Kursk and German Strategy in 43

Germany had two options in 1943, attack or defend. The Kursk offensive was doomed almost from the get go. Superior German technology was found inferior to Soviet numbers and preparation. Was Kursk a big mistake? What would have happened if they had chosen a defensive posture in 1943, would Germany ultimately have stopped the Red Tide on the Eastern Front?

 

Kursk was in fact a defensive action :it was a preemptive attack,to forestall a Russian summer offensive .The German losses at Kursk being that small (54812 men and 252 tanks and Assault Guns),I don't think that "no Kursk" would have made a difference .

 

well in very early 1943, Manstein performed his miracle at Kharkov and smashed 52 Russian divisions after he suckered them in and encircled them. Going on the offensive was in no way there only choice. Those losses aren't small when you consider the dire need of any men and equipment by the Wehrmacht.

 

kursk and many other battles .. google translate needed..
http://militera.lib.ru/h/koltunov_solovyev/index.html

http://militera.lib.ru/h/index.html main page to links..


Part One. The defensive battle of Soviet troops (5-23 July 1943.)
Chapter One. Situation at the beginning of summer-autumn campaign 1943 [15]
Chapter Two. Create an impregnable defense [48]
Chapter Three. The defensive battle in the northern fase Kursk salient (5-11 July 1943.) [101]
Chapter Four. The defensive battle in the southern fase Kursk salient (5-23 July 1943.) [135]
Part Two. Soviet counterattack (July 12- August 23, 1943, Mr.)
Chapter Five. Orel operation (July 12- 18 avgusta1943 g) [185] Chapter Six. Belgorod-Kharkov operation (3-23 August 1943, Mr.) [273]

 

its all in russian

 

you will need google translate, or you should have a translate tool on your toolbar..ray..

 

Well, we have already this old thread, it´s huge so reading it will take time but there´s quite alot of info that will help you and tells what some of think about the Zitadelle:

http://www.ww2f.com/eastern-europe-february-1943-end-war/13554-kursk-popular-demand.html

 

So am I understanding this correctly that the tank battles of Desert Storm were every bit as large as the battles at Kursk?

 

It depends of what you are using:number of tanks,soldiers,aircraft,artillery,losses,length of the front......

 

In the first Russian counter offensive (Kutuzov),the Germans,on the defensive,lost 86064 men,thus:remaining on the defensive was no certainty for fewer losses .
And in december 1943,the Germans had even more tanks in the East than in july .

 

I don't mean to derail the thread. Iraq's losses.

Estimated Iraqi Losses: (Reported by U.S. Central Command, March 7, 1991)
36 fixed-wing aircraft in air-to-air engagements
6 helicopters in air-to-air engagements
68 fixed- and 13 rotary-wing aircraft destroyed on the ground
137 Iraqi aircraft flown to Iran
3,700 of 4,280 battle tanks
2,400 of 2,870 assorted other armored vehicles
2,600 of 3,110 assorted artillery pieces
19 naval ships sunk, 6 damaged
42 divisions made combat-ineffective

 

thank for the information on Desert Storm;is there anything on Iraki human losses ?
On Zitadelle :German losses :54182 men,252 tanks,159 aircraft
:Russian losses:177847men,1614tanks,459 aircraft (Russian losses are official figures;unofficial estimates are much higher).
Of the German tank losses ,there were 10 (TEN) Tigers.
In the following Russian counter-offensives,the losses on both sides were much higher.
Thus my point:if Kursk was a decisive turning point,what about Stalingrad (with higher losses) and Bagration (ditto)?
I am convinced that no battle was decisive .

 

In hindsight it's easy to see Citadelle was a big mistake, Field Marshall Model openly said so but went about his end of it anyway. Manstein too had his doubts about Citadel and even Guderian famously asked hitler "My Fuhrer, why do you want to attack in the east at all this year?" Keitel replied for Hitler and said that they needed to attack, and a victory for "political reasons" (!!!).

In reality, Citadelle at best would have achieved only a minor "straightening of the line" and again in hindsight, perhaps prolonged the war by a few months. But while the Kursk salient was a major threat to the German line, Citaddelle was hardly worth the cost of the cream of the German units in the east and the depletion of the entire remaining German panzer reserve on the Ostfront.
the attack was doomed to fail for several reasons (also pointed out by Robin Cross in his excellent book Citadelle):

1. The Russians were well informed of almost every detail of German plans for Citadelle months in advance. This was due to the British Enigma machine code-breakers, who fed the Russians decoded German intercepts from enigma-machine communications throughout 1943.

2. Thanks to the decrypts, the Russians could deploy their forces in plenty of time and were very well prepared with artillery, minefields, and anti-tank guns in important areas when the panzers finally came (on July 4, 1943, exactly when and where the British code breaks said they would.)

3. Hitler's indecisiveness over Citadelle worked in the russian's favor. He too had grave doubts about Citadel and in the weeks before the attack, actually spent hours studying books about similar battles that had taken place in world war 1, trying to decide on the best strategy. Hitler delayed the attack several times, which gave the Russians months to build no less then 9 seperate defensive lines spaced miles apart, each one heavily defended by armor, anti tank guns, minefields and anti tank ditches.

4. As a result of Hitler's irresolution, he kept delaying the attack, placing his faith in the new German panzers then coming on line - the Panther and the Elefant tanks that were just then flowing in signicant numbers from the factories. These new tanks were simply not ready and on being rushed into service for Citadel, most of the new Panther's broke down (it had many drivetrain troubles and at least one Panther was abandoned by its crew on the way to the attack as flames were shooting out the exhaust pipes.)
The Elefant too was another disaster, while well armed with a big gun and heavily armored, many of the Elefants were lost just after they had made a major breakthrough. The Elefant's supporting infantry had been killed off and the Elefants were then destroyed one by one by Soviet infantry - as the Germans had not fitted the Elefants with any machine guns to defend themselves!

5. While the German forces (almost a million men, over 2,000 tanks and over a thousand aircraft for this attack alone) had an almost impossible task, they came tantalizingly close to achieving their objectives in the pincer movement aimed at Kursk. The Russians had more reserves to throw in to stop any German breakthrough at the point in the battle where the Germans had none.
And even after it was clear that Citadelle would fail, the Western allies invaded Sicily, requiring German forces be transferred away from the Eastern front. This Hitler did, and he called off the attack on July 17 and ordered the entire SS Panzerkorps to Italy.

 

Kursk showed the Red Army one thing, they could win the war.

 

I've seen them anywhere from 20,000 to almost 200,000.

 

Hitler believed on what I have read that whatever the end result there would be no Red Army attack until 1944 even if the salient would not be crushed. The losses on both sides would be so big anyway, he counted. Of course he was hoping to crush the salient for military as well as political victory. But once again he underestimated the Red Army reserves. What was the main battle for Hitler was only the phase 1 for the Red Army. Once the Zitadelle was closing to its end the Red Army pincers with fresh reserves and tank formations started their attack on both sides of the Kursk salient pushing the Germans backwards. So the calculations on German side were wrong from the beginning. Even if they could close the salient they would have to open it to move troops to stop the flank attacks.

Operation Kutuzov - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

I don't know where you got these figures(about the German forces),but the official German figures are (sourceas Deutsche Reich und der zweiten Weltkrieg ,tome 8):625271 men,2699 tanks AND assault guns,and 1372 aircraft (the strength of the Luftwaffe on the whole Eastern front was:1833)