How we come to know what we know

Irrelevant, even with making the considerable leap of faith in assuming the numbers are statistically valid. The unavoidable fact remains that American tanks "targeted" hostile tanks on the battlefields of Europe as part of Armored Force doctrine and out of practical necessity.

Duckbill

 

Where did did Black6 claim he had figures? Perhaps I missed it.

Duckbill

 

I was more or less isolating tanks lost in combat, not mechanical breakdowns or those abandoned/captured/blown up by crew after the breakout. The German loss column becomes very quickly bloated once the Allied Air Forces blew a hole in German lines enabling the Allied breakout and their position was completely compromised. If a German tank was disabled in combat and was out of action during the time period in question then it most certainly counts. In a similiar vein I would offer that Allied aircraft lost in combat during the Battle of France in 1940 are fair game for analysis of combat effectiveness against Luftwaffe losses in the same period, but not those abandoned, destroyed by crews or captured by advancing German ground units.

Yes, can you suggest a source? I have Jentz and there is data for German crews, but I'd like a good authoritative source for Allied crew casualties.

Fair enough and I do the same, however there's more than a few that use the same tactic to bait. Sorry for the poor choice of words.

 

I know they did.
I confirmed I knew so by posting data that confirmed the % of such targets.
Though no specific ETO figure is given the African figure of 24% is given as the highest %. Thus the ETO figure must be less than 24%.
The aerage % for all theatres was 14%.


So we have the obvious fact that the Sherman was not optimised for tank v tank duels.
As tanks were not its main adversary then surely the decision not to make this role its prime objective was vindicated by events?
Seems pretty straightforward to me.

Their is no data for German tank crew casualties that I know of. The only way to get them is to go through the detailed Unit Histories (mainly Tiger Units) and match the losses to known tank losses. Very time consuming and not for the faint hearted Apart from a superficial glance I have not sunk that far-yet!

Richard Anderson gives the US Armour and Cavalry crew losses here:

Axis History Forum • View topic - Sherman Tank Losses



The actual Army totals, from the Adjutant Generals Final Report are:

Total Battle Casualties - 936,259
Total Deaths - 234,874
Total KIA - 198,856 (includes KIA while captured and MIA declared dead)
DOW - 26,762
Died of other causes - 9,256 (while captured or missing)
Captured, returned to military control - 111,426
WIA, not died - 589,959

Of those Armored Force losses were:
Total Battle Casualties - 6827
Total Deaths - 1,581
Total KIA - 1,407
DOW - 167
Other deaths - 7
Captured, returned to military control - 414
WIA, not died - 4,832

Of those Cavalry losses were:
Total Battle Casualties - 21,703
Total Deaths - 5,135
Total KIA - 3,963
DOW - 913
Other deaths - 259
Captured, returned to military control - 1,851
WIA, not died - 14,717

Of those Infantry losses were:
Total Battle Casualties - 661,059
Total Deaths - 142,962
Total KIA - 120,111
DOW - 19,799
Other causes - 3,052
Captured, not returned to military control - 52,299
WIA, not died - 465,798


Note that in the first post in the AHF the claim is made (in relation to Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry)

the rate of loss of Shermans is really staggering, especially so in Hill's book.

'Hill's book' is a reference to a book by Stuart Hill's about his Regiment.
By Tank into Normandy: Amazon.co.uk: Stuart Hills: Books

The actual losses for SRY 1944-45 were:

2 Sherman I
6 Sherman Ic
14 Sherman IIDD
34 Sherman III
2 Sherman V
1 Sherman Vc
1 Stuart III
2 Stuart VI

A total of 62 from a start of 80 tanks (60 M4/10 M3)

Clearly the losses were not 'staggering' and it illustrates how overblown the claims about Allied tank losses have become.

And as we have people here dropping names all over the place to show their range of contacts can I add I was in touch with Stuart before his death and was able to provide him (and the Regimental Association) with footage of a Tiger they had captured.
They were able to put names to the men shown on the film for me. I have met/and dealt with a good number of UK authors and tank crewmen in my time.

The 'breakdown/ran out of fuel numbers for the Germans are often used as if they mean German tanks were so hard to knock out that they broke down first. Not so. The breakdown rates for German and Allied tanks were much the same. The difference being that an Allied tank could be repaired. A German tank could not and was left behind. This same tank, IF IT WAS FIXED AND PUT BACK INTO COMBAT would have eventualy been knocked out. It was the breakdown that saved it from being penetrated NOT the fact it was superior.
I love the German histories where you can read such gems as :

Today we went into action. We knocked out 50 Allied tanks but only lost 10 of our panzers. 25 of our tanks were so badly damaged they had to be abandoned and 15 so shot up they were sent back to Germany for repair. A further 20 will need a month in repair before they are fit for action but we showed we can easily get a 5:1 kill ratio!

Silly I know but not that far from reality.

 

Not necessarily. The average relative percentages are a function of the total number of theaters of operation reported in the study. I would also point out that the putative 14% figure for the ETO amounts to a much higher total number when compared to that of N. Africa. That is to say, 14% of a population totaling in the many thousands produces a much larger result than 24% of a population totaling mere hundreds.

There also remains the question of the sampling technique for the study. GIGO.

If the author does not report the specific percentages for the other theaters of operation we must ask ourselves -- why? After all, ink is cheap, and percentages are easily calculated. Why did the author not report the percentages for the ETO? It was by far the single largest theater of operations, and the bulk of American armor, including all armored divisions, was committed there. This omission represents an unmistakable, prima fascia flaw in the study.

Duckbill

 

Duckbill wrote:

Simple, the M1 Abrams was developed during the cold war. The west had no hope of building the numbers of tanks that could be and were fielded by the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, they couldn't hope to field armored vehicle crewmen in the numbers the Soviet bloc countries could. The most likely scenario would be a defensive engagement against a numerically superior force. Strategy was to fight a holding action until reinforcements could be flown into theatre and married up with prepositioned equipment. Lethality, protection, speed, maneuverability, reliability and crew survival were the prime concerns. Unit cost and fuel economy became secondary considerations. We went with fewer, extremely well protected vehicles, with a powerful gun and advanced fire control system, one that could fire and move at the same time,effectively. We went with highly trained, highly proficient tankers (think NTC) because that was our only option. This is similar to the decision that the Germans made. Even though we had the best tank and tankers, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact had capable vehicles in such numbers that neither side enjoyed a clear advantage, and this balance maintained the status quo until the Soviet Union started to crumble.

Black6 wrote:

This is actually a very good analogy when comparing to the Sherman. In 2003 when the M1025 war first deployed in Iraq during the "march up" the humvee mounting a TOW, M2, M240 or Mk19 was perfectly capable of doing the job assigned. It's mobility, firepower and dependability more than off-set it's lack of armor. Later when IED's became the weapon of choice for the insurgency, troops added field expediant armor and the military started to field uparmor kits, the threat was countered. The enemy started deploying more powerful IED's and became more effective, the U.S. military deployed M-1114 uparmored humvee's, electronic and physical measures to counter the threat. The insurgents deployed more sophisticated more, powerful IED's to include EFP's (explosively formed penetrator). Similarly, in WWII in the weapon vs protection race, greater protection led to increased caliber, improved ammunition and/or higher velocity guns. One of the greatest improvements was in shaped charge weapons that enabled an individual soldier to kill most AFV's. Back to the modern example, the military, realizing the humvee couldn't continue to be upgraded to meet the threat, developed the MRAP. While this provided greater protection to the soldiers/Marines it also cut down on mobility because of the vehicle's size and weight, not as critical in SASO operations in an area with numerous large urban areas as the protection factor provided. In Afghanistan most operations take place in rural areas with very primative infrastructure. While the MRAP Cougar provides great protection against IED's it has poor off road performance and it's great weight restricts areas it can operate in. It's high center of gravity also leads to an unexpected consequence, when operating in rough terrain or on unimproved roads and bridges, it presents a significant rollover hazard. The incident rate for this type accident and it's associated injuries and deaths, has led to the development of another vehicle. The MRAP Cougar has become in Black6's words "inadequate/obsolete". Currently the Marine Corps will no longer deploy MRAP's to Afghanistan but is now deploying M-ATV's.

I don't believe that's what JBark meant. I think what he was trying to say was, that the nature of the German defenses in the hedgerow country around Normandy was such that the allies were forced to adopt tactics that were not optimal for the Sherman's strengths. This is what led to the high loss rate. Had the roles been reversed, I'd wager that the "superior" Tiger and Panther would have experienced extremely high loss rates because of the nature of the fighting required by the terrain and defenses. While the Tiger's heavy armor would have made it more survivable, it would not have been immune and the engagement ranges would have negated much of the advantages it's main gun enjoyed. The Panther would have likewise lost much of it's main guns range advantage, it's inferior HE capability would have been a serious handicap and it's weak flank and rear armor would have made it a "death trap". Finally, the losses suffered would have had greater effect upon the ultimate outcome of the battle because there wouldn't have been the vehicles to replace the losses taken. Germany probably wouldn't have achieved the breakout because their tank losses couldn't have been made good and in the unlikely event that they had, mechanical breakdowns would have halted the advance.

 

You can if you want. I think the rest of us can make our own minds up about the reports veracity.

As is internet quibbling

Here is the acknowledgement page.


Page 1 and 2 of the 9 pages listing the Allied Armoured Units studied:



and pages 1and 2 of the 7 pages listing documents consulted.




I think the viewer can decide for himself if they think the authors of Technical Memorandum ORT-T-117 got it wrong.

 

This picture is from the oldest son's 2006-07 Iraq tour. The vehicle is an up armored humvee, it was hit by an anti-tank mine, none of the passengers were injured. Hit by an explosive device designed to take out a tank and the crew compartment is completely intact. Not exactly as frail as Black6 stated.

 

Actually, a discriminating "viewer" will note there is nothing given about the sampling technique utilized by the author, and come to the conclusion that the results are open to question.

Additionally, the bibliography implies the data was gleaned from a large number of official and unofficial publications. In short, a survey was conducted, and data assembled regardless of the reliability of the source material. This problem is seen in other ORO reports.

They often contain valuable information, but it has to be sifted, wheat from chaff so to speak. A more recent ORO study examined artillery expenditures, but the model was flawed by co-mingling data from different armies operating under diverse circumstances. Even the author admitted as much in his conclusions. His honesty and integrity were commendable.

You appear to be laboring under the misconception that producing images taken from a document containing lots and lots of data is prima fascia evidence of its validity and reliability. It is not. You might succeed in impressing those who are unfamiliar with such displays, but it remains that those who are more discerning will view them as something less than absolute proof.

Duckbill

 

Citing another discussion forum as a source of information is a questionable practice at best, even if it is an excellent forum like AHF. I'll bet I can find another discussion forum with different numbers. If I then post a link to that forum, it will carry the same weight as yours.

Duckbill

 

Much like your recent attempt to establish sandbagging a Sherman helped protect against hollow charge projectiles Your claim you talked to some Vets and they told you it worked.
If only we could aspire to such rigorous and tested methods! No mention that you
were working from a random sample covering a large number of units over many periods of time, interviewed them separately so they couldn't reinforce each other on the questions
Don't do as I do, do as I say I believe ?

Sorry, did you say something?

I know the pitfalls. Many years back an 'expert'was regaling us with stories how a buddy of his in Southern France took out some Tigers with heavy artillery. Claimed a shell went through a Tiger from front to rear taking the engine with it. When I pointed out this was impossible as there were no Tigers in the south the man took it hard. However since then he has comitted the story to print ( online ) and I noticed he has changed it from 'Tiger tank' to 'Panther tank' without even a word thanks to me either!

No misconceptions I know what you are up to. The above is just a long winded way of saying:

I can't say the data is wrong.
I cant say the conclusions are wrong.
I know nothing of the methods used to compile this report.
All my criticisms of its methods are pure speculation on my part.
I can not find a single report or document to contradict anything in this report.
I just like to argue and stir things up

Stir away, it don't bother me none.
The fact is the conclusion in ORO-T117 stand and are valid until such time as you show otherwise.

Refutation of this source is your responsiblity, not mine. Nor am I required to provide the author's sources for your examination.

Then do it. Stop whining and put something substantial in your posts.
Find me another version of Adjutant Generals Final Report
and we can see if you are correct.
Remember now another version of the report rather than random internet chatter.

 

"There you have it. Please do not attempt to explain this away as Eisenhower being “political” in his concerns over the shortcomings of the main armament of the M4 medium tank. Given the quotations I have provide, it just will not wash."

You provided quotations? I think you wrote a bunch of stuff and claim it was said. It would seem, by what you've said had happened, that someone told Ike something and he took steps to have it investigated. Do you know his frame of mind when he reacted to what was told to him? Does an alleged request for 90mm guns mean that the Sherman wasn't a good tank.

I mentioned that he requested of General White to make a comparison of US equipment to German equipment. 18 March 1945 he writes to Gen. White (commander of 2nd Armored Div.) and reuests the comparison, but to..."not take the time to make a general staff study....as I want to tell the truth about these matters to the War Department rather than to allow and misconceptions to prevail." March, 1945. When did that war end? He's not a politician?

 

Oral history is something quite different than quantitative history. The latter involves the rigorous application of statistical methods such as random sampling and multiple regression analysis. The former does not. In fact, when conducting oral interviews regarding a specific topic such as the efficacy of sandbags against shaped charges, random sampling is decidedly of no value whatsoever. Similarly, you would not ask a truck driver about the protection offered by sandbags, you would ask a tanker.

Off topic

As you may have noticed, there are some holes in your ORO. For example, the sampling technique has been brought into serious question. And by your own admission, there is no percentage for tank “targets” the ETO. This certainly raises legitimate questions regarding the reasons for the author’s omission of information from the very theater that experienced by far the largest commitment of armored forces by the Western Allies. Does he not explain this rather glaring omission?

Exactly, citing another discussion forum as the source for the official Adjutant General’s Final Report constitutes random internet chatter.

Duckbill

 

?

If it is all made up as you think, then why ask?

Ah, yes. Eisenhower sent identical letters to MG White and MG Rose (3d AD) on 18 March 1945. I have a copy. Here’s a few things Eisenhower wrote in those letters that you or your source left out.

My own experience in talking to our junior officers and enlisted men in armored formations is about as follows: Our men, in general, realized that the Sherman is not capable of standing up in a ding-dong, head-on fight with a Panther. Neither in gun power nor in armor is the present Sherman justified in undertaking such a contest…..

Eisenhower goes on to tell the two men that he wanted their responses in informal letters addressing the following: (a) Your own personal convictions about the quality of our tank equipment as compared to the German, …. (b) Your opinion as to the ability of the new T-23 [he almost certainly meant the T-26E3] with the 90mm gun, to meet the Panther on equal terms, and (c) A digest of the opinions of your tank commanders, drivers, gunners, and so on these general subjects.

Eisenhower added that he wished these letters to be marked “Personal.”

Do you happen to know what MG Rose said about the Sherman?

Duckbill

 

Really?

Are you sure?

Perhas you might be wrong?

For once?

Or twice?

 

You didn't have to wager. The Panzers made multiple counterattacks against the Allies and all of them ended very, very badly. It could be argued that the Germans adopted to the bocage fighting with far less success than the Allies.

Its a tad weird to ignore personnel losses in German armored units in Normandy when discussing the shortcomings of Allied tanks. After fighting for two months in ideal defensive terrain, German Panzer Regiments somehow suffered higher crew casualty rates in this one campaign than the accumulated crew casualty rates in the worst-off US tank battalion.

As for modern comparisons: Interestingly, during the Cold War, the Russians placed a premium on the mobility of their tanks, believed their primary AT weapon was their artillery, and the intended victims of their tanks were infantrymen, clerks, cooks and trucks. They loaded more HE and HE-Frag rounds than AP rounds for their guns.

Not to mention when the M-1 tank first deployed , its adversary, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, fielded T-64s and T-80s that were very well protected against M-1's 105mm gun at the frontal arc and had a bigger gun. The top three design priority of the M-1 in order of importance were battlefield surveillance systems, speed of target-acquisition, and crew survivability. I talked to Cold Warriors in the armor arm, and most of them said they had no intention of engaging Russian tanks up front. They were trained to outmaneuver the Reds, not to slug it out.

 

He favored the acceleration of the M26 program. However, according to the unofficial history of the 3rd AD, Gen. Rose also believed American tanks were superior to their German counterparts in fire control systems, turret traverse, motors and track life....

 

No pic showed up, but good info posted earlier. I didn't want to get too far off topic with details about Humvees, but I'm glad that someone understood where I was going with it. I guess not everyone on a WWII forum has a working knowledge of current trends...

edit- OK, pic came through now. Thats an 1114, not a 1025 and thats a big difference.

 

You seem to be great at saying such, but have yet to provide anything resembling said analysis. So far, just anecdotal references to books that agree with your position.

Oh, and picking fights and borderline insulting anyone who disagrees.

AND, the always-popular "answer everything with a rhetorical question so no one can really refute you" method of "debating".


But hey, other than that, I'm sure you've got great contributions forthcoming.

 

Black6 wrote:

Yes I'm aware that it's an M-1114 that's why I identified it as

The official nomenclature for the vehicle is M-1114 Up-Armored Armament Carrier the M1025 is armament carrier, basic armor, without winch.

As I stated your analogy was near perfect for the discussion on the Sherman. If one looks at how we progressed from the M-1025 through the various improvements in the Humvee line to the MRAP to the M-ATV during the current wars, we can understand how the Sherman and it's mission evolved. As I said, the M-1025 was a near perfect vehicle to execute "Maneuver warfare", the doctrine practiced by the US in the initial invasion of Iraq. M-1025's in CAAT teams engaged and defeated modern Iraqi armor (to include T-72 and T-80 tanks) on numerous occasions during the initial invasion. Just as the Sherman was near perfect when it appeared in north Africa at El Alamein in October 1942. It's armor protection was adequate for the main tanks and AT weapons it encountered. It's mechanical reliability and mobility made it excellent for for fighting in this AO. It's 75mm main gun was more than adequate to deal with the PzIII's and short barrelled 75mm PzIV's and it's HE capabilities were put to good use. The Sherman of WWII was a part of a bigger overall combined arms package just as the M-1025 was in the current wars. If you take out out the artillery, air support, tanks, Bradley's/LAV's/Stryker's/AAV's and infantry team the M-1025 would have proved inadequate as a stand alone weapons system. The enemy get's a vote, and just as in today's war the WWII German capabilities changed and improved. The Sherman evolved also, applique armor, wet ammo storage, the 76mm gun, the fitting of the T-23 turret, the mounting of the 17 pounder for the Firefly version, the M34 to M34a1 mantlet, the "Jumbo" version and on and on. Just as the Humvee series reached the limit of their cabability to be upgraded so did the Sherman and the M-26 just like the MRAP entered service but not all at once. The need to continue operations forced the M4/humvee to continue to serve after an improved follow on version became available. Both were still capable but not optimal.