FDR and the oil embargo.

I think you are also forgetting America's anti-colonial/imperialist stance. We had something called the Open Door policy from the Spanish-American war until the Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931, and was sort of set up to keep the status quo in place without expansion of influence in the Far East by ourselves and others. After then (1931), it seems to me the two Chinas (Nationalist/Communist) were not supported in any meaningful fashion by the American government. The Nationalists were semi-supported by many private citizens (Christian missionary groups), and industiralists, but not by the government of either Hoover or Roosevelt.

Selling "arms" to the Chinese while they were involved in their civil war would be a hard sell, no matter which one we sold to if we even could convince the congress to fund the production of the arms (unlikely) while at peace. The Chinese civil war and later invasion of China by Japan were NOT seen as reasons to increase our military spending nor to involve ourselves on the Chinese mainland. America had very limited interests in China at the time. The Chinese had walked out of the Versailles peace treaty while it was still in the works, and American Chinese relations hadn't really improved all that much until the Japanese invaded. Even then we (America) looked at it as a 'non-event" until the USS Panay and three Standard Oil tankers were sunk in 1937. The Japanese apologized "for the error" and paid over $2.2 million in gold as a "fine". America accepted the money, and once again ignored what was goine on in China.

We didn't feel it was any of our concern. And we are straying far away from the original topic here I think.

 

Hello brndirt1,

not at all. With the above statements you are backing up my thoughts or interpretation of Americas committment or awarness towards Japan.

It was only after the Japanese had secured the Chinese coastline and eyed onto the leftover European colonies that FDR realized that war with Japan was inevitable.
And as such he got ready for a war, the first step being embargos on vital war materials, the second step...well the Japanese were faster.

Regards
Kruska

 

Why is it ALWAYS assumed that the U.S. government wanted to go to war?

The Government was reaping the benefits of European war anyway, by marketing their military products. Factory orders from the United Kingdom of Great Britain were going to guarantee American jobs (and votes for FDR) without sending anyone off to fight on the other side of the globe.

Japanese conquests in China were pure optimisim, taking advantage of a murderous Civil War. I often wonder whether the Japanese government would have gone to war in China at all without the already established conflict in progress destabilizing the region. The largest monetary investors in the China region were, and had been since the Boxer Rebellion, American business interests. When a former ally, Japan, begins to junk these commercial interests in a miltary fashion, the only possible response is a miltary one, because the diplomats have already failed.

It is always assumed, furthermore, that Japanese militarism in China was destined for success. I have tried to figure this in, and it just doesn't make sense either. I feel that the Japanese Army was finding that they may have bitten off more than they could chew in China, and that once Chiang Kai-Shek solved his economic problems, that more and more Japanese troops were going to find themselves swallowed up, never to return....but only possible with American help. The best way to help China get back on it's feet was to undermine Japanese interference.

 

I have said this twice before, so please read carefully. Manchukuo was not included in any part of the Hull note. What Hull told Nomura was that the puppet government in Nanjing had no authority to rule over China. In an April 16th meeting Hull told Nomura “The question of non-recognition of Manchuria would be discussed in connection with the negotiations and dealt with at this stage, and that this status quo point would not, therefore, affect ‘Manchukuo,’ but was intended to apply to the future from the time of the adoption of a general settlement.”

Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan by Herbert P. Bix pg. 603

Togo implied that the government was forced to opt for war after it had carefully studied the “Hull note.” In fact there was (and is) no record of such an examination. What Togo sought to obscure in addition to the professional incompetence of his Washington diplomats, was that Hull had never challenged Japan’s continued control of Manchukuo; and that he, Togo, might have, but did not, insist on postponing war with the United States at that time by making Hull’s document a focus for negotiations.

Tojo and the Coming of War by Robert Butow
Footnote on page 344

It would seem, therefore, that Japanese statements asserting that the Hull note was all the more unacceptable because it demanded that Japan sever its ties with Manchukuo should not be taken seriously.

 

The Japanese Army definitely was preparing for war. I believe the final push of the war button was to elect Tojo as PM. Was it possible to negotiate through Konoe as he was the PM steps for peace? Or was the Army too strong. naturally the emperor decides but was Konoe considered a puppet without any diplomatic power by the US? And left thus the keys of war to Tojo who obviously was Emperor´s trusted man. Just like Hitler had his "Yes men" and did not listen to those who had a realistic view of the situation.

Fumimaro Konoe - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Konoe justified his demission to his secretary Kenji Tomita. "Of course his Majesty is a pacifist and he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war was a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: 'You were worried about it yesterday but you do not have to worry so much.' Thus, gradually he began to lead to war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more to war. I felt the Emperor was telling me: 'My prime minister does not understand military matters. I know much more.' In short, the Emperor had absorbed the view of the army and the navy high commands."

 

Hello mikebatzel,

you got to help me on this one

AFAIK Manchuria and Manchukuo are the same thing.
Manchuria
View attachment 10941
Manchukuo
View attachment 10940
So if I read your blue text,
“The question of non-recognition of Manchuria would be discussed in connection with the negotiations and dealt with at this stage, and that this status quo point would not, therefore, affect ‘Manchukuo,’ but was intended to apply to the future from the time of the adoption of a general settlement.”

So the question of non-recognition of Manchuria would be discussed - but this would not affect Manchukuo ?

If I would be a Japanese, then I would be very confused now

Regards
Kruska

 

.
The Hull note stated that the Nationalist government was to be the solely recognised government of China. Manchuria is indisputably part of China. How does Japan lay claim to ruling a part of China when Japan has just formally agreed there was to only be one government for all of China?
.

.
It’s a moot point. If the United States wants to avoid war with Japan then it makes a realistic offer intended to do so; the US looks the other way in China for the time being and the Japanese are to find an excuse not to declare war when the US enters the European conflict. And if Japan spurns this offer and attacks, then so be it - the US has lost nothing.

 

Hi Kruska. You are correct in that they are the same. Non recognition would be discussed, yes, but a return to status quo in China would not include Manchukuo. Hull's statement includes two separate topics in a single sentence. Hope that helps.

 

Hello mikebatzel,

that is what I ment, by saying if I would be Japanese........

Hull is telling me to retract my Nanjing issue and after I (Japanese) give up on it, then the US want's to further talk with me (Japanese) about Manchukuo.

Well, if I would be Japanese I would tell him to F*** of (in diplomatic Japanese ) and send my fleet secretly to a big naval base of his in the Pacific, and Hull could wire back to FDR "Mission accomplished as wanted"

Regards
Kruska

 

During a conversation with Secretary Hull on November 20 the Japanese
Ambassador presented a proposal reading as follows...........

[in part]


"1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to
make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern
Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-
China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.


"2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace
between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in
the Pacific area.

"In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to
remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of
the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final
agreement.


"3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a
view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which
the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.


"4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to
restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the
freezing of the assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required
quantity of oil.


"5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such
measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the
restoration of general peace between Japan and China."


Hull mulled over this modus vivendi [in part]........



Full consideration was given by officials of our Government to a
counterproposal to the Japanese note of November 20, including the
thought of a possible modus vivendi.
"The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute
to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to
afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the
Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of
peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the
Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the
Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus
vivendi, as follows:



"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan,
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their
national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace
throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs
therein.

"2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they
have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force
into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern
or the northern Pacific area.

"3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its forces
now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those
forces; to reduce the total of its force in French Indochina to the
number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land,
or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise.

"The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the
position of the Government of the United States with regard to the
presence of foreign troops in that area.

"4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify
the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the
extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the
United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their
peoples:

"(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the
sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the
purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at
Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese
obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds
in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood
that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of which in
transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption
of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States.

"(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows:

"(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided
for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two
Governments may agree.

"(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such
limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of
commodities in short supply in the United States.

"(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in
value per month.



"(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations
the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in
short supply in the United States.

"(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of
petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a
monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum
to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined
after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is
understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the
operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting,
heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses.

"(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and
additional commodities added by agreement between the two Governments as
it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering
the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the
Pacific area.

"The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application
of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary
to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as
provided for in paragraph 4 above.

"6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach
the Australian, British, and Dutch Governments with a view to those
Governments taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph 4
above.

"7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China,
the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in
reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the
Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions
and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and
exemplify the fundamental principles of peace law, order, and justice,
which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between
the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and
which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area.

"8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of 3 months
with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance
of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful
settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the
modus vivendi for a further period."

The tentative modus vivendi was submitted for consideration to the
Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China.



But instead presented the Japanese with this [in part].........




"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose
to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British
Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and
the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American,
British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai Governments an
agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to
respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event
that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of
Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking
such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the
threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the
Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential
treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would
use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of
treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and
police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
not support-militarily, politically, economically-any government or
regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of
China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China,
including rights and interests in and with regard to international
settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of
1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British
and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China,
including rights in international settlements and in concessions and
under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and
Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation
treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including
an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will
respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the
unite States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the
dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose,
half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has
concluded with any third power or powers shall he interpreted by it in
such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this
agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the
Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other
governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic
political and economic principles set forth in this agreement."


Makes you scratch your head doesn't it??

Hull's efforts range widely among historians, from lauding his work as strong and necessary to deriding it as overly aggressive and war-inciting.

Take your pick!

 

Hello ANZAC,

Good information - thanks.

That Hull/FDR presented Japan with demands that were unaceptable to them is understood. On the other hand why should the US let the Japanese roam and murder around in Asia, especially in China.

Maybe the US thought that the Japanese would indeed recognize, what it would mean to get into a war with the US - obviously the Japanese government did not realize this, or the Japanese had plans in regards to a military confrontation with the US that for some reason besides Pearl never became reality.

Regards
Kruska

 

Once Tojo was PM just how many peace-loving people were there in the Japanese top politicians to tell the emperor how to run the situation...?

 

.
One of the oldest tricks in the book is to come up with a proposal that looks reasonable, and then send it out to a, “committee” to be butchered. I write a draft, “My proposal is to allow the Japanese to conquer China”. I then send my draft to every department and allied government I can think of (the more the merrier), who promptly gut it with an avalanche of reservations and objections. I then go with a document which accounts for all of these objections instead of my original proposal. My intention was to make these reservations all along, but I want to blame everyone else for my actions and take as little responsibility personally as possible.

 

.
Here’s an interesting example of this ambiguity in action. Toland from 133 to 135 details were American were mistranslating Japanese diplomatic instructions, and then Hull was acting upon the assumption that the inaccurate versions being decrypted by US intelligence were true. For example, Togo wrote,
.
“The situation both within the country and outside the country is extremely pressing and we cannot afford any procrastination. Out of the sincere intention to maintain peaceful relations with the United States, the Imperial Government continues the negotiations after thorough deliberations. The present negotiations are our final effort and the security of our nation depends on it. Now that we make the utmost concession in the spirit of complete friendliness for the sake fo peaceful solution, we hope earnestly that the United States will, on entering the final stage of the negotiations, reconsider the matter and approach this crisis in a proper spirit with a view to preserving Japanese-American relations.”
.
But the US translated it as,
.
“Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relations between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more upon the continuance of the parlays, but this is our last effort. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship: this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States.”
.
As Obrana Pointer will no doubt suggest, Hull’s version was an unfortunate mistranslation of the Japanese original, with difficulties in the subtleties of the Japanese diplomatic language causing problems. The difficulty with that explanation is that the translations seemed always to be making these Japanese documents look more sinister. Never accidental translations that made them look more reasonable. If mistranslation were really the problem, then about 50% of the time the mistranslation would have flattered the Japanese, just by random chance.
.
As anyone who has done a parts inventory can tell you, if people are being honest then you may have too many or too few of a specific part number on the shelf, but over the course of the entire inventory your overages will tend to balance out your underages. If you are always under, then it ain't no accident; someone is stealing.
.
So I guess the question I ask is, were these mistranslations an unfortunate accident that just happened to always do the Japanese a disservice, or did Hull prefer the mistranslated intercepts on his desk?

 

Hi Kruska!

It probably went beyond Japanese expansionist aims in China.

EVERYONE had been running roughshod over the Chinese since the 19th century & The Japanese had been pursuing their expansionist policies on the mainland since defeating the Russians in '05 with the admiration of both President Roosevelt & the Wall St bankers who helped finance Japans war [according to Costello] & since '31 [in Manchuria] & killing Chinese by the tens of thousands since '37, culminating with the Nanking atrocity in '38.

The catalyst was Hitlers war in Europe leaving British & Dutch colonies in the East vulnerable & tying down the USSR.

From a Japanese viewpoint it was a once in a lifetime chance to help themselves to British & Dutch controlled rubber & oil in Malaya & the East Indies & further the establishment of the "Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

The problem was what would the US do?

Interesting, haven't read any of Tolands books, is that from 'Infamy' 'The Rising Sun' or other?
What did you think of it?

 

If it was to avoid war, all it had to do was agree to the Japanese note of November 20! It's doubtful if the Japanse would accept anything less. " -the US has lost nothing" except its 'good name' by accepting Japanese hegemony in the western Pacific, and becoming an ally in all but name of the Japanese in the conquest of China.