee\Grant Tanks - When the United States rearmed in 1940 they saw France overrun by the German panzers and felt they had to build a tank with thick armor and a powerful gun. The tank designers ran into an unforeseen problem, there were not currently any U.S. foundries capable of manufacturing large castings of turrets and hulls in large quantities. So the tank had to be improvised, having a 75mm gun mounted to one side of the body, and a small turret with a 37mm gun. The armor was riveted together due to the casting problem. Unfortunately it was found out if the tank hull was struck by a shell, even if it did not penetrate the armor, it would result in rivets popping off into the interior of the tank. This caused high crew casualties. Additionally the Grant was rather tall and thus an easy German target. The Soviets used it anyway, despite the depressing nickname "a grave for seven brothers". The U.S. eventually solved the casting problem and decided to produced a better medium in the M4 Shermans.

Lend-Lease Motor Transport:

The most important vehicles that the Allies supplied were trucks and jeeps. Soviet manufactured trucks (GAZ-AA) were copies of 1930-era designs and did not have the cross-country abilities of the more modern vehicles provided by the Allies.

The amounts shipped to Russia included; 197,825 - 1 1/2 ton trucks, 210,000 - 2 1/2 ton trucks, 12,000 jeeps and automobiles, 52,000 motorcycles, 4,000 ordinance and fuel hauling vehicles, 8,000 trailers, and 2 million miscellaneous tires.

The Soviets produced an estimated 281,500 trucks (not counting the little GAZ-AA) during the War, and made use of many captured vehicles. The Allies sent just over 400,000 trucks, these higher quality Lend-Lease trucks greatly facilitated Soviets in mounting offensives at a faster pace, that eventually got them to Berlin. Without them they undoubtedly would have had to manufacture trucks instead of AFV's and other equipment, causing the War in the East to be prolonged.

For example: In Koniev's initial offensive in April 1945 to take Berlin, 15,000 of the 18,000 trucks in his Motor Transport Regiments moving ammunition and food around and to the front were Lend-Lease trucks.

Lend-Lease Aircraft And Fuel.

The Soviets produced an estimated 101,000 combat aircraft during the War, supplementing their airforce with an estimated 15,000 following list of Lend-Lease aircraft (this is the closest to the 10% in any of the categories):

Single-Engine Fighters Shipped---Lost In Transit---Arrived

P-39/P-400 Aircobra 4,719, - Unknown, - 3,200 est.
P-40F Kittyhawk 4,017, - Unknown, - 2,975 est.
P-47C Thunderbolt 195, - 0, - 195
P-63 King Cobra 2,456, - 67, - 2,389
British Hurricane 2,952, - Unknown, - 2,250 est.
British Spitfire 1,331, - Unknown, - 1,000 est.

Twin-Engine Aircraft
A-20 Havoc (Various Versions) 2,908, - Unknown - 2,600 est.
B-25 Mitchell 862, - Unknown, - 750 est.
British H-P Hampden 23, - 0, - 23
British A-W 41 Albemarle 14, - 0, - 14
C-47 Dakota Transports 8, - 0, - 8


In addition to these aircraft shipments, the Soviets received some training when the planes arrived, usually when pilots delivered them. All of the arrived numbers are an educated guess, due to incomplete bookkeeping, shipping losses and contradictory sources.

As mentioned earlier the Allies shipped a total of 476,000 tons of 100 octane aviation fuel that was also one of the more important items received. Production of this fuel was necessary to considerably enhance aircraft performance. It required sophisticated refining equipment and advanced techniques of production that the Soviets were short of.

Lend-Lease Military Equipment Misc.
5.5 Million Combat boots
23 million yards of army cloth for uniforms, etc.
Misc. rucksacks, bedding, blankets, tents and cots
Misc. saddles, harnesses and 93,000 tons of jute.

Lend-Lease Communications, Rail and Naval Equipment

Over 2 million feet of waterproof telephone wire sent. This was a very important commodity that requires precise quality control standards. The Russian-made wire on the other hand, was substandard and had a reputation for always having a leak or short in it somewhere. The Lend-Lease cable was considerably more reliable. Since the Russians preferred using wire communications over wireless radios (so the Germans could not listen in on them) it was considered one of the more valuable items.
56,500 field telephones and 245,000 wireless radios for field and vehicle use. 1,000 locomotives and 250,000 tons of steel rails, as well as miscellaneous rail switching and signaling equipment items.

520 Ships, tugs, barges and miscellaneous vessels that included 4 older Capital Ships, 33 Subchasers, 22 Minesweepers and 12 Gunboats. 1,111 - 20mm naval AA guns as well as several hundred torpedoes.

Lend-Lease Misc. Raw Materials, Tooling, Construction And Mfg. Equipment

1.2 million tons of steel in the form of slabs, sheets, tubing and bars, the Allies shipped them enough to make approximately 40,000 medium tanks, i.e. the T-34 (if it had been used for that exclusively). Other misc. Raw metals including 217,000 tons copper ingots, 134,000 tons aluminum sheet and ingot, 48,000 tons lead, 42,000 tons zinc, 29,000 tons tin, and 6,500 tons nickel. They didn’t need much nickel since they had taken the Finn’s mines during the war with them.

Misc. chemicals, lubricants, paint, antifreeze, propane, acetylene, oxygen and 103,000 tons of rubber. 20,000 machine-tools including mills, lathes, grinders, drill bits, industrial diamonds, welding equipment and miscellaneous tools (calipers, scales, drills, hammers, screwdrivers).

Excavators, bulldozers, cranes and electrical equipment. Oil refining equipment. In a real twist of irony, the Japanese sold the Soviets raw latex from Indo-China for metal ores, and the Soviets turned around and shipped it to America in the reverse Lend/Lease arrangement. So during the war, the US got raw latex from Indo-China by way of Stalin.

Lend-Lease Farm Equipment, Food, Cigarettes And Medical Supplies .Farm Tractors, plows, farm Implements (shovels, spades, sledgehammers) and chemical fertilizers. Field Kitchens, cooking pans and utensils. 4.5 million tons of food that included processed meats, wheat flour, prepared rations, preserves, chocolates and at least 12,000 tons of butter.

Cigarettes And Tobacco. Medical Equipment -- instruments, stethoscopes, drugs such as morphine to aspirin for pain relief, antigens, antiseptics and bandages.

Single military samples Sent:
M-1 Rifle, T-10 Heavy Tank, M-24 "Pershing", a DeHavilland Mosquito, B-17 Flying Fortress, B-24 Liberator and misc. other equipment to help the Russians in a technical sense as examples of what the Allies were manufacturing.

Net value for its time in 1940’s U.S. dollars was $ 11,260,343,603.02. This was a smaller number since reverse lend lease is figured into the total. This is NOT 10% of what the Soviets needed or used.

The Soviets sent America rare earth minerals in the holds of returning ships, like Wolfram, Magnesium, Flurospar, and Bauxite. The reverse L/L totals were taken into account. These numbers were verified by Soviet records when the Soviets and later the CIS applied for and were granted IMF loans in the late eighties and early ninties, and their WW2 war debts had to be addressed.

 

It's impressive [& important] but the Soviet Union would most likely have "held on" and eventually prevailed over Hitlerism [without it]

 

The November 1940 gambit with the Soviets was just a ploy to lull Stalin, at the same time Ribbentrop was regaling Molotov with a partnership & dividing the World into spheres of interest, OKW & OKH were planning BARBAROSSA in detail.

Hitler had made up his mind in July '40 to move against Russia.

On July 29th 1940 at his command HQ train ''Atlas'' Jodl revealed to the chiefs of the Army, Navy & Air force the Fuhrer's determination to crush the Soviets.

He asked if something could be done immediately, the Generals said no, attacking Russia could simply not be entertained in the Autumn of '40, troops needed to be re-equipped after the Western campaign, May '41 was the target.

And at the Berghof on 31 July in conference with the military leaders Hitler emphasized that the SU would have to be destroyed according to Erickson.

The German armies requirements for Barbarossa, Ruestungsprogramm-B, were agreed within a framework of Hitlers order to prepare for an attack on the SU. As of August '40, this program was to dictate the output of the German armies economy for the next eight months.

Strategic as well as ideological reasons pushed Hitler East, but the latter dominated his approach to the coming campaign, and coloured his assessment of the SU.
He stated that Asia must be pushed behind the Urals, no vestige of the Russian Empire was to survive West of that point.

Erickson says on 22 August Stalin formally and fiercely disassociated himself and the Soviet command from the Warsaw adventure, thus consigning the Polish insurgency to inevitable death and inescapable destruction.

Perhaps the Red Army did need rest, but Stalin objected to every plea by the Poles for air drops of supplies & if the Red air force couldn't/wouldn't he then refused the British & Americans the right to land in the SU after flying from Italy.

It was unfortunate that just as fascism reared it's ugly head the US had retreated into isolationism & the stock market crash couldn't have come at a worst time, probably saved Hitlers skin.

In 1924 the Nazis polled 1,918,300 votes [6.5%] & 32 seats in the Reichstag.
In 1928 they only polled 810,100 votes [2.6%] & 12 seats, the Nazis were going down the gurgler, but the Wall st crash turned everything around as US banks called in loans & millions of Germans were out of work, after the financial crisis the Nazis went from strength to strength.

Hitler had the luck of the devil at his shoulder throughout his life.

Survived WW1, the Wall st crash saved his political skin, the French let him take back the Rhineland, he said it was the most terrifying time of his life, ''if the French met us with force we would have had to run with our tails between our legs'' he would have probably been kaput there & then.

Then appeasement, Manstein gave him France, Stalin gave him Poland [& almost gave him the USSR]

Plus he survived at least 17 attempts or planned attempts on his life.

His luck finally ran out on 30 April 1945.

Think that covers Suvorovs theory.

 

My two cents .... Hitler had No Choice ... yes he always intended to invade Russia and declared it in Mein Kampf, but the war against Britain forced him to delay that, but when Stalin annexed the eastern part of Romania by ultimatum, and got his army to a distance of just 120 miles from his source of oil in Ploesti, Romania, that's when Hitler realized how dangerous his position was, and that he had to move fast, so although this meant war in two fronts (Britain in the West and Russia in the East), a thing that Germany always wanted to avoid, he ordered his army to prepare to invade Russia as soon as possible.

First; Although some discount the Independent Russian Researcher Suvorov b/c he does not show documents ... dont write him off so quickly .... one must understand russian culture ... first this is an ex Russian Military Intelligence Officer who has nothing to gain in smearing the former communist regime... (I have lived in Russia and worked with Russian Army - Trust me fear still runs deep for revealing the mother's land secrets).

Second; People forget the stated Soviet Red Army's official defining goal was Not national defense but rather global conquest by aggressive global war to bring Communism to power everywhere.


Third; Russia made the deal with Hitler with explicit intention and knowledge that this will start a European war that will first exhaust Germany France and Britain and then the fully prepared Russia will attack Germany and will occupy all of Europe. Stalin clearly explained all that to his government in a meeting on Aug. 19, 1939, in which he told them exactly why Russia is going to sign (four days later) the deal with Hitler's Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, that cleared the way for Hitler to start World War 2.


Finally; The interview of Herman Goering by Major Kenneth W. Hechler USA after the war lends support to the Russian Researchers (Viktor Suvorov and Mark Solonin).... Hechler: "Were Hitler's fears of Russia military or ideological? Did he fear communism's spread or Russia's military might?" Answer by Göring: "Hitler feared a military attack. Molotov made the following demands in February 1941: a second war on Finland, to result in Russian occupation of the entire country; invasion of Romania and occupation of part of the country; strengthened Russian position in Bulgaria; solution of the Dardanelles question (none of us wished to see Russia there); and the question of the Skagerrak and the Kattegat. This made us fall out of our chairs, it was so incredible. This was the last straw ....In November 1940, when the first alarming reports came from the east, Hitler gave his first orders to OKW regarding the steps which would have to be taken if the situation with Russia became dangerous. Provision had to be made for the eventuality of a Russian attack. In March 1941, Hitler made up his mind to launch a preventive attack on Russia as a practical matter. I had favored making more concessions to Molotov, since I believed that if Russia invaded Finland and Romania, the differences between her and Britain and the United States would have become insuperable. Hitler, however, was personally distrustful of Russia all the time and saw in her, with the mighty armaments she had been piling up for 10 years, the great future enemy of Germany".

 

Exactly, but that is how it went historically in 1941. What I am suggesting is a better support plan based on full involvement of the DR in the planning process for sustainment DURING the campaign. This was not done historically, bureaucracy reigned and Army Group Center was left on a much shorter logistical leash as a result.

 

Black6,

I think you are overlooking the massive restructuring that was taking place in 1941. Glantz stated that the Red Army was making a return to the deep battle concept and so many units were being completely reformed, manuals re-written, and new commanders taking over; it was because of this, in addition to German professionalism, that Barbarossa gained spectacular success.

You said the Red Army was still being purged in 1941. But look at when Gen. Rokossovsky was released from his gulag without prejudice and given a combat command--March 1940. Stalin was power hungry and paranoid as ever, but he suspected imminent war with Germany. That the Germans attacked before he was ready threw him into utter confusion, but he knew.

Militarily, time is usually on the side of the defender, because it takes less soldiers and weapons to hold a front than to defend it. Good evidence indicates that the Soviets were steeling themselves for war, not in 1941, but maybe 42 or even 43. If the Germans delayed, they would run into the teeth of Russian strength, and that's always bad.

 

that the OKW and OKH were making plans for a war against the SU,does not prove that 1)Hitler had the intention to attack the SU and 2)if he had the intention,that the decision was taken .
If Hitler had taken in july 1940 the decision to attack the SUthan was his order to demobilize a great part of the army contradictory .
Even on 20 december 1940(!),Hitler ordered that the "schwertepunkt " of the armaments industry was still with the KM and the LW.
"Gemaess den Weisungen des Fuerherbefehls vom 20 december 1940 waren der Durchfuehrung der befohlenen Kriegsmarine-und Luftwaffenruestung als der Grundlage der Fortzetsung des Krieges gegen Grossbritannien fuer die naechtste Zeit alle personellen Massnahmen unterzuordnen".
Source:WFSt/Abt.LIINr.2295/40
The war against Britain still had priority .
My assumption is that the final decision only was taken in the spring of 1941.The offensive and defensive preparations for a war against Britain and the US(quadruplication of the aircraft strength of the LW)would leave Germany defenceless if there was a war with the SU.The possible threat of the SU was excluding a build-up of the KM and the LW for the war against Britain and the US AND the continuing war with Britain (and the increasing threat of the US) was excluding a build-up for a war with the SU .In both cases,there was already a second front .And,if there was-should be -a war with the SU,it had to happen in 1941,because the situation was worsening.
Germany was already in a desperate situation .

 

I doubt that a better support plan was possible.
A good source is ie Deutsche Reichsbahn in World War II (available on the net ):it gives a description of the German difficulties :shortages of water,wood,coal (Russian coal was not suitable for the German locomotives)