Not a what if, but a why did (or why didn't) - Southern France to Northern Italy

I have been looking for the reasons why, after the invasion of Southern France in Operation Dragoon, why didn't either the US 7th or the French 1st Army turn east after going ashore and push into Northern Italy? A large number of Germans formations (10th and 12th Army) could have been cut-off, or forced to rapidly withdraw north which would have broken the stalemate on the Italian peninsula. Then, the British 8th Army and the US 5th Army could have pushed north in pursuit of the withdrawing Germans, changing the scenario in Southern Europe considerable. I understand that Ike's "broad front" theory that was put into practice probably figured greatly into the US 7th and French 1st Army march north, instead of east. Seems to me that things could have been interesting if the move to Northern Italy would have been allowed.

Any help or insight would be greatly appreciated.

 

The Alps? Also I think doing that in a way would negate the intention of the landings; pushing into Italy would be no small task. If they sent troops to Italy then the push north into France would have been considerably weaker, which was considered a more important task

 

Does the Alps extend all the way to the coast of the Mediterrenean? Yes, I could see that such a barrier would hinder movements of an army, which could also mean that it would prevent a German counter-attack from Northern Italy into the flanks of the advancing US 7th and French 1st Armies.

 

The point was to open the port of Marseille and protect the southern flank of 12th Army Group wasn't it? If 6th Army Group turned to Italy, Third Army would be wide open.

 

Yes, I guess y'all are right. I thought it would be a neat plan though....

 

What.....And give Churchill his soft underbelly in force that the Americans always suspected and fought against....Surely this would have negate the arguments and need for landing craft taken away from Med that caused so many hot words. Also why take troops away from Italy initially and the arguments that caused if your going to use them against Italy in another way anyway. Never a starter A58...

 

It still would be a neat plan. An end run is an American tactic anyway. An "end across" would have been better, go in at the Riviera, go right towards Italy, cut across to Austria, then make a post pattern straight to Berlin. TOUCHDOWN - The crowd goes wild!!!!

 

One problem with that A58....Logistic wise...no airfield big enough to fly in coke machines and ice cream...Im doing my running felon act as we speak.

 

Airborne re-supply conducted while on the march my boy. The men will have an extra incentive to move forward when they are informed that extra beer rations are included. Well, that might actually slow down the march a bit. But once the hangover is gone, it's FIREBALL FORWARD!!!!

 

The reason they did not do the maneuver you suggest is because of the unfavorable terrain, as other people mentioned, but primarily because the Italian front was always a secondary front if not almost a "backwater" of the war.
Once Italy quit the war in 1943, it became the first major front on the continent where the allies fought the Germans directly. Unfortunately for the allies, the Italian terrain very much favored the defense. Central and northern Italy is noted for its high mountains and rocky hills, and numerous rivers and streams criss-cross the countryside, making for a very defensible battlefield.

Hitler put Feldmarschall Albert Kesselring in charge of Italy's defense, and Kesselring did a superlative job with minimal resources, and put up a defense that has been described by one book (Time-Life Series) as "of notable economy and skill". With very few men, tanks, guns or aircraft (since the Eastern and later Western fronts consumed the bulk of the German army) Kesselring's forces managed to hold the allies back in Italy almost until the very end of the war.

The allies did not attempt to subdue Italy fom the North because it was probably impractical, and unecessary. The real prize was Germany itself and ultimately, Berlin. To divert even more allied forces to what was regarded as a secondary theatre would have been considered as simply taking away from the main effort, the conquest of Germany itself.

Another important reason may have been that, it was already 1944 and the British and American leadership knew their citizens were already getting very war weary - any mucking about would have been avoided since, with Germany obviously on the ropes, the politicians now had to take public opinion into account.

 

In addition to that map from Lou, check out this one from the Military Academy which show the topographical layout, as well as the landing and advancement and defensive areas for both allies and axis.

Goto:

http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2 europe/EuropeanTheaterGIF/WWIIEurope67.gif

The whole southern landing area sort of "funneled" up the river between two mountain/high lands with little established land traffic road or rail.

 

Thanks for all the input guys, now I know why they did what they did, or didn't do what they shouldn't oughta do sort of....I think....

So, now I know why the US didn't pursue the Northern Pacific Strategy, by invading Japan from Alaska and the Aleutions, and now I know why the Allies landed in Southern France and rapidly advanced up the Rhone River Valley enroute to Germany. Man, now if y'all can help me find my car keys....

 

3rd pocket on trousers...next to pump action shot gun. Your wife just phoned me to tell you...And she needs some bread from the mall on way home y'all

 

Thousands of comedians out of work these days and Mr. Funnyman wants to be a stand-up comic....

 

First, as others have mentioned, there's that tiresome principle that you never get something for nothing; devoting troops and resources to this operation means taking them away from the advance up the Rhone valley and ultimately from Eisenhower's front, where for most of the campaign he had no more divisions on line than the Germans. The Allies' big bugaboo once they broke out from Normandy was logistics, and it was essential to get ports like Marseilles open and supporting the main front as expeditiously as possible.

Secondly, if the Allies wished to make a major effort to break into the North Italian plain, by the time of Dragoon in August 1944 their armies in Italy had reached the latitude of Florence. If they wanted to devote several additional divisions to fighting through a range of mountains, they could have had the three American and five French divisions withdrawn for southern France continue the offensive where they were. Pulling out these forces is often blamed for giving the Germans time to establish themselves in the Gothic Line. The air support given to Dragoon would also be available.

I'd also question whether the Allies could land in southern France, fight their way through the Alps, and advance down the Po Valley in time to cut off the German armies in Italy which, at that point, were in the northern Appenines. The Po Valley is constricted between the Alps and Apennines and features several rivers that could provide Kesselring a series of fallback positions. Most likely he would continue to be slowly pushed back.

Another option if clearing northern Italy was the priority would be to land on the Italian Riviera in the vicinity of Genoa. This would save having to fight through the mountainous Franco-Italian border region.

 

I wonder if clearing Northern Italy would have been better than going into Southern France. The port of Marseilles was extremely valuable in keeping the logistical line going, but wouldn't taking Marseilles been a moot point if the Scheldt Estuary had been cleared and Antwerp taken sooner? Since we are supposing and wondering here, that at least warrants a few minutes of consideration I think.

Of course that leaves German forces in Southern France to be dealt with as opposed to larger amounts of German forces on the Italian Peninsula that could be cut off and put in the bag. The Germans in Southern France would have more than likely withdraw to the north to avoid being cut off as they did when they pulled out of Greece when the Russians were advancing in the Balkans. That would only strengthen the German's defensive line along the West Wall though, which would cause SHAEFE to re-think their strategy in the latter part of 1944 (give Patton the ball!).

Anyway guys, please apply input where needed.

 

From memory Even with Antwerp recieving at full capacity there is not enough incoming supply to support 21st & 12th Army Groups at full offensive capacity in the winter & spring. And, certainly not three AG totalling seven Armys, plus French civil requirements. Marsallies was needed to make up the balance.

Plus capturing the Po River basin is not going to knock Germany out of the war. Capturing the Ruhr pretty much will. Ikes primary goal was to take the Ruhr. Places like Bavaria, Berlin, Rome, Paris... were al secondary or third hand objectives.