What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?

All these posts are starting from the (IMHO unproved) point that MG could succeed,but that there was some one on the allied side who was bungling the whole thing

Speculation is by definition unproved, but it's equally speculative to insist that the operation couldn't possibly succeed no matter what was done differently. I for one would enjoy a rational debate of some of the suggestions I and others have made.

 

but were unwilling to risk a company six miles from its parent division.

You'll get no argument from me for one there cannonade. And I agree with the caution implications you state.

The reason why the paras today, don't hang about. I cannot compare at all the thought of stalled para bn at Wolfheze at night stopping...for any reason...And compare it to later years 2 para at night in contact with Argies and their following reaction of getting on..move...

Lessons were learned...

 

In my post, I specified Montgomery as this was his plan and he was the Commander, hence the decisions were up to him. The truth is that the old axiom is true in this case that No plan in war survives in its entirenty upon contact with the enemy.
I also believe that one thing that the Germans had in their favor was the use of Kampfgruppes. They were able to react quickly and send units directly where they were needed and put together to fit the needs of that particular situation. This was common on the eastern Front and by policy in the German Army as a whole.

 

Refer to post 153 above. The Acting Wing Commander covers it well.

However, I do whole-heartily agree with your last statement about plans not surviving in their entirety upon contact with the enemy. Omaha Beach comes to mind with that axiom. When thing go bad, a lot of "making it up as you go along" comes into play.

 

My answer is :nothing .Why would a defeat mean that there was something wrong with the operation ?

 

Depends if in the operational orders, it states the aim of the operation is to achieve certain objectives and bring the enemy to defeat...I think the operational orders are quoted in Urqharts book but I can't remember them. If we didn't meet the objectives stated in the operational orders then I think that can be classed as a failure.

 

Well,there is a tendency to say that,if an operation failed,there was something wrong:faultly planning,faultly execution,etc.That's neglecting that in any operation,there are 2 players,and that the success or failure of an operation also is depending on the enemy:his reactions,his planning,his strength.
Thus,it is possible that the planning and the execution of an operation were leaving nothing to be desired,but,that still the operation failed.

 

Not that this has anything to do with the question of the original poster, but I think the mission should have been scrubbed altogether and the Scheldt Estuary cleared first. Supplies were not getting to the front quick enough for the Allied Forces as they moved towards the German frontier.

 

Not even I am going to defend Montgomery from the daft comment he made post-bellum about Market-Garden : 'It was 95% successful'.

Which is rather like being 95% pregnant......

 

Yes, being that close only counts with hand grenades and thermo-nuclear warfare.

 

Thus,it is possible that the planning and the execution of an operation were leaving nothing to be desired, but that still the operation failed.

That's a good general observation; certainly sometimes you can do everything right, everything humanly possible, and still fail; but I don't see Market-Garden in the "nothing to be desired" category. There were a number of things which might have made a difference and which seem feasible enough to be legitimate topics for consideration.

M-G's criterion for succes was more clear-cut than many operations of war - either there was an exploitable bridgehead across the Rhine or there was not. "90% successful" is like saying a daredevil jumped 90% of the way across the Grand Canyon........

A-58's comment is also true; even if the bridgehead had been achieved (including a bridge) and "Hell's Highway" leading to it secured, the advance would soon have faltered for lack of supplies, as was happening to Allied spearheads across the front.

 

The Military Channel's The Lost Evidence: Operation Market Garden (HD - FULL 45 Minute Film)
- enjoy it while it lasts! Features lots of reenactors (I often wonder if anyone here recognizes themself!)
and computer generated effects to fill in blanks.

[video=youtube;rxbCt1B6wNA]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rxbCt1B6wNA[/video]

 

I saw an interesting comment that Monty was still pouting over not being in overall command and that he did not apply himself to the planning in his normal way.

 

Indeed Montgomery did not apply himself to the planning of Market-Garden in the normal way : he was effectively given just seven days in which to prepare. Weeks had been devoted to the airborne landings in Sicily, months to the D-Day drops. 'Comet' had to be hastily re-arranged and the problems of logistics and resupply were never adequately covered.

'Monty sulking' is yet another bit of routine Monty-bashing.

 

he did spend far too much time crying over his not being left in command, so I do wonder.

 

Have only read a little bit of it but from what I know of MG, There was also a political need to finish the war ASAP, Before Christmas...

Some fault should lay with Monty and Eisenhower but not the full blame, There is plenty of blame to go around to many of the military and political people involved with MG.

Using what amounted for most of it a single road to advance along really put them in a dangerous position, They should have realized that the Germans wouldn't need there entire army to stop/hold them up, At times even a dozen AT guns with a few hundred men were able to bring there entire advance to a screeching halt that required massive air power and in some cases several hours to get past. Simple matter is the Netherlands was never a land suited for fast moving warfare, Something that the air borne needed so that they wouldn't have been chewed up behind enemy lines.

 

It is interesting that the Dutch high command had a test for its candidates the exact same problem and there were two routes and the one Monty chose was the wrong one and resulted in a failing grade. I believe Monty deserves the blame because it was his operation and the buck stopped with him

 

Hey guys,Was the plan to sweep east,behind the Ruhr strait away.?Or was the plan to attack due north to the zunder sea,to cut off the German 15th army(or it's remnants)first.? I've seen both plans on different sites,so I can only assume that'supplies'were one big problem,as other posters have said.any ideas.? Cheers,Lee.

 

I always had the impression that whatever the official plan may have called for, a drive east towards Berlin was Monty's primary choice. To be fair Patton probably had the same Idea as well. I suspect Ike would have favored the destruction of the 15th Army first.

 

According to Ellis, which quotes a 21 Army Group order of 14 September 1944, the objective of Second British Army appeared to be encircling the Ruhr industrial region in conjunction with US First Army. Page 27.

Source note is: M.525 [HS/21AG/COS/A/8.I]