The only country in the world with a decent motor vehicle industry in those days was the US, they produced about 4 million motor vehicles per year, more than 10 times Germany's production. Germany's motor vehicle industry was in its embryonic stage by the start of WW2, rougly in the same level as the US's motor industry was at the start of WW1. Considering that they had such small motor vehicle industry, plus, very little oil, a massive 300 division army, they couldn't motorize their entire army.
The USSR and France in 1940 had similar levels of mechanization. The fact was that only the US could deploy a large and fully mechanized army in those days. Britain had a fully mechanized army, however, their army was quite small compared to the German or Soviet armies.
I know what the point of the Thread is. All I mentioned in passing is that other countries also used horses, not on the same scale as the Germans did. Nor did I state That other countries used more horses then the Germans Did. Yes It was astonishing since you figured we would of evolved from WWI. Plus I posted Pictures of Germans and one of the US Calvary 1945 in Germany since I liked the Picture.
WOW, I would've never guessed that 80% of the German army was horse-drawn. I would have most likely guessed around 40-50% of the German army was horse-drawn. Thanks for the interesting and resourceful thread, sniper1946.
I think I remember from the book Enemy at the Gates (not that horrible movie of the same name) it was mentioning about the German army being mostly horse drawn and the German troops stuck in the Kessel after Operation Uranus did killing and eating their horses before they ate each other.
This question is debatable enough and as it eventually turned out, it did prove critical to the war's result. Can we have some stats as to what % of the armies of the other countries, esp the allies were motorized? On a personal note, i feel that Germany was justified in going to war with just 20% of motorized support, for the simple fact that Germany was in a major financial crisis in the 1930s and only after Hitler came to power, did she some how manage to regain some financial footing. At that point in time in 1939, the nation would have to feed a 3 million member Wehrmacht and it could not have gone on indefinitely mobilizing funds towards the war effort. So, probably from that perspective Horses were better off than motorized divisions [ to support motorized divisions]. Also, Germany did not have much of fuel resources of her own. She imported fuel (ironically, most of it from Russia - which was eventually cut off after Barbarossa 1941) and most of German fuel produced later was synthetic fuel under the command of armaments minister Albert Speer.
this is a debate on this issue, regards, ray.. Axis History Forum • View topic - German vs. Allied war-making potential
The US and Commonwealth were essentially 100% mechanized / motorized. 'Leg' infantry formations still marched for the most part but could be lifted, and frequently were, by available motor transport when the situation called for it. Both only had formations using horses when they deemed this advantageous. Britain started the war with one cavalry division in the Middle East that was quickly disbanded. The US had two. One, the 2nd, was disbanded in North Africa and broken up. The 1st Cavarly division only operated dismounted and by late war was almost undistinguishable from a standard infantry division. The 10th Mountian made some use of pack animals in their specialist role too. The French had about 25% motorization but, their doctrine was primarily defensive so their use of horses was not a major problem for them. And, yes, it did prove crucial to the outcome of campaigns. For example, the second (1942) summer offensive of AGS in Russia was hobbled by lack of motor transport. Because the Germans couldn't push or repair the rail system in Russia fast enough this campaign right from the start was relying on a German version of the Red Ball Express. By the time AGS reached Stalingrad they were nearly 300 miles from the nearest rail head. Virtually all motor transport outside panzer divisions in AGS was turned over to hauling supplies forward. Horse drawn transport was used tactically as it could not possibly cope with moving supplies 300 miles forward. The Italians were hobbled by their lack of motor transport in North Africa. The Germans there devoted a huge amount of available transport to moving supplies forward. This was in part due to their inability to clear and restore ports to operational service. So, it really isn't lack of motor vehicles alone that cripples the Germans strategically. It is a combination of lack of motorization, lack of mechanized engineering equipment to restore roads and infrastructure quickly, and an operational tempo that was beyond what their army could often handle logistically.
This explains a little bit of the discrepancy between the US of A and the rest of the world as to "automobile" production. In January of 1940 it was reported in Time magazine that: In Detroit last week General Motors Corp. celebrated an event that has yet to happen in any other nation: off Chevrolet's assembly line rolled the 25,000,000th General Motors car. Meanwhile, older mass-producer Ford was nearing its 28,000,000th; and younger mass-producer Chrysler had passed its 7,500,000th. All together, all motor makers of all other nations combined have yet to build their 19,000,000th car. See: MOTORS: It Can Happen Here - TIME
The Germans also benefited from having horses to eat during the siege of Budapest, when IX SS Cavalry Corps was surrounded.
The world total of personnel cars in 1928 was :29638535,of which 25.523.779 in the US. In 1939 :42.834.465 of which 29.705.220 in the US In 1947:44.887.058 of which 33.233.975 Source :The (Dutch Winkler Prins Encyclopedia )