How we come to know what we know

Backwards you have it.

The LST was designed and built to accommodate the M4 medium tank. One of the most serious problems that had to be solved was one of ventilation on the lower deck. During loading, unloading, as well as the run into the shore during an amphibious assault, the tank engines were running. It would take only a few minutes for the lower deck to become uninhabitable due to carbon monoxide poisoning rendering the LST unusable for its intended purpose.

To solve this problem an exact wooden mockup of an LST was built at Ft.Knox. Various configurations of powered ventilation systems were then tried while the “LST” was loaded with M4 medium tanks with their engines running. Eventually the correct ventilation system was developed, and the rest, if as they say, history.

The wooden LST was turned into a classroom building for the Armored Force OCS when the designers and engineers were finished with it. The wooden LST is still at Ft. Knox.

Duckbill

 

Thanks Duckbill, I did not know. Also I was not as clear as I intended in my post. I wished to point out that the US had a complication that most other nations did not. Getting the equipment over two vast oceans to the front in time to be usefull, had to play a part in the design philosophy of a weapon system. For the US the idea of taking a Pzkw 38t in 1942 and sending it to France to remove it's turret and replace it with an open mounted anti-tank gun was not much of an option. Time enevitably forced compromises.

 

belsar,

Good point,... actually its an excellent point.

The US was the only belligerent that was forced to maintain a logistical system that spanned the entire globe. Not only that, but the terminal points of this system were often in obscure, out of the way, backwaters which required the US to build sufficient port capacity to handle the flow of munitions and supplies. Where port capacity could not be “built” the US had to develop and maintain ship to shore discharge capacity in the form of landing ships, landing craft, and even specially developed 2-1/2 ton trucks known as DUKWs.

I recently read that at its peak capacity the supply line from the US factory to the army ASP in the ETO was as long as 90 days. In other words, 90 days of supply for any given item was required just to keep the supply line full, and deliver the first item to the armies.

The logistical support of the armies was a major, often forgotten or underappreciated undertaking without which the war could not have been won.

Duckbill

 

For the Germans improvisation was a vital necessity. They had little choice but to scrounge up every weapon and make the most they could of it. Hence, their artillery park included virtually every artillery and antitank piece they captured and by 1944 it looked an awful lot like the Soviet artilllery park.
The same went with AFV. There was never enough so inprovisations had to be substituted. The Pz 38t chassis was available in relative quantity and no longer usable as a battle tank. Plopping a large antitank gun on it was a suitable improvisation.

The US by comparison, never had endemic widespread shortages of equipment. There were literally hundreds of Shermans in supply depots in England and later France to replace casualties as they occured. There simply was no need to resort to the sort of ad hoc use whatever was at hand improvisations like the Bekker conversions of French equipment or the first generation panzerjäger.
The US did often use captured artillery, at least the better quality guns, until the ammunition ran out to supplement their own guns. But, that simple expedient never replaced regular artillery units in the field.

The big differences between the German industrial cycle and the US one were:

The US relied on mass production. Modifications and changes to items occured at wider intervals and only after much thought and testing went into both the change itself as well as how to best implement it without disrupting production.
The Germans relied far more on batch work and hand-made production. They could implement changes to virtually every item on a production line with no real effect on output. They could also rework individual vehicles and aircraft returned to the factory for rebuilding in much the same way. These could simply be inserted into the production "line" as if they were new production. Hence you see regular small changes to many items in their military.

Secondly, the US could not return equipment to the factories with any degree of ease for major repairs or modification. This would have involved moving the item to a port, preparing it for shipping, shipping it back to the US, unloading it and then finally, sending it to the factory for whatever was to be done.
The result here was that their equipment had to be repairable in the field wherever it might be. The logistics and maintenance train had to be capable of making any repairs or modifications necessary where they were. Nothing was going back to the factory for anything.
The Germans on the other hand could simply load equipment on a train and send it back to the factory for rework or modification. While many units were loathe to part with anything that even remotely was useful to them the system did allow for field units to send their heavily damaged or broken equipment back to Germany for rebuilding.
This theoretically and practically reduced the need for a massive logistics and maintenance train in the field. I say theoretically because as the war progressed and units found themselves further from Germany at the end of very uncertain rail systems this concept simply broke down entirely. Maintenance units could no longer keep much of the equipment running. Any really serious problem meant cannibalizing or abandoning the equipment rather than repairing it. There was simply no way to get the equipment to a railhead and return it to Germany for repair. The system wasn't designed with far flung operations a thousand miles from Germany in an undeveloped part of the world.
The US maintenance system was designed with just that in mind.

 

T.A., the use of captured equipment I understand, as every nation did so. What I find difficult to grasp is why Germany placed themselves in the position they were in by choosing expensive, complicated equipment in the first place. They had WWI experience of fighting multiple enemies, with a greater combined industrial base, while they endured a ever shrinking reasource availability. Logic would imply choosing a system that would give you the most out of what you had.

 

According to the Lutes Report, in addition to published documents, the single most critical shortage in the ETOUSA was one of medium tanks. In some cases, units that lost tanks in the Ardennes-Alsace Campaigns were not brought back to their authorized T/E until late February or early March when emergency deliveries to the theater made this possible.

There was an ongoing shortage of critical types of artillery ammunition which was not alleviated until near the end of hostilities in Europe. Rationing of this ammunition was strictly controlled by the army groups and SHAEF to ensure the buildup of stocks in the ASPs large enough to meet the requirements of planned operations.

There were other critical shortages of equipment and supplies that plagued the US Army in Europe, but the list is far too long to enumerate here.

Duckbill

 

While I doubt anyone could put an absolute answer to that question I think it can be more generally answered to some degree. Every nation has its character. For the Germans there is a long history of engineering and scientific precision in their national background. That is, their engineers and scientists wanted theoretical and actual 'perfection' in their designs. For them good enough was the enemy of better. They always strived for best.
The problem with this is that in wartime their best equipment might have been superior but, they could never produce enough of it due to its complexity. Adding to this was the problem of that same gear often failing mechanically due to its being cutting edge in nature.

Britain often produced innovative designs and ideas but these often ended up in production looking like something one made in their garden shed using a rock and a hammer. They often were literally made of bits and pieces almost like a poverty stricken mad scientist had been the contractor. This didn't mean their ideas or innovations were bad; just their execution.

The US went for practical. They often discarded better for good enough. They tended to stick to what worked and could be mass produced. So, rather than cutting edge technologies the US often had practical, reliable and, useful equipment.

The Soviets tended towards simple, somewhat crude but, producable designs that allowed for cheap mass production.

That is relative at best. What the US called a "critical shortage" was often about equal to "business as usual" for the Germans by 1944. Few, if any German units were at their TO&E after 1940 ever. Artillery ammunition was short but nowhere like the German problems where it was often a matter of just having some!

When you look at this sort of problem you have to keep the overall perspective in mind. The Germans (and Japanese) were often dealing with scraping up just a few gallons of gas, a few rounds for some weapon or, other similar shortages on a daily basis to keep their army fighting. The US had problems but they rarely, if ever, got to that sort of desperation.

Look at the German 1942 summer offensive in Russia. Panzer divisions outside AGS had just one battalion (usually understrength) of tanks while their second battalion was now "infantry." Divisions in AGS had one or two battalions at the onset of the offensive but only about 75% of their motor vehicles. Most infantry divisions were at 75% or so strength and some outside AGS were down around 50%. This was normal for the Germans.

The US and Britain generally tried to keep their divisions up to strength at all times. Yes, they didn't always manage that but more often than not they came close or succeeded.

 

On 26th December a request was made for up to 500 Shermans to be released from British stocks to help replace the Bulge losses. By 1st January 1945 351 had been converted back to US standards and issued to the US Army.
Around the same time 106 25pdr guns, 72 Artillery trailers and 30 6pdr guns and associated ammunition were given to the US because of her severe amunition shortages.

 

I cannot disagree more strongly with your characterization of what "critical shortages" meant to the ETOUSA.

As someone who appreciates the operational art then surely you understand that delaying planned operations for weeks or even months in order to stockpile sufficient artillery ammunition to support that operation represents a serious problem - one that was often critical.

Cheez -- please take a look at Ruppenthal's Logistical Support of the Armies before accepting the misguided notion that the good ol' US Army had mountains of ammunition in the ETO, and commanders just wanted more and more when they already had more than enough to do the job.

Even better read Report of the General Board Study No. 58, Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery before you make comments about the US Army having sufficient supplies for "business as usual." Pay particular attention to the conclusion on page 79 -- artillery ammunition shortages contributed materially to lengthening the war.

Please don't confuse the wealth of production in the ZI with having sufficient supplies of critical items of artillery ammunition at the front. It just ain't so.

Duckbill

 

Nothing in the above changes what I've said. Whatever the US / Allied shortfalls in materials and resources were they were miniscule compared to what the Germans were suffering. The Allies had sufficent, even with shortfalls, to retain the initative for virtually the entire period from D-Day on in the ETO. The Germans managed to gain local initiative in the Ardennes for a matter of about a week, may two at most, at the cost of their last reserves.
That the US / Allies didn't get what they planned is hardly an indication of severe shortage. That lack of artillery rounds in the desired amount lengthened the war some is of no relevance since the war was still successfully won by the Allies.
Now, if shortages of materials and supplies had led to a lenghty stalemate or complete reversal of fortunes in the ETO I would agree that they made a difference. But that didn't happen.

 

Wow, I respectfully submit you are talking through your hat. (or out the other end)

When presented with sources to the contrary all you do is respond with historical generalities and vague platitudes, while pontificating that “it changes nothing.” Why do I hear Sgt. Shultz’s voice in my head when I hear these words? Anyway --

Your observation -- "That lack of artillery rounds in the desired amount lengthened the war some is of no relevance since the war was still successfully won by the Allies." – is specious. The actual quotation I provided clearly states: artillery ammunition shortages contributed materially to lengthening the war. See the difference?

Now I direct your attention to the conclusion or “resume” section of the report. Perhaps you can relate to what it has to say, especially since it speaks directly to your dismissive comment (above).

The fact that the campaign was successful must not [underlined in the original] be taken as proof that the supply of artillery ammunition was enough. There may be possibility for discussion as to what a proper day of supply should be, but the history of the campaign is incontrovertible proof that the amount furnished was not enough [underlined in the original].

And,

A precise quantitative evaluation of the effect of the inadequate ammunition supply cannot be made [actually it can now thanks to multiple regression analysis], but it is the opinion of this Headquarters [SHAEF] that a supply in general approximately 1/3 greater than that furnished could have saved many lives and shortened the war.(Report of the General Board, Ammunition Supply for Field Artillery, Study No. 58, p. 47.)

It just doesn't get any clearer than that.

You are very knowledgeable across a broad range of subjects, but US Army logistical operations during WWII is not one of them.

Duckbill

 

Lengthening the war is an irrelevancy. If it had actually altered the outcome by allowing the Germans to successfully make a counter offensive (ie., the Ardennes Offensive succeeds because of this in whole or part) then I would agree. But, that isn't the case. Your argument is (and the one your source(s) make) is that the war didn't go according to Allied plans. My counter is "So what?" When does a war ever go exactly according to plan?
The initiative between Germany and the Western Allies never shifted in favor of the Germans except during the opening phases of the Ardennes Offensive. They didn't shift in the German Mortain counteroffensive, they didn't shift from D-Day to the breakout at St. Lo, they didn't shift during Market-Garden.
On a strategic scale the shortage of ammunition did not significantly impact the outcome of the campaign. So, it lengthened it. That changes nothing of significance.
It is like arguing that the German 6th Army taking Stalingrad would have saved them from the Soviet counter offensive.

Obviously, it was regardless of the above. The Western Allies won. Artillery played a role in that victory and the use of it was sufficent to help ensure that success. To argue otherwise would be to take a position that US artillery assets could not perform their mission to a point where success was in question. That is not the case.

Okay, more ammunition would have resulted in fewer casualties and a shorter campaign. That is an irrelevancy. The US won, the Germans lost and the amount of artillery and other assets was adequite to ensure that outcome. It is nothing more than splitting hairs to argue that more would have been better.
Of course more would have been better! When is that not the case? The alternative case is demonstrated from the American Civil War. McCellan made the same argument. He needed more to win. The difference was that he would not fight until he had more. Montgomery to a degree makes that argument repeatedly in WW 2.
In point of fact, I could easily argue that waiting for more would have both resulted in more casualties and lengthened the war.

No, it doesn't.

 

Duckbill-

It would seem that while knowledgeable and wellspoken you always seem to resort to acting like the south end of a north bound horse. Why?

 

I love your post. It is the long-winded, pedantic equivalent of "don't confuse me with the facts."

According to your logic, logistics has nothing to do with winning the war. See what I did there? logic - logistics.

Well, you know what they say about people who study logistics and those who don't. It may be trite, but in this case, there is apparently some truth to the maxim.

By the way, do you have any sources to back up your position, or is it just that, an opinion without any basis in fact? No?

What, do you suppose our friend Hans Delbruck would have to say about holding firm to an opinion without benefit of sources to support it?

Duckbill

 

If you are not going to contribute to the discussion, please use PMs or VMs if you wish to insult me.

Duckbill

 

"If you are not going to contribute to the discussion, please use PMs or VMs if you wish to insult me."

I'll start with that.

But, your argument doesn't hold water. I would direct you to Martin VanCreveld Supplying War chapter 7 War of the Accountants et al. He basically makes the same argument I do and demolishes yours in the process.

When the Allies found themselves several months ahead of their scheduled advance rates per plan their supply train had a hard time keeping up. Their plan collided with reality and they had to compensate. This they did successfully. If they hadn't the campaign would have turned out either a draw or a loss.

What your source shows is that there were shortages. That is to be expected seeing as how the Allies advanced far faster than they expected, could not repair ports and the rail system and experianced more wasteage than they planned on. But, the dry facts of the Army Green Book series is hardly the whole picture.
If anything, the Western Allies even experiancing shortages were far more cautious than their German counterparts were earlier in the war. The German advance into Russia even in 1941 was done on a much tighter shoe string than the Allied advance across France in 1944. It is irrelevant that it cost the Allies more casualties just as it was for the Germans in 1941 in Russia. The difference was the Allies never pushed so hard that they went beyond their culmunation point (see Masters of War by Handel for example) like the Germans did in Russia. They did extend themselves as the Ardennes Offensive shows but not so much as to allow a complete loss and forcing the Allies to restart their campaign anew at some later date.

The original Allied plan called for them to be on the Seine River on D+90 and the German border on D+360. The Allied logistic planner's numbers turned out to be far to pessimestic. What the Allies could accomplish with what was on hand was several times what the planners thought they could.
I think both Delbruck, Engels (Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army) or. Dodge (Hannibal) would agree much like Molkte or Napolean that plans rarely survive contact with the enemy. The Allies won in spite of logistical difficulties in part because their logistical difficulties were not as significant as the logisticians thought they would be.

 

It would seem that the term "shortages" can be fairly tricky when considering that there are relative shortages (when compared to your adversary), absolute shortages (dont have anything) and shortages as defined by one's doctrine (which may not be a shortage to some, but severe to others). The term is obviously subjective.

 

Gentlemen....

I'm going to steer us back to the subject of the thread- Armor.

Having considered the previous posters, I'd like to go on record and state, from my lofty perch on the first available soap-box...(Ahem!)


A tank is, in the end just a piece of equipment.

Ergo, it is only as good as the person/persons using it.

Look what happened to Manteufel's armor in 1944....immobilized for lack of petrol and abandoned. A lot of this type of discussion tends to focus purely on the technical side, and ignores completely the human element in assessing what exactly was the "best" tank of the war.

The Germans would seem to have the edge here, hand picking their tank crews as they did, and schooling them with time for gunnery practice and other training, to increase the likelyhood of them advancing from one engagement to the next intact, and with another "accoutrement" drawn from the motor pool.

I maintain that a well crewed tank will have the maximum chance of surviving an engagement even in a technically inferior machine. For it is just a machine, and it's perofrmance is highly dependant on the way in which it is used. The "Elephant" is the classic example here, suffering losses out of proportion to the numbers committed when used in a role they were unsuited for, but very deadly when used in a fashion that maximized the strengths of this particular piece of equipment. This is a product of TRAINING of the servicemen that are to use it in anger, not some inherent "superiority" that is somehow present in the design.

So, evaluating the "best tank", in my humble view, is really describing which country had the best overall training programme to turn out a supply of people to handle this weapon in a way that produced the best results.

 

A few other things this ignores which are pretty important. The crew does not effect whether a tank requires a high degree of maintenance and whether this maintenance can be performed easily or not. Time on the battlefield is important; a tank which spends an inordinate amount of time in repair or requires frequent maintenance is less capable of doping the job its side needs it to do. A gas guzzling tank also becomes a logistical handicap. A tank which is too slow or manuevers badly will not be as effective as one that does not. The Panther was considered nearly blind when buttoned up, a factor which allowed allied tanks to flank it and fire on it in many cases.

Lastly, and very importantly, in a protracted war like WWII, a weapon like a tank must be produceable in numbers, quickly and at a reasonable cost. Notice that the allies had two tanks that were produced in excess of 40,000 pieces while the Germans couldn't come close to these numbers. I think the technical aspect is critical (especially because it lets me easily rate a thinner armored, lesser gunned tank as superior.)

 

Ahh...no. I will contribute how I want, where I want and when I want without restriction from you.

If you wish to contribute to my thread could you stay on topic and do your best to be polite. Polite means not trying to pick fights, no snide comments or attempts at ridicule.

Thank you for playing.