Who do you think is to blame for the outbreak of war in 1939?

But then France and Britain had won the previous war, so it is not very strange that they were more or less content (though many in France would probably have preferred to impose even harsher terms on Germany).

 

I think Britain and France were willing to accept some of Hitler's goals (reunification of all Germans and domination of Central Europe ),if it was done without war or humiliation (occupation of Czechia ).
I am not a fan of IF-threads,but I think that,if Hitler had attacked in 1938,there would have been a war:that's why Chamberlain was undertaking that much diplomatic iniatives,why there was nothing to come from Paris,Prague,Berlin :at last resort,Prague could give away,laying the blame on Paris,and Paris could lay the blame on London .If there was a war,Chamberlain had the choice berween humiliation or fighting:that's why he compelled the Czechs to surrender .
In 1939,there was no possibility for Chamberlain to compel Poland to give away at Hitler;the only chance was to give Poland a guarantee,hoping that would be enough to frighten Hitler (in Chamberlain's mind,the guarantee was not to help Poland,if it was attacked ,it was only to prevent an attack),but,for Hitler,it was only bluff (Britain could not aid Poland,and France would do nothing without Britain)and Chamberlain had the choice:humiliation (and loosing the elections )or fight.
You will note that in 1938 and in 1939,France was sitting mum,Britain was conducting the dance and was speaking for France,which was not consulted .

 

It was France and Britain's fault for being wussies. In September of 1939, the French and British could have invaded western Germany with little trouble and force Hitler to leave Poland.

 

This is far too simplistic. It was a combination of things which built up to the point of war, and it was Hitler alone who was responsible for its outbreak in the European theater. I've posted this before, so bear with me.

The Canadian historical scholar/author Margaret Macmillan takes the position that "The allies (she says), were not the caricatures history has remembered: vengeful Frenchmen, pusillanimous Brits, or naive and bumbling Americans. And to blame the treaty for World War II (she says), is ‘to ignore the actions of everyone–political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, ordinary voters–for 20 years between 1919 and 1939.’ ‘Whatever the treaty,’ she argues, ‘Germany would have been an unhappy place in the 1920s.’ Reparations were initially set at $33 billion.

But MacMillan maintains that Germany paid only about $4.5 billion in the entire period between 1918 and 1932. Slightly less, she points out, than what France paid after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71–with a much smaller economy. And the French paid in gold, on time and in full (Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World", McMillan)

Stephen Schuker, a University of Virginia historian and author of "American 'Reparations' to Germany, 1919- 1933", believes the Germans, by using the proceeds of American loans to pay off their debts in Europe, ultimately paid no reparations at all. And when the Germans defaulted in the early thirties as a result of the "depression" (Schuker argues), American bankers had effectively paid reparations to Germany. Indeed, according to Schuker's calculations, the total net transfer from the United States to Germany in the period 1919-1931, adjusted for inflation, "amounted to almost four times the total assistance that the United States furnished West Germany under the Marshall Plan from 1948 to 1952."

"It is much easier to make war than peace," complained French Premier Georges Clemenceau during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. (Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World", McMillan)

Hitler, for one, claimed in the 1920s and '30s that the European boundaries drawn at Versailles unjustly separated thousands of "ethnic" Germans from their brethren in the Fatherland. But many historians now believe Wilson stayed as close to his declared principle of drawing boundaries on the basis of ethnicity as was economically and strategically feasible at the time. Czechoslovakia and Poland, for example (both of which were recognized but not "created" by the peace conference) could not have survived ethnic homogeneity.

The Czechs needed the mountains to the north, the Sudetenland, to protect their cities and industries in the valleys below, and the Poles, to be commercially viable, required access to the sea. As a result, tens of thousands of those ethnic Germans living in those areas ended up either Czech or Polish.

If the Allies had drawn boundaries on ethnicity alone, as Boston University historian William Keylor points out, they would have made postwar Germany bigger than it was in 1914! And that, after four years of fighting and millions of deaths, "was politically impossible (unthinkable)."

When you look at Europe at the end of 1919, says Keylor, author of A World of Nations: the International Order Since 1945, "it (Versailles) comes as close to an ethnographic map as any settlement before or since."

So why has it taken historians so long to reconsider Versailles, and give it a fair shake? For one thing, because the conventional view makes such a good story, says MacMillan. "We like to believe that statesmen are a bunch of boobs anyway, if not wicked," and for many years after the settlement respectable voices said just that.

She credits the end of the Cold War, though, for bringing many historians into her camp. Civil wars in the Balkans, rebellions in Africa, fighting in Palestine, the squabbling of minorities in Iraq–all are the same issues faced by the peacemakers in Paris. Today, as western leaders continue to struggle with these same problems, she says, we can see that Clemenceau was right: "Making peace just isn't as easy as we thought."

"Hitler did not wage war because of the Treaty of Versailles, although he found its existence a godsend for his propaganda," the Canadian-born historian writes. As for the three peacemakers, she believes they were genuinely well intentioned: "They could not foresee the future and they certainly could not control it. This was up to their successors. When war came in 1939, it was a result of 20 years of decisions taken or not taken, not of arrangements made in 1919."

The traditional view is that onerous war reparations drove the German economy to the collapse that brought Hitler and the Nazis to power in 1933. But Ms. MacMillan demonstrates that the reparations demanded of Germany were less than those paid by France after its defeat in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war. Further, she notes, Germany paid only about one-third of what it owed in compensation for its occupation and destruction of Belgium and northern France.

Rather, she believes, the real problem was that Germany did not feel defeated. "They didn't think they had lost the war," she said during a recent visit to Paris. "They'd never seen foreign troops on German soil. The German army marched back in good order to Berlin. German industry was intact. Germany was still the biggest European country west of the Soviet Union. It never really disarmed, and it was strong enough in 1939 to conquer most of Europe."

I (Clint) agree with this portion most strongly, the German Heer marched back in parades where they were feted and applauded, almost as if they had won something. The Allies allowed the new Weimar government to not only demobilize and shrink their army, but to disarm them, and try the 900+ accused war criminals as well. The army was shrunk (on paper at least), but many small arms and machineguns remained outside of their control. Only about a dozen war criminals were tried at all, and most were released with "time served" as their sentences.

If on the other hand, the Heer had marched back into Germany without their weapons, and marching behind an armed foreign army who paraded in Berlin, the German populace may have felt less "betrayed by a stab in the back"; and fully recognized their defeat.


Hitler was responsible for the beginning of what would become to be called World War II, his double dealing, "cooking the books" to make unemployment appear to be contained, and Ponzi scheme economics made going to war nearly his only option.

Remember his words from Mein Kampf; "if land (lebesraum) is to be gained in Europe it can only come at the expense of Russia (he always called the Soviets Russians). Following the path of the Teutonic Knights of old we must use the German sword to take land for the German plow." (paraphrasing from memory)

 

In september 1939 there were no significant British troops in France and the French were not willing to risk a lot of casualties by attacking (Btw :the weakness of the Germans in the west is much overrated ).

 

That's correct I've never found Info to support that. But WWII was not only about Europe, and China was Supported in those times By the US.

 

The root of the problem is the treaty of Versailles and the Germans for not accepting the fact they lost the Great War. But the allies could have stopped Hitler in 39 instead of 45.

 

From what I've heard the Germans had only 30 divisions with no big guns and tanks, while the French had 120 divisions available, not including the wussies hiding in the maginot line, I agree the British probably wouldn't have done much in the initial invasion of Germany, but I could guarantee they would be involved after the French were

 

Operation "Canned Goods" should not be over looked:

Hitler's Fake Attack on Germany that Started World War II - Operation Canned Goods - Associated Content - associatedcontent.com

 

Yeaupe sounds good to Moi! Hitler can be Blamed and held responsible. If he would of stayed out of Poland and many other fronts.

 

I remember read this once a long time ago, But since I got the Info from one of those questionable Sites I though it was Bull.

Interesting Read thanks for the link, Therefore this is true.

So Hitler created a lie to justify his actions against Poland.

 

I beg to differ, while NOT a monstor group of troops, the BEF was there in late 1939, and got larger by May of 1940 during the "phony war" period.

The British Army itself in 1939 really was a comparatively small, professional force, and in and of itself it was a well equipped, well led, and well trained group, especially the BEF.

Taking nothing away from the "reserve" and Territorial Army groups, but only the core of the BEF sent to France in 1939 was the group established and still extant in name after the Boer War. At the outbreak of war in 1939 the British Expeditionary Force was dispatched to France and was composed of 12 divisions in total size, but in reality the true size of the BEF only included four regular (BEF) infantry divisions and 50 puny little light scout tanks which had trained together as a "unit" (this was the real "BEF"). All the rest of them were new conscripts or reservists (I think), and hadn't had the training nor time for integration into their new commands.

As one of the longer standing/existing units in at least name in Europe, it was the best for the moment the British had surely, but rather tiny in both numbers and equipment compared to anybody else. The problem was that the other men in the supplemental eight (8) divisions were new, poorly trained and not well equipped.

By May of 1940, one more regular and five more divisions from the Territorial Army arrived to supplement the artificially enlarged BEF in France. So now there were about 395,000 British, Commonwealth, and Dominion men in France and on the Belgian borders with about 240,000 assigned to front-line service, most of whom had NOT worked together but were simply attached to the BEF.

The tank strength had grown to a two-battalion infantry tank brigade (100 medium tanks) and two cavalry light tank brigades (200 light scout tanks). Even by May of the next year the British strength had grown, but as events would prove it was not up to the task of battling the Nazis.

Especially with the command structure as it existed under the command of French General Gamelin.

 

I second that!

 

Generally,I agree with your post,but my point is that in september,there was (not yet ) a BEF in France and that all depended on the French willingness to risk heavy casualties by attacking .
When the BEF arrived,there was no allied offensive to liberate Poland (the excuse beying the bad weather ),but I think the French had never the intention to fight for Poland:the goal of the French-Polish treaty was (in the mind of the French)that Poland would help if France was attacked (not the inverse).
About the German strength in the West:I have seen a post on Armchair General (with a lot of detailed information) indicating that,already on 15 september,the German strength in the West was considerably reinforced and that the assumption that the French could walk over the Germans is wrong .

 

I think we might be talking at cross purposes here, while both saying basically the same thing. The BEF didn't start really arriving in France until late Sept. to the end of the year (1939), and I agree that the French were far from willing to "dash out" of their multi-billion franc fortifications. They were well prepared to "fight the last war".

I did manage to find this over on the Axis History Forum, this is not mine by any stretch of the imaginaiton:

The plan for the deployment of the BEF to France was called Plan W, and the man mainly responsible for it, was Maj-Gen L.A.Hawes.

The advance parties left for France on September 4th 1939, with the first major contingents arriving at Cherbourg on September 10th, and at Nantes & St Nazaire on September 12th.

The first 2 Corps of the BEF were in France within 37 days after mobilization. I Corps took up its positions by October 3rd, whilst II Corps took up its positions by October 12th 1939

1st Infantry Division
2nd Infantry Division
3rd Infantry Division
4th Infantry Division

By the end of 1939, another regular division had arrived-the 5th.
By January 5th 1940 the first Territorial Division, the 48th (South Midland) had arrived and joined I Corps

The 50th (Northumberland) arrived around January 20th onwards, with the 51st (Highland) arriving from the 24th January. The 42nd (East Lancashire) arrived on April 12th, plus also the 44th (Home Counties), which came under BEF control from April 1st.

The III Corps was activated on April 9th

The above 'fighting' divisions were followed by the following divisions used as LOC troops-: 12th (Eastern) around April 22nd, 23rd (Northumbrian) also around the 22nd, and finally the 46th Infantry Division around the 24th April.

By the end of April the strength of the BEF in France had reached 394,165. Of this total, 237,319 were within the main fighting formations/units. 18,347 were TA divisions undertaking labour and training duties. 17,665 were reinforcements held at area bases. 78,864 were on LOC duties, whilst a further 23,545 were stationed on other duties. 9,051 were in drafts en route, 2,515 were yet to be allocated and finally 6,859 were with the AASF.

　
See:

Axis History Forum • View topic - BEF DEPLOYMENT TO FRANCE 1939-40

 

If the easy answer is to blame Hitler, what is the harder one?

Maybe I should rephrase the question as how far can we blame Hitler for the outbreak of war - to make it less simplistic.