Pearl Harbor and then??

formerjughead;

What? , i..it...its..n ...no..not...true?!!

Allright, so you would tend to go for conclusion 1, which I could follow on as well as on conclusion 2. But I still feel that both conclusions-or reasons- lack this "grand strategy" - why?

I hope that I am not driving you nuts - but this "missing" grand strategy just keps bugging me.

Regards
Kruska

 

Well, I would tend to believe that there are documents and warplans from Yamamoto, the chief of Staff. or the war cabinet in regards to a "grand strategy" towards Indonesia and the British in regards to Malaya and Singapore.
The Japanese advance towards Burma and India clearly shows that the Japanese knew that just defeating or attacking the British at Singapore couldn't win the war, as such they continued against the British.

Bringing the war to them via Burma and India, instead of waiting for the British to build up and strike at them what? 2 -3 years later.

So did the Japanese act according to a devised plan as part of an overall strategy or meerly by gut feelings?

Where (if so) is the plan or strategy in regards towards the USA - besides attacking a naval base?

The answer if at all - could only be found in Japanese documents - and this is from where my question originates from:

Any documents found on this issue? or how come nobody seemed to be bothered in asking the Japanese after the war - in order to find out.

Regards
Kruska

 

The traditional Japanese plan for war with the US anticipated a Naval rather than land war. Although the Japanese were ahead of most in regard to carrier operations, they were still wed to the notion of a "decisive battle" between naval forces that would decide the conflict, in other words, they were preparing to re-fight the Battle of the Japan Sea. Traditions die hard.

The traditional IJN plan for war against the US was:

• Put its weight behind an attack on the Philippines.
• The US fleet woul sortie to come to the aid of the Philippines.
• The IJN would use submarines and aircraft based in the Marianas, Carolines, etc. to attrit the US fleet enroute, to bring it down to parity or better with the IJN fleet.
• The US fleet would then be engaged in waters near Japan and destroyed in a "decisive battle"

The Japanese believed the the US, with its fleet destroyed, would have no choice but to accept peace leaving Japan's territorial acquisitions intact. It was going to be a short war.

Yamamoto's plan to preemptively strike the US fleet at Pearl Harbor would immediately attrit the US fleet and make it all the more certain that the IJN would prevail in the decisive battle that they expected to fight.

The Japanese strategy was really rather simple, and simplistic. Although not officially involved in the European war, the US was already involved via Lend-Lease and the Japanese expected the US would become fully involved. They did not think the US could successfully pursue war on two fronts. Japan would prevail in a short war and gain what they had not been able to in diplomatic negotiations with the US.

 

Hello mcoffee,

please don't get me wrong, but the above statement IMO is an assumtion based on what? did Yamamoto or the war cabinet publicly express this?

We are still turning in circles - I didn't have time yet to read up on OP's posted sources "MacArthur Shogunate" etc.

Regards
Kruska

 

There are many sources that discuss Japan's war plans. OpanaPointer mentioned "The Reluctant Admiral". It goes into much detail of the IJN's plans over the years for war against the US as well as Yamamoto's plan for Pearl Harbor. "Eagle Against The Sun" also discusses Japan's strategy for war.

With all due respect, I think you are attempting to make it more complicated than it really was.

 

OP,
maybe this "mongrel Americans" is more of propaganda value rather then the true estimation of the Japanese leadership towards the US.
Vis versa IIRC the Americans had also the viewpoint in the 30's about the Japanese not being able to fly aircraft - (no sense of balance, due to being carried as babies on the back of their mothers)
It didn't prevent the US from stationing a/c in the Pacific though.

The final blow - yes in Bushido, but in their military campaigns? were did they deliver a final blow to whom during 1937-41?

The Japanese had seen what America was able to do from 1901 - 1940 in military and economical aspects. They were not blind towards this - even if propaganda suggests this.

My grandfather and greatgrandfather had strong industrial and military contacts to Japan from 1890 - 1955, and from their records or stories I never got the impression that they were a bunch of Samurais believing rather in the power of the sword then technology.

Due to this (maybe I am wrong) I tend to outrule this "blind bushido issue" towards the US or Europe.

Regards
Kruska

 

Kruska, in one communication with his superiors back in Tokyo, while he was stationed in D.C. as Naval attache, Yamamoto expressed his distain for the USN as it existed at the time. Not the weapons themselves, but the officers and political leaders who commanded the Navy. I believe his words were something to the effect of "cocktail swilling, golfers" (or something) who would rather play a second set of nine holes than address any strategy meetings. Yamamoto had also attended and graduated from the Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island before 1922 in their 10 month course for foreign officers.

Yamamoto and Kurabayashi both admired the US production capacity, but held the leadership of America of the time in distain. Of course, this was in the twenties. But, "first impressions" and all that.

 

Hello brndirt1,

you are correct on the assessment of the Japanese mindset towards the Americans in regards to their indiviual military performance - Yamamoto had been naval attachee in the US for IIRC about 4 years. His perception was shared for example by most of the Germans incl. Hitler. I would say this mindset also applied to the British in viewing onto their cousins.

Hitler and the majority of the Germans had no high regards towards the Americans on behalf of soldiers or soldiers conduct - however they were very well aware about Americas industrial and thus military might.
The same would apply to the Japanese. The Japanese especially due to their relationship to Germany and contacts to Europe were just informed about everything the Germans knew or kept in their records in regards to the Americans.

For example both the Japanese and Germans (incl. my grandfather) studied and evaluated also US technology on behalf of machinery, steel, weaponary and ammunition. In the 30's especially late 30's he was many times in Japan mostly with Sumitomo Shōji the Uraga Company and Mitsubishi Shokai, he had very explicit contacts with the Taisei Yokusankai party and the Yokusan Shonendan. He was well aquainted with Count Yoriyasu Arima - the "baseball Japanese".

These Japanese Zaibatsus also had diverese subsidaries and employees in Europe and in the States. They knew very well about the issues of industrialization and economics. Yamamoto or a General Yamashita were anything else but dumb samurai wielding japs the same would apply to Prince Fumimaro Konoe or Hideki Tojo.

That during the manifold revolutions times, extreme elements killed woman for smoking or killed people wearing western clothes does not stand for a general example of Japans attitude towards the West. Every businessman or Japanese with international background in the 30's and 40's wore Western clothes without getting killed.

My Greatgrandfather cooperated with and faught against the Japanese in the time from 1890 - 1920. The Japanese line infantryman and their officers lived the bushido tradition in all aspects, however the higher Japanese ranks knew very well about what was going on in this world.

From what I have read so far, I tend to believe that the insight knowledge of the Japan in the 30's from many posters here is strongly tainted by US pre-war propaganda views and wrong assertions towards Japan.

That the Japanese military attitude towards the US and anybody else can be termed arrogant can't be denied - so was the Wehrmachts attitude against their enemies - but it does not excuse or explain a missing Japanese "general strategy" towards their enemies.

Regards
Kruska

 

Not driving me nuts at all, As much as this topic swirls around my head. Both sides knew they would eventually face off in a genuine shooting war. The big question of course was who would strike the first blow. Whoever strikes the first blow will control the tempo, of the conflict, for the first few months. Japan woould use that time to gain as much territory and solidify control over it while the US planned it's response. I don't think the raid at Pearl Harbor was meant to be a "death blow" to the US Navy, just a solid shot to the jaw to take it's legs away temporarily while Japan solidified it's control over the Pacific and established forward supply points.

It is a well known fact that the Japanese spent years planning the raid at Pearl Harbor; but, what was the US planning, was the US just sitting idly by waiting to be a victim, or was there something in the works? I tend to subscribe to the latter.

So, was the "Doolittle Raid" the ad hoc retaliation that it is portrayed as or is it a smaller version of what the US had in mind for it's opening move?

 

The US seemed pretty determined to let the Japanese strike the first blow.

Well in some ways it cut the legs out from under their doctrine. They wanted to attrit the US Battleline so they could defeate it in the "Decisive Battle". Instead they rendered the US incapable of fighting such a battle even if they wanted to for a year or more. By then it was too late.

Actually I don't think that's known at all. The US fleet hadn't been there that long and the Kido Butai didn't come into existence until 10 April 1941.

Yes

Look up "War Plan Orange" or the "Rainbow Plans". Note that by the late 30's the navy knew the former wouldn't work at least in terms of rapidly reinforcing the Philipines.

 

lwd........... you are missing the point. I am aware of the "Rainbow Plans" and their defensive nature. What is not covered in either plan is a response. The Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor staggered the US Navy momentarily and allowed Japan to take control over the Phillipines, Malaysia, Singapore et al. .....yada yada yada etc.

The question I have is what was the US plan if Congress/ FDR had decided to take military action against the Japanese prior to 7, Dec. 1941. I don't buy the whole "just waiting for an excuse" ideology. However; any offensive action prior to 7, Dec. 1941 would not have garnered the same support as the actions taken after that date.
I think the Japanese put too much emphasis on Pearl Harbor as being "Offensive" significantly for the US, It was a much more significant in a defensive role as it would turn out.

I am sure that in 2076 there will be an internet discussion over the futility of the attacks of 11, Sept.

 

LRusso216,

I would fully agree with this, however who would sit around (Japanese) on Guam, Marianas, etc.etc. and wait for the Americans to utilize their enourmous latent power?

This is the general assumtion towards this issue - but my position is, that it seems to be rediciulous for the Japanese to believe that the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet will cause the Americans to start weeping and begging for peace. They also did not asume that taking Singapore would make the British weep and beg for peace.

Sorry, it still comes back to the question - where is the "grand strategy" of wacking the US Fleet and occupying Pearl in order to have a forward base that would enable them to keep Americas West Coast busy, rather then waiting for the US to build up and strike back from their forward base Pearl?

Regards
Kruska

 

Woudln't be the first time. I can be pretty oblivious at times.

On a marginally related theme here are a some of articles that are worth reading with at least periphial import to the topic:
Were the Best Good Enough?
What if the Japanese had not attacke Pearl Harbor?
Grim Economic Realities
The Hawaiian Invasion, and other Nonsense
Oil and Japanese Strategy in the Solomons: A Postulate
The Principle of the Objective
Title

 

Well it sort of worked for them vs the Russians a few decades earlier.

 

I added to my previous post.....phone rang and I hit "post" prematurely.

http://www.ww2f.com/wwii-general/39844-pearl-harbor-then-3.html#post471972