How we come to know what we know

JBark writes: Well, I would have to ask a couple of pertinent questions. First, how many tankers have you talked to compared to how many served in the ETO? Second, did you talk to them during the war or thirty or forty years hence when they got to read comparisons of the guns and /or heard a whole bunch of things other people had said.

I've talked with officers and men who served in the 4th, 8th, 12th, and 14th Armored Divisions. More than I can easily count. Some of them taught tank gunnery and tactics at Ft. Knox and elsewhere before going overseas. Are you suggesting that M4 medium tanks in other units had the necessary floor space to carry extra rounds?

Well you've got me with your second question. As someone who talks with these men on a regular basis, I find it difficult to believe their opinions about the relative performance of their tank guns in combat do not represent expert testimony in their own right. Are you suggesting the 75mm tank gun was just as good as the 76mm?

Duckbill

 

I think I have a different opinion about what is expert opinion. That being said let me ask; are you saying that the HE round of the 75 and the 76 were comparable. I thought they were not.

I don't mean to degrade your conversations with our country's heroes but it is important to remember that anecdotal stories (65+ year old memories) are not always the best evidence to use, for a number of reasons.

Back to the subject of the thread. I'm not really sure how a discussion of the guns of the Sherman fits in to this thread. Perhaps I missed where you were going with this. The gun itself does not make or break this tank. The tank has been fitted with all sorts of guns, an experimental 90mm turret was mounted; certainly the decisions made in the states about what guns were needed in Europe don't decide whether or not the Sherman was a great tank? The numerous guns mounted in the tank show me what an incredibly flexible weapons platform it was.

John

 

I have to basically agree with that. I would also add that in more than a few cases people are constrained by their experience level when it pertains to a given subject matter. It reminds me of how an 18 year old has ALL the answers to life and dismisses anything that isn't solved with their simpleton tools of rationalization. If it doesn't make sense to them, it is either stupid or wrong.

Agreed (re opinions)...but completely subject to facts being used in context. Too often facts become disinformation when used out of context or in part/parcel to create a false picture.

 

Black- Agree as well. I think about some of what I have heard people say over the years, on forums and in the average discussion I might have with someone I meet. The notion that the Germans had fearsome, all powerful tanks and the unstoppable blitzkrieg are ideas that are everywhere. I believe that there are many people out there that will harbor these beliefs and not let them be changed no matter what they read. I was involved in a discussion on a forum about the Panther v. Sherman with me expressing the opinion that the Sherman was the better tank. The discussion would occasionally come back to which tank would survive the tank v. tank duel, evalutions of gun and armor thickness kept popping up but in the long run I felt the points I made on the Sherman showed it to be the superior machine. The parties I discussed this with could not grasp the notion of evaluating a tank simply as a machine built to do a job in a given environment. I believe that they needed to believe that the Germans built the best tank of the war and would not be shaken form this idea. Fueled with decades of misinformation and the tireless mantra of "my tank can beat your tank" they can easily go on and on defending the Panther despite its shortcomings. (I believe that the Panther could have been designed a little better in a few areas and could easily have been the best tank of WWII and given the allies more headaches than it did.)

 

Point out a few boards where that argument is common. I'd enjoy doing a bit of demolition.....

 

It was my stated intention to take a break from posting while I tended to some personal and professional business, but I find it impossible not to follow up on JBark's comments.

As I understand it, this thread is about "how we come to know what we know" about the combat effectiveness of the Sherman tank in the ETO. I would pose the question a little less emphatically -- How we come to know what we think we know? – in order to acknowledge the fact that historians never, know everything about a given subject. Despite which phraseology is used, it raises the issue of historical method, which in turn brings us to question JBark’s “wave of the hand” dismissal of the eyewitness accounts and opinions derived from battlefield experience by the men who actually used these tanks in combat.

It is accepted practice among professional military historians to vet eyewitness accounts using available historical records and corroborate their statements with the eyewitness accounts of others whenever possible. This leads us to the following question for JBark……

If properly vetted and corroborated eyewitness accounts of veterans do not rise to the level of expert testimony, then what sources meet your criteria as “expert” in your own research into Sherman tanks?

Duckbill

 

You have effectively touched on a problem that permeates the study and writing of history, and in particular, the so-called military variety.

Researching and writing military history for professionally oriented publication is rarely a rewarding endeavor, at least from the financial aspect. This venue for historical publication requires the use of primary sources, and if done properly will enhance one’s academic standing, and by extension, advance his or her career.

Writing military history for the consumption of the general public often entails economic benefits as well as building for oneself a “name” which in turn, advances one’s career. This approach to historiography does not necessarily require the use of primary sources, and as a result, the end product is often highly derivative, as OP points out.

These opposing forces, professional vs public consumption, has created a two-tiered system of historiography. Serious students of military history will avail themselves of the more professionally oriented publications which use primary sources, and often go to those sources themselves. Even then, care must be taken to avoid being mislead, intentionally or not.

Duckbill

 

Duckbill writes:
"...which in turn brings us to question JBark’s “wave of the hand” dismissal of the eyewitness accounts and opinions derived from battlefield experience by the men who actually used these tanks in combat."

I'm not sure I appreciate how you've represented what I said. I certainly did not dismiss eyewitness accounts and battlefield opinions as simply as you put it. First of all I did not see any of this opinion...you simply want me to believe it exists. You hinted at conversations you had with parties unnamed and unnumbered and offered nothing but a vague reference to their opinions. Frankly put, I have no idea who you are nor any reason to believe "I talked to some vets that said so and so." Generally in the forums I have seen, and I have no reason to think this one is different, people usually use references which can be verified. From the sound of it I would assume, not much to go on of course, that you are talking to vets currently, possibly in a VA hospital, I have no way of knowing. I would put to you why do you think it possible to get accurate testimony of events that occured 60+ years ago from men that are in the 80's. Memories fade and are influenced over the years. Ask any prosecuting attorney what is thought of eyewitness testimony, and then ask him/her what they think of eyewitness testimony 60 years after the fact.

Duckbill also writes:
"...If properly vetted and corroborated eyewitness accounts of veterans do not rise to the level of expert testimony, then what sources meet your criteria as “expert” in your own research into Sherman tanks?"

I think the obvious reply right off the bat is who has "properly vetted and corroborated" these accounts? Where have you shown this or discussed it here? You are still referrring to a vague reference and I'm not even sure what point you are trying to make here. In the event that you had properly interviewed a suitable number of veterans I still am left with the opinion that tankers are not experts on tanks. Is the infantryman an expert on rifles? An artilleryman an expert on canons? Does the fighter pilot know all about fighters? Am I an expert on Volkswagons because I have driven one for several years? I would prefer to get expert opinion on tanks from people that have done unbiased comparitive research of the tanks of WWII. It is very easy to make statements about armor without comparison but I think for one to be believed there always needs to be perspective.

I'm not sure what point you want to make here. The 76 better than the 75, in some ways yes, from what I have read. I've also read that there were those that did not want to give up the HE round of the 75 and I've also read that the greater flash and smoke from the 76 were not welcome. As we all know the war was won, primarily with Shermans equipped with 75's. The Pershing was needed and while a better tank killing round might have been useful earlier we seemed to have done pretty well. That's my take on it, so far.

I'm not entirely sure what point you want to make. It would seem we have a different idea about who is expert about WWII armor. I appreciate that.

John

 

TA, considering how dynamically different these two tanks are from each other and how little in the way of common ground there is I find it difficult that someone could effectively make an air tight general case one way or the other. Do you have a suggested common ground comparison from previous discussion? If its already here on the forum I apologize (but please provide link).

 

While it is difficult to make a truly air-tight case, it is possible to do a much more thorough comparison of AFV than is generally done. The case for or against can be made on two basic lines of thought: Technical / engineering merits and ergonomics.
The technical merits case is fairly easily made. There is hard and fast data that can be used. What thickness is the armor? What is its metallurgical composition? How does the gun perform theoretically and practically? How reliable is this or that system on the vehicle? That is usually where the argument begins and ends.
But, there is another side to this. That is the ergonomics or, how the crew performs with the vehicle's systems. This aspect is more tenious but still can be examined in quite a bit of detail. For example, how would the crew aquire and fire on a target? Is this done more quickly in one vehicle than another and why? Can the loader access rounds easily and does he have room to efficently work the gun?
The ergonomics argument is more difficult to make. You have to know how the crew operated the vehicle and its layout in detail. While much of this information is buried in odd corners of books and the net it takes more effort to find it. Additionally, one can perform some degree of basic time-moton studies on specific crew functions using standard methods as one would in industrial engineering.
When you add in ergonomics you often find that these overwhelm many of the technical aspects of the vehicle. That is, they dominate the argument. Yet, most people have overlooked them almost entirely.
The above has been posted here more than once. What exact threads? Off hand I couldn't tell you but, I likely could find and resurrect them in an hour or two if really necessary.
So, if I were to show up on some board where the Germanophiles were waxing eloquent about the merits of the Panther or Hetzer, as but two examples, on their techinical merits (almost certainly the case) I would throw in a huge amount of ergonomic issues blindsiding them in an area they have little knowledge of. That would send them scrambling for rebuttal information. Then there is simply adding additional technical issues in more detail. So what if the armor is 80mm thick on the glacis. Its composition, hardness and, consistancy in quality are X,Y,Z making it inferior / superior to vehicle B. Again, it raises the argument to a new level of detail that removes the pimple-faced, cheese-eating, high school boy fascinaiton with all things German argument on this subject.

 

That seems pretty balanced, but how does one measure the ergonomics (Im not an engineer...) ?
Im curious because to this day in the automotive industry different car companies have different ideas about what is comfortable to use or work on that appears to be greatly influenced by their culture. So, different ergonomic scales/concepts?

I know from close examination of the interior of the T34 that the Soviet concept of ergonomics was "what is ergonomics?". I also understand that the distance a T34 could drive was more dependant upon oil for the engine than diesel in the gas tank (just a couple of the worst flaws of the vehicle). So I'm just curious how Allied and German tanks rate, not head to head but more or less top to bottom.

I've found that these "best" threads have to be framed well and kept in context to really be relevant, otherwise they're not worth much.

 

In engineering terms you can do things like MODAPTS or MTM studies of exactly how someone might do something in the vehicle. For example, the loading sequence.

MODAPTS - The Language of Work

MODAPTS is pretty easy to learn and you can apply it to a wide range of action sequences. It gives you a "100%" time for dong those actions. That doesn't mean that someone can't be slower or faster but rather that that is the "standard" time for the task to compare actually doing it to.
So, you could compare loading times in various tanks using the sequence of actions the loader has to go through and then see what tank has the fastest or slowest loading time.

In the T-34/76 models loading becomes incredibly slow after the first three rounds, if all three are the correct type and used, because of the ammo storage system. The loader has to kneel on the 'floor' of the turret (this is actually a bunch of rubber mats that cover the ammo cases and badly uneven footing), remove some of the matting and pull out a three round 'suitcase' with additional ammunition in it.
He would then open the case, get the round and, then have to stand and load it. As the action went on he would find himself working on the floor of the vehicle among piles of empty ammo cases, rubber mats, and empty shell casings (there is no hatch or place to eject empties from the vehicle so they would pile up inside) all the while trying to find and open full cases possibly with the help of the bow gunner, who is largely otherwise useless anyway.
You can see that this might slow the T 34 to a rate of fire of just 2 or 3 rounds in a minute and probably less as the poor loader becomes exhausted from his gymnastics of trying to recover rounds and load them in a likely lurching, moving vehicle. I would think he would also need to not be succeptable to motion sickness or that would add another whole new dimension of misery to this exercise.

On most boards you are looking for diamonds on a beach of sand in terms of posts. That is just the way the internet and these boards are.

 

Two points are to be made in response to your question. Firstly, your presumption that my interviews and discussions with WWII veterans all occurred “60+ years” following the end of WWII is incorrect. Secondly, it appears you have not had the opportunity to speak with WWII veterans who are in their 80s and 90s. You would be very surprised at the clarity of mind and acuity of memory displayed by many of these men. Several WWII veterans are regular contributors to this forum. I invite you to carefully examine their posts for evidence of inaccuracies and feeble-mindedness. Their excellent writings will be quickly disabused of your notions to the contrary.

My oral history interview techniques were learned many years ago while in graduate school. They have been honed through practice and study. Are they perfect? No, not by a long-shot. I come away from each session/discussion with the feeling that I could have done better, or that I missed something important.

The idea that veteran “tankers are not experts on tanks” is disturbing to say the least. Who else used them in combat, and saw first hand their capabilities and limitations? In this regard, their expertise, albeit different than that of the ordnance officers who designed them, is undeniable. The Ordnance Department’s Zebra Mission (February 1945) under the command of Col. Joseph M. Colby of the Tank and Automotive Command provides a classic example of technical “experts” trying to tell combat “experts” which tank was the best. During his visits to the front line armored units Col. Colby learned: They emphatically wanted no more M4s with the 75mm gun.

And,

When Col. Colby tried to sell the battalion commanders of the 3d Armored Division on the Shermans [with 75mm guns] they already had, (being unable to offer them anything better on a large scale immediately) he ran into a hornet’s nest. After the heavy casualties of the winter they were beginning to regard the 75mm Shermans as deathtraps. (Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead And Battlefront, p. 334. Lida Mayo is a respected military historian who served as an official historian of the Ordnance Department moving to the US Army Center of Military History.) Gosh. Do you suppose this is where that bad, bad Belton Cooper got the offensive title for his book?

No particular point. The former stems from MG Alvin C. Gillem, commanding officer of the Armored Command, who recommended limiting production of the 76mm Sherman so it could not supplant those with 75mm guns which had improved HE capabilities. The latter originates from tests conducted in the ZI, the results of which and were articulated to the AGF by MG Gillem. The flash problem was largely solved by the addition of a muzzle brake. Neither gun proved overly successful in the antitank role, although the 76mm was the superior of the two. As demonstrated above, veteran tankers were not impressed with the capabilities of the 75mm gun. (Bailey, Faint Praise, p. 85.)

Yes we won.

But,

At practical ranges the 76mm, even with HVAP ammunition would not successfully penetrate the glacis plate of the Panther. The guns were ineffective,…. They concluded that the British had the right idea when they threw away the 75mm guns on their lend-lease Shermans and mounted their 17 pounders.

And,

The Ordnance item that came under the sharpest fire from combat commanders was the Sherman tank with the 75mm gun. (Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead And Battlefront, pp. 327, 476.)

Thus we see that that the role played by American tankers in winning the war in Europe is mostly the result of combat veterans, experts in armored combat if you will, who through innovation and tactics overcame the limitations of the Sherman tank while using its positive attributes to their maximum. Proof, if you will that a weapon system, to use more modern terminology, is only as good as the men and women who use it in combat.

Who are the armor experts on whom you rely and why have you limited yourself to believing only them?

Regarding this self-imposed limitation of yours, I leave you with Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen’s enlightened observation: It is well known that military history, when superficially studied, will furnish arguments in support of any theory or opinion. (Letters on Artillery, p. 108.)

Duckbill

 

I would add this: At least with the US Army their focus on ordinance couldn't be just on the ETO. They had to consider the MTO and SWPA as well. In both of the later the M4 75mm was more than adequite as a tank.
It was only after D-Day and only in NW Europe that the problem of being over-matched in armored vehicles really became a problem. The M4 76mm and introduction of the M 36 rectified that problem at least partially in the short-term with a long term solution being far heavier tanks like the T 32 to 38 and a new medium, the M 26.
Of course tankers in the field felt let down by their equipment to some degree. That is understandable as the US was behind the curve in development to a degree. But, they were catching up.

 

T.A. has a good point, and I would add that the M4 had to be designed to fit on LST and bridging equipment all ready in production. They had to be built and shipped to the front in time for the crews to train for a proposed 1943 invasion of Europe. At some point a decision had to be made that this is the best to be had, so lets start making them.

 

A good point, sources. I've come to realize the importance of reading from the back of the book, i.e., looking at the bibliography of the book to see what sources the author used. I like it when I see a lot of government "literature" from many nations. I also like to see the books I cn't afford myself, Hunnicutt et al.

 

Good points but I always like to jump in and remind folks that the job of a tank is not simply fighting other tanks. Based on what I've read it is cetainly not what they did most often in the ETO and tanks were not the primary killers of tanks. The Sherman did very well as part of a combined arms assault.