The Bombing of Germany

m kenny,


"It is a myth that the US did 'precision bombing' whilst the RAF bomber indiscriminately."


Without a doubt!

It defies common sense, and any research on the subject since the "bomb in a pickle barrel" fairy tale was debunked.


John.

 

Further,

The bombing of japan was primarily an incendiary one, with great satisfaction given to the results in terms of "square miles destroyed" after such an incendiary raid.

Think of all the japanese mothers and babies incinerated in Tokyo etc.



John.

 

Not so. The following graph shows the true nature of the RAF effort after May 1944.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.pdf

 

Seems what I read your chart is correct
The subsequent highest priority campaigns were against V-weapon installations (June 1944) and petroleum, oil, and lubrication (POL) plants (September 1944). Additional CBO targets included railyards and other transportation targets, particularly prior to the invasion of Normandy and, along with army equipment.

Combined Bomber Offensive - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.pdf

and the highest Combined Bomber Offensive priority industry became Operation Crossbow in June 1944 and the Oil Campaign in September. Tedder's proposal to keep oil targets as the highest priority and place "Germany's rail system in second priority" was appproved by the CSTC on November 1.

Strategic bombing during World War II
Survey studies show that, in the over-all, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area. In the fall of 1944, only seven per cent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point.

RAF turned their attention to the tactical air battle in support of the Normandy Invasion. It was not until the middle of September that the strategic bombing campaign of Germany again became the priority for the USSTAF.

Strategic bombing during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

While I am inclined to sympathize with your theme, I must correct you on one aspect. Millions of gays were not killed. More like 4,000.

 

World War II was total war. The Germans and Japanese established that theme early on. Why people insist one excoriating the Allies for following suit is something that I find to be ridiculous.

When people cry about Hamburg, I think of Babi Yar.When people moan about Toyko, I remember Nanking. When people express disgust over the Dresden bombing, I recall the Einsatzgruppen. When people condemn Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I bring up Unit 731 and all of its attendent horror.

This also doesn't include the very elementary fact that it was the Germans and Japanese who were the aggressors. It as they made the decision to make war and genocide. That they suffered greatly for it is of no concern for me. Frankly, they deserved it.

The harsh truth is that this post-war criticism is largely levied by those who are Axis apologists or Left leaning persons who dislike the United States. It has little to do with humanitarian concerns.

A truly humane person would recognize the absurdity of selective condemnation in a holocaust of death and destruction like World War II. Human beings were being destroyed en masse. What difference does it make how or where they died? The point is that they died.

Lastly, civilians are the nation. They are potential replacements, they make the ordnance, equipment, and produce the foodstuffs necessary for war. Arthur Harris' campaign made perfect sense by attacking the core of the machine that waged aggressive war.

Germany was compelled to surrender in WWI as the result of a sea blockade that brought Germany to the verge of mass starvation. How is that okay and aerial bombarbment not? People are going die in large numbers eitherway. The only difference is that one is violent and the other is not.

 

I'm in agreeance with the Allied perspective. Bombing was one of the necessary evil's of WW2. I do feel, though, that commanders like Harris were putting far too much faith in this campaign to win the war on it's own. Harris jealously guarded his priority one status in terms of reinforcing his losses, at the expense of Coastal Command, who needed the aircraft just as badly, and most certainly would not have lost between 5 and 15% of their numbers on any given operation.

Having said that, I still believe bombing was a major contribution to the victorious result attained by the tri-services of the Allies. Post-war bleating about the in-justice of it all I certainly have no time for.

A relative of mine flew B-25 Mitchell bombers in this campaign. His aircraft is now on display in Holland, at Oosterbeek. His son, Franz, took me there as a child specifically to see this aircraft, and to explain why it was there.

My Dutch relatives make no apologies about what Franz the Elder did for his war service.

 

Never been able to find much on specific targeting by the bombing offensive, below are percentage stats from ''The strategic air war against Germany, 1939-1945: report of British Bombing Survey Unit'' by Sebastian Cox.

RAF bombing tonnages claimed dropped by bomber command in accordance with main directives.

All aircraft targets [factories, air fields, radar etc.] 2.94%
Docks & port areas 5.68
Military instalations 11.43
Long range weapon instalations 7.17
All oil targets [oil plants, fuel dumps etc] 9.84
All industrial targets [ball bearings, ordinance, steel & coke etc.] 2.63
Towns 45.66
All transport targets [rail centres, bridges, waterways etc.] 13.8
Miscellaneous .76

8th USAAF bombing tonnages claimed dropped in accordance with main directives.

All aircraft targets [factories, air fields, radar etc.] 21.67%
Docks & port areas 5.12
Military instalations 3.35
Long range weapons industry 5.75
All oil targets [oil plants, fuel dumps etc] 11.91
All industrial targets [ball bearings, ordinance, steel & coke etc.] 10.49
Towns 6.11
All transport targets [rail centres, bridges, waterways etc.] 35.06
Miscellaneos .34

15th USAAF bombing tonnages claimed dropped in accordance with main directives.

All aircraft targets [factories, air fields, radar etc.] 18.04%
Docks & port areas 5.02
Military installations .75
Long range weapons industry -
All oil targets [oil plants, fuel dumps etc] 22.04
All industrial targets [ball bearings, ordinance, steel & coke etc.] 9.46
Towns 3.59
All transport targets [rail centres, bridges, waterways etc.] 41.10
Miscellaneous -

Keegan's figures had area bombing considerably higher, although as above, it could be on how you specify different targets.

 

It all depends how you cut the numbers. Davis' work suggests that, in the case of the 8th AF's bombing of Germany, about half the total effort was blind bombing against urban targets.

 

Davis's bombing database is a formidable piece of information and a useful resource, however I have found many, many, omissions of operations, particuarily smaller (30 a/c & under) precision raids where they were after very specific targets. I have also found larger raids that Davis describes as a "city" attack where the aiming points were in fact things like oil refineries. I think Davis did a commendable job in compiling a huge amount of information but the operations he did not include or or mis-labled that I have come across, would certainly change percentages of things like "city" attacks in the time frame I have just looked at, which was Bomber Command ops April to December 1944.
Dave Wallace
Just to follow-up, I picked a month at random - Looking at July 1944, Davis lists about 58 separate Oboe operations for the month. When you look at 109 Squadron's ORB, they were on 113 separate Oboe operations in that month and 105 Squadron may have been on some that 109 wasn't (105 & 109 did all Oboe marking). Just in that month alone Davis is off by huge factor, all of which were precision raids to specific targets.
Cheers
Dave Wallace

 

Thanks for that Dave.

A comment I have re: the 8th AF component is similar. In a number of cases I've found (especially re: attacks on airfields), Davis' spreadsheets state the primary target, however mission reports from the BGs involved sometimes indicate that the secondary or, worse, an un-named target of opportunity was actually attacked.

I don't know obviously to what extent this would change the overall picture. There's also some "fuzziness" around marshalling yards. Many are in the middle of towns, others not.

 

I find the USAAF's stated bombing policy in WW2 to be dishonest. It tries to claim that it didn't practice area bombing, but any study of the targets selected and the methods used (the USAAF's version of area bombing was called carpet bombing) show that to be clearly false


It should be noted that the USAAF classed any town with a railway running through it as as legitimate target, and that a large amount of the percentage of attacks classed as 'all transport targets' were in fact area attacks on towns, ie Dresden.

ps It should also be noted that the USAAF bombed Dresden a total of six times compared to the RAF who only bombed it on once, the last USAAF attack being on the 17th April 1945 when 580 bombers attacked the area surrounding the marshaling yards near the town center.

 

Mark
I think fuzziness is a good word to use on the subject because to an extent the data can be sorted many different ways and produce different results. You can use number of sorties, tons of bombs dropped, types of bombs dropped (as we have seen in this thread), individual operations, individual targets as well as types of targets, each of which will show different results. All of these are valid points but using different factors generates different results, depending which ones you select. After the war ended the effectiveness of the Strategic Bombing Campaign in Europe was deemed a failure by some by shifting through this information the right way , even though German Armaments Minister Albert Speer cited the three main reasons the Nazis lost the war as being: - The ability of the Russians to endure and keep fighting, the supply of war material from the USA and the Strategic Bombing Campaign. The differences in opinions on this subject have been around for 65 years and are not about to go away anytime soon.
Cheers
Dave

 

Thanks for the link to the Davis book mhuxt, it's a good read.

 

No worries.

I don't have a link for you, but see if you can track down a pdf of "The Army Air Forces in World War II Volume Three Europe: Argument to VE Day" from the Office of Air Force History, first published 1951.

It speaks quite frankly of the awareness that USAAF bombing was inaccurate, but had (or was hoped to have) an effect on morale. It was also felt that it was better to keep the pressure on the Luftwaffe using H2X missions, rather than adhering strictly to visual bombing and so flying less frequently.

 

I don't see the reason of all the fuss and indignation :there was nothing special about allied bombing of Europe (not only Germany ),of course,if you would under the ruins,you would have another opinion
Europe was bombed
1) because the technology existed
2)because the air force lobby was willing to prove that they could win the war on their own
3)because the politicians and the public opinion wanted to prevent a new Passendale
4)because the air force lobby was selling the idea (better the mirage) that bombing would mean a cheap and quick war
5)because,till Overlord,there was no alternative (the alternative being to do nothing ).
A lot of civilians (600000 Germans and tens of thousands others) were killed,but in earlier wars,much more civilians were killed .
What one could argue,is that the area bombing (the Douhet doctrine) was a failure .

 

I have to stop and wonder if Hitler had had B-17s and P-51s would he have contnued to bomb London?
I believe the answer would have been YES!
Part of the philosophy of war at the times was to destroy vital military targets and destroy the will of the people to continue the war. It takes more than soldiers to fight a war. If a "civilian is working in a munitions factory, aircraft factory, communications center or railway yard they are helping to support the war effort. Just because they go home at night doesn't mean they weren't part of the war.
If these civilians are killed by a bomb in their factory they're considered military targets. If they are killed in their homes are they still not the same person?
Granted to see they're children die is a shame, but if you kill the guy making the bf-109 or fw-190 or Stug, you have helped the war effort for the allies.
If there were absolutely no military targets in the city then you may have an arguement for someone who will listen. I don't thik there were many in London who would have listened very long.

 

Surfersami,

I think it was Harris that said it best.

The aim was to stop the machine. If you could blow it and the operator up then well and good, but if not then stopping the electricity, depriving the worker of sleep or food or depriving the factory of machine parts or components, or stopping the finished product from going anywhere, then you have achieved your aim.

Agree 100% on the role of a civilian in a ("total") war.

John